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vPreface 
Most stuff from the 1920s sits in museums – the exception is the international tax 
regime 
The current international corporate tax regime for taxing the business proceeds of firms 
operates arbitrarily. The aggregates of the nation states’ international corporate tax systems 
seem to distort a global efficient allocation of resources. 
The current model of corporate taxation finds its origins in the 1920s. It well suited the 
economic realities of the early days of international trade and commerce; the times when 
international business primarily revolved around bulk trade and bricks-and-mortar industries. 
But those days are long gone. Globalization, European integration, the rise of multinational 
enterprises, e-commerce, and intangible assets have changed the world considerably. 
These developments have caused the model to operate inconsistently with the economic 
reality of today. Corporate taxation and economic reality are no longer aligned. The model is 
ill-suited to current market realities. As a result multinational business decisions are distorted 
by tax considerations. The arbitrage may work to the benefit or detriment of nationally and 
internationally active firms. It also seems to put pressure on nation state corporate tax 
revenue levels. This may lead to spill-over effects and welfare losses at the end of the day. 
Matters seem to worsen in today’s increasingly globalizing economy. 
The question arises as to whether a proper alternative for taxing multinationals can be 
modeled. How should business proceeds of multinationals be taxed? Can we create 
something that suits the nature of a global marketplace somewhat better? What would such 
an alternative tax system look like? How would it operate? 
This study seeks to set forth an alternative to the corporate taxation framework currently 
found in international taxation. The aim is to develop some building blocks for an optimal 
approach towards taxing the business proceeds of multinationals, i.e., a ‘corporate tax 2.0’. 
As a starting point the authority of currently applicable national, international, and European 
tax law are not necessarily accepted. Accordingly, applicable tax law serves illustrative rather 
than argumentative purposes in this research. 
There are many people I wish to thank. This dissertation would not have been completed 
without the support and help that I received during the process of preparing the manuscript. 
Some I should mention explicitly. 
First of all, I would like to extend heartfelt thanks to Professor emeritus Henk van Arendonk, 
our former Chair of the Tax Law Department of Erasmus University Rotterdam. Henk, thank 
you for opening the doors to the institute, allowing me to carry on the research that I had 
started earlier at Utrecht University but which I could unfortunately not finish there as Utrecht 
University had to close down the Tax Department for budgetary reasons in 2011. Thanks are 
due also to Professor Sigrid Hemels, our current Chair, for keeping the doors of the institute 
open, giving me the chance to keep up and extend my research activities at Erasmus 
University for the years to come. Many thanks must also go to Loyens & Loeff N.V., the law 
firm I have been working with since 2006, for its support as a ‘backstop’ in the times that 
university budget cuts endangered the financing of my research activities. I feel particularly 
indebted to Paul Simonis and Rob Cornelisse for their efforts in this respect; thank you Paul, 
and thank you Rob. I am also indebted to Foundation European Fiscal Studies, for its support; 
and particularly the foundation’s Chair in this respect, Professor Arnaud de Graaf. 
Furthermore, I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to my PhD supervisor, 
Professor Ton Stevens, for the hours spent on reading the draft manuscript and for taking the 
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time to discuss the observations and findings, particularly in the final stage of the research 
process. And Ton, thanks again for sharing your insight, allowing me to further simplify the 
advocated system mathematically in Chapter 6. I am also indebted to my former supervisor at 
Utrecht University, Geerten Michielse, for encouraging me to pursue the real argument rather 
than the authority argument to base my reasoning upon. Thanks Geerten for providing me the 
tool to widen the framework of my thinking. 
 
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the members of the plenary doctoral 
committee. A special thanks to the members of inner doctoral committee, Professors Henk 
Vording, Hans van Sonderen, and Arnaud de Graaf. Thank you for the time spent on reading 
the draft version of the manuscript, and for the valuable and insightful comments. You allowed 
me not only to sharpen my opinions but also enabled me to avoid some potential analytical 
pitfalls in the process. I would also like to thank the other members of the plenary doctoral 
committee, Professors Pasquale Pistone, Sigrid Hemels, Peter Kavelaars, and Reinout Kok. 
Thank you for your precious time, for reading the manuscript, and for your willingness to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction; ‘Sharing the Pie’ 
1.1 Introduction; the issue
1
 
1.1.1 The territorially restricted fiscal sovereignty in an era of globalization calls for 
an international tax regime 
We live in an era of globalization. An increasingly borderless global economy has emerged in 
which production factors almost effortlessly flow across country borders – particularly in the 
larger production regions. Domestic markets have gradually opened up, steadily evolving into 
a single worldwide marketplace.
2
 The resulting opening up of domestic markets, business 
opportunities and competition have created an environment in which profit maximization-
driven multinational enterprises have been able to thrive and to become the players 
dominating international trade and investment today.
3
 
 
Most nation states have facilitated these processes of cross-border market integration, as free 
and fair trade and competition are widely considered to foster economic growth, optimizing 
welfare and prosperity. The various trade agreements in place promoting free cross-border 
flows of production factors and products may be considered noteworthy examples in this 
respect. One of the most notable legal frameworks facilitating cross-border economic activity 
perhaps is that of the European Union. Within the context of the European Union, the Member 
States have created a legal, even an institutional framework, to facilitate both formally and 
substantively the integration of the Member States’ domestic markets into a single internal 
market without internal frontiers. 
 
While domestic markets have integrated and internationalized, the corporate tax systems of 
countries have essentially remained a domestic matter. The fiscal sovereignty of the nation 
state is a national affair. This also holds true within the European Union, where the 
competence to levy direct taxes has remained at the level of the individual Member States. 
The term fiscal sovereignty here refers to the sovereign right of a nation state to levy tax – 
i.e., the revenue side of fiscal policy – for the purpose of financing the public goods it provides 
to society – i.e., the expenditure side of fiscal policy.
4
 The fiscal sovereignty is a quintessential 
property of a nation state. It is the instrument through which it expresses its function of 
redistributing individual well-being to optimize the collective well-being of its population.
5
 
Without this power of the purse, a state cannot function; perhaps even be considered not to 
exist at all. 
 
Consequently, the corporate tax on the proceeds that multinationals derive from their cross-
border investments needs to be shared. Corporate tax revenues are to be divided between 
                                                     
1
 This chapter draws from and further builds on Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of 
Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy’, 38 Intertax 281 (2010). Some paragraphs have been drawn from Maarten 
F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law 
Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
2
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment, (2008), at 11. 
3
 See e.g., Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian 
Tax Journal 823, at 826 (2002), and Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-
Commerce and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 5-17. Abdallah and 
Murtuza refer to the changes in the way multinationals conduct international business, i.e., from the traditional way on 
a country-by-country basis to the adoption of new global business models such as e-commerce and shared services 
or intangible assets. 
4
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, Comparative Fiscal Federalism – Comparing the European Court of Justice and the 
US Supreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence (EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation) (2007), at 1. See also Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, ‘The Three Goals of Taxation’, 60 Tax Law Review 1 (2006-2007). Further to the revenue raising and 
wealth redistribution functions Avi-Yonah also recognizes a third function of taxation: taxation as a tool or instrument 
to steer taxpayer behavior. I understand the possibility of tax to be employed as an instrument to drive taxpayer 
decisions yet do not recognize it as something to be desired, at least not in corporate taxation. In my view, 
corporation taxes should operate neutrally. Hence, I see no room for an instrumental function in corporate taxation. 
See for some further analysis Chapter 2 of this study. 
5
 See Kevin Holmes, The Concept of Income – A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis (2001), at Chapters 1 and 2 and Victor 
Thuronyi, “The Concept of Income”, 46 Tax Law Review 45 (1990), at 45-105. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The 
Three Goals of Taxation’, 60 Tax Law Review 1 (2006-2007). See Chapter 5 of this study for some analysis of the 
concept of income in taxation. 
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nation states; tax burdens are to be distributed among corporate taxpayers. ‘Sharing the tax 
pie’.
6
 Nation states cannot neglect each other’s sovereign rights to levy tax. The right of nation 
states to tax business income is effectively limited to business proceeds derived within their 
geographic territories.
7
 
 
Accordingly, an allocation methodology is required to achieve this objective. A distributive 
code is needed, a model; an international tax regime.
8 
Theoretically, such a model could 
evolve as the end result of a process where the nation states involved mutually coordinate 
their tax systems – i.e., an equilibrium through tax coordination. Alternatively, such a model 
could be the outcome of a process where the nation states involved compete with one 
another in attracting and preserving economic activity within their territories at each other’s 
expense – i.e., equilibrium through tax competition. 
 
1.1.2 The current international tax regime was developed close to a century ago 
1.1.2.1 The regime’s purpose: geographically locating profits generated 
Under the current international tax regime, the nation states seeking to tax corporate income 
basically all try to geographically tie down a multinational firm and the profits it generates or 
the value it adds through any investments in the respective taxing state’s territories.
9
 For this 
purpose, all nation states have established a tax jurisdiction concept to geographically 
determine a firm’s economic presence and, accordingly, its taxable presence (‘nexus’). And 
all nation states have subsequently established a method to calculate the income the 
respective firm derives at that geographic location (‘allocation’); that is, to geographically 
attribute the profits of the firm to the territories of the respective taxing state who may 
subsequently effectively subject these profits to corporate tax. 
 
In essence the international corporate income and capital gains tax systems – hereinafter the 
international tax systems – of basically all modern democratic constitutional states share this 
objective. And basically all nation states worldwide to some extent utilize the same 
approaches to that end.
10
 By international tax system of a state I mean the aggregate of its 
national income and capital gains tax system and its network of double tax conventions. With 
respect to the Member States of the European Union these aggregates of domestic tax laws 
and double tax convention networks are placed within a framework of supranational European 
                                                     
6
 The reference to the ‘sharing of the tax pie’ has been taken from Nancy Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of 
International Income’, 29 Law and Policy in International Business 145 (1998), at 153. 
7
 See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The 
State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination, (1984) 228, at 230 referring to “the notion 
that jurisdictions are entitled to tax the value added within their borders including that by non-resident factors, that is 
to share in the income accruing to non-resident factors and earned by them within the geographical area.” See for a 
comparison Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), referring to Musgrave at 27. 
8
 The term ‘international tax regime’ has been taken from Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International 
Law; An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (2007), at Chapters 1 and 10. 
9
 See the Communiqué of the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Moscow of 19-20 
July 2013, at par. 18: “Profits should be taxed where functions driving the profits are performed and where value is 
created.” See also Arnaud de Graaf, Paul de Haan and Maarten de Wilde, ‘Fundamental Change in Countries’ 
Corporate Tax Framework Needed to Properly Address BEPS’, 42 Intertax 306 (2014), at 308. Further, see OECD, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013, at 20: “Assure that transfer pricing 
outcomes are in line with value creation,” and Yariv Brauner, ‘BEPS: An Interim Evaluation’, 6 World Tax Journal 10 
(2014), referring to that remark of the OECD at 32 and 38. At 38: “[f]or transfer pricing, the OECD has 
(unprecedently) produced what sounds like a principle: allocation of tax base according to value creation.” See also 
Peggy. B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State 
Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination, (1984) 228, at 228-246, Irene J.J. Burgers, 
‘Some Thoughts on Further Refinement of the Concept of Place of Effective Management for Tax Treaty Purposes’, 
35 Intertax 378 (2007), Brian J. Arnold, ‘Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits under Tax Treaties’, 57 
Bulletin for International Taxation 476 (2003) and Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent 
Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-280. On profit allocation, see 
OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010. For some analysis, see Danny Oosterhoff, ‘The True Importance of Significant 
People Functions’, 15 International Transfer Pricing Journal 68 (2008). 
10
 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapters 1, 4 
and 5. 
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Union law in scenarios falling within the scope of application of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 
 
1.1.2.2 The building blocks of a typical corporate tax 
 
Tax jurisdiction: nationality, domicile, and source 
 
The key attributes of the international tax systems of states are the following. To establish tax 
jurisdiction countries typically make use of taxation principles based on nationality, domicile, 
and source. These principles, respectively the ‘nationality principle’, the ‘residence principle’, 
and the ‘situs principle’ are used to identify the multinational firm’s economic presence within 
a country and to establish its taxable presence accordingly (‘nexus’). 
 
In corporate taxation, the nationality of corporate bodies is typically determined by reference 
to the company laws applicable in the countries governing the legal capacities of the legal 
entities involved.
11
 Corporate residence and source are generally determined by reference to 
the physical-geographical concepts of ‘place of effective management’ and ‘permanent 
establishment’ – i.e., with regards to the latter defined as the fixed place of business through 
which the taxpayer carries on its business activities. 
 
Limited tax liability, unlimited tax liability and juridical double tax relief 
 
The concepts of nationality, residence and situs not only constitute the basis for establishing 
tax jurisdiction, typically the respective corporate taxpayers’ scope of its liability to corporate 
taxation is subsequently also based on these concepts.
12
 By applying the principles of 
nationality and residence it is determined which taxpayers qualify as resident corporate 
taxpayers. Resident taxpayers generally are taxed on their worldwide corporate earnings – 
the ‘unlimited tax liability’. The application of the source principle results in the recognition of 
non-resident corporate taxpayers. Non-resident taxpayers are typically taxed on the corporate 
earnings that they realize within the territories of the respective taxing state – the ‘limited tax 
liability’. 
 
In general the state of residence ensures that foreign source income is not effectively taxed 
twice by providing double tax relief – the ‘elimination of double taxation’. The mechanisms 
commonly applied in practice are the ‘direct (ordinary) credit’ for foreign tax and the ‘base 
exemption’ for foreign income.
13
 The source state typically does not subject the foreign source 
income items of non-resident taxpayers to corporate taxation. These mechanisms effectively 
seek to ensure that business income is taxed only once. 
 
Separate entity approach for tax entity definition purposes 
 
The taxable entities in corporate taxation, the corporate taxpayers, are corporate bodies. 
Typical examples of taxable corporate bodies are publicly and privately held limited liability 
companies. Partnerships are generally regarded as transparent for tax purposes and each 
partner will be subject to corporate income tax or individual income tax for their share of the 
partnership’s income, unless an exception applies. Some countries consider limited liability 
                                                     
11
 To identify a corporation’s nationality typically two approaches taken may be distinguished, the incorporation seat 
system and the real seat system. Under an incorporation seat system a corporate entity’s legal capacities are 
governed by the company laws under which the respective entity has been incorporated. Under a real seat system a 
corporate entity’s legal capacities are governed by the company laws applicable in the jurisdiction in which the 
corporate body governing the respective entity is effectively situated. See for some further analysis Chapter 6 of this 
study. 
12
 The income taxation of individuals is left out of consideration in this study. The same holds for the 
(inter)relationships between a corporate income and capital gains tax on the one hand and an individual income and 
capital gains tax on the other. 
13
 The Netherlands’ international tax system makes use of an alternative double tax relief mechanism in the area of 
individual income taxation. The mechanism is commonly referred to in tax practice as a tax exemption with 
progression. It however conceptually operates as a credit mechanism. More specific, the relief mechanism provides 
for a credit that is equal to the amount of domestic tax that is attributable to foreign income. This double tax relief 
methodology is extensively explored in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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companies tax transparent and in some countries tax transparency is optional. Other 
countries treat partnerships or limited partnerships as corporate taxpayers. It differs greatly 
depending on the country involved. 
 
To identify the taxable entity for corporate taxation purposes it is often relevant whether the 
legal entity involved has legal personality – i.e., the capacity to own property and to conclude 
legal transactions –; whether its equity capital is divided into shares, whether the participant’s 
liability for the entity’s debts is limited, and whether the participant may publicly trade its 
corporate interest – i.e., without the consent of its fellow participants. If the answers to these 
questions are affirmative, the legal entity typically qualifies as a corporate body and its 
corporate tax liability subsequently follows on from this. However, in the end, clear lines often 
cannot be drawn. And it may be difficult to decide when exactly a corporate entity constitutes 
a corporate body and hence a taxpayer for corporation tax purposes. No legal paradigm 
exists in this area. 
 
Typically, the approach of subjecting corporate bodies to corporate taxation as separate 
taxable entities is followed regardless of whether the corporate bodies involved are part of a 
functionally integrated multinational firm. This is particularly true in cross-border 
environments. Notably, permanent establishments are hypothesized to be separate 
enterprises for profit allocation purposes, distinct from the taxable corporate body of which it 
legally forms part. The approach taken of taxing corporate bodies individually is generally 
referred to as the ‘(functionally) separate entity approach’, or the ‘classical system’ of 
corporate taxation. 
 
 Realized nominal return to equity for tax base definition purposes 
 
The taxable base in corporate taxation is typically defined by reference to a realization-based 
nominal return to equity standard.
14
 This holds true for the corporate tax systems of most 
countries. Again, save for some exceptions. A key feature of the nominal return to equity 
standard is the difference in deductibility for tax purposes of remunerations paid for the 
provision of the capital involved. The tax-deductibility depends on the question as to whether 
the means provided qualify as debt capital or equity capital for tax purposes. The 
remuneration paid for raising debt – interest – constitutes a tax-deductible item. The 
remuneration paid for raising equity capital does not; dividends generally are not tax-
deductible.
15
 
 
 Tax base allocation; separate accounting and arm’s length standard 
 
As regards the geographic division of the corporate tax base, the basic objective is to allocate 
corporate profits to the firm’s investment location. The allocation mechanism is built on legal 
constructs and fictions. The separate entity approach that is used to identify the taxable entity 
has the effect that legal transactions undertaken by taxable legal entities are recognized for 
tax allocation purposes, also when these transactions are undertaken within a multinational 
firm in a cross-border environment. As a result, cross-border legal transactions undertaken 
between affiliated corporate entities are recognized for tax base allocation purposes (intra-
firm inter-entity legal transactions). In cross-border environments even fictitious legal 
constructs may be recognized for this purpose. So-called internal dealings are constructed to 
geographically divide the profits of a single taxable corporate body between the permanent 
establishment and the head office (intra-firm intra-entity transfers). The approach of 
recognizing intra-firm modes of transfers for tax base division purposes is generally referred 
to as ‘separate accounting’ (‘SA’). 
 
                                                     
14
 See e.g., Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448, and Serena Fatica et al, ‘Taxation Papers; The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: 
Consequences and Solutions’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 2012:33. 
15
 See on this matter, e.g., The debt-equity conundrum, Cahiers de droit fiscal international vol. 97b, International 
Fiscal Association, Sdu Fiscale & Financiële Uitgevers, Amersfoort, The Netherlands, 2012, and Serena Fatica, 
Thomas Hemmelgarn, and Gaetan Nicodeme, Taxation Papers; The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: Consequences And 
Solutions, Working paper no. 33, July 2012, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union. 
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As intra-firm modes of transfers are recognized for corporate tax base division purposes, the 
proceeds from these intra-firm dealings need to be distributed amongst the affiliated taxable 
entities of the firm. These intra-firm transfers need to be priced. The transfer price is based on 
a fiction which is referred to as the ‘arm’s length principle’ or the ‘arm’s length standard’ 
(‘ALS’).
16
 A transfer price is established for intra-firm transactions and equivalent dealings as 
if the affiliated entities are third parties. In the end, the arm’s length transfer price is 
determined by reference to the physical-geographical concept of ‘significant people 
functions’.
17
 The objective of this concept is to ultimately allocate business income to the 
place where the individuals relevant to the business enterprise actually perform the business 
activities of the multinational firm.
18
 This approach is generally referred to and abbreviated as 
SA/ALS. 
 
Correction mechanisms; group regimes 
 
In the event that the corporate income allocated does not correspond to economic realities or 
is otherwise considered inappropriate by the taxing states involved, various correction 
mechanisms have been put in place. Examples of such correction mechanisms are ‘tax-
consolidation regimes’, or ‘profit-pooling regimes’ for groups of affiliated companies to 
appreciate the reality of the firm to constitute a single economic entity. These regimes regard 
the firm as a single unit, regardless of its legal organization. These tax-grouping regimes 
however typically do not apply across the tax-border of the respective taxing jurisdiction. 
Other common examples of correction mechanisms seeking to adjust the effects of the 
chosen system to appreciate economic realities are the so-called economic double tax relief 
mechanisms such as ‘indirect credit regimes’ and ‘participation exemption regimes’. These 
mechanisms and regimes apply with respect to proceeds from intra-firm or inter-firm equity 
interests, such as dividends and capital gains on shareholding disposals. The purpose of 
these mechanisms is to mitigate the economic double taxation that the classical system of 
corporate taxation initiates.  
 
Correction mechanisms; anti-abuse regimes 
 
Furthermore, one may also think of the anti-abuse measures typically used by high-tax 
jurisdictions to counter the artificial shifting of corporate profits by multinationals to low tax 
jurisdictions – ‘sticks regimes’. These anti-abuse measures commonly apply to tax-recognized 
income streams involving intra-group distributions of financial resources or intellectual 
property lacking underlying economic substance, That is because these resources are 
internationally mobile and easily transferred legally within a multinational group of affiliated 
corporate bodies. Furthermore, intra-firm income streams are generally tax-deductible at the 
level of the payee group company in the country in which real investment takes place. 
 
The anti-abuse measures may be of a general non-targeted nature and operate as such. 
They typically apply irrespective of legal arrangements and firm resources utilized for tax 
avoidance purposes. Examples of general anti-abuse mechanisms include the concept of 
‘fraus legis’ that applies in various countries, and the abuse of law doctrine in place, e.g., 
under European Union law. These measures seek to counter artificial legal arrangements set 
up to avoid tax. For instance, tax-deductions, source tax reductions or tax shelters sought 
under such an artificial arrangement may be disregarded in the investment country by 
substituting the inter-affiliate legal transaction for corporate tax purposes and by the tax effect 
as sought under the legislative tax act’s object and purpose. 
                                                     
16
 The arm’s length principle is a fiction as it assumes that the intra-group transfer price is set as if the affiliates are 
unrelated (i.e. third parties). However, the economic reality is that the activities take place within the multinational (‘in-
house’). The decision to keep the activities in-house is based on economic considerations. This reality is ignored 
under the arm’s length principle. See for some analysis Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global 
Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286, Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case 
for Unitary Taxation of International Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201 (2008), at 201-215, and 
Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for 
Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 103-111. This issue is dealt with 
extensively in Chapter 6 of this study. 
17
 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010. 
18
 See for extensive analyses Chapter 6 of this study. 
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Anti-abuse measures may also be designed to apply in certain specific cases. These 
measures have in common that they seek to ensure single taxation in line with economic 
realities in the country in which the multinational firm has actually invested. Examples of such 
targeted anti-abuse measures are ‘subject-to-tax clauses’ and ‘switch over from exemption to 
credit mechanisms’. These typically apply where corporate taxpayers derive income sourced 
in foreign tax jurisdictions who subject these proceeds to low or no taxation. A second 
example is the use of anti-deferral legislation (‘controlled foreign company’, or ‘CFC’). The 
CFC rules apply to situations in which passive income is sheltered in controlled foreign 
subsidiary companies that are subject to low or no taxation in their countries of tax residence. 
A third example is the use of interest deduction limitations, such as ‘earnings stripping’ and 
other ‘thin-capitalization measures’. These measures apply where corporate taxpayers take 
out intra-group or other loans producing tax-deductible interest payments to levels that are 
considered inappropriate by the respective tax jurisdictions involved (‘base erosion’). 
Furthermore, one may think of the concepts of economic and beneficial ownership ignoring 
legal realities for corporate tax purposes in certain specific cases – the ‘substance over form 
approach’. These measures may apply where corporate taxpayers seek to divert income 
streams through controlled intermediate subsidiaries, so-called ‘conduits’, to benefit from 
source tax rate deductions available under the treaty convention networks of the country of 
the conduit’s tax residence – ‘tax treaty shopping’.
19
 
 
Harmful tax measures 
 
At the other end of these anti-abuse measures lie the beneficial tax regimes that are typically 
used by low-tax jurisdictions – ‘tax havens’ – to artificially attract corporate profits to their 
jurisdictions – ‘carrots regimes’.
20
 Low or no-tax jurisdictions may make use of measures 
under which intra-firm corporate activities lacking economic substance receive a beneficial tax 
treatment persuading multinationals to artificially shelter corporate profits in their territories. 
These measures basically have in common that the aforementioned intra-firm income 
streams remain untaxed at the level of the recipient group company situated in the respective 
no or low-taxing jurisdiction. 
 
These tax shelters attracting corporate resources are typically utilized at the expense of the 
tax jurisdictions in which the actual investments have been made as the income streams 
generated are generally tax-deductible at the level of the payee group company but not taxed 
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 See on this matter, OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project; Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 
September 2014, OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 6: Preventing the 
granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances, 14 March 2014 – 9 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
2014, as well as International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 28-34, and, e.g., Paulus Merks, ‘Dividend Withholding Tax 
Planning Techniques: Part 1’, 39 Intertax 460 (2011, No. 10), at 460-470, and Paulus Merks, ‘Dividend Withholding 
Tax Planning Techniques: Part 2’, 39 Intertax 526 (2011, No. 11), at 526-533. Some of those source countries, a 
notable example of which is India, address the matter by introducing anti-abuse rules seeking to tax the capital gains 
derived on the disposals of the shareholdings held by the higher tier group entities in those interposed conduits. This 
practice attracts treaty interpretation issues as the host state involved makes use of a ‘look-through’ approach 
upwards in the corporate legal structure to tax the indirect corporate shareholder on the capital gain derived. As a 
general rule, however, under tax treaty law capital gains are taxable exclusively in the home state of the corporate 
investor. See on the matter Marc M. Levey, et al, ‘Vodafone: An Analysis under Internationally-Recognized Tax 
Principles’, 40 Intertax 477 (2012, No. 8/9), at 477-484. 
20
 See on this subject, e.g., OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, OECD, Paris, 1998, OECD, 
and OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Countering 
Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
16 September 2014. See on the matter also the Commission’s ‘December Package’, i.e., its communication to the 
European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax 
evasion’, (COM(2012) 722 final, its recommendation on aggressive tax planning (c(2012) 8806 final), and its 
recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good 
governance in tax matters (c(2012) 8805 final), which the Commission released on 6 December 2012. Further, see 
the Commission’s press release entitled ‘Clamping down on tax evasion and avoidance: Commission presents the 
way forward’ (IP/12/1325). The package followed up on the communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion including in 
relation to third countries (COM(2012) 351 final) of 27 June 2012. For some analysis and reading see Maarten F. de 
Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 
(2014), at 24-38. 
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in the hands of the recipient group company based in the low-tax jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
such practices are widely considered to constitute an inappropriate means for tax jurisdictions 
to compete with one another for the taxable proceeds from corporate investment. 
 
Under such ‘harmful tax measures’ or ‘predatory regimes’ intra-group distributions of financial 
resources or proceeds from intellectual property are typically subject to a low level of tax or no 
tax at all. These types of money flows are mobile and easily transferred legally within a group. 
Harmful tax regimes are often referred to in practice as ‘offshore regimes’, ‘group financing 
regimes’, ‘headquarter regimes’, ‘captive insurance regimes’, ‘flow-through regimes’, or 
‘intellectual property holding regimes’. Sometimes these regimes go hand in hand with 
taxpayer confidentiality mechanisms on the basis of which the low-tax jurisdictions involved 
do not disclose tax-relevant administrative and financial information to other jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, the availability of such beneficial regimes is often restricted to foreign investors. 
They are ‘ring-fenced’. Local investors are often ineligible to opt for their application. 
 
Tax jurisdictions sometimes decide to make use of harmful tax regimes to foster growth of 
their domestic economies. Tax jurisdictions may particularly resort to the use of tax shelters 
when their economic potential is very moderate given their limited size, remote geographic 
location, or lack of natural resources. 
 
Beneficial tax regimes 
 
Furthermore, some taxing jurisdictions also seek to compete for mobile actual investments 
and corporate profit by granting beneficial tax treatment to proceeds from investments in 
intellectual property, transportation, or production in their territories. The incentives that such 
‘production tax havens’ provide to such mobile direct investment activities are sometimes 
referred to as ‘tax holidays’ and ‘patent box regimes’.
21
 The incentives granted typically relate 
to certain types of direct investment proceeds, such as manufacturing or research and 
development (R&D) activities. 
 
‘Tax free zones’ or ‘low-taxed economic zones’ may be put in place where the countries 
involved seek to attract direct investments to certain pre-designated areas within their 
territories.
22
 The award of such tax incentives to attract mobile direct investment triggers tax 
competition and fiscal state aid issues that may even be considered illegal where European 
Union law applies.
23
 
 
 And finally the tax rate 
                                                     
21
 The term ‘production tax haven’ has been taken from Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and 
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1589. For explanation of the 
economic ‘raison d’etre’ of tax holidays, see Chris Doyle et al, ‘Taxation of Foreign Multinationals: A Sequential 
Bargaining Approach to Tax Holidays’, 1 International Tax and Public Finance 211 (1994, No. 3), at 211-225. See 
also the recent OECD briefs to G20: Part 1 of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on the impact of BEPS 
in Low Income Countries, OECD, Paris, July 2014, and Part 2 of a Report to G20 Development Working Group on 
the impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, OECD, Paris, August 2014. For an analysis of preferable corporation 
tax regimes in South East Asia and some suggestions forwarded to resolve the entailing tax competition issues 
through tax coordination at the level of the Association of South East Asian Nations, see Adrianto Dwi Nugroho, 
‘Tickets to Ride: The Race for Preferable CIT Regimes Towards ASEAN Economic Community’, 40 Intertax 531 
(2012, No. 10), at 531-539. On the recent spread of IP-boxes, see International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; 
Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014,at 21. For some 
analysis of whether public funds should support R&D activities, see Åsa Hansson et al, ‘Tax Incentives, Tax 
Expenditures Theories in R&D: The Case of Sweden’, 6 World Tax Journal 168 (2014), at 168-200. 
22
 See, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 
Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1588. 
23
 For some further elaboration, see Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the 
CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. See on the matter also Michel Aujean, 
‘Tax Competition and tax Planning: What Solution for the EU’, 23 EC Tax Review 62 (2014), at 62-63. Worth noting is 
that the European Commission views the patent box regime in place in the United Kingdom’s international tax system 
as harmful tax competition. See European Commission, Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation), UK – Patent 
Box, Room Document # 2 of 22 October 2013. It considers that ‘the advantages under the regime are granted even 
without any real activity and substantial economic presence in the Member State involved’. It further considers that 
‘the rules for profit determination do not adhere to internationally accepted principles.’ Moreover, the European 
Commission is currently in the process of assessing the Luxembourg ‘intellectual property tax regime’; European 
Commission, Press release, IP/14/309, Brussels, 24 March 2014. For some reading and analysis of the Luxembourg 
regime, see Frank van Kuijk, ‘The Luxembourg IP Tax Regime’, 39 Intertax 140 (2011, No. 3), at 140-145. 
11
10 
 
 
The corporate tax payable on the business income thus allocated is finally determined by 
applying the corporate tax rate to that taxable business income. This wraps-up the ‘tax-pie-
sharing’ process in international taxation. 
 
1.1.2.3 The success of the 1920s Compromise 
The basis for the current international tax regime was developed close to a century ago, back 
in the 1920s and is therefore commonly referred to as the ‘1920s Compromise’.
24
 In these 
early days of international taxation the League of Nations, as the ‘predecessor’ of the United 
Nations and the OECD, drafted the first Model Tax Conventions on Income and Capital. 
 
The 1920s Compromise was founded on best practices and political compromises, rather 
than principles. However, the outcome of the compromise adequately suited the economic 
realities of the early days of international taxation. International trade, for instance, consisted 
largely of bulk good trading the prices of which were set at the global commodity markets. 
The readily availability of global commodity prices enabled the application of the arm’s length 
principle to geographically divide corporate profit among affiliated corporate bodies and 
between permanent establishments and head offices in cross-border business scenarios. 
Furthermore, the successful engaging into business activities in those days required the 
establishing of a physical presence in the taxing jurisdiction to be able to service its local 
market. Firms needed to set up places of management, stores, factories, storage facilities and 
the like to serve the local customer. This may explain the decision to resort to a physical 
presence for tax jurisdiction purposes to determine the geographical source of the firm’s 
business income on the basis of the place of effective management and permanent 
establishment. 
 
The 1920s Compromise has been a tremendous success story. Virtually all current 
international tax systems of the democratic constitutional nation states in the world are based 
on it. Also, it is likely that the compromise will have a great impact on the direction in which 
international taxation will develop in the future or near future.
25
 
 
1.1.3 The international tax regime has become outdated and flawed 
1.1.3.1 The international tax regime has become outdated 
As said, the international tax regime that the 1920s Compromise has brought about was and 
is still based on practices and political compromise. Practice rather than principle directed the 
design of the international tax regime.  
 
Should we be bothered? Perhaps yes, as we pay a price. The aggregate of the international 
tax systems of states, the international tax regime, provides for a model that suited the 
economic realities of the early days, that is the times in which international business revolved 
around bulk trade and bricks-and-mortar industries. However, globalization, European 
integration, the rise of multinationals, e-commerce, and intangible assets have changed the 
world considerably. 
 
Internationalization has had its effects. The present international tax regime arbitrarily affects 
corporate tax burdens imposed on corporate investment proceeds and hence the corporate 
tax revenue levels.
26
 The current system distorts business decisions as corporate tax burdens 
differ by investment type, geographic location, financing, and the way in which the firm has 
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 See Peter Harris et al, International Commercial Tax (2010), at 19 and for some historical notes Sunita Jogarajan, 
‘Stamp, Seligman and the Drafting of the 1923 Experts’ Report on Double Taxation’, 5 World Tax Journal 368 (2013), 
at 368-392. 
25
 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, and OECD, Action 
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013. 
26
 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013. See also Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary 
Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at section 2.2.4. 
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legally organized its investments internally. Multinationals are typically subject to a differential 
corporate tax treatment dependent on the types of business activities they engage in or the 
question whether they finance their operations internally or externally with debt capital or 
equity capital. Furthermore, the tax treatment generally artificially differentiates between a 
firm’s legal organization of its business operations via a branch structure or a subsidiary 
structure.
27
 
 
1.1.3.2 The international tax regime has become to operate arbitrarily as a 
consequence 
As the effective corporate tax burdens imposed arbitrarily vary depending on the ways in 
which economic operators have arranged their affairs, corporate taxation affects business 
decisions. At the end of the day the corporate tax payable differs depending on the answers 
to questions such as ‘Do we sell our products through a physical store or a virtual web 
store?’; ‘Do we setup a branch or a subsidiary to service that market?’; ‘Do we structure our 
business by incorporating a taxable subsidiary company or shall we use a tax transparent 
partnership?’; and ‘Do we finance our business operations with external or intra-group debt or 
equity capital?’ Conceptually the answers to these questions should be of no relevance to the 
actual tax burden. But since they do, corporate taxation proves to be a distortive factor in the 
business process. 
 
Moreover, international tax systems typically subject economic operators to different 
corporate tax treatment dependent on whether business is carried on in a cross-border or a 
purely domestic context. For instance, countries may subject taxpayers to different tax 
burdens depending on their corporate nationality and corporate residence. This triggers direct 
discrimination issues and indirect discrimination issues; a nationality or residence should be 
of no relevance in determining the tax burden. A taxing country may also subject a taxpayer 
to a different tax burden depending on whether its income is generated within several tax 
jurisdictions or solely within a single tax jurisdiction. The tax burden imposed may differentiate 
dependent on the investment direction. The inbound or outbound movement of the respective 
investment often affects the tax burden that is imposed on the investment returns. This 
triggers jurisdiction entry restrictions issues and jurisdiction exit restrictions issues. 
 
The differentials in the tax treatment arising from the crossing of borders by investors and 
investments obviously affect the economic decisions of economic operators whether or not to 
cross the tax-border. Taxation also affects the business decision of an economic operator as 
to whether or not direct investment across the tax-border. Problems may, for instance, arise 
where cross-border tax grouping is not allowed while tax-groups may be formed within a 
single tax jurisdiction. Issues may also arise where foreign source losses may not be offset 
against domestic source profits while corporate bodies may setoff losses and profits derived 
from domestic sources only.
28
 
 
The arbitrary tax differentials in the international tax regime cause investment location 
distortions as they affect the geographic distribution of the production factors capital, labor 
and enterprise. In individual cases things may work out to the benefit or detriment of individual 
multinationals or tax administrations. Well-advised multinationals may even be able to change 
the jurisdictional allocation of their business income for tax purposes to their benefit without 
substantially altering their underlying investment. Through a clever legal structure of their 
business activities their taxable corporate profits may be artificially shifted to the 
comparatively lower tax jurisdiction (‘tax optimization’). Accordingly, multinationals may 
influence their effective average tax rates in the countries in which they are economically 
active. 
 
                                                     
27
 See e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 8. 
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It is no secret that statutory corporate tax rates and the effective tax burdens imposed on the 
profits of multinationals often do not align. As the process of globalization proceeds, an 
increasingly greater gap seems to emerge between statutory tax rates and effective tax 
burdens; sizeable parts of the multinationals’ global earnings may effectively escape 
corporate taxation as the current tax consultancy practice sometimes shows.
29
 Also, the 
arbitrary tax differentials may affect corporate tax revenues accordingly.
30
 
 
1.1.3.3 The international tax regime has become unfair 
The arbitrage in the international tax regime exerts great pressure on the international tax 
systems of states. Observed as a whole, it may be said that the aggregate of international tax 
systems of the states distorts the proper functioning of domestic markets, the internal market 
within the European Union and the emerging global market. Corporate taxation basically 
comes apart at all seams.
31
 This may be considered problematic, not only in terms of fairness 
but also in terms of the countries’ abilities to collect corporate tax revenues. 
 
It seems that the international tax regime can be employed for one’s own benefit if one knows 
its way around in the tax toolkit.
32
 Indeed, this could prove beneficial to multinational firms at 
micro-level. However, if observed from a macro-perspective the arbitrariness of the 
international tax regime may ultimately prove problematic for all parties involved, both for the 
taxpayers and for the taxing states. In the end, it is necessary to raise revenues through 
taxation to finance public expenditure. If countries encounter structural and perhaps even 
insurmountable difficulties in raising revenues from taxing the proceeds from cross-border 
business activities in the long run, it may even be impossible to uphold the welfare state; in 
the end the arbitrage may even result in welfare losses.
33
 Perhaps, everyone ends up paying 
the price of a flawed international tax regime at the end of the day. 
 
Several tax scholars have concluded that the model that resulted from the 1920s 
Compromise is poorly equipped nowadays to adequately capture the geographic location of 
business activities and business income for corporate tax purposes.
34
 Somewhere down the 
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 That is, although “it is difficult to reach solid conclusions about how much base erosion and profit shifting actually 
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road, the system has become outdated and flawed and arbitrary as a result. The international 
tax regime has become unfair. And, at the end of the day, we all pay the price for it. 
 
1.1.4 The distortions categorized: ‘obstacles’, ‘disparities’ and ‘inadequacies’ 
1.1.4.1 Distortions; the influence of taxation on corporate behavior 
The distortions in the international tax systems of states may be analytically categorized in a 
twofold manner, i.e., by distinguishing between the distortions that occur in relation to the 
allocation of tax among taxpayers on the one hand and the distortions that occur in relation to 
the allocation of tax between countries on the other. With the term ‘distortion’ I mean the 
influence of the international corporation tax systems of nation states on the manner in which 
multinationals actually and legally arrange their business affairs.
35
 
 
1.1.4.2 Arbitrary allocation of tax to taxpayers: ‘obstacles’ and ‘disparities’ 
First, distortions occur in relation to the allocation of tax to taxpayers. The tax burden on 
business income differs depending on whether or not the economic operator conducts its 
business activities in a cross-border environment. This difference is ultimately caused by the 
fact that fiscal sovereignty rests with the respective sovereign states. Effectively, there is little 
coordination between countries in tax law design. Today, there is no supranational body that 
is competent to coordinate the levy of direct taxes. This category of distortions may be divided 
into two subcategories: ‘obstacles’ and ‘disparities’.
36
 
 
‘Obstacles’ arise where the international tax systems of countries unilaterally treat cross-
border business activities differently from non-cross-border (i.e., domestic) business activities 
for tax purposes.
37
 These differences in tax treatment may hinder or promote cross-border 
investment relative to domestic investment by subjecting business proceeds to comparatively 
higher or lower tax burdens dependent on the location of the investor or its investment. The 
distortive different tax treatment is imposed by a nation state unilaterally. The difference in tax 
treatment of domestic and cross-border economic activity occurs within the tax system of a 
single state. Obstacles are a problem internal to the international tax system of a state. 
 
The obstacles in the international tax system of a country affect the decisions of economic 
operators in that they may wish to direct, redirect or locate themselves or their economic 
operations across-tax borders, since the tax burden imposed unilaterally by states may 
differentiate as a consequence of such a decision. The tax burden unilaterally imposed may 
be comparatively higher or lower relative to the equivalent domestic scenario. 
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In practice, obstacles are imposed by states when economic operators enter, locate 
investment or exit the domestic markets of these states (restrictions).
38
 Moreover, obstacles 
are imposed when countries tax economic operators differently depending on their nationality 
(‘direct discrimination’) or place of residence (‘indirect discrimination’). Due to this, 
internationally active economic operators see themselves hindered or favored when they 
move out of domestic markets, creating a tax bias relative to those staying at home. The 
obstacles imposed upon moving into or out of tax jurisdictions distort the functioning of the 
globalizing economy. Within the European Union, obstacles distort the functioning of the 
internal market without internal frontiers.
39
 When multinationals are confronted with obstacles 
they may either be unable to work their way around them, or make use of them to their benefit 
when arranging their business affairs (legally). European Union law seeks to remedy these 
types of distortions through the application of the fundamental freedoms. 
 
‘Disparities’ or ‘mismatches’ – these terms are considered to be synonymous in this research 
and are used interchangeably – arise where the international tax systems of states mutually 
diverge from one another. The distortive differences in the tax treatment of cross-border 
business activities relative to domestic business activities are not caused by states on a 
unilateral basis – as is the case with obstacles –, but find their origin in the parallel exercise of 
the fiscal sovereignty by the states concerned.
40
 Disparities are a multilateral non-
coordination issue.
41
 
 
Disparities result from mutual differences in a country’s definition of a taxable entity (‘who to 
tax?’), tax base (‘what to tax?’), its tax rates, or any differences in the application of the 
international tax principles of nationality, source, and residence. A disparity in taxable entities 
occurs where the respective states concerned treat legal entities differently for tax purposes. 
This produces so-called ‘hybrid entity mismatch’ issues.
42
 One country may consider an entity 
tax transparent, while the other does not. Examples of disparities in tax bases include 
differences involving the deductibility or non-deductibility of expenses, or mutual differences in 
depreciation schemes. Another example of such a disparity is a difference in the qualification 
and/or interpretation of facts and circumstances for corporate tax purposes; for example, one 
state may consider an income item taxable or deductible interest expense, while the other 
state considers it a non-deductible or exempt dividend distribution. This produces so-called 
hybrid income issues, ‘income mismatches’ or ‘timing mismatches’.
43
 Examples of disparities 
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mismatch issues. It suggests resolving the matter pragmatically by means of a two-step approach which makes 
reference to 1) a ‘primary linking rule’, denying a deduction at the level of the payer entity if the income item involved 
is not included in the taxable income of the recipient entity, and 2) a ‘secondary linking rule’ (or ‘defensive rule’), 
denying an exemption (i.e., including the income item in the taxable base) at the level of the recipient entity if the 
income item involved is tax-deductible at the level of the paying entity. Within the European Union, the Parent-
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found in the application of international tax principles include juridical or economic double 
taxation or the absence of taxation.
44
 One state looks at the source for the purposes of 
subsequently levying its corporate tax, while the other state looks at residence or nationality, 
or has an alternative interpretation of source, residence or nationality for its domestic 
corporate taxation purposes. Disparities occur when economic operators move across tax 
jurisdictions. This distorts the functioning of the globalizing economy and the internal market. 
Disparities hinder or promote cross-border investment dependent on facts and circumstances 
relative to domestic investment. That is, by subjecting cross-border business proceeds to 
comparatively higher or lower tax burdens relative to their domestic equivalents. 
 
Mismatches or disparities in the international tax regime affect the decisions of economic 
operators. They may wish to direct or redirect money flows or move to or move their 
operations into a different tax jurisdiction as the tax burden imposed by states in their mutual 
operation may differentiate as a consequence of such a decision. The tax burden imposed 
may be comparatively higher or lower relative to the domestic scenario. Mismatches may 
even entail economic double taxation and double non-taxation. 
 
In practice, multinationals are being accused of employing any disparities or mismatches in 
the corporate tax systems of countries to their benefit. That is, by using the mismatches in the 
international tax regime to reduce the overall effective tax burden on their business income 
without substantially altering their investments. It has been argued that this occurs, for 
instance, by making use of a so-called hybrid entity or hybrid income structures.
45
 In practice 
these are labeled ‘Hybrid Instruments’, ‘Hybrid Entities’, ‘Hybrid Transfers’, ‘Dual Residence 
Entities’, ‘(Double) Deduction/No Inclusion Transactions’, or ‘Foreign Tax Credit 
Transactions’.
46
 The common denominator of these ‘mismatch arrangements’ is that use is 
made of the disparities in the definition of taxable entity, tax base of a country or its tax base 
allocation mechanisms, or tax rates. 
 
1.1.4.3 Arbitrary allocation of tax among states: ‘inadequacies’ 
 
 ‘Inadequacies’; three categories 
 
Second, distortions occur in relation to the allocation of tax between countries. These are 
caused by the flaws in the international tax regime – the ‘inadequacies’. The model of the 
1920s Compromise is no longer adequate to allocate corporate tax in accordance with 
economic reality.
47
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Subsidiary Directive has recently been amended to adopt a similar approach in this area. Under the recent 
amendments, EU Member States are not allowed to grant the benefits of the directive to the parent company – i.e., 
the provision of an exemption on the intercompany dividends received – if the respective payment is tax-deductible at 
the level of the paying subsidiary company in the other EU Member State. The Member States are required to 
implement the changes to the directive into their domestic legislation as per ultimo 2015. 
44
 A clear-cut example of a disparity – i.e., the juridical double taxation of cross-border dividends due to a mutual 
divergence between international taxing principles used – can be found in Court of Justice, case C-128/08 
(Damseaux). See for comparison Article 293 of the former Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty). 
Article 293 EC Treaty has been repealed under the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 
45
 See OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the effects of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements (Recommendations for domestic laws), 19 March 2014 – 2 May 2014, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, 19 March 2014, OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 
2: Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements (Treaty Issues), 19 March 2014 – 2 May 2014, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, 2014, and OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project; Neutralising the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014, 
OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, OECD, Hybrid mismatch 
arrangements; Tax policy and compliance issues, OECD, Paris, 2012, and European Commission, Staff working 
paper, The internal market: factual examples of double non-taxation cases, Consultation document, Brussels, 
TAXUD D1 D(2012). See for some examples of tax planning arrangements under the Dutch international tax system, 
Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business income’, 
in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011), at section 3. 
46
 Ibidem, and see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to 
Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 8, and Tulio Rosembuj, 
‘Abusive Transactions on Financial Hybrids’, 39 Intertax 234 (2011), at 234-247. 
47
 See Arthur J. Cockfield, ‘The Law and Economics of Digital Taxation: Challenges to Traditional Tax Laws and 
Principles’, 56 Bulletin for International Taxation 606 (2002), at 606-619, Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize 
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The inadequacies in the international tax regime may be categorized into three groups by 
reference to the inadequacies in the: 
 
1. separate accounting concept, producing distortions and arbitrage in firm level 
decisions as regards the intra-firm legal organization of the business operations 
undertaken; 
2. realization-based return to equity tax base standard, producing distortions in firm level 
decisions as regards the financing of the business operations or marginal business 
operations undertaken, and; 
3. the methodologies used to geographically divide corporate profit, producing 
distortions in firm level decisions as regards the geographical location of the business 
operations – thereby initiating investment location distortions. 
 
 Inadequacy 1: separate entity approach 
 
First, as said, corporate entities are typically subject to corporation tax on an individual basis 
under the separate entity approach. This approach is generally upheld in the event that these 
taxable entities belong to an integrated group.
48
 However, in reality multinational groups of 
companies do not operate in a segregated manner. They operate in concert as a functionally 
integrated economic entity with a common objective of profit-optimization. 
 
This difference in tax treatment affects the legal organization of the firm, distorting the choice 
of legal form.
49
 The recognition of intra-firm legal transactions for tax purposes creates the 
possibility of arbitrage, i.e., ‘profit-shifting on paper’ through intra-group legal structures.
50
 
Separate accounting induces an incentive for multinationals to engage into the cross-border 
legal shifting of the firm’s resources to low or no-tax jurisdictions. This occurs, as said, for 
instance through ‘tax sheltering’, i.e., the intra-group legal shifting towards these jurisdictions 
of financial resources or intellectual property.
51
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 266 (2006) at 266-280, Dale Pinto, 
‘Exclusive Source or Residence-Based Taxation – Is a New and Simpler World Tax Order Possible?’, 61 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 277 (2007), at 277-291, Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: 
The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 
(2005), at 103-111, Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286, Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary Taxation of International 
Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201 (2008), at 201-215, Michael J. Graetz, ‘The David R. 
Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory 
Policies’, 54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001), at 261-336 and also Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a 
Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 
181. On transfer pricing, see Yariv Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for 
Transfer Pricing Purposes’, 28 Virginia Tax Review 81 (2008), see also Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound 
direct investment: economic principles and tax policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 
(2008), at 625-638. 
48
 See for a comparison Wolfgang Schön, ‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part II)’, 2 World 
Tax Journal 65 (2010), at 71. 
49
 See International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 13, as well as Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ's 
Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), at section 3. 
50
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 7: “it is well known that the SA 
methodology gives MNEs scope for strategic tax planning and tax avoidance, to the detriment of collection of public 
revenues. In particular, the current arm’s length-based system for multinational groups to shift taxable profits between 
each Member State provides possibilities for multinational groups to shift taxable profits between the different EU 
countries in which they operate (i.e., by strategically manipulating the internal transfer prices of their intra-group 
transactions or by altering the financial structure of the group members in order to minimize the groups’ overall tax 
liabilities) This causes tax-induced distortions to the international allocation of corporate tax bases across EU 
countries and is an additional reason for tax competition among national governments (further than the traditional tax 
competition for real investment), as identified by recent literature).” For an overview of tax planning techniques in the 
area of dividend taxation, see Paulus Merks, ‘Dividend Withholding Tax Planning Techniques: Part 1’, 39 Intertax 460 
(2011, No. 10), at 460-470, and Paulus Merks, ‘Dividend Withholding Tax Planning Techniques: Part 2’, 39 Intertax 
526 (2011, No. 11), at 526-533. 
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 See also Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the 
World’, 2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 313, who refers to “widespread evidence … that significant profits from 
FDI end up in tax havens of one kind or another where little real activity in fact occurs.” 
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Tools commonly used in this respect include setting up controlled legal entities that are 
recognized for tax purposes within such jurisdictions and subsequently arranging intra-group 
legal transactions to create tax-recognized income streams directed into those jurisdictions. 
This is established quite easily, as said, because of the mobile nature of these financial 
means or intangible resources and the absence of third-party conditions in controlled intra-
firm environments in which these transactions generally take place. Textbook profit shifting 
arrangements involve intra-group debt financing and intellectual property licensing. These 
arrangements typically generate tax-deductible interest and royalty payments in countries in 
which investments actually take place. 
 
 Inadequacy 2: nominal return to equity tax base standard 
 
Second, the taxable base of these corporate entities, as said, is typically defined in terms of a 
realization-based nominal return to equity standard.
52
 A key feature of this standard is that 
debt and equity financing are treated differently for tax purposes. The remuneration paid for 
taking out debt is generally tax-deductible at the level of the debtor. The reverse is generally 
true for the remuneration paid for taking up equity. However, economically these types of 
corporate financing are essentially the same. Both provide funding in return for a 
remuneration, with respect to which a certain level of economic risk is incurred. 
 
As a result debt financing us favored over equity financing for tax purposes. The different tax 
treatment is sometimes referred to as the ‘financing discrimination’ and affects financing 
decisions. This is particularly true for marginal investments, as financing decisions are widely 
known to respond to marginal effective tax rates.
53
 Since interest is generally deductible while 
dividend is not, the current tax system provides a distortive incentive to finance marginal 
investment with debt as the effective tax rate on a debt-financed marginal investment is nil, 
while the tax rate on the same marginal investment is infinitely high if financed with equity 
capital.
54
 Accordingly, the tax system incentivizes the financing of marginal investments with 
debt. 
 
 Inadequacy 3: profit division methodologies 
 
Third, as said, the taxable profit derived by the taxable entities involved is typically assigned 
to tax jurisdictions on the basis of legal and physical-geographical tax jurisdiction concepts. 
The tax base is allocated to countries by reference to the arm’s length standard. 
 
This approach reveals its flaws in the real world. One may think of the difficulties in assigning 
the income from cross-border e-commerce activities. The traditional physical-geographical 
permanent establishment concept does not cover a virtual web store as a website cannot be 
considered a fixed place of business through which the taxpayer’s business activities are 
carried on.
55
 It has been argued in the literature that the international tax regime completely 
fails to capture the digitization of the economy as a result of that.
56
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 See e.g., Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
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and the Cost of Capital’, 2 Journal of Public Economics 1 (1973), at 1-34. 
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Commentary on the Model Tax Convention on Article 5, OECD, Paris, 22 December 2000. 
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 See e.g. Lee A. Sheppard, ‘The Digital Economy and Permanent Establishment’, 70 Tax Notes International 297 
(22 April 2013), Charles McLure, Jr., ‘Alternatives to the concept of permanent establishment’, 1 CESifo Forum 10 
(2000), at 10-16, Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-280, and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic 
Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997). Avi-Yonah observes at 509 that the ‘single tax principle is 
 
19
18 
 
 
Moreover, multinationals may be able, for example, to shift business income to low-tax 
jurisdictions through strategically arranging the transfer prices relating to the intra-group 
trading of firm specific rent-yielding assets, such as intellectual property portfolios that provide 
unique monopoly rights. As there are no outside markets for trading these often valuable 
intangible assets, it is generally impossible to find comparable transactions to determine the 
transfer price for these interaffiliate transactions by reference to the arm’s length principle. 
This gives multinationals some room to reduce their overall tax burden by strategically 
arranging their intra-firm transfer prices.
57
 In addition to this, even the OECD’s ‘significant 
people functions’ concept is under some pressure in practice, for instance as a result of the 
increased mobility of labor. 
 
In practice, multinationals may be able to create some modest substance in low tax 
jurisdictions – for example by setting up intermediate holding companies, group financing 
companies, intellectual property holding companies, or captive insurance companies, which 
companies are subsequently managed by a few people who are actually working and present 
within that jurisdiction. This serves the purpose of the legal allocation of substantial parts of 
the respective multinational’s overall corporate earnings to that tax jurisdiction. The presence 
of some of the firm’s workers in the respective low-tax jurisdiction may accordingly be used to 
substantiate the tax base allocation for corporate tax purposes to that jurisdiction in any 
discussions with the tax authorities in the high tax jurisdictions in which the firm involved is 
active. 
 
Multinationals may also be able to discretionarily shift parts of their corporate profit to low-tax 
jurisdictions through so-called corporate conversion arrangements, commissionaires 
structures and principal-agent structures. In practice, multinational firms may be able to 
convert their fully fledged ‘distributor group companies’ and ‘manufacturer group companies’ 
in high tax jurisdictions – producing high profit level indicators in transfer pricing analyses – 
into low risk distributors and low risk manufacturers – producing low profit level indicators in 
transfer pricing analyses. The purpose of such conversions is to initiate a shift of the firm’s 
economic rents to a low tax jurisdiction in which the firm’s ‘principal group company’ is 
domiciled for tax purposes. The principal group company acts as the firm’s ‘entrepreneur’ for 
corporate tax allocation purposes, i.e., the group company to which the risks involving the 
firm’s business operations have been assigned legally, and on whose behalf its agents – the 
distributors and manufacturers – perform their low-risk, low-profit functions. The principal 
group company would accordingly be awarded the firm’s economic rents. 
 
This renders the international corporate tax base quite mobile since multinational firms have 
some discretionary power as to where to geographically locate the ‘entrepreneur’ for 
corporate tax purposes. In essence multinational firms can to setup shop in any tax 
jurisdictions of their choice. 
 
The consequence: arbitrary allocation of tax among states 
 
The consequence of these flaws in the international tax regime is that the tax burden imposed 
on business income depends on the question whether the economic operator performs its 
business activities in a cross-border context. Firms that operate in a cross-border 
environment have some leeway when it comes to assigning taxable corporate profit 
                                                                                                                                                        
undermined because e-commerce makes it much easier to earn income from cross-border transactions that is not 
subject to tax by any jurisdiction. The benefits principle is undermined because under current rules income from e-
commerce may not be taxable by the source jurisdiction’. For the recent OECD initiatives on this matter, see OECD, 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 1: Address the tax challenges of the digital 
economy, 24 March – 14 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 24 March 2014, and OECD, OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Addressing the tax challenges of the digital 
economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014. 
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 See for comparison Ruud A. de Mooij, ‘Will Corporate Income Taxation Survive?’, 153 De Economist 277 (2005), 
at 292, and e.g., Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated 
Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European 
Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 7-8. 
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geographically, whereas firms that operate in a single jurisdiction only do not have such 
leeway. 
 
Nevertheless, we must conceptually deal with a distortion in the way in which tax is allocated 
between states. The following thought experiment may explain this. Suppose that all 
international tax systems were identical. There would be no disparities or obstacles and the 
tax burden on both the cross-border and domestic business activities of economic operators 
would be exactly the same. In the event that the current profit building blocks would be 
applied as presently the case, the allocation of tax between states would still fail to be in 
accordance with economic reality. The legal and physical-geographical oriented concepts on 
which the formula is built would still prove inadequate to allocate the tax between states. Just 
think of the digitization of the economy and the impossibility of capturing the web store under 
the permanent establishment concept. Still no comparable transactions could be found to 
establish the arm’s length transfer price of the intra-firm transfer of unique intangibles within a 
multinational group of affiliated corporate entities. Since the concepts used in international 
taxation would continue to operate arbitrarily, the geographic division of corporate profit would 
remain arbitrary as well. 
 
1.2 The research question: ‘corporate tax 2.0?’ 
Should this arbitrary sharing of the tax pie under the current international tax regime be 
considered a problem? The answer to this question will of course depend on one’s personal 
views on the matter. Were things to be considered from a non-critical rationalistic view, one 
may reply by accepting the operation of the international tax regime as the status quo: ‘Things 
can only be considered wrong when labeled wrong on the basis of a legal statute. The law is 
the law. If this is how the tax law works there is no problem since legislative acts and 
conventions do not normatively question their own operation’. One may also answer the 
question with an ‘I do not care’, an emphatic ‘no’, or ‘perhaps’. One may just, in the absence 
of a line of argument, agree have different opinions on the matter. In my view, however, one 
could do better. 
 
As I see it, the arbitrage in the operation of the current international tax regime in today’s 
emerging global market is – or at least should be – considered problematic. My answer is 
therefore ‘yes’, as I find the arbitrage problematic and unfair. I will define the term ‘fairness’ in 
the chapter 2. In my view the international tax regime operates unfairly to the extent that it 
enables the careful circumvention of moral obligations to contribute to society through the 
clever arrangement of business affairs (legally) and be rewarded with a reduced tax burden. 
Why should the international tax regime allow a certain class of taxpayers to escape their tax 
obligations while others cannot? Why should equal economic circumstances be treated 
differently for tax purposes? I fail to see the justification for this. 
 
It necessarily follows from this that arguments or inferences derived from the current 
operation of the international tax regime – the status quo – pleading its fair operation would 
fall short as well. In my view, legal instruments should not be considered valid or fair by 
simply pointing out their existence and operation. There is no inherent moral truth in the 
international tax regime as it currently applies. Legal systems, including the international tax 
systems of nation states, are man-made intellectual achievements. They can be shaped, 
formed and altered to our wishes. If a rule or a legal regime is in place that does not function 
properly, I suggest to respond by starting to think of an alternative that does work. 
 
So, if an international tax regime has been established that operates arbitrarily, the response 
should be to start thinking of an alternative that would perhaps operate better. And since the 
problems in the international tax regime are the product of its own operation, one would need 
to look for external alternatives assuming it is acknowledged that an analytical issue in 
corporate taxation cannot be resolved within the same tax framework that created it.
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This requires conventional ‘tax-thinking’ to be set aside to explore unconventional alternatives 
for the current system. It is too easy to blame the big bad multinational for seeking to optimize 
its tax costs by cleverly structuring its business activities to benefit from the operation of the 
international tax regime. Profit-optimization is an essential objective of a multinational firm. It 
should not be forgotten that the nation states are the ones who designed the international tax 
regime. If they fail to properly tax multinationals, they should design something better. Indeed, 
“[t]he charge to tax must fairly fall within the words of the law and, if it cannot, then that is a 
question for the legislature”
59
” Fairness in corporate taxation is not a corporate responsibility; 
it is the responsibility of the nation states. 
 
This perhaps explains why the various commentators explore unconventional alternative 
means to share the international corporate tax pie; the corporate tax 2.0.
60
 And this may also 
explain the approaches taken within the European Union’s project to establish a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base – the CCCTB.
61
 The Commission’s proposal of 16 March 
2011 for a coordinated European Union-wide corporate tax essentially seeks to provide a 
comprehensive solution for the inequities and inefficiencies in the application of the twenty-
eight different corporate tax systems in the European Union.
 62-63
 Insofar as the division of the 
tax pie within the European Union is concerned, the CCCTB proposal, for instance, does 
away with the concept of separate accounting, differences in the definition of the tax base, 
and the arm’s length standard and replaces these by a harmonized tax base that is shared 
between the European Union Member States on the basis of a predetermined fixed formula 
and which tax base is subject to a European Union-wide corporation tax that is effectively 
levied from tax consolidated groups. 
 
This study seeks to do the same; an autonomous exploration of some alternative ways to 
share the international pie. This study therefore necessarily questions all the building blocks 
of the current international tax regime. 
 
Accordingly this study takes a ‘clean-slate-approach’. It is based on a single axiom only, 
namely the principle of equality. The concept of tax parity of economic equal circumstances 
underlying the concept of tax fairness as I understand it is the postulate that is the departure 
point of the reasoning in this study.
64
 The approach taken may be considered unconventional. 
Indeed, “[i]n fact, our whole tax system develops relatively conservatively. There is a strong 
preference to change by interpretation, through ‘massaging’ of rules and concepts, and 
almost a religious belief that old concepts must be good for new realities if we just stretched 
them in the right way.
65
 And indeed, as Brauner notes “[t]his reality resulted in an inefficient 
system.”
66
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This paves the way to put forward the research question that this study seeks to address: 
 
 
 
How should business proceeds of multinationals be taxed? 
 
 
How should we tax multinationals in a global market? How should we share the pie? Is it 
possible to think of something better than the current model? What would such an alternative 
model look like? How would such a corporation tax 2.0 operate? 
 
1.3 The approach taken to finding an answer 
1.3.1 Seeking a normative framework 
This question cannot be answered as easily as it is posed. The following remarks may 
therefore be worth making. I seek to answer the central questions by means of a qualitative 
analysis. The line of reasoning is essentially built on three steps which are addressed by 
reference to the following three sub-questions. The answer to these questions enables the 
lining-up of the building blocks of a corporation tax 2.0 in the final chapter, chapter seven: 
 
1. How should the notion of ‘fairness’ in corporate taxation be understood? 
2. How should the obstacles be removed? 
3. How should the disparities and adequacies be remedied? 
 
Before giving an overview of the outlines of the following chapters, it should be mentioned 
that the objective of this study is to tentatively forward suggestions for an ideal model to tax 
multinationals in a global market environment. It seeks the ‘ought’ rather than the ‘is’. The aim 
is to consistently put forward the real argument, rather than the argument of authority.  
 
All observations, arguments and conclusions in this study are the outcome of autonomous 
reasoning. The study does not resort to the existing domestic tax systems or the double tax 
convention networks in the current international tax regime as a normative benchmark. It does 
not adhere to or resort to authorities legal or otherwise as a stepping-stone for building the 
analysis. 
 
Indeed, various references are made to tax concepts and approaches in a variety of 
countries, tax conventions and model tax conventions, legislative acts, court rulings and 
doctrine. References are also made to the existing international principles of source, 
residence and nationality, as well as the existing economic policy concepts of capital and 
labor import neutrality and capital and labor export neutrality. But rather than to provide 
normative points of departure, all references to, borrowings from and analogous 
interpretations of the materials in the current tax model are included for the sake of 
convenience, or for explanatorily or illustrative purposes or otherwise worth addressing in 
support of the underlying theoretical analysis. 
 
The sole axiom appreciated in this study is the notion that equal economic circumstances 
should be treated equally for tax purposes. This study is the product of a deduction from the 
principle of equality as I understand it. To substantiate my reasoning I have sought to 
carefully and logically build the analysis. Where convenient, considered appropriate or for 
illustrative purposes, reference is made to the available legal materials, as well as studies and 
analyses in both law and economics. Where considered illustrative or necessary, numerical 
and formulaic examples have been developed autonomously or by analogue. Some 
occasional references are made to my personal observations as a practicing tax lawyer.  
 
This paper presents a qualitative analysis. No empirical research has been undertaken. I am 
a tax lawyer, and neither a trained economist nor a behavioral scientist. I am also not a 
statistical analyst. This study therefore does not provide in-depth empirical impact 
assessments explaining current economic or behavioral effects of the international tax regime 
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or forecasting future effects of any changes thereof. Any available literature will respectfully 
be referred to for that matter.
67
 Moreover, as no data exists on the effects of the theoretical 
system developed in this study, obviously no quantitative research thereof has been 
performed either. This paper, accordingly, is the outcome of a normative research, which 
integrates qualitative legal, philosophical, and economic analysis in an interdisciplinary 
manner, referring to empirical studies as an auxiliary. 
 
Furthermore, the study does not address the various practical hazards and issues of a 
potential implementation of any of the suggestions made. No consideration has been given to 
problems with drafting relevant legal texts or coping with transitional problems, nor to any 
political realities perhaps pointing in a different direction. Should the findings of this study ever 
be or considered to be implemented in the real world, to say the least one should consider the 
considerable practical hazards thereof. Just think of incorporating the concepts into legal 
texts, the transitional issues involved in their adoption, and the political views, willingness and 
consensus required to merely consider the adoption of the suggestions put forward in the 
following chapters. One may be prone to conclude that such a project is hopeless and throw 
in the towel, perhaps even beforehand. 
 
In sum, it is not my aim to provide a clear-cut, ready-to-use alternative international tax model, 
including draft legal texts in annexes, analyses on transitional issues and assessments of 
future behavioral effects. I merely seek to discover, through logic reasoning, some of the 
missing pieces of the current international tax jigsaw puzzle. In other words, to come up with 
an alternative framework of reference, a model of thought the purpose of which perhaps is to 
provide an analysis for future thinking and discussion. In the end my aim is to simply come up 
with some alternative ideas on the issue of how multinationals should be taxed in a global 
economic environment. 
 
1.3.2 Part II: Chapter 2 – Some thoughts on fairness in corporate taxation 
In Chapter 2 the first sub question, the question of how to understand the concept of ‘fairness’ 
in corporate taxation as I understand and interpret it is addressed. I have drawn inspiration 
from international tax theories and the objectives underlying the current legal framework of 
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the European Union. The chapter addresses the parameters of my notions of fairness in 
taxation as I boiled these down from my interpretation of the maxims of equity and economic 
efficiency as developed in international tax theory.
68
 
 
My basic argument is that fairness in corporate taxation is founded on the equality principle, 
conforming to the historically widely acknowledged notion of equal treatment before the law. 
Economic equal circumstances in se should be treated equally for tax purposes and unequal 
economic circumstances in se should be treated unequally insofar as circumstances are 
unequal. 
 
The normative requirement of tax parity in equal economic circumstances, should in my view 
be kept separate from the application of the relevant tax laws in a particular case as the tax 
effects in a certain case are tested against the benchmark of the notion of tax parity in equal 
circumstances – from which taxation is excluded as the subject of the analysis. The tax 
effects in a particular scenario should be separated analytically from the fairness concept as 
these tax effects constitute the ‘test object’ against which the equality principle is tested. This 
allows a normative analysis of the tax effects without the tax effects influencing the outcome 
of the test; much like the results of a numerical calculation do not affect the underlying 
mathematical rules directing those results. 
 
It can be deduced from the equality postulate that everyone in an economic relationship with 
a taxing state has the obligation to contribute to the financing of public goods from which one 
benefits in accordance with one’s means – ‘equity’.
69
 Production factors should be distributed 
on the basis of market mechanisms, without public interference or at least with as little public 
interference as possible – ‘economic efficiency’. Taxation should follow economic reality, 
rather than steering it. Taxation should, neither positively, nor negatively affect business 
decisions – i.e. tax neutrality, including the concept of neutrality of the legal form. 
 
These starting points then serve as the basis of a framework that is built in the following 
chapters addressing both the 1920s Compromise and the model I seek to develop in this 
study. An overview of the building blocks for this model is given in Chapter 7. Pivotal concepts 
include the concepts of ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’ 
autonomously developed in Chapter 3, the ‘theory of the firm’ derived from Coase in Chapter 
4, the ‘Schanz-Haig-Simons concept of income’
70
 in Chapter 5 and the quest for the location 
of the ‘true’ geographical source income based on a spectrum that includes the notions of 
origin and destination in Chapter 6. 
 
1.3.3 Part III: Chapter 3 – Towards a fair international tax regime; eliminating 
obstacles 
Chapter 3 addresses the second sub question, i.e., the question of how the obstacles in the 
current international tax systems of states should be eliminated. As said, countries currently 
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autonomously decide on the definition of a taxable entity and that of the taxable base, the tax 
rate to be applied, as well as the international tax principle employed to establish tax 
jurisdiction. 
 
The chapter conceptually builds on the assumption that fiscal sovereignty in corporate 
taxation rests with the nation state – i.e., as is currently the case. The presence of disparities 
or mismatches in the international tax regime is necessarily assumed. Given the fact of non-
coordination, the question arises as to how to achieve tax fairness within an international tax 
system of a state. What could or should nation states unilaterally do to eliminate the obstacles 
they unilaterally impose? 
 
Inspired by a melting pot of what I consider the best elements in existing theories, concepts 
and practices in international tax law, I put forward the argument that a nation state’s 
international tax system should be internally fair. This results in a concept that is referred to 
as ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’. 
 
For this purpose, the equality principle is explored similarly to the fundamental freedoms as 
applicable within the European Union and the interpretation of the principle of equality by the 
Court of Justice. The operation of European Union law in this area is considered to be of 
more help than the operation of the non-discrimination rules in the double tax conventions 
and human rights conventions currently in place. The non-discrimination rules in double tax 
conventions merely provide a bundle of non-discrimination rules to be appreciated by the 
source state, rather than a non-discrimination principle underlying the international tax system 
of the relevant country.
71
 The non-discrimination concepts in human rights conventions 
provide the countries involved wide margins of appreciation to differentiate in the tax 
treatment of residents and non-residents and the tax treatment of domestic and foreign 
investment. So these are considered not all too helpful in this area either. On the contrary, the 
fundamental freedoms in European Union law provide for an equality principle devoid of 
statutory limitations and appreciation margins. In my view, the freedoms provide the 
analytically soundest approach towards parity in tax treatment. The fundamental freedoms 
have the potential to drive our rethinking of the design of the international tax regime towards 
a full appreciation of the equality principle in corporate taxation. 
 
Moreover, the widely known tax policy concepts of capital and labor import neutrality and 
capital and labor export neutrality are scrutinized to demonstrate that tax neutrality is actually 
absent in these two concepts. Import neutrality promoting tax systems distort production 
factor exports; export neutrality promoting tax systems distort production factor imports. The 
same necessarily goes for double tax relief systems in any international tax systems that are 
based on these neutrality concepts. An alternative concept is developed that is referred to as 
‘production factor neutrality’. This neutrality concept holds water as it proves to promote tax 
neutrality in both inbound and outbound movements of the production factors capital, labor 
and enterprise. To my knowledge, this interpretation of the tax neutrality concept is original. 
 
The point is made that ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’ require the 
taxation of the worldwide business proceeds of firms that have nexus in a taxing state. To 
acknowledge the single tax principle this worldwide taxation should be combined with an 
equitable and neutral form of double tax relief. For that purpose, I adhere to the mechanism 
currently applied in the Netherlands’ international tax system: the ‘credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income’. This produces an approach where all countries involved tax 
the fraction of the worldwide income to which they are entitled: ‘taxing the fraction.’ 
 
Chapter 3 concludes by illustrating the non-distortive effects of the advocated fractional 
approach through numerical examples dealing with progressive tax rates, cross-border 
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losses, intra-firm modes of transfers and currency exchange rate movements. For this 
purpose I invite the reader to engage in a thought experiment applying identical international 
tax systems at both sides of the tax border and to analytically cancel out the effects of any 
disparities. The approach taken corresponds conceptually to the ‘internal consistency test’ in 
US constitutional law.
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1.3.4 Part IV: Chapters 4 through 6 – Towards a fair international tax regime; 
eliminating disparities adequately 
1.3.4.1 General remarks 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to formulating some answers to the question of how to 
adequately remedy any disparities in the international tax regime. These chapters basically 
build on the observation that the disparities or mismatches in the international tax regime can 
be removed through coordination. The distortions in the operation of the global market caused 
by the mutual divergences between the international tax systems of sovereign states may be 
resolved by coordinating the tax entity definitions, the tax base definitions and the tax base 
allocation methodologies. Basically the point is made is that coordinated international tax 
systems, by definition, are not disparate international tax systems. 
 
Chapters 4 through 6 build on the assumption that nation states may be willing to let go some 
of their sovereign rights in the area of direct taxation or are at least willing to coordinate their 
tax entities, tax bases and tax allocation methodologies to some extent. 
 
This should by no means be unattainable. The current international tax regime has 
characteristics that basically all corporate tax systems worldwide have in common; so some 
tax coordination already exists, but the building blocks of the international tax system operate 
inadequately. Moreover, the ideas for the coordination of the current model and the 
development an alternative model are not that new. Illustrative is the work that has been 
undertaken within the European Union that currently seeks to adopt a harmonized corporate 
tax system for European businesses. 
 
In the end, tax coordination is a matter of political willingness – nothing more and nothing less 
– and should be accordingly recognized for what it is.
73
 Indeed, “the case … turns largely on 
the question of whether our tax rules should follow the centripetal forces of an increasingly 
global economy or the centrifugal forces of politically sovereign states.”
74
 Hellerstein notes: 
“My sense is that the former will ultimately prevail over the latter…”
75
 
 
Let’s assume that there is a political will to arrive at some sort of coordinated tax system. This 
begs the question of how to design such a coordinated international tax regime. What would 
be a fair alternative for the current system? How should be the design of the tax entity for 
instance? How should the tax base be defined and geographically be divided among 
countries? 
 
If one were to coordinate and change the international tax regime coherently, why not change 
things for the better, change the scenery and look for approaches that may actually bring 
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about fairness in the taxation of multinational firms? For this purpose, the following three 
questions are addressed in chapters 4, 5 and 6 below:  
 
1. Who should be taxed? 
2. What should be taxed? 
3. Where should it be taxed? 
 
The question of whether tax rates should be coordinated or how to appreciate tax rate 
disparities and subsequent fiscal competences is not addressed in a separate chapter. 
Instead, the issue of rate coordination or revenue sharing is touched upon in the final section 
of Chapter 6. 
 
1.3.4.2 Chapter 4 – The group as a taxable entity 
Chapter 4 is devoted to finding an answer to the question of who to tax. What should be 
considered the appropriate taxable entity or ‘tax subject’? As income tax applies to natural or 
legal persons – the income tax as a personal, or ad personam tax – the question of whom 
should be considered the taxpayer must be answered. Who earned the income? 
 
Inspired by Coase’s ‘theory of the firm’,
76
 or ‘internalization theory’, I will argue that the 
integrated firm should be treated as a single entity for tax purposes rather than its constituent 
individual corporate bodies. The international tax regime should let go of the separate entity 
approach, i.e., the classical system of corporate taxation in which each (affiliated) corporate 
body forms a separate taxable entity, and permanent establishments are seen as distinct and 
separate enterprises for tax base allocation purposes. The separate entity approach needs to 
be abandoned and replaced by a ‘unitary business approach’. The multinational should be 
treated as a single tax entity for corporate tax purposes. This may technically be achieved 
through a mandatory tax consolidation for instance. This would enable the economic entity, 
i.e., the multinational firm, to be treated as the taxable entity. 
 
From there on I build a framework to identify the taxable entity as the first building block for 
the conclusions in Chapter 7. The economic entity should be treated as the taxable entity. For 
the purpose of defining the group for corporate tax purposes, I argue that tax consolidation 
should be mandatory for: (a) corporate interests that give the ultimate parent company a 
decisive influence over the underlying business affairs of its subsidiaries, provided that (b) the 
parent company holds its corporate interest as a capital asset. In addition, tax consolidation 
should be mandatory in both domestic and cross-border scenarios (‘worldwide tax 
consolidation’). 
 
Following on from the building blocks for an internally equitable and capital-and labor neutral 
international tax system developed in Chapter 3, it is argued that the group should be subject 
to an unlimited corporate tax liability, that is taxation of the worldwide income in each taxing 
jurisdiction in which it exceeds a minimum threshold of economic activity. In cross-border 
scenarios, double tax relief should subsequently be given on the basis of the Dutch-style 
methodology referred to as the credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income. 
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1.3.4.3 Chapter 5 – Economic rents as taxable base 
Chapter 5 is devoted to finding the appropriate tax base or the ‘tax object’. An income tax not 
only applies to persons – i.e., as an ad personam tax; it may also be considered an in rem tax 
that applies to the taxable object, being the ‘income derived’. This triggers the question of 
what should constitute the taxable base. What should be taxed? 
 
The analysis is inspired by the ‘Schanz-Haig-Simons’ concept of income or the ‘capital 
accrual theory’ and builds on the widely acknowledged notion that multinational firms derive 
rents. The argument is made that the international tax regime should autonomously identify a 
taxable base for corporate tax purposes by reference to a firm’s economic rents. Economic 
rents constitute the remuneration in return for the provision of the production factor of 
enterprise. 
 
The approach taken is to arrive at a tax system under which basically only the above-normal 
returns are taken into account for the purposes of calculating the corporate tax base. Various 
commentators advocate the approach of taxing rents instead of profits. Such an approach 
could technically be achieved by means of an allowance for corporate equity or via a cash 
flow tax. The allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’) provides a deduction for equity, 
equivalent to interest. 
 
It is argued that fairness requires nation states to make use of a tax base foundation concept 
containing an allowance for corporate equity. That is to appropriately mitigate the financing 
discrimination issues that arise under a typical nominal return to equity based tax system. An 
allowance for corporate equity produces c.q. promotes an equal to statutory average effective 
tax rate, a nil marginal effective tax rate, and mitigates the distortions that arise under a 
common corporate tax in the presence of differentials in tax depreciation and economic 
depreciation. The present values of depreciation and allowances for corporate equity are 
independent of the rate against which assets are written-off in the tax bookkeeping. 
 
Moreover, in respect of minority shareholding investment proceeds it is argued that economic 
double taxation effects should be mitigated by means of a relief mechanism that will be 
referred to as the ‘indirect tax exemption’. Such a mechanism would basically operate as an 
indirect credit, with the exception that the credit available is calculated by reference to an 
amount equal to the domestic tax that can be attributed to the excess earnings of the 
respective entity in which the equity investment is held. To efficiently arrive at a single 
taxation of the business cash flows involved, the economic double tax relief mechanism would 
be combined with a ‘loss recapture mechanism’ and a ‘profit carry forward mechanism’. The 
neutral operation of such a double tax relief system is demonstrated by means of numerical 
and formulaic examples. To my knowledge, the relief mechanism developed in this study is 
original. 
 
1.3.4.4 Chapter 6 – In search of an allocation mechanism 
Chapter 6 seeks to answer the question as to how the corporate tax should be geographically 
divided among the tax jurisdictions, ‘Where should we impose tax?’ How should the global 
firm’s taxable base be allocated geographically? The chapter is devoted to the development 
of a proper allocation key as an alternative to the current distortive profit attribution 
methodologies in international taxation. A daunting task indeed. Yet, it seems a necessary 
one in a global market where sovereign nation states all want a slice of the pie. 
 
The analysis is inspired on the theory of the firm and the notion that the firm’s business 
proceeds should be taxed only once as close as possible to its source. This implies the need 
to engage into a search of available approaches to pinpoint the geographic locations where 
the firm adds economic value. This however begs an answer to the question as to how the 
true geographic source of economic rents derived by a global firm should be determined. 
 
The observation is made that income lacks geographic attributes. Income has no geographic 
location. Income production as the resultant of the interplay of inputs and outputs of a firm are 
as global as is the multinational itself. This may render it somewhat pointless to search for the 
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true source of income. This however does not mean that there is nothing to be said about the 
matter. 
 
The chapter reviews the spectrum of possible angles ranging from the firms’ inputs locations 
at origin to the firms’ outputs locations at destination. The argument is made that if one only 
needs to agree on the allocation key, perhaps the most sensible thing to do is to aim at taking 
away arbitrage opportunities as much as possible. That would lead to an attribution of tax 
base by reference to elements that seem rational to use but are not within the firm’s control. 
The tax allocation would operate invariantly to the location of resources in such a case. 
 
The argument is made that it would be sensible to attribute tax base by adhering to the 
demand side of income production. That is because income may be seen as the resultant of 
the interplay of both supply and demand with the supply side being under the control of the 
firm involved whereas the firm has no, or at least little, control over the demand. That would 
produce a destination based tax base attribution approach where the tax base is assigned to 
the market jurisdiction, rather than the production jurisdiction, as is currently the case in 
international taxation. 
 
It is further argued that such a destination based tax base attribution approach would 
enhance fairness. It would promote a global efficient and non-discriminatory allocation of firm 
inputs. The system would cease to distort investment location decisions for tax reasons, even 
in the event of movements in currency exchange rates and interest rates. To my knowledge 
this property of the advocated system is original. The allocation of firm rents to the market 
jurisdiction would significantly mitigate the incentives to shift taxable profit by shifting 
corporate investment across tax borders, which exist under the current origin oriented 
international tax regime. 
 
The ideal would be to adopt a destination based tax base attribution approach on a worldwide 
coordinated basis. But even if it would be impossible to achieve international consensus at 
this point, a strong incentive would exist for individual states to move towards assigning the 
tax base to the market state. That is because that would very likely boost domestic 
competitiveness, attracting foreign direct investment and employment, and driving economic 
growth as a consequence. If one country would decide to implement a destination based 
corporate tax system – particularly if it would involve a major production country – chances 
are that others would follow suit. It would be in their self-interest. The adoption of a 
destination based tax base attribution by that first nation state may initiate a knock-on effect 
with an end-result of a worldwide adoption by nation states of destination based corporation 
tax systems. 
 
A transformation of the current origin based system into a destination based fractional 
corporation tax system would perhaps entail a redistribution of tax revenues across countries. 
The distributional effects would be hard if not impossible to predict, though. Matters would 
depend on various future behavioral effects. Both from the perspectives of the multinationals 
and the tax jurisdictions involved. The question is which countries would gain and which 
countries would lose out seems dependent on domestic corporate sales to corporate income 
ratios, ceteris paribus. 
 
1.3.5 Part V: Chapter 7 – Sharing the pie; building blocks for a ‘corporate tax 2.0’ 
The final Chapter 7 contains the conclusions of this study. It is argued that the building blocks 
of a fair corporate tax 2.0 can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Fairness in corporate taxation calls for tax parity in equal economic circumstances; 
 Taxing the fraction; corporate taxpayers would be subject to worldwide taxation in 
each jurisdiction in which it has nexus – double tax relief would be granted by 
reference to the domestic tax attributable to the taxpayer’s nexus abroad; 
 The firm involved would constitute the tax entity; 
 The firm’s rents would constitute the taxable base; 
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 The firm’s rents would be geographically assigned by reference to the firm’s sales at 
destination. 
 
1.3.6 Drawing from and building on my earlier publications 
Before proceeding, it is noted that parts of Chapters 1 through 4 and 6 have been drawn from 
and build on the following of my publications – see also footnotes 1, 77, 172, 548 and 1218: 
 
 Maarten F. de Wilde, Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a 
Globalizing Economy, 38 Intertax 281 (2010); 
 Maarten F. de Wilde, A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups in the 
Emerging Global Market, 39 Intertax 62 (2011); 
 Maarten F. de Wilde, What if Member States Subjected Non-Resident Taxpayers to 
Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-
Style Tax Exemption?, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 6,  
 Maarten F. de Wilde, Currency Exchange Results – What If Member States 
Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation Whilst Granting Double Tax Relief 
under a Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 
(Volume 65), No. 9;  
 Maarten F. de Wilde, Intra-Firm Transactions – What if Member States Subjected 
Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a 
Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 
65), No. 12, and; 
 Maarten F. de Wilde, Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-
directive a solution?, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38.  
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Chapter 2 Some thoughts on fairness in corporate taxation 
2.1 Introduction
77
 
This first chapter, which also makes up the first constituent part of the analysis in this study, 
addresses the first sub question, i.e., the question as to how the concept of ‘fairness’ in 
international corporate taxation should be understood. What should be the benchmark to 
assess the fairness or unfairness of the international tax regime? What constitute the 
principles for a sound tax system? 
 
This chapter describes the concept of ‘fairness’ as I understand and interpret it. Inspired by a 
combination of international tax theory and the objectives that underlie the legal framework of 
the European Union, I address the parameters of my notions on fairness in taxation. These 
parameters will be based on my interpretation of the maxims of equity and economic 
efficiency as developed in international tax theory.
78
 
 
The basic argument made is that the notion of fairness in corporate taxation is founded on the 
equality principle, conforming to the historically widely acknowledged notion of equal 
treatment before the law. Economic equal circumstances in se should be treated equally for 
tax purposes and unequal economic circumstances in se should be treated unequally insofar 
as circumstances are unequal. 
 
The normative requirement of tax parity in equal economic circumstances, in my view, should 
be kept separate from the application of the respective tax laws in a particular case as the tax 
effects in the case at hand are tested against the benchmark of the notion of tax parity in 
equal circumstances from which taxation is excluded as the subject of analysis. The tax 
effects in a particular scenario should be separated analytically from the fairness concept as 
these tax effects constitute the ‘test object’ against which the equality principle is tested. This 
allows a normative assessment of the tax effects without the tax effects influencing the 
outcome of the test; in the same way that the results of a numerical calculation do not affect 
the underlying mathematical rules that direct the outcome.  
 
It can be deduced from the equality postulate that everyone in an economic relationship with 
a taxing state has the obligation to contribute to the financing of public goods from which one 
benefits in accordance with one’s means – ‘equity’.
79
 Production factors should be distributed 
on the basis of market mechanisms, without public interference or at least with as little public 
interference as possible, i.e. ‘economic efficiency’. Taxation should follow economic reality, 
rather than steering it. Taxation should, neither positively, nor negatively affect business 
decisions – i.e. tax neutrality, including the concept of neutrality of the legal form.  
 
The argument is made that equity and neutrality may ultimately only be achieved through a 
worldwide harmonization of tax laws. That would require a transfer of sovereignty to a 
supranational body. Perhaps this is an unrealistic scenario politically, as states seem to be 
unwilling to give up their sovereign powers in the field of direct taxation. Perhaps, the tax 
sovereignty of states should therefore be seen as a given, at least when it comes down to 
setting the tax rate. 
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2.2 Conditions for a fair allocation of tax on business income in a globalizing 
economy 
2.2.1 The allocation of corporate tax should be equitable and economically efficient 
2.2.1.1 Also a corporate tax should be fair  
 
Fairness requirement in corporate taxation cannot be simply denied 
 
International tax theory basically widely adheres to the notion that the allocation of the tax 
burden among taxpayers and the tax revenue between nation states should be equitable and 
economically efficient.
80
 These normative cornerstones of a fair tax system were already 
rudimentarily acknowledged in the 18th century by Adam Smith as the ‘maxims of equity’.
81
 
 
Notions on fairness as developed in international tax theory traditionally constitute the 
normative foundation with respect to the allocation of individual income tax.
82
 This should also 
be the case when the discussion involves an assessment of the fairness in international 
corporate taxation. Why should a corporate tax escape the normative requirement of being 
fair? Corporate taxation should be imposed in a fair way.
83
 
 
Perhaps this view is considered controversial. A cynic may very well deny the fairness 
requirement in corporate taxation altogether. He may argue that a corporate entity does not 
need to be treated fairly as a corporate entity does not even exist in reality – the ‘artificial 
entity theory’. A legal entity is merely a legal construct, a stamped piece of paper. And 
perhaps a piece of paper should not be taxed in the first place. And even if such a legal 
construct should be taxed, there is no reason to treat a construct equitably and economically 
efficiently for tax purposes – the cynic might add. 
 
Corporate tax is a pre-individual tax; if individuals should treated fairly for tax 
purposes, by inference, so should corporations 
 
I respectfully disagree with this position. Indeed, the legal entities that are subject to corporate 
tax are merely persons by virtue of the company laws under which they have been created. 
Corporate legal entities are persons by law, having legal personality, which allows them to 
operate a business legally and to derive a profit from it. Corporate entities can therefore, 
legally, also be taxed. And indeed, as a corporate entity is just a legal construct in the end, 
the underlying individuals are the persons who ultimately effectively bear the tax imposed on 
the corporate entity. This does not mean, however, that it does not matter whether corporate 
entities are treated fairly or unfairly for tax purposes. 
 
The first answer given to the cynic might be that a corporate tax conceptually operates as an 
‘advance levy’ to the income and consumption taxes imposed on the individuals behind the 
entity – the ‘aggregate theory’.
84
 And as the tax treatment of individuals should be fair, 
corporations should also receive a fair tax treatment as the corporation tax charged to a 
corporate body can be seen as a (temporary) replacement of the individual income tax 
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chargeable to the individuals behind the corporate body.
85
 So, if the individual ultimately 
effectively pays the corporation tax, it seems sensible to argue that corporation tax should be 
levied equitably and neutrally since the individuals behind the entity who effectively pay the 
tax should receive a fair tax treatment. 
 
At the end of the day the reality is that indeed only individuals pay tax. All taxes are ultimately 
borne by individuals rather than legal constructs.
86
 Although we do not know exactly who 
bears the tax as the incidence of corporation tax is unknown, this still holds true.
87
 The 
corporation tax may be effectively borne by the firm’s owners, i.e., the statutory incidence of a 
corporation tax. But the owner does not necessarily have to bear the tax in the real world. The 
tax burden may also be passed on to the firm’s customer, the consumer, or passed back to a 
worker of the firm or its supplier. In the end it comes down to the relative elasticities in supply 
and demand in the relevant markets involving the production factors used and the products 
sold to make a profit. The tax incidence depends on the given price elasticities in the labor 
markets, the capital markets and the customer markets at a given time and place. In reality, 
as said, the tax incidence is unknown. 
 
 Multinational firms exist as economic entities 
 
This being said, it is not implied, however, that corporate taxation should be abolished as it is 
allegedly sufficient to tax the underlying shareholders, the individuals. 
 
As a second response to the cynic could be that multinational firms may be considered to 
exist in the real world as economic entities separate from their owners – the ‘real entity 
theory’.
88
 That would provide a first argument to tax the firm separate from its shareholders. 
Firms may be considered real as they are homogenous units created economically to 
maximize profit production for the benefit of its portfolio shareholders. Economically, firms 
exist as ‘joint ventures’ or ‘partnerships’ of the firms’ continuously changing owners, the 
portfolio shareholders that is, who have ‘outsourced’ the management of their ‘joint venture’ to 
the firm’s management. The presence of a firm’s corporate management representing the firm 
entails that a firm may actually be considered to exist as a venture, economically separate 
from its shareholders. 
 
Accordingly, the firm can be seen as a separate economic operator – an agent with a 
governance structure – to be distinguished analytically from its owners, i.e., the portfolio 
investors that financed the firm’s underlying integrated cross-border business operations with 
equity.
89
 A firm may comprise of a single legal entity or a group of economically integrated 
legal entities under the common control of an ultimate parent company. If the firm has 
business activities in more than one country – and has foreign direct investments – it is 
typically labeled as a multinational firm, multinational enterprise, or plainly as a multinational. 
 
It may be acknowledged that the firm’s equity investors, the owners, do not operate the 
business through their corporate interests themselves. The owners of the firm merely hold 
their interest as a portfolio investment as they are primarily interested in the economic return 
on their shareholdings rather than in the underlying business operations of the firm. 
                                                     
85
 See on the question of why to tax corporations in the first place, Richard M. Bird, ‘Why Tax Corporations?’, 56 
Bulletin for International Taxation 194 (2002), at 194-203 and Ruud de Mooij, ‘Will corporate income taxation 
survive?’, 3 De Economist 153 (2005), at 292. 
86
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 41 and 156. 
87
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘Thoughts on the Future Of the State Corporate Income Tax’, 25 State 
Tax Notes 931 (23 September 2002), at 936-938, and Peter Harris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or 
Russian Roulette?’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012), at 278. 
88
 Avi-Yonah adopts the argument of a firm’s existence to argue that the imposition of a corporate tax is justified as a 
means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of corporate management. See Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, ‘Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax’, 90 Virginia Law Review 1193 (2004), 
at 1193-1255. 
89
 This can be considered true to the extent that it concerns a publicly, or widely, held company. With respect to a 
controlling shareholding in a privately, or closely, held company, the presence of one economic operator may be 
argued, i.e., the investor and company seen in conjunction. This is the case in which the shareholder/taxpayer holds 
a controlling corporate interest in the company through which the business enterprise is carried on for the purpose of 
employing that controlling interest it for the benefit of its underlying business enterprise on a continuing basis. 
39
35 
 
 
A portfolio shareholder makes equity capital available to the firm so that the firm can pursue 
its direct investment activities as an entrepreneur. In return, the shareholder is remunerated, 
i.e., it receives proceeds from its portfolio equity capital investment in the form of dividends 
and capital gains upon the disposal of its corporate interest. The investor mainly holds the 
portfolio investment interest as a security. The underlying property, business or other 
activities of the firm in which the interest is held is of secondary importance to the 
shareholder. The shareholder typically does not care too much about the types of investments 
undertaken by the multinational firm; as long as they are profitable. 
 
The firm itself, through its corporate management, carries on the business enterprise by 
means of its direct investments. The firm together with its portfolio shareholders does not 
make up the economic entity as the multinational firm operates its enterprise as the economic 
entrepreneur, separate from its investors. Accordingly, the firm is a homogenous economic 
value creator – i.e., rather than a mere conduit of income derived by its portfolio investors.
90
  
 
As the firm constitutes a single economic unit, it perhaps should be treated as a single unit, 
separate from its owners, for tax purposes notably as the firm and its portfolio shareholder 
can be seen to constitute separate economic units. This allows the assessment of the 
corporation tax on a stand-alone basis. That is, separate from the other taxes in a country’s 
‘tax mix’. The relationships between the corporation tax and the income and consumption 
taxes levied from the firm’s shareholders and workers are not reviewed in this study. The 
integration of corporate taxation and individual income taxation is not analyzed either. The 
same applies for the relation between corporate taxation and consumption taxation, for 
instance to mitigate or resolve tax cascading issues in these areas. These matters are left 
untouched as they are outside of the confines of the central research question of this study. 
 
 Multinational firms derive economic rents 
 
A third response to the cynic could be that the multinational firm as a single economic 
entrepreneur derives economic rents. By operating business activities in a functionally 
integrated manner on a global scale, firms have proven able to produce so-called above-
normal investment returns, commonly also referred to as ‘pure profits’, ‘inframarginal returns’ 
or ‘above-normal returns’, ‘excess earnings’, ‘business cash-flow’, or ‘economic rents’. Firms 
derive these rents, i.e., these earnings or economic value increases in excess of the normal 
return rates to the production factors of labor (wage) and capital. Standard low-risk return 
rates on capital, for instance are yields on savings deposits or government bonds. The above 
normal return rates may be seen as the remuneration for the production factor of enterprise 
(for more on economic rents see Chapter 5). 
 
As the multinational firm produces rents it makes sense to tax these rents derived from the 
firm directly through the corporate tax system – instead of taxing these rents indirectly in the 
hands of its portfolio shareholders. Just as workers pay tax on their earnings – wage taxes –, 
the production factor of labor and portfolio investors pay tax on the returns on capital – capital 
income taxes – the production factor of capital, it may be considered sensible to also tax firms 
on their returns on the production factor of enterprise, its rents that is. The perspective may 
accordingly be taken that the corporation tax should be included in the tax mix to finance the 
public goods and services provided by the state from which the multinational also benefits. 
 
 Avoid ‘fairness spillovers’ to other taxes in the tax mix 
 
The final response to the cynic could be the following. The fairness question cannot be denied 
in corporate taxation. That is to avoid something that may be referred to as ‘fairness 
spillovers’ to other taxes in the tax mix. 
 
Let us assume that a taxing authority for whatever reasons and on whatever grounds were to 
introduce a corporation tax and no notions of fairness would be taken into account. In doing 
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so, the tax authority would adopt a non-equitable and non-neutral tax. Such a tax would 
operate arbitrarily, spilling over to the other taxes in the tax mix such as the wage tax, the 
capital income tax, or the consumption tax. Would that be a problem? The answer to that 
question may very well be in the affirmative. 
 
Were the corporation tax to operate arbitrarily – it would for instance be unable to sufficiently 
tax the multinational firm’s economic rents, thereby creating tax arbitrage – the taxing 
authority that seeks to raise revenue to finance expenditure would need to resort to 
alternative means. It would for instance resort raising wage taxes and consumption taxes, or 
the levies on real estate. The absence of fairness in the corporate tax – i.e., the presence of 
inequity and non-neutrality in it – would accordingly have some spill-over effects into the other 
taxes in the tax mix. That would render the alternative taxes unfair as well, i.e., inequitable 
and distortive. 
 
Such fairness spill-overs from the corporate tax into the other taxes in the mix that would 
follow from neglecting the fairness in corporate taxation would render matters perhaps even 
more difficult than a priori addressing them. The unfair leakages into the other taxes in the tax 
mix would have to be addressed. The arbitrage created in corporate taxation would need to 
be fixed somewhere else in the mix. And, indeed, this may be considered the case under the 
current international tax regime. As it seems impossible to properly tax the rents that 
multinationals derive from their global operations, the tax burdens imposed on consumption 
and labor are simply increased in response to that in order to finance public expenditure. 
Those increases are commonplace. We are unable to tax the firm, so we tax the consumer 
and the worker instead. 
 
In sum, the issues of fairness cannot be escaped by simply arguing that fairness is absent in 
corporate taxation. The issue may even be reinforced to avoid that the questions on fairness 
would just be transferred to another context. That would perhaps render things only worse as 
it would give rise to the additional, perhaps insurmountable, issue of measuring the level of 
unfairness in the other levies in the mix to compensate for the unfair corporation tax system 
created. The issue can only be dealt with by accepting that the notions of fairness equally 
apply in corporate taxation; if not on moral grounds then perhaps for pragmatic reasons. 
 
2.2.1.2 Fairness in tax theory corresponds to the notions underlying the European 
Union 
Before elaborating on the constituent parts of the following section, it is worth noting that the 
notions of fairness, i.e., equity and economic efficiency, also lie at the heart of the legal 
framework on which the European Union has been built.
91
 The cornerstone objectives 
underlying the European Union – which align with the common values of the Member States – 
correspond to the notions on which international tax theory has been based, at least 
indirectly. Please let me elaborate on this and devote a few words to the matter. 
 
The objective of the European Union is the same as the objective of a typical constitutional 
democratic sovereign nation state. The European Union seeks to promote the well-being of 
the people living within its geographic territories.
92
 For that purpose, the European Union 
seeks to establish an area without internal frontiers on the basis of common social and 
economic policies to ensure fair, i.e., equitable, and free, i.e., economically efficient, 
competition. This entails that all publicly induced distortions in the functioning of the internal 
market without internal frontiers need to be eliminated.
93
 
 
To enhance equity and economic efficiency within the internal market – put in the perspective 
of direct taxation by the Member States – the direct tax systems of the European Union 
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Member States need to be harmonized.
94
 At the same time, where European Union law 
applies, the abolition of all unilaterally imposed obstacles to cross-border movements of 
goods, services, persons and capital is required; the European Union’s ‘free movements’ or 
‘fundamental freedoms’. The area without internal frontiers has been established as a means 
to reach these objectives. The European Union is an autonomous supranational legal order. 
European Union law has direct effect in the respective domestic legal orders of the European 
Union Member States.
95
 
 
However, today, harmonization of the direct taxation systems of the European Union Member 
States has been attained only to a very limited extent. With the exception of the prohibition of 
state aid and a few Directives, the competences in the area of direct taxation currently 
completely lie at the level of the European Union Member States. A basic property of 
European Union law in the field of direct taxation is that when the European Union was 
founded no competences to levy direct taxes were transferred from the Member States to the 
Union. Today, the European Union Member States have veto power with respect to any 
European Commission proposal that involves a transfer of sovereignty in the field of direct 
taxation to the European Union.
96
 Consequently, within the internal market without internal 
frontiers, fiscal sovereignty is fragmented into as many autonomous tax jurisdictions as the 
European Union has Member States – currently twenty-eight. In direct taxation, a true internal 
market without internal frontiers does not exist (yet). It is a ‘work in progress’. Accordingly, the 
sovereignty of the Member States in the field of direct taxation does not substantially differ 
from the sovereignty of non-European Union Member States in this field. 
 
This nevertheless does not change the reality that European Union law has a profound 
influence on the international tax systems of the Member States. The established case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union reveals that the Member States have to exercise 
their competence in direct taxation consistently with the free movement rights.
97
 Where the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is applicable, any obstacles imposed by the 
Member States are incompatible with the principle of free movements, unless these obstacles 
can be justified under the treaty or the ‘rule of reason’ – i.e., by overriding reasons in the 
general interest, for instance, on the basis of anti-tax abuse considerations. 
 
Consequently, the Member States are competent to decide whether or not to tax and to 
distribute this competence to tax amongst each other through double tax conventions, as long 
as they adhere to the principles of free movements.
98
 This means that – like non-European 
Union Member States – the Member States of the European Union are sovereign in their 
decisions on who to tax (taxable entity), what to tax (tax base) and at which rate (tax rate). 
They are also sovereign in their decision on which taxing principle (i.e., source, residence, 
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nationality) to apply to base tax jurisdiction upon. However, the manner in which these 
decisions are subsequently expressed in that respective Member State’s international tax 
system falls within the competence of the European Union. This means that the Court of 
Justice is competent to examine the international tax systems’ operation as to their 
compatibility with the fundamental freedoms.
99
 
 
The Court of Justice’s case law on direct tax matters reveals a significant legal difference 
between European Union Member States and non-European Union Member States. 
European Union Member States have to answer to a court that is competent to rule on 
obstacles that are incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. In cases in which the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union is applicable, the Court of Justice can accordingly 
force the Member States to eliminate any unilaterally imposed obstacles in their international 
tax systems. Under the fundamental freedoms intra-European Union cross-border business 
activities may not be taxed differently from intra-European Union domestic business activities 
under the international tax systems of the Member States. Consequently, this supranational 
legal framework has a profound effect on the Member States’ tax policy decisions. Non-
European Union Member States are not legally required to answer to such a supranational 
court. In that context there is no legal framework which can force non-European Union 
Member States to eliminate any obstacles from their international tax systems. The absence 
of such a legal framework, however, does not mean that no obstacles conceptually exist in 
the international tax systems of non-European Union Member States. Absent a legal 
authority, there is just no one to tell those countries to get rid of them. 
 
Nevertheless, in my view, the European Union’s notions of equity and economic efficiency 
within the internal market may have a general effect in the development of ideas on a fair 
allocation of tax in a global market. It is true that the European Union is a supranational legal 
framework that is unique in the world. Obviously, European Union law has no legal effect 
outside the scope of application of the Treaty on European Union. But the European Union is 
not built on unique values. It is built on notions shared by twenty-eight developed countries in 
an internal market without internal frontiers. And it may be appreciated that it is somewhat 
hard to understand how matters conceptually need to be different for the constitutional 
countries adhering to the rule of law outside the context of the European Union and its 
internal market, but nevertheless within the reality of an emerging global marketplace where 
production factors effortless flow across country tax-borders.  
 
The European Union experiences and the attempts undertaken to dissolve the distortions in 
the functioning of the internal market that have been induced by the operation of the direct 
taxation systems of the Member States – indeed, together with its perhaps far-reaching 
consequences in practice – may therefore also have a meaning outside the geographic area 
of the European Union. Accordingly, the conceptual horizon is merely extended beyond the 
geographical borders of the European Union and the operation of its legal framework. That is 
to translate its underlying notions to a universal level. Why not? 
 
2.2.2 What does equity mean? 
2.2.2.1 The obligation to contribute to the financing of public expenditure  
Equity is an ethical concept, based on equality, i.e., the basically universally accepted notion 
of equal treatment before the law.
100
 Everyone in an economic relationship with a taxing state 
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has the moral obligation to contribute to the financing of public goods from which one benefits 
– i.e., the ‘benefits principle’ adhering to income tax or corporate income tax as an in rem tax, 
in accordance with one’s means – i.e., the ‘ability to pay principle’ adhering to the income tax 
or corporate income tax as an ad personam tax. 
 
The term ‘everyone’ is addressed in more detail in Chapter 4, in which the question is 
assessed of who should pay corporate tax. Without going into detail here, it should be noted 
that in my view the taxpayer for corporate tax purposes should correspond to the economic 
operator, the economic entity deriving business income.
101
 To the extent corporate taxation of 
multinational firms is concerned, it is the multinational that should be treated as the tax entity 
for corporate tax purposes. 
 
‘One’s means’ is described in more detail in Chapter 5, i.e., the question of what to tax in 
corporate taxation. Although I will not go into detail here, in my view the tax base should align 
with the Schanz-Haig-Simons concept of income.
102
 According to this concept, income is a 
substitute for measuring well-being which cannot be measured objectively. Individual well-
being is therefore measured in substitute terms of income, defined as an increase of 
economic power – the creation of economic wealth by the provision of production factors – as 
increased economic power can be measured objectively. Furthermore, most people would 
tend to agree that a higher standard of living enhances one’s satisfaction with life – although 
such a view may perhaps also be considered somewhat materialistic. Insofar as the concept 
of income focuses on business proceeds, the concept of income basically seems to resort to 
business cash flow or economic rent as the remuneration for the enterprise factor of 
production.
103
 
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the term ‘benefit principle’ addresses the connection 
between the imposition of tax and the public goods provided in return, although the benefits 
are individually immeasurable. Without entering into the details at this place – the matter is 
assessed in depth in Chapter 6 – it should be noted that the income tax should be levied at 
the location that corresponds to the income’s geographical source as closely as possible.
104
 In 
this study the benefits principle, notably, is seen in its broadest sense. The interpretation of 
the benefits principle is not restricted to payments to a governmental body which directly 
result in the provision of governmental services – i.e., retributions. In addition, it is worth 
noting that the ‘ability to pay principle’, as addressed in this study, simply refers to one’s 
actual ability to pay the tax due. Is the economic operator solvent; is the firm involved in fact 
able to pay the corporate tax due?
105
 
 
2.2.2.2 Inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity  
In international tax theory, the concept of equity comprises two dimensions: inter-taxpayer 
equity on the one hand and inter-nation equity on the other hand.
106
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Inter-taxpayer equity: horizontal and vertical inter-taxpayer equity 
 
Inter-taxpayer equity seeks a fair allocation of tax among taxpayers.
107
 This dimension of 
equity has been developed in a domestic context. The equality principle forms the normative 
point of departure. Economic equal circumstances in se should be treated equally and 
unequal economic circumstances in se should be treated unequally insofar as circumstances 
are unequal. 
 
Within the context of inter-taxpayer equity, a distinction is typically made between horizontal 
and vertical inter-taxpayer equity. Horizontal inter-taxpayer equity requires that taxpayers who 
derive equal amounts of income pay equal amounts of tax. “If two taxpayers earn identical 
incomes, this doctrine of equity would imply that each should contribute identical shares in 
taxation.”
108
 Vertical equity requires that taxpayers in unequal circumstances are appropriately 
taxed bearing these unequal circumstances in mind. Different amounts of income should be 
subject to different amounts of tax. The tax burden imposed should further reflect some 
degree of progressiveness. As the utility of marginal income declines, it would be fair to 
subject marginal income items to a progressive tax rate.
109
 It should be noted that inter-
taxpayer equity does not seem to be based on independent principles or features of tax 
fairness. The equality principle calls for equal treatment in equal circumstances, as well as 
unequal treatment in unequal circumstances insofar as the circumstances are unequal. 
Horizontal and vertical inter-taxpayer equity accordingly both boil down to the same 
underlying notion of equality. 
 
In my view, both the ability-to-pay principle and the benefits-principle result from the notion of 
inter-taxpayer equity.
110
 An example may illustrate this. Let’s say that corporate taxpayer 
‘Shoe Sales Company’ operates a shoe selling business enterprise around the corner. The 
equality principle requires that Shoe Sales Company is entitled to the exact same corporate 
tax treatment as, let’s say, corporate taxpayer ‘Taxi Company’ who operates a taxi service 
business enterprise across the street. Both equally benefit from public goods provided – 
public order, infrastructure, legal system, a market to service, et cetera. Therefore, both 
should equally and proportionally contribute to the funding of these public goods. In case they 
realize a profit, they should be liable to pay corporate tax to a certain amount in accordance 
with their ability to pay. In the event that they suffer a loss, they should not have to pay tax as 
they are not able to pay tax and may even go bankrupt when the tax authorities force them to 
do so. 
 
 Some notes on optimal tax theory 
 
Notably, it may be worth submitting the following remarks on optimal tax theory at this 
point.
111
 Optimal tax theory fairly appreciates that each individual taxpayer has different 
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characteristics, opportunities and tastes, including things like physical and mental capacity, 
life expectancy, education levels, environmental influences, health, and leisure time. All of 
these contribute to or detract from that person’s well-being. 
 
Optimal tax theory therefore sets forth that the unequal possession of these characteristics 
necessarily entails the imposition of corresponding unequal tax burdens. Accordingly, optimal 
tax theorists seek to achieve inter-taxpayer equity based on difficult to specify, perhaps 
somewhat subjective criteria. How can it be objectively determined whether one person is 
well-off compared to someone else? Whilst conceptually appealing, this line of reasoning has 
not been adopted in this study. 
 
This study seeks to address fairness in taxation by referring to income in terms of accrued 
economic power as a measurable proxy for immeasurable well-being. Furthermore, the cost 
of taxation is considered to be distributed fairly if allocated to taxpayers that find themselves 
in equal economic circumstances, i.e., in terms of income levels measured as accrued 
economic power, prior to the imposition of tax. 
 
The question of how to adjust for inter-taxpayer inequalities in terms of mutually diverging 
social characteristics that make up a person’s individual well-being is left untouched in this 
study. Such a correction, although perhaps conceptually desirable, should be achieved 
through political processes in my view; for instance by way of deciding on the tax rates to be 
applied, or via the expenditure side of fiscal policy. Furthermore, as this study seeks to tax the 
business proceeds of multinational firms, which necessarily lack attributes of social well-being 
– it seems sufficient to look at its economic value creation by reference to the production of 
increased economic worth in monetary terms. 
 
Inter-nation equity 
 
Inter-nation equity seeks a fair allocation of tax between states.
112
 This dimension of equity 
has been developed in a cross-border context within the confines of the present system of 
sovereign nation states. It takes fiscal sovereignty as a given due to the lack of a 
supranational body with sovereign taxing powers. More than one taxing state is involved. Let 
us again take Shoe Sales Company into mind. Shoe Sales Company is taxed as a corporate 
taxpayer by a certain country. It operates a shoe selling business around the corner but its 
place of effective management is abroad. And take into mind again Taxi Company, which is 
also taxed as a corporate taxpayer by a certain country but this company has its place of 
effective management in that country. It operates a taxi service business enterprise across 
the street, which happens to be on the other side of the (tax) border. 
 
In international taxation a different tax residence of a corporate taxpayer is generally 
considered to constitute a different circumstance.
113
 Both the domestic tax systems and the 
double tax conventions networks of basically all countries worldwide follow this assumption. 
Accordingly, international taxation is based on the basic approach that the situation of 
residents and non-resident taxpayers is different and can therefore legitimately be subjected 
to different tax treatment. As a consequence for instance, only taxpayers that are resident of 
one of the countries that are party to a double tax convention concluded may invoke the 
application of the tax treaty. Furthermore, taxpayers are typically subject to a different tax 
treatment by reference to their tax residence – i.e., the unlimited tax liability of resident 
taxpayers versus the limited tax liability of non-resident taxpayers. The starting point, hence, 
is the existence of tax borders and a different tax treatment depending on where the taxpayer 
has its tax residence. Both Shoe Sales Company and Taxi Company would receive a different 
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tax treatment, compared to each other as well compared to their competitors at home and 
abroad. 
 
Why is that? What difference should residence make to the question of a fair imposition of 
corporate tax in a global market; conceptually? I do not know to be honest. My response 
would be: none. I fail to see why a taxpayer’s tax residence would constitute a different 
circumstance and therefore justifies this different tax treatment. In today’s reality where 
economic operators move increasingly effortlessly across tax-borders in an emerging global 
market place, the tax residence is economically immaterial. The tax residence should be 
insignificant in a global market (although it does not in reality, as, it matters a lot in corporate 
taxation where a company resides for tax purposes). In an increasingly borderless world, 
there is no reason why the presence of a tax-borders and the tax place of residence should 
continue to be this conceptual stronghold to argue differences in circumstances. The 
paradigm in my view can only be explained by reference to dogmatic reasoning based on 
yesterday’s economic realities. 
 
In my view, the notion of equality as applicable within the internal market under European 
Union law is much more up to date, as it appreciates and adheres to the concept of the 
internal market without internal frontiers. The European Union and its free movement rights 
fundamentally aim to remove any distortions caused by the presence of tax-borders within a 
frontierless internal market. Hence, for the purposes of applying the principle of equality it is 
essentially sufficient that situations are materially similar under European Union law – for 
instance irrespective of a taxpayer’s place of residence.
114
 
 
Inter-nation equity has its normative foundation in the equality principle as well. However in 
international tax theory it is generally referred to and labeled differently as the principle of 
non-discrimination. However, the difference between the equality principle and the non-
discrimination principle may simply be the labels used. The difference may just be of a 
terminological nature. 
 
This means that again both the benefits principle and the ability to pay principle ensue from 
this equal treatment concept.
115
 Please let me briefly elaborate on this. Corporate taxpayers 
Shoe Sales Company and Taxi Company both benefit from public goods provided. Therefore 
they should contribute to the financing of the public goods both here and abroad as they are 
economically present and subject to tax both domestically and abroad. Also, their tax 
contribution should be equal to those of the taxpayers that decided to keep things local and 
not cross the border. Otherwise the taxpayers would receive unequal tax treatment when 
compared to each other. The difference in treatment would merely result from the economic 
operator’s decision to either cross the tax-border or not – which should be considered 
immaterial in a global marketplace. 
 
 Keeping the equality principle separate from the operation of legal rules and  
 constructs 
 
I fail to see why corporate taxpayers who conduct their business activities in a cross-border 
context should find themselves in different circumstances for tax purposes compared to 
corporate taxpayers who conduct their business activities entirely in a domestic context. Both 
operate businesses in the global market. The presence of a man-made tax border is 
conceptually immaterial in this respect. 
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Please let me devote some words to this. An analysis of a rule or legal construct against the 
equality principle requires a comparison of the circumstances to be set off against the 
operation of the assed legal rule or construct. The normative requirement of tax parity in 
economic equal circumstances, the ‘test’, should be kept analytically separate from the 
differences in legal treatment in a particular scenario. That is because the difference in the 
legal treatment is the object of the assessment; the issue under discussion – the ‘test object’. 
If legal differences would seep into the analysis, the differences in the legal treatment would 
affect the outcome of the assessment. The difference in legal treatment could then even be 
utilized to argue the inequality of the circumstances: ‘the circumstances differ as the legal 
treatment differs; hence there is no equal treatment issue’. Such reasoning would be logically 
invalid. It would essentially cancel out the equality principle in law. The point made is much 
like the observation that the numbers in a calculation should not affect the underlying 
mathematical rules as the numbers could then affect the mathematical outcome and thus set 
aside the mathematical rule. 
 
Translated to fairness in corporate taxation, this means that the tax effects in a particular 
scenario should be kept analytically separate from the fairness concept, as the tax effects 
constitute the object against which the equality principle is offset. Only that approach allows a 
normative analysis of the tax effects without having the tax effects affecting the outcome of 
the assessment. Again, much like the outcome of a calculation not affecting the underlying 
mathematical rules that direct that outcome. 
 
At the end of the day, the sovereignty of states, and hence the presence of tax-borders is a 
legal construct. There is no inherent moral truth behind it. As borders are man-made, they can 
also be removed legally by mankind. The existence of the European Union as a supranational 
body to which the Member States have transferred parts of their sovereign entitlements 
proves this thesis. Accordingly, domestic and cross-border business activities of corporate 
taxpayers need to be compared without taking the presence of the tax-border, a legal 
construct, into consideration. And in doing so – bearing in mind a globalizing economy – I fail 
to recognize why circumstances of the aforementioned business activities of our corporate 
taxpayers, Shoe Sales Company and Taxi Company, are considered different circumstances 
from those of their domestic peers just because they have decided to take their business 
operations across a legal construct such as a tax-border. 
 
 No tax burden differential dependent on intra-firm legal organization 
 
Furthermore, equity requires that a group of affiliated corporate entities which jointly, i.e., as a 
single economic operator, carries on a single integrated business enterprise should be 
subject to an overall tax burden that corresponds to the tax burden that an independent 
corporate entity, operating a similar business, is subject to. This approach is commonly 
referred to as the ‘unitary business approach’
116
 and broadly adhered to in the literature.
117
 
The unitary business approach may be recognized in tax grouping regimes seeking to treat 
the affiliated group of corporate bodies as a single tax entity. Tax grouping regimes can be 
found in the international tax systems of various states. The same approach may also be 
recognized in the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) project undertaken 
within the European Union’s institutions. This matter is further addressed in Chapter 4. 
 
Please note that it is conceptually impossible to reconcile the unitary business approach with 
the separate entity approach and the functionally separate entity approach under which 
affiliate corporate bodies are taxed as if they were separate taxable entities and permanent 
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establishments are considered distinct and separate enterprises for tax base attribution 
purposes.
118
 The same is true with regards to the subsequent recognition of inter-company 
transactions and internal dealings for which an at arm’s length transfer price must be 
determined.
119
 This subject matter is dealt with in Chapters 4 and 6 respectively. 
 
The single tax principle 
 
Moreover, equity requires that business income is taxed only once – ‘the single tax 
principle’.
120
 It is unfair to tax economic rents more than once or less than once. Both 
‘overtaxation’ and ‘undertaxation’ are unfair. As income is earned only once it should also be 
taxed only once. “Income should be taxed only once, as close as possible to its source (as 
any economic activity that is taxed more than once will be discouraged while those that are 
not taxed will be favored. This is both unfair and inefficient. Double taxation distorts costs and 
prices, interferes with production decisions.)”
121
 
 
This holds true in both a domestic and a cross-border context. It would be unfair if taxpayers 
Shoe Sales Company and Taxi Company would be taxed twice on their income earned or 
less than once, only because of their decision to cross a tax-border. 
 
2.2.3 What does economic efficiency mean? 
2.2.3.1 Tax should not affect economic decisions 
 
 Neutrality as to where to produce and sell 
 
Economic efficiency provides an economic foundation for a fair allocation of tax among 
taxpayers and between states.
122
 Economic efficiency presupposes that the productivity of 
income is the highest, and with that, also the fairest when production factors and consumption 
are distributed on the basis of market mechanisms without public interference or as little 
public interference as possible. The concept of neutrality as regards the question of where to 
produce and sell has also been referred to in the literature as ‘market neutrality’ or ‘global 
optimality’.
123
 
 
For the purposes of taxation, economic efficiency requires that “taxes should distort as little as 
possible the prices resulting from the interaction of supply and demand in the market. Tax 
policy should strive for neutrality between investment and consumption and among products 
and industries. Government should not use its power to alter prices to favour any one industry 
or producer.”
124
 Corporate taxation should merely follow the economic presence of an 
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economic operator and the economic value it creates. Taxation should not affect business 
decisions – neither in a positive nor in a negative manner. 
 
This holds both in domestic and cross-border business environments. “From a theoretical 
perspective, if income derived from cross-border transactions is taxed more heavily than 
domestic income, the added tax burden creates an inefficient incentive to invest domestically. 
This proposition is widely accepted and underlies the effort, which by now is about a century 
old, to prevent or alleviate international multiple taxation. The corollary also holds true: If 
income from cross-border transactions is taxed less heavily than domestic income, this 
creates an inefficient incentive to invest internationally rather than at home. The deadweight 
loss from undertaxation is the same as that from overtaxation. In addition, there is also a 
strong equity argument against undertaxation of cross-border income.”
125
 
 
An optimal tax, therefore, is a tax that does not result in welfare reducing market distortions, 
or limits these distortions were possible – i.e., the notion of tax neutrality.
126
 “Production is 
allocated efficiently throughout the world if it is not possible to reallocate resources between 
activities in a way that would increase total output”.
127
 The idea is essentially that market 
forces should continue to operate as if no taxes were levied. 
 
The open market economy and the welfare benefits of globalization are not reviewed in this 
thesis. Empirical studies and historical developments broadly illustrate that free trade and 
competition enhance competition, improve efficiency in the allocation of production factors 
and stimulate firms to innovate.
128
 Surely, not everybody wins. But on an overall basis the 
opening up of domestic markets is widely held to have increased public welfare and with that 
the well-being of many. 
 
 Neutrality as to intra-firm legal organization of business; neutrality of legal  
 form 
 
Economic efficiency also requires the neutrality of legal form.
129
 That is because intra-firm 
legal aspects are superfluous when it comes to determining the amount of earnings of the firm 
involved. At the end of the day, legal aspects such as the limited or unlimited liability under 
company law are irrelevant when it comes down to the question of how much profit the firm 
has produced. It is, for instance, true that the limited liability ensuing from the operation of 
economic activities through subsidiary companies enables the firm to take greater economic 
risks – potentially allowing it to produce a higher profit level. However, the limited liability itself 
is irrelevant when it comes to the question of how much profit the firm has derived. Corporate 
profit is a quantitative variable. 
 
Corporate taxation seeks to tax corporate earnings, i.e., the accrued economic value as a 
result of engaging in economic activity by a company. Intra-firm legal realities do not play a 
role in the calculation of the amount of accrued economic value. Intra-firm legal realities are 
superfluous when it comes to determining the amount of corporate or other earnings. 
Accordingly intra-firm legal realities should be of no relevance also in the determination of the 
level of the taxable profits derived. 
 
In sum, the manner in which the business activities undertaken are structured legally should 
be irrelevant when levying corporate tax. “The income of a common enterprise should be 
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taxed without regard to its organizational structure”. 
130
 Intra-firm legal affairs should not 
influence the firm’s corporate tax base. The firm’s internal legal organization should 
accordingly be of no relevance for the answer to the question of how much economic wealth 
the firm has created.
131
 
 
 Tax neutrality implies no room for tax instrumentalism 
 
The question of whether taxation may or should be used to influence taxpayer behavior – tax 
instrumentalism – is answered in the negative in this study.
132
 Politically it may be considered 
desirable to make use of the tax system as a regulatory tool. This explains tax 
instrumentalism, i.e., the making use of the tax system as a tool to steer taxpayer behavior. 
 
Conceptually however, there is no room for this regulatory function of taxation. At least not in 
corporate taxation when tax instrumentalism results in unequal tax treatment in equal 
economic circumstances. The Schanz-Haig-Simons concept of income defines business 
income in terms of economic accrual or economic rent. In my view, an impost on accrued 
economic power, an objective economic phenomenon should be levied for the sole purpose 
of raising revenue to finance public expenditure. Political desires to steer or regulate the 
underlying economic phenomenon, i.e., regulatory aims, should be expressed in regulations, 
subsidies, fines or penalties, instead of in the tax system. Instrumentalism should accordingly 
be dealt with on the expenditure side of fiscal policy if so desired by society. 
 
Illustrative for the approach taken at this point are the illegal state aid rules in European Union 
law.
133
 These rules prohibit the selective granting of beneficial tax treatment – tax subsidies– 
to certain industries or branches of economic activity to attract corporate investment.
134
 
 
Tax neutrality implies that no room exists for tax competition 
 
The neutrality principle dictates that taxation should not influence business decisions. The 
current international tax regime seeks to tax business proceeds at the investment location. 
Practice shows that countries use their international tax systems to mutually compete rather 
than to mutually cooperate. Countries compete in the area of taxation to attract and preserve 
investment within their geographic territories; the ‘race for the tax base’.
135
 Tax competition 
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between states is essentially incapable of enhancing the efficiency of the current international 
regime. 
 
In the current origin oriented international tax regime seeking to tax firms at the investment 
location, the tax competition phenomenon drives average effective tax rates and corporate tax 
revenues downwards, ceteris paribus.
136
 This means that in all manifestations of tax 
competition, the international tax regime, in its current manifestation may ultimately force the 
effective tax rate on business proceeds to nil – the ‘race to the bottom hypothesis’.
137
 Logics 
prescribe the recognition of states playing a zero sum game. By attracting business activities 
to a certain state through granting tax incentives inevitably mutual spill-over effects are 
triggered. The tax-induced attraction of investment to one state would necessarily be at the 
expense of another. A favorable tax climate in one state equals a revenue cost in the other. 
 
Accordingly, little conceptual basis exists for the commonly acknowledged differentiation in 
tax law between harmful and – apparently – ‘unharmful’ tax competition.
138
 There is no 
conceptual dividing line between harmful and unharmful tax competition. That is, at least to 
the extent it is desired to tax firm rents in a globalized economy. The difficulties that both the 
OECD and the institutions of the European Union encounter in defining what should be 
considered ‘harmful tax competition’ in an unbiased manner under their ‘soft law’ approaches, 
adopted to tackle this phenomenon, are illustrative in this respect.
139
 
 
It seems that nation states may only compete with each other when they try to attract foreign 
investment through optimizing nation state administrative net outputs. That is, the level of 
efficiency in respect of the cost of government incurred where a sovereign state 
administratively fulfils its distributive tasks.
140
 Then, the tendency will be to direct investment 
towards the state with the lowest tax costs to public goods ratio, i.e., the most efficiently 
arranged government. 
 
2.2.3.2 Neutrality in corporate taxation matches equality in corporate taxation 
As with equity, the tax neutrality principle may considered to be founded on the equality 
principle as well. Accordingly the tax neutrality principle requires equal tax treatment in 
economic equivalent circumstances; economic equality in taxation that is. Under the 
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foundation concept of income adhered to in this study, the choice has been made to subject 
economic wealth accrual to taxation as a substitute for measuring well-being. This implies that 
the ability to pay principle and the benefits principle result from the neutrality concept also. 
The proceeds from each business activity should be taxed equivalently. That is because 
unequal corporate tax treatment in equal economic circumstances – hence, inequality – 
distorts business decisions and therefore the distribution of production factors. 
 
Inequitable corporate tax treatment is economically inefficient, and therefore distortive. Equity 
and neutrality are interchangeable concepts as both ensue from the same underlying notion, 
i.e., the notion that equal economic circumstances should be treated equally. Why would a 
profit-driven economic operator for instance decide to engage in a certain business activity if it 
were to be confronted with a comparatively burdensome unequal corporate tax treatment on 
the proceeds derived from this activity? Suppose that our shoe seller mentioned above would 
be treated less favorably for tax purposes. Shoe Sales Company would be subject to a higher 
tax burden on its income compared to our taxi services enterprise Taxi Company. Rationally, 
Shoe Sales Company would cease its shoe selling activities and start a taxi service business 
as Taxi Company did, ceteris paribus. It would be rewarded with an increase of its after-tax 
profit. Hence, unequal corporate tax treatment influences business decisions. 
 
As unequal tax treatment influences the behavior of economic operators, I find it hard to 
recognize a trade-off between equity and economic efficiency – i.e., other than sometimes 
argued in the literature. That is to say, at least not within the context of corporate income 
taxation. 
 
Let me illustrate this with another example, this one regarding progressive tax rates. In my 
view tax rate progressiveness as called upon by vertical inter-taxpayer equity may evenly be 
based on economic theory. Under the law of diminishing or declining marginal utility, the 
perceived value or utility of a good declines with each additional unit acquired. The first euro 
or dollar of income derived by a taxpayer has a high degree of utility. The second, third, and 
basically each marginal euro or dollar of income derived has a progressively lower marginal 
utility for the taxpayer. This means that a progressively higher tax levied on a marginal 
increase of each unit of income derived, in terms of utility has the effect of enhancing equality 
in respect of the tax burden imposed. As the utility of a marginal item of income declines, a 
higher amount of tax should be levied to effectively reach the same tax burden imposed, i.e., 
in terms of utility. Although nominally higher the tax burden would substantially be the same, 
in terms of utility that is. This also explains why flat income tax rates are often considered to 
have a regressive effect in terms of utility. Accordingly, as taxation can be seen as an 
instrument available to the government to redistribute individual well-being to optimize the 
collective well-being of the population, wealth transfers from the more well-off to the less well-
off via the fiscal system under progressive tax rates may not only be based on equity grounds 
but on economic theory as well, i.e., the law of diminishing marginal utility. The rationale of 
declining marginal utility may accordingly be seen as to also apply, at least derivatively, within 
the context of a corporate tax. After all, a corporate tax in fact operates as an advance levy to 
the individual income tax.
141
 
 
2.2.3.3 Pursuing worldwide economic efficiency 
Various commentators have argued that sovereign states should pursue worldwide economic 
efficiency.
142
 The gist is that no state should attempt to use its tax competences to change 
relative prices in the other state any more than it would in the absence of taxes, as this would 
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be at the expense of both itself as well as the foreign nation state.
143
 This means amongst 
others that neither the economic operator’s place of residence nor the place of its business 
activities should influence the way in which the taxpayer is effectively taxed. 
 
In a global market, worldwide efficiency and national efficiency go hand in hand. The national 
and international income tax system of a default state is, or at least should be founded on 
ideas on an international tax policy that serves the well-being of that state’s people in the 
broadest sense. As described above the same objective has been pursued by the European 
Union. 
 
An internationally competitive national open market benefits from an undistorted 
internationalization of domestic business. The strive for national economic efficiency 
simultaneously entails the strive for worldwide economic efficiency. Consequently, the pursue 
of worldwide efficiency should be a cornerstone of a state’s national and international tax 
policy and its national or international income tax system in today’s emerging global 
marketplace. 
 
2.2.4 Administrative convenience; getting rid of the red tape 
In addition to the concepts of equity and economic efficiency, the principle of administrative 
convenience, or simplicity is generally recognized as one of the principles of sound taxation 
as well.
144
 It basically requires the tax system produces as little red tape as possible. “The 
notion of simplicity encompasses the comprehensibility of the system, the ease with which 
taxpayers can figure out how much they owe with absolute certainty, and how much time and 
effort they have to put into complying with the tax system. It reflects the extent to which 
taxpayers have to consult expert counsel from their lawyers or accountants either to compute 
their taxes or to take advantage of tax-saving devices.”
145
 
 
Administrative convenience may be viewed from two perspectives, that of the tax 
administration and that of the taxpayer. The tax authorities seek administrative convenience 
when assessing the corporate tax liability of the corporate taxpayer. The taxpayer seeks 
administrative convenience when complying with the tax laws. In a globalizing economy, 
obligations for taxpayers to provide information on their international business income, as well 
as agreements between states on mutual administrative assistance and cooperation, 
obviously are of significant importance. This is also true for legal remedies available to 
taxpayers under domestic law and under mutual agreement procedures and international 
arbitration procedures laid down in international agreements, for example, the relevant 
provisions in bilateral tax conventions and the many tax information exchange agreements 
worldwide in place. Within the context of European Union one may think of the Arbitration 
Convention in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises and the 
European Union Directives on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters.
146
 Moreover, 
the parties involved should obviously be entitled to litigate unresolved matters through an 
independent judicial system at all times. 
 
Simplicity or administrative convenience arguments, however, in my view do not have the 
same hierarchical status as the equality principle. The principle of equal treatment before the 
law should not be refuted on the basis of administrative convenience arguments.
147
 The 
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principle of administrative convenience plays a role in support of the principle of equality. It 
should not be the other way around. 
 
The principle of administrative convenience fulfils a different role than the notions of equity 
and neutrality. The simplicity argument is of a practical nature – it seeks to reduce red tape. It 
deals with the question whether tax can be assessed without insurmountable practical 
difficulties. Other than for equity and neutrality, the principle of administrative convenience 
does not see to the normative question how tax should be allocated among taxpayers and 
between states. In that respect, the principle of administrative convenience may only impose 
practical limitations to efforts pursuing equity and neutrality in practice. Hence, a theoretically 
sound, i.e., an equitable and economically efficient, distribution of tax cannot be contaminated 
with arguments of an administrative convenience nature. Practical problems ask for practical 
solutions. The equality principle provides the will, simplicity the way. 
 
2.3 Fairness requires international coordination, but fiscal sovereignty 
2.3.1 International coordination required 
The notions of equity and neutrality as set forth in the above call for a coordination of the 
international tax regime. Only common approaches in the international tax law design can 
sufficiently secure the single taxation of business income and may accordingly promote global 
efficiency.
148
 
 
It may even be said that to arrive at true equal tax treatment in economic equal circumstances 
this would conceptually require a globally harmonized corporation tax system.
149
 “In a real 
world situation in which there are cross-border flows of portfolio and direct investment, and 
also international trade, than all traditional forms of taxation would be distorting unless they 
were completely harmonized. (…) [M]arket neutrality (…) holds if taxes do not distort 
competition between companies; that is, one company does not derive a tax-induced 
competitive advantage over another. It is clear from this analysis that market neutrality would 
require full harmonization of source and residence corporation taxes.”
150
 Only a full global 
harmonization of the international tax systems of countries can overcome the distortions in 
the allocation of corporate tax among taxpayers and between states in a global market place 
– i.e., the obstacles, disparities and inadequacies referred to in Chapter 1 of this study.
151
 
 
2.3.2 Suggestions and proposals forwarded for a corporate tax 2.0 by others 
Prior tax scholarship has produced a range of suggestions and proposals to arrive at a 
coordinated alternative international tax regime. 
 
Various commentators have for instance advocated a unitary business approach to come to a 
system where basically the multinational group is treated as a single tax entity for corporate 
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tax purposes.
152
 That would allow for a global tax consolidating (or a regional alternative) or 
otherwise cross-border pooling of taxable profits.
153
 
 
A coordination of the consolidated taxable base of multinational firms should by no means be 
impossible to achieve. “Theoretically, income should be determinable on a uniform basis. 
Definitions of income or net income may differ between countries, but this does not mean that 
such differences cannot be reconciled. Worldwide consolidated financial accounting clearly 
represents an effort to do so.”
154
 Indeed, “[f]inancial accounting and tax accounting methods 
frequently differ materially. Given that each is directed to serve a different purpose this is not 
surprising. The preparation of consolidated financial statements, however, demonstrates that 
the consolidated or combined tax statements can be prepared and the reconciliation of tax 
and book or financial income is a common requirement on most tax returns.”
155
 “If problems 
exist … the answer is not to abandon the unitary method but to adopt more appropriate 
measures.”
156 
 
 
The so determined multinational firm’s global tax base would subsequently be divided among 
the respective tax jurisdictions in which the firm is active on the basis of a profit allocation key. 
That key should reflect the economic presence of the multinational within the relevant tax 
jurisdiction. That is because the tax should be levied as closest as possible to its geographic 
source. 
 
It has been suggested that this profit division key should be based on the ‘profit split or 
residual profit split method’ in transfer pricing, producing a tax allocation mechanism referred 
to as a ‘global profit split’.
157
 It has also been suggested to use a predetermined fixed formula 
– an approach that is referred to as ‘global formulary apportionment’.
158
 It has further been 
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advanced in the literature to combine the two – i.e., the split of the residual profit by reference 
to a metric formula.
159
 Notably, the European Commission proposal of 16 March 2011 for a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (‘CCCTB’) envisages a harmonized European 
Union-wide cross-border consolidated corporate taxable base to be shared among the 
Member States by reference to a formulary apportionment mechanism also.
160
 The purpose 
hereof is to achieve equity and neutrality in the field of corporate income taxation within the 
territories of the European Union.
161
 
 
One difficult aspect that must be taken into consideration is that the allocation key should 
adequately tie down a firm’s geographical presence. This is exactly what the current 
international tax regime fails to accomplish. In the event that a newly developed allocation key 
would be unable to achieve this, it would be as inadequate as the current one. In which case, 
the allocation of tax between states would still not be in accordance with economic reality. 
 
This looming scenario inspired Auerbach, Devereux and Simpson to propose even more 
radical changes: a business income tax based on cash flows, the ‘destination-based cash 
flow tax’.
162
 Such a tax would subject economic rents to tax and for tax base allocation 
purposes it would be linked to the goods supplied and the services rendered by economic 
operators at the customer location. It would function conceptually in a manner akin to a 
destination-based value added tax system based on cash flows rather than on invoices. And 
any wages paid would effectively be tax-deductible. 
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The potential alternatives to the current international tax regime are discussed in more detail 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Notably, if corporate tax rates would also be coordinated, any tax rate 
disparities would be cancelled out as well. In such a case, it would become completely 
insignificant for corporate income tax purposes where a corporate taxpayer resides for tax 
purposes or where it carries on its business operations geographically. Regardless of the 
geographic location of the firm, its investments, or its supplies of goods and services, its 
effective average tax rate would always be identical. All distortions in the allocation of tax 
among taxpayers would accordingly be taken away. As taxation would cease to distort the 
geographic distribution of production factors in that event, such an approach would not only 
be supported by equity arguments, but also by tax neutrality arguments.
163
 Indeed, “as long 
as each company faces the same effective corporate tax rate on all its investments then 
location decisions will not be distorted.”
164
 
 
2.3.3 But fiscal sovereignty… 
Attaining some sort of augmented level of coordination of the international tax systems of 
countries as said has a price. It necessarily needs to be accompanied with a transfer of 
autonomy in the field of direct taxation to some sort of a supranational body. That body would 
set, execute and enforce the rules, and would subsequently settle any disputes that arise.
165
 
 
This position may be illustrated by reference to the work done in approximating the tax 
systems of countries within the context of the European Union. In the end, the pursue of the 
shared objective of the Member States and the European Union to obtain a true internal 
market without internal frontiers requires the transfer of sovereignty to the Union.
166
 Illustrative 
are the harmonization efforts undertaken by the European Commission – efforts effectively 
necessitating autonomy transfers from the Member States to the European Union. No room 
exists for tax borders in an internal market without internal frontiers. 
 
However, the 1920s Compromise on which basis the current international tax systems of 
countries, including those of the European Union Member States, are currently built is 
quintessentially based on the sovereign entitlements of nation states to levy tax to finance 
expenditure. This has resulted in the current tax borders. Indeed, today’s reality of twenty-
eight different international tax systems of as many European Union Member States set-up 
alongside tax borders analytically cannot coincide with the pursue of an internal market 
without internal frontiers. Each difference in the tax burden regarding intra-European Union 
business activities relative to purely domestic business activities involves a distortion of the 
internal market. A distortion in need to be removed through an approximation of the Member 
States’ corporate tax systems.
167
 
 
An internal market without internal frontiers can only be realized through a uniform European 
Union Company Income Tax (‘EUCIT’).
168
 Equivalently, a borderless global market can only 
function under a global corporation tax. Seen from this perspective, the sovereignty of states 
in direct tax matters today – and with that, an allocation of corporate tax alongside tax borders 
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– is a pragmatic, preliminary, alternative for a genuine global market. The same holds true for 
the internal market without internal frontiers.
169
 Hence, as it currently stands, European Union 
law in the field of direct taxation finds itself in a transitional period. The same is true for the 
international tax regime. There is no difference between the fiscal sovereignty of states in the 
internal market and the fiscal sovereignty of states in the global market. 
 
Regardless of the theoretical soundness, or lack thereof, of the coordination suggestions 
advanced in the literature and the harmonization proposals of the European Commission, 
today, they all merely exist on the drawing board. And chances are that this will remain so for 
the time being. It perhaps is not very realistic to assume any proposals will be adopted 
anytime soon. 
 
The reason for this is that a transfer of competences in taxation necessarily implies a transfer 
of sovereignty for international law public purposes. After all, the fiscal sovereignty of a state 
is a quintessential feature of the concept of a state in international law. A state cannot 
function without the power to tax. And today, states prove unwilling to give up their 
sovereignty in corporate tax matters. This is true, both globally and regionally (e.g. within the 
European Union. 
 
Illustrative is the legislative constraint within the context of the European Union where the 
Member States on the one hand express the objective to approximate tax legislation requiring 
a transfer of sovereignty to the union, while the same Member States on the other hand seek 
to maintain their competence to levy direct taxes – illustrated by the Member States’ 
unanimous vote upon the passing of European Union tax legislation.
170
 It is no coincidence 
that the harmonization of direct taxation within the European Union has been kept limited to 
only a few Directives and the Arbitration Convention; and only time will tell whether the 
Member States will truly be willing to adopt the Commission proposals for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. 
 
But as long as the suggestions and proposals remain on the drawing board, fairness will not 
exist in the reality. The market distortions that result from the obstacles, disparities and 
inadequacies in the nation states’ international tax systems will linger on as long as they are 
not resolved. The status quo will effectively be upheld as long as states remain unwilling to 
resolve the problems that they have created. This however does not mean that we should 
stop thinking about an optimal international tax regime. 
 
2.4 Final remarks 
This chapter addresses the question of how to understand the notion of fairness in 
international corporate taxation. What constitutes the benchmark to assess the fairness or 
unfairness of the international tax regime? What are the principles underlying a sound tax 
system? 
 
It is argued that the notion of fairness in corporate taxation is founded on the equality 
principle, thereby conforming to the historically widely acknowledged notion of equal 
treatment before the law. Economic equal circumstances should be treated equally for tax 
purposes. Unequal economic circumstances should be treated unequally for tax purposes 
insofar as the circumstances are unequal. 
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From the equality postulate it can be deduced that everyone in an economic relationship with 
a taxing state has the obligation to contribute to the financing of public goods from which one 
benefits in accordance with one’s means – ‘equity’. And production factors should be 
distributed on the basis of market mechanisms without, or at least with as little as possible, 
public interference – ‘economic efficiency’. Taxation should be in line with economic reality; it 
should not affect business decisions – tax neutrality, including the neutrality of legal form. 
Income should be taxed once, as close as possible to its source. 
 
It has further been set forth that: 
 
 in a global market environment it should be irrelevant for corporate tax purposes 
where the economic operator has its place of residence for tax purposes. It should 
also be irrelevant whether or not the economic operator involved performs its 
business activities in a cross-border context – see further Chapter 3; 
 the taxable entity for corporate tax purposes should correspond to the economic 
operator deriving the business income. If it concerns the taxation of a multinational 
firm, the firm should be treated as the taxable entity for corporate tax purposes – see 
further Chapter 4; 
 the tax base should be designed by reference to a foundation income concept that 
truly focuses on business income. It should tax business cash flows or economic 
rents, as these constitute the remuneration for the production factor of enterprise – 
see further Chapter 5; 
 the tax should be levied once at the location that corresponds to the income’s 
geographical source as closely as possible – see further Chapter 6. 
  
Moreover, the argument has been made that fairness in corporate taxation may ultimately 
only be achieved through a worldwide coordination of country tax systems. Indeed, various 
scholars have suggested possible approaches to achieve this means. The suggestions range 
from global profit splits to destination based cash flow taxes. The European Commission 
envisages a European Union wide cross-border consolidated corporate tax base to be shared 
among the Member States by reference to a formulary mechanism. 
 
Indeed, it perhaps cannot be expected that any of these suggestions will leave the drawing 
board any time soon. Nation states seem politically unwilling to give up their sovereign 
entitlements in the field of direct taxation; a necessary prerequisite to achieve some form of 
tax approximation. Perhaps, the tax sovereignty of states should be taken as a given. That is 
to say, at least to some extent, for instance with regards to establishing the tax rate (see 
further Chapter 6). 
 
This however does not mean that political realities provide a sufficient argument to stop 
thinking about an optimal international tax regime. As long as the suggestions put forward 
continue to exist on the drawing board only, fairness in corporate taxation will not be achieved 
in reality. As long as nation states remain unwilling to resolve the problems that they have 
created, the status quo will not change. The problems in the international tax regime will not 
be resolved by adhering to political realities. “Political opposition should be recognized for 
what it is.”
171
 Let us proceed.  
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Chapter 3 Towards a fair international tax regime; eliminating obstacles 
3.1 Introduction
172
 
Chapter 2, the first analytical part of the analysis in this study, concludes with the observation 
that the concepts of equity and neutrality in corporate taxation ultimately call for a 
coordination of the international corporate tax systems of nation states. Tax coordination 
necessarily involves the acceptance of an erosion of the nation state competences to design 
their corporate tax systems autonomously though. Tax coordination requires states to align 
their tax systems and calls for bilateral or multilateral action. 
 
Were the starting point of thinking be taken that such bilateral or multilateral action, for 
whatever reason, is unattainable the following question arises. What could, or perhaps should 
states unilaterally do to remove the distortions in their international tax systems created by 
themselves? How could countries mitigate the obstacles they unilaterally impose when they 
tax corporate income from sources earned by multinationals in their respective territories? 
 
The analysis in this chapter builds on the analytical assumption that the fiscal sovereignty of 
states is taken as a given. State sovereignty in taxation forms the departure point of the 
analysis. It follows that also the environment of an uncoordinated international tax regime 
should be taken as a given, i.e. an international tax regime that comprises of as many 
disparate international tax systems as there are sovereign nation states. What could 
individual states unilaterally do to advance the fairness of their own international tax systems? 
The second analytical part of this study contained in this single Chapter 3 is devoted to 
answering this question. 
 
This chapter accordingly addresses the unilaterally imposed obstacles in the international tax 
systems of states that hinder the functioning of the global market. As identified in Chapter 1, 
obstacles arise when the international tax systems of states internally impose a different tax 
treatment on cross-border business activities relative to domestic business activities. The 
absence of tax parity in domestic and cross-border economic environments is the effect of 
unilateral tax legislative action. 
 
As states impose these obstacles unilaterally, they can also resolve them unilaterally. 
Coordination is unnecessary in this area as countries do not need each other to resolve the 
obstacles in their own tax systems. This is conceptually true for the obstacles in the 
international tax system of any state – i.e., of the countries that are a member of the 
European Union and of the countries that are not. The mere difference in the legal reality of 
European Union countries and non-European Union countries is that European Union law has 
made available a remedy to counter the obstacles in the tax systems of the Member States in 
the form of the fundamental freedoms. Where European Union law and its free movement 
rights apply, the Court of Justice is competent to strike down the discriminatory and restrictive 
obstacles in the Member States’ international tax systems. Where European Union law does 
not apply, obviously, no legal remedy is available as it the case for the obstacles in the tax 
systems of the states that are not party to the European Union. But the lack of a legal remedy 
in these contexts does not mean that obstacles are conceptually absent in these contexts. 
 
Drawing inspiration from what I consider the best elements of existing theories, concepts and 
practices in international tax law and European Union law, it is argued in this chapter that a 
nation state’s international tax system should be internally fair. The argument accordingly is 
built on a concept of ‘tax fairness within the international tax system of a state’. For this 
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purpose, the equality principle is explored as it is addressed within the European Union under 
the fundamental freedoms, and the interpretation thereof by the Court of Justice. The notion 
of tax fairness within the international tax system boils down to something that is referred to 
as ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’ in this study. 
 
The widely known tax policy concepts of the neutrality of the import and export of capital and 
labor are assessed as well to prove that tax neutrality is actually absent under these two 
concepts. Import neutrality promoting tax systems distort production factor exports. Export 
neutrality promoting tax systems distort production factor imports. The same necessarily goes 
for double tax relief systems in international tax systems that are based on these neutrality 
concepts. An alternative a concept is developed that is referred to as ‘production factor 
neutrality’. This neutrality concept proves to promote tax neutrality of both inbound and 
outbound movements of the production factors of capital, labor and enterprise. 
 
The point made is that ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’ ask for the 
levy of a worldwide taxation on the business proceeds of firms that have a business 
connection, nexus, in a taxing state. To acknowledge the single tax principle, this worldwide 
taxation should be combined with an equitable and neutral form of double tax relief. For that 
purpose, the mechanism adhered to is the double tax relief methodology as is currently 
available to tax paying individuals residing in the Netherlands: the ‘credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income’. This produces a model in which all countries involved pay tax 
on their share of the worldwide income to which they are entitled; ‘taxing the fraction’. 
 
This chapter concludes by illustrating the non-distortive effects of the advocated fractional 
approach by means of numerical examples under a progressive tax rate structure, cross-
border losses, intra-firm modes of transfers and currency exchange rate fluctuations. A 
thought experiment is engaged into for this purpose, which assumes that the model is utilized 
at both sides of the tax border. That is to analytically cancel out the effects of the tax 
disparities that are dealt with as an analytically separate matter in Chapters 4 through 6. The 
approach taken conceptually corresponds to the ‘internal consistency test’ in US constitutional 
law.
173
 This chapter is wrapped-up with an analytical linking of the advocated approach with 
that of the Court of Justice in its case law in direct tax matters. 
 
3.2 What standard should be required for an international tax system to be ‘fair’? 
3.2.1 General remarks 
The sub-question of how to eliminate the unilaterally imposed obstacles in the international 
tax system of a nation state is actually preceded by another one: what standard has to be 
fulfilled for an international tax system to qualify as internally ‘fair’? How can one achieve 
fairness within a state’s international tax system with respect to the corporate taxation of 
multinationals that are active within their territories? The answer to this question would 
provide the key to the development of a concept of fairness within an international tax system, 
i.e., an international tax system without obstacles. 
  
Inspiration for an answer to this question can again be found in international tax theory.
174
 
Leads can also be found in the case law of the Court of Justice interpreting the European 
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Union’s fundamental freedoms in the field of direct taxation. With every preliminary question 
on the fundamental freedoms in this area, the Court of Justice sees itself confronted with the 
same question: ‘Does European Union Member State X impose an obstacle (discrimination / 
restriction) when applying tax measure Y; yes or no?’
175
 
 
One may therefore expect that the Court of Justice, when answering this question, would 
analytically adopt the same reasoning each and every time for this purpose. That is because 
the court is called upon to give a preliminary ruling on analytically the same question in each 
and every occasion. Assuming the court’s reasoning is analytically sound, an analysis of its 
case law should enable a deduction of the underlying rules directing its rulings. Much like the 
solutions of mathematical problems enable the deduction of the underlying mathematical 
rules directing these solutions. One could similarly infer the underlying standards adopted by 
the Court of Justice from its case law. These standards would then provide the building blocks 
for an international tax system without obstacles. This provides all the reason to explore the 
Court’s case law to somewhat deduce its underlying reasoning therefrom. Unfortunately, as 
will be shown the Court of Justice’s reasoning however is not consistent. 
 
3.2.2 Fairness within the system; tax competence at state level, disparities as a 
given 
The exploration of the notion of fairness within an international tax system in this chapter 
requires that the following analytical assumption is made. As said, for the purpose of pursuing 
the analysis, the current reality of the competences of the nation states to levy direct taxes is 
taken as a given. 
 
Logic prescribes that the necessary consequences of the sovereignty supposition should be 
taken as a given also. This for instance holds regarding disparities, or mismatches. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, disparities are market distortions that occur due to mutual 
divergences between the international tax systems of states. Disparities are the consequence 
of non-coordination in the international tax regime. Examples include the market distortions 
that result from the mutual divergences in the taxable entity, base, and rate, as well as mutual 
divergences in the application of the international tax principles of nationality, source and 
residence. Disparities result in different tax burdens on the proceeds from cross-border 
economic activities in comparison with proceeds from purely domestic economic activities. 
This affects the geographic distribution of production factors. The presence of disparities or 
mismatches is widely considered problematic.
176
 
 
It also follows from this that disparities can only be considered problematic if one is willing to 
encroach upon the sovereignty supposition, as the disparities in the international tax regime 
may only be removed through tax-coordination; and tax-coordination necessarily requires the 
limitation of nation state competences in the field of direct taxation. 
 
However, even though disparities are typically considered problematic, the requirement for 
resolving it, i.e., a transfer of autonomy is generally considered unacceptable. Illustrative in 
this regard is the trend in the European Union where European Union Member States on the 
one hand express the objective to harmonize their tax and other legislation, which requires a 
transfer of sovereignty to the European Union, while the same Member States on the other 
hand seek to maintain their sovereign competence to levy direct taxes. 
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3.2.3 Equity within the international tax system of a state 
3.2.3.1 The benefits principle and the ability to pay principle within the international 
tax system of a state 
 
In Chapter 2 it is noted that the notion of equity is a moral concept that is founded on the 
principle of equality. As said, everyone in an economic relationship with a taxing state has the 
moral obligation to contribute to the financing of the public goods provided from which one 
benefits – i.e., the benefits principle – in accordance with one’s means – i.e., the ability to pay 
principle. A further cornerstone property of each international tax system of a state, as said, is 
the single tax principle.
177
 It is both unfair and inefficient to tax the same income more than 
once or not at all.
178
 Under the assumption of a nation state’s fiscal sovereignty, a corporate 
taxpayer’s business profits should be taxed once, by one state only, as close to its source as 
possible. 
 
From this it may be deduced that the notion of equity within a tax system requires that the 
level of tax should be determined by some rough reference to the public goods provided by 
the taxing state. That is to appreciate the benefits principle.
179
 Corporate taxpayers should 
contribute to the financing of public goods provided by a nation state irrespective of their 
place of residence, as soon as their economic presence within that state exceeds a certain 
minimum threshold – a business connection; ‘nexus’.
180
 The tax should be levied as close as 
possible to its source, i.e., where the multinational conducts its business activities.
181
 
Examples of tax jurisdiction thresholds currently applied by states are the concepts of 
permanent establishment and the place of effective management.
182
 The question of whether 
these thresholds operate adequately, as said, is addressed in Chapter 6. 
 
3.2.3.2 Equity requires that a tax-border crossing has no effect on the overall tax 
burden imposed by a state 
When it comes to the determination of the corporate tax burden in the taxing state where the 
relevant multinational firm has some nexus, it may also be deduced from the equity notion 
that it should be immaterial where the corporate taxpayer has it geographical place of 
residence. It should also be immaterial whether the firm derived its business proceeds 
geographically; from sources solely within that state or from sources geographically dispersed 
across a multitude of states. The firm’s worldwide corporate earnings should be taken into 
account in this respect. That is to appreciate the ability to pay principle. 
 
Equity further requires countries to give the same tax treatment to taxpayers engaging into 
tax-border passages as those taxpayers that do not and only operate within that country’s 
territories. The tax border crossing should be immaterial in the determination of the tax 
burden imposed on the taxpayer. For example, the business proceeds that corporate 
taxpayer ‘Shoe Sales Company’ mentioned in the previous chapter derives from its shoe 
selling business should be taxed equally irrespective of whether the firm resides locally or 
                                                     
177
 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime’, 
61 Bulletin for International Taxation 130 (2007), at 131. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as 
International Law; An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (2007), at Chapters 1 and 10 and Klaus Vogel, ‘“State 
of Residence” may as well be “State of Source” – There is No Contradiction’, 59 Bulletin for International Taxation 
420 (2005), at 420-423. 
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 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime’, 61 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 130 (2007), at 131. 
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 Although the relationship between thee taxes paid and the public goods received cannot be measured, it does not 
follow from this that such a relationship is absent. 
180
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime’, 61 Bulletin for 
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 See for a comparison Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the 
End of the World’, 2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 310. 
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Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World’, 2 World Tax 
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abroad for corporate tax purposes. Moreover, the tax burden imposed on Shoe Sales 
Company by the relevant taxing state should be equal regardless of whether the firm operates 
a shoe store only around the corner or abroad as well. Not only its tax place of residence, but 
also the question as to whether it derives its proceeds from sources within a single tax 
jurisdiction or across various tax jurisdictions should be immaterial in determining the effective 
tax burden imposed by the taxing jurisdiction involved. That is because both the ability to pay 
principle and the benefits principle should be simultaneously respected. 
 
Would it be equitable to subject a firm to a different tax burden depending on the question 
where the taxpayer involved has geographically located its place of tax residence? Or 
whether it decided to geographically derive its business income from sources within a single 
state or spread across various states? In an increasingly borderless global market 
environment, that is? Would it be fair to subject taxpayers to diverging tax burdens due to the 
mere business decision to operate in a cross-border environment, rather than in a purely 
domestic environment? My answer would be negative as I do not recognize the change in 
circumstances of passing a tax-border as a relevant parameter to determine the corporate tax 
burden on proceeds from domestic sources. Tax borders are constructs, legal lines drawn by 
man. Both the ‘overtaxation’ and ‘undertaxation’ of cross-border business activities in 
comparison with non-cross-border (domestic) business activities should essentially be 
considered unfair.
183
 
 
3.2.3.3 Market equality principle in European Union law requires the same 
 
 European Union law requires that cross-border economic activity is treated on  
 a par with domestic economic activity for tax purposes  
 
The notions of equity as explained in the above paragraph may be recognized within the 
context of the European Union as well. Where the Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union applies, the fundamental freedoms – as interpreted and explained by the Court of 
Justice – recognize the equality principle in an equivalent manner. 
 
In general, the Court of Justice’s approach is fairly distinct. Provided that the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union applies, free movement means that all economic 
operators may rely on the application of the same national tax rules for participation in the 
domestic markets of the respective European Union Member States, irrespective of their 
place of residence – the ‘market equality principle’.
184
 In the event that a Member State 
disregards the principle of market equality by taxing economic operators differently on the 
basis of their place of residence, this Member State imposes an obstacle – i.e., it 
discriminates. 
 
The obstacles that the European Union Member States have created in their international tax 
systems distort the functioning of the internal market. Economic operators often see 
themselves hindered when moving between the domestic markets of the respective European 
Union Member States. The crossing of a tax-border by an economic operator within the 
borderless internal market often results in a tax treatment that differs from the treatment in a 
domestic scenario. Moving across tax jurisdictions within the internal market often has effects 
in terms of the tax burdens imposed by the individual European Member States. As tax border 
passages should not have an effect in an internal market without internal frontiers in terms of 
the tax burden imposed by a Member State, obstacles are incompatible with the fundamental 
freedoms. 
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 See Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
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As said, the issue is not limited conceptually to the tax systems of the European Union 
Member States. The unilaterally created tax inequities in country tax systems faced by 
economic operators and their investments upon crossing a tax border do not only distort the 
functioning of the internal market, but also distort the functioning of the emerging global 
market. As said, there is no conceptual difference between the internal market and the global 
market. 
 
 Tax parity of resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers 
 
The sizeable flow of rulings of the Court of Justice in the field of direct taxation neatly 
illustrates the inequities and inefficiencies in the international tax systems of the European 
Union Member States. The fundamental freedoms and the case law of the Court of Justice 
interpreting the operation of these freedoms further provides lines of reasoning on how to 
dissolve these obstacles. This makes it worthwhile to look at the case law worthy to look into. 
 
According to various rulings of the Court of Justice, residents and non-residents are in a 
comparable position when a Member State exerts its fiscal sovereignty over them.
185
 Resident 
and non-resident taxpayers accordingly find themselves in equal circumstances on the mere 
basis that the taxing state exercises its taxing powers over both of them. 
 
For tax purposes, this means that a non-resident taxpayer deserves the same tax treatment 
as a resident by a European Union Member State as soon as this European Union Member 
State decides to tax this non-resident. Member States are typically considered to have tax 
jurisdiction if and to the extent that a non-resident conducts business activities through a 
branch – i.e., a permanent establishment – situated in that state. Tax jurisdiction is typically 
also exercised when a non-resident is subject to a source tax, for instance on outward bound 
dividends, interests or royalty payments. 
 
The economic operator’s place of residence should be of no relevance whatsoever when it 
comes to determining its tax burden in a European Union Member State. However, this notion 
does not correspond to the residence principle as employed in the OECD and the UN Model 
Conventions on income and capital – establishing limited tax liability for non-resident 
taxpayers on the one hand and unlimited tax liability for resident taxpayers in combination 
with double tax relief on the other hand.
186
 
 
Tax parity requirement does not apply unimpaired – Court of Justice 
 
However, under primary European Union law in the field of direct taxation, as it currently 
stands, the principle of equality unfortunately does not apply unimpaired. For example, the 
concept of ‘most favored nation treatment’ as an expression of the equality principle is not 
acknowledged by the Court of Justice. European Union law as it currently stands seems to 
allow that residents of other Member States are treated differently compared to residents of 
third Member States under their double tax conventions, in my view for indistinct – though 
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 Cf. Court of Justice, cases C-527/06 (Renneberg), C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal), C-379/05 (Amurta), as well 
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the Court (unfortunately, in our view) accepted that residents and nonresidents are not, as a rule, comparable for 
income taxation purposes (case C-279/93 (Schumacker), in order to allow source taxation for nonresidents and 
worldwide taxation for residents”, and at 525: “But: Residents and Nonresidents Are Not in a Different Position”. See 
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politically understandable – reasons.
187
 For example, in the D. case, the Court of Justice 
allowed the Netherlands to tax-treat non-resident taxpayers residing in Germany differently 
from non-resident taxpayers residing in Belgium and taxpayers residing in the Netherlands. 
Taxpayers that resided in Germany were refused the allowance for wealth tax whereas those 
that resided in Belgium and the Netherlands were entitled to the allowance for wealth tax.
188
 
 
Moreover, the Court of Justice unfortunately seems to condone that Member States reversely 
discriminate against their taxpayers who are nationals or residents compared to taxpayers 
who are non-nationals/residents or non-nationals/non-residents. The Court allows the 
Member States to tax-treat the ‘foreigner’. An example of a reversed discrimination 
sanctioned by the Court of Justice is the case of the Heirs of M.E.A. van Hilten-van der 
Heijden.
189
 The case involved Dutch inheritance tax, which provides that the estate of a Dutch 
national who dies within ten years after his or her emigration from the Netherlands to a foreign 
country is taxed as if that national had continued to reside within the Netherlands. A credit for 
foreign estate tax is provided for double tax relief purposes. The estates of emigrated non-
nationals, however, are not subject to the ten year rule – a reverse discrimination accordingly. 
The Court of Justice observed that such a difference in tax treatment for tax allocation 
purposes cannot be regarded as discrimination in breach of the fundamental freedoms. The 
Court accordingly seems to allow the Member States to discriminate against its own 
nationals, at least to a certain extent. 
 
In addition, in my view for indistinct reasons also, purely domestic scenarios fall outside the 
scope of the fundamental freedoms.
190
 Economic operators in purely domestic situations who 
receive a less favorable tax treatment than those that operate across a tax border of a 
Member State have to invoke the equality principle as applied in the domestic legal order of 
the respective Member State, or the human rights conventions to which the Member State is 
a party. An example of this can be found in the Flemish social security insurance case dealing 
with the access to Flemish social security insurances of workers in Flanders, Belgium.
191
 
Under the Flemish social security insurance under scrutiny in this Belgian case, Walloons that 
worked in Flanders were treated differently from Flemish and other European Union citizens 
working in Flanders, despite the fact that the circumstances were equal for all of them – all 
citizens conducted economic activities within the territories of the European Union, Flanders 
in this case. The Court of Justice, however, allowed Belgium to treat these citizens differently 
as it considered the unfavorable treatment of the Walloons relative to the Flemish a purely 
domestic situation. The Walloons had to invoke the equality principle laid down in the Belgian 
Constitution. 
 
This being said about the Flemish social security insurance case, however, the Belgian 
Zambrano case casts some doubt on these remarks.
192
 In Zambrano, the Court of Justice 
considered a purely internal scenario to fall within the scope of application of the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union. The Court considered European Union law, i.e., the right 
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of residence within European Union territory for European Union nationals, to apply to a minor 
child, a Belgian national, irrespective of its previous exercise of its right of free movement. So 
in this case European Union law seemed to apply also in purely domestic scenarios. Or is this 
only the case in European social security matters (except for social security insurances) and 
not in the area of direct taxation? We do not know. This renders matters legally indistinct in 
this respect.  
 
The application of European Union law also in purely domestic scenarios would make sense. 
That is because also a purely domestic activity within a European Union Member State is an 
activity undertaken within the European Union’s internal market without internal frontiers. Why 
should European Union law not apply to all activities within European Union territory? Purely 
domestic activities are activities within the internal market without internal frontiers as well. 
Why would a cross-border element have to be present to apply the Treaty on Functioning of 
the European Union in an area without internal frontiers? So the court’s case law has left a 
gap between how the freedoms ought to apply and the manner in which the court interprets 
and applies these freedoms; a difference between ‘is’ – i.e., how the law applies today – and 
‘ought’ – i.e., how the law should apply – accordingly. 
 
 Leaping forward towards market equality; Renneberg  
 
This being said, nevertheless the Court of Justice has taken a big leap forward towards the 
recognition of the ‘European Union resident’ for tax purposes in the Renneberg case.
193
 In 
Renneberg, the Court of Justice recognizes an obstacle in the tax treatment in the 
Netherlands of non-resident taxpayers deriving income from both foreign sources and 
domestic sources. The tax treatment of non-resident taxpayers differed from that of Dutch 
resident taxpayers deriving income from both foreign and domestic sources. 
 
The Netherlands allows its resident taxpayers individuals to include negative income items 
from foreign sources in the domestic, i.e., the Dutch source, tax base being the worldwide 
income. With respect to the foreign income of resident taxpayers, the Netherlands provides 
double tax relief on the basis of the so-called ‘tax exemption with progression’ method. This 
method basically functions as a credit for the Dutch income tax that is attributable to the 
foreign source income items. Please note that the double tax relief method is explained in 
detail in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter as the method in itself operates equitable and 
economically efficient. 
 
Conversely, the Netherlands does not allow non-resident taxpayers to include negative 
income items from foreign sources in the Dutch tax base. The foreign income of non-resident 
taxpayers is ‘exempt’ from Dutch tax; the territorial taxation of non-resident taxpayers. By 
doing this the Netherlands effectively provides ‘double tax relief’ to non-resident taxpayers 
through a ‘base exemption’. Regardless of the terms used, conceptually it is a base 
exemption in terms of its effects. 
 
Consequently, non-resident taxpayers who are subject to taxation at source and who receive 
‘double tax relief’ through a ‘base exemption’ are treated differently and, in the Renneberg 
case less favorably, relative to resident taxpayers who are subject to tax on their worldwide 
taxation and who receive double tax relief through the Dutch-style tax exemption. The 
difference in tax treatment is based solely on the taxpayer’s place of residence for tax 
purposes. In the Renneberg case, the Court of Justice observed that the Netherlands, by 
doing so, imposed an obstacle, i.e., an indirect discrimination that could not be justified by 
                                                     
193
 See Court of Justice, case C-527/06 (Renneberg). Contra Court of Justice, case C-250/95 (Futura). 
72
66 
 
overriding reasons in the general interest.
194-195
 Consequently, the Netherlands was required 
to eliminate this obstacle from the Dutch international tax system.
196
 
 
The Renneberg case has far-reaching consequences if the reasoning of the Court of Justice 
were to be conceptually rated at its true value and the potential effects were to be assessed in 
full. In this respect it should be noted that equal tax treatment in the manner required by the 
Court of Justice in Renneberg can only be achieved by fully removing the current difference in 
tax treatment based on the taxpayer’s residence. Tax parity would only be achieved if the 
taxpayer’s place of tax residence would be completely removed from the tax system as a 
relevant factor in determining the tax burden. 
 
It follows from logic reasoning that the parity in taxation of resident and non-resident 
taxpayers can only be achieved at the end of the day by adopting worldwide taxation for both 
residents and non-resident taxpayers once the Netherlands exercises its sovereign taxing 
powers. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, double tax relief would need to be 
granted for a taxpayer’s foreign source income items by applying the Dutch-style tax 
exemption mechanism. Territorial taxation of both residents and non-residents would prove 
analytically insufficient, for it distorts outbound movements of production factors.  
 
 Tax-parity under Renneberg versus approaches in international taxation 
 
This observation on the requirement of tax-parity of resident taxpayers and non-resident 
taxpayers is not only relevant for the Dutch international tax system. In basically all 
international tax systems worldwide the tax treatment of resident taxpayers differs from that of 
non-resident taxpayers. Resident taxpayers are typically subject to a worldwide taxation with 
a reduction for double tax relief in respect of a taxpayer’s foreign income items. Non-resident 
taxpayers on the other hand are subject to a territorial taxation; foreign source income is 
disregarded which effectively translates into a base exemption for tax purposes. Notably, as 
will be demonstrated hereunder in section 2.4.4 of this chapter, the alternative, i.e., the 
adoption of a strict territorial system in respect of both non-resident and resident taxpayers 
would not provide a solution. The same is true for a worldwide system with a base exemption 
for foreign income. That is, because territorial systems also do not promote equal tax 
treatment of domestic and cross-border economic activity in the end; they hinder outbound 
investment.
197
 
 
Indeed, the approach taken by the Court of Justice in Renneberg does not correspond to the 
typical different tax treatment of resident and non-resident taxpayers in the current 
international tax regime – i.e. worldwide taxation in combination with double tax relief for 
foreign income versus territorial taxation. And indeed, the tax differential between the resident 
and the non-resident taxpayer is even explicitly sanctioned by the OECD in its commentary 
on its Model Convention on Income and Capital.
198
 The double tax convention networks of 
essentially are essentially built on a differential in treatment between resident and non-
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resident taxpayers. A typical double tax convention for instance only applies to taxpayers that 
are resident of one of the contracting states. Non-resident taxpayers of such a contracting 
state that reside in a third-country for tax purposes are generally ineligible for treaty benefits. 
This triggers obvious non-discrimination issues as this difference in tax treatment is 
essentially discriminatory.
199
 The OECD thinks otherwise. In the commentary on its model 
convention, the OECD is of the opinion that the taxpayer’s place of residence constitutes a 
difference in circumstances justifying a different tax treatment – i.e., save for the source state 
in some specific scenarios explicitly addressed in the non-discrimination provision in Article 
24 OECD Model Convention on Income and Capital. The OECD’s approval, however, does 
not mean that things are all right conceptually. 
 
It has been observed in the literature that the ruling of the Court of Justice in Renneberg 
forms a threat to the double tax convention networks of countries as the ruling is not in line 
with international taxation concepts.
200
 Because the Renneberg ruling deviates from the 
approaches in traditional international tax law the ruling is generally considered flawed: 
‘Renneberg differs from international taxation and therefore Renneberg is wrong’.
201
 However, 
it may equivalently be argued that the double tax convention networks of countries and its 
concepts used are a threat to the equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers and non-
resident taxpayers which has been recognized by the Court of Justice in Renneberg. 
‘International taxation differs from Renneberg and therefore international taxation is wrong.’ 
 
In my view, the question of which of the approaches normatively trumps the other at this point 
requires an assessment of the underlying concept of equity. Merely pointing at the difference 
in approaches is insufficient to normatively arrive at the conclusion as to which of the two 
should prevail. Neither the Court of Justice’s observations in Renneberg, nor the approach 
taken in traditional international taxation is the test; it is the equality principle that constitutes 
the benchmark. Renneberg and the international tax approach are the objects of the test. As 
the extensive calculations in the upcoming sections shall demonstrate, the difference in the 
tax treatment of the resident and the non-resident taxpayer is essentially discriminatory. Let 
us proceed. 
 
3.2.4 Tax neutrality within the international tax system of a state 
3.2.4.1 Economic efficiency within the international tax system of a state 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the notion of economic efficiency is based on the presumption 
that the productivity of income is the highest, and with that also the fairest, when production 
factors are distributed on the basis of market mechanisms without, or at least with as little as 
possible, public interference. Taxation should not affect business decisions, neither in a 
positive nor in a negative manner. The tax parity should hold irrespective of the direction of 
the movement of capital, labor, or enterprise – tax neutrality. 
 
3.2.4.2 Tax neutrality requires that a tax-border crossing has no effect on the overall 
tax burden imposed by a state 
Tax neutrality within an international tax system accordingly requires that where a nation state 
exercises its sovereign taxing powers, the tax burden it imposes on business income earned 
from domestic sources should be the same regardless of whether the business activities 
involved are performed solely within the territories of the taxing state or performed or directed 
across the territories of various states. In terms of domestic tax burdens imposed it should be 
immaterial whether the business activities are performed in a purely domestic context or in a 
cross-border economic environment. In addition, it should be immaterial where a taxable 
economic operator has established its place of residence. 
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Let us suppose that the tax burden in a particular state differs depending on the economic 
operator’s place of residence or whether or not it performs its business activities in a cross-
border context. Take our taxpayer Taxi Company, for example. Although Taxi Company 
operates its taxi service business enterprise domestically, across the street, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2 – it resides abroad. Or let us assume that our taxpayer Taxi Company – residing 
within the territories of the taxing state operates two taxi service businesses: one domestically 
across the street and one across the border. In the event that Taxi Company’s local corporate 
tax burden would be different depending on its place of tax residence or the circumstance of 
whether or not it operates its taxi business enterprise both across the street and abroad, this 
would influence the entrepreneurial decision on keeping things local or crossing the tax 
border. Indeed, Taxi Company’s management would think twice before taking such a 
business decision. 
 
Differentials in tax burdens that arise in consequence of exercising the decision to 
economically passage the tax border obviously affects the decision as to extend business 
across the borders of a taxing jurisdiction’s territories. One may for instance think of the 
following scenarios. A state for instance may subject hidden reserves to immediate corporate 
taxation upon corporate emigrations or outward bound cross-border intra-firm capital asset 
transfers while equivalent movements within that state’s territories do not attract such a levy – 
exit taxes levied upon outward bound tax border crossings.
202
 One may also think of 
disallowing cross-border aggregation of business profits and losses realized while such an 
aggregation is available to the extent that the business operations are carried on within that 
state’s territories – cross-border loss offset.
203
 
 
Tax effects upon tax border crossings are inconsistent with today’s economic reality of an 
increasingly borderless global marketplace. Taxation would obviously also affect Taxi 
Company’s decision as to stay at home or to take up business activities across the tax border. 
For instance the impossibility to offset foreign losses against domestic profits, while such an 
offset is available in a purely domestic scenario creates a bias towards investment in the 
taxing jurisdiction in which the taxpayer already derives taxable profits.
204
 
 
To the extent that the international tax system of a state unilaterally affects business 
decisions, it distorts the proper functioning of the globalizing economy. Under the notion of 
neutrality within the international tax system of a state, such a differential tax treatment upon 
the crossing of a tax border of an economic operator or its economic activity is undesirable. 
 
3.2.4.3 Market neutrality principle in European Union law requires the same 
 
 Also European Union law requires that cross-border economic activities are  
 taxed in the same way as domestic economic activities  
 
The notions of neutrality as set forth in the above paragraph may be recognized within the 
context of the European Union as well. Where the Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union applies the fundamental freedoms as interpreted and explained by the Court of Justice 
the neutrality principle is basically recognized in an equivalent manner. 
 
Again, in general, the Court of Justice’s approach is fairly distinct. From the Court of Justice’s 
case law it can be derived that tax neutrality constitutes a cornerstone principle of European 
Union law. Provided that the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union applies, the 
fundamental freedoms guarantee that economic operators can move their business activities 
between the respective domestic markets of the European Union Member States under the 
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free movements rights – the ‘market access’ or ‘market neutrality principle’.
205
 In the event 
that a Member State infringes on the market neutrality principle by taxing economic operators 
differently as soon as they move their businesses between the respective domestic markets 
of the European Union Member States, these Member States unilaterally impose an obstacle, 
i.e., a restriction. In such a case the tax treatment differs, depending on whether the 
respective economic operator performs its business activities in an intra-European Union 
cross-border or in an intra-European Union domestic context. 
 
The obstacles that the European Union Member States have created in their international tax 
systems distort the functioning of the internal market. Economic operators often see 
themselves hindered when they direct their investments across the domestic markets of the 
respective Member States. That is as the crossing of a tax border within the internal market 
without internal frontiers often produces a differential in tax treatment relative to the domestic 
scenario. The shifting of corporate investment between tax jurisdictions within the internal 
market often has effects in terms of the tax burdens imposed by the individual European 
Member States. As tax border passages should make no difference in the internal market, 
restrictions are incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. 
 
Again, the issue is not limited conceptually to the tax systems of the Member States of the 
European Union. The unilaterally created tax inefficiencies in country tax systems upon tax 
border crossings of economic operators and their investments do not only distort the 
functioning of the internal market. They also distort the functioning of the globalizing market. 
As said there is no conceptual difference really between the internal market and the global 
market. 
 
 Tax parity of returns from domestic investment and returns from cross-border  
 investment 
 
Again, the rulings of the Court of Justice in the field of direct taxation provide ample 
illustrations of the restrictions in the international tax systems of the European Union Member 
States. 
 
According to various rulings of the Court of Justice, proceeds from intra-European Union 
cross-border investment and proceeds from intra-European Union domestic investment are 
comparable, as soon as a Member State exercises its sovereign taxing power over these 
activities.
206
 It does so by reference to the presence of a group company, a permanent 
establishment, or through levying a tax at source. 
 
For tax purposes this means that a taxpayer, who directs its investment across a tax border, 
deserves to be treated neutrally for tax purposes vis-à-vis a taxpayer that directs its 
investment solely within the territories of the taxing Member State. Each business activity 
performed within the territories of a Member State and taxed by that state is comparable 
under European Union law and, hence, deserves the same tax treatment. Consequently, 
there should be no difference in the tax burden imposed by that state regardless of whether 
the business activities are performed solely within that Member State or spread across 
various Member States. 
 
This entails that the geographic location, the direction and the extent of the economic 
operator’s investments should be of no relevance when it comes to determining the tax 
burden on investment proceeds in a European Union Member State. It is noted that this does 
not correspond to the concepts of limited tax liability and strict territorial taxation. These 
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 See Frans Vanistendael, ‘In Defense of the European Court of Justice’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 90 
(2008), as well as Frans Vanistendael (ed.), EU Freedoms and Taxation (2004), at 107. The same may be true for 
residents of non-European Union Member States in the event that the European Union has concluded an association 
agreement with that state containing provisions (with direct effect) dealing with free movements of goods, services, 
persons and capital. 
206
 Cf. Court of Justice, cases C-527/06 (Renneberg), C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal), C-379/05 (Amurta), C-
303/07 (Aberdeen), C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), C-397/98, C-410/98 
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concepts are widely employed in the international tax regime with regards to non-resident 
taxpayers. Also the OECD and the UN Model Conventions on income and capital accept the 
limited tax liability of non-resident taxpayers.
207
 Under double tax treaties, for instance, the 
source state is entitled to tax non-residents only if and to the extent that these derive income 
from sources situated in that state. And the double tax relief mechanisms in the tax 
conventions are targeted to apply in the state of residence only. Some tax jurisdictions extend 
the approach of taxing only domestic income to both non-resident taxpayers and resident 
taxpayers (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, Panama). 
 
Moreover, European Union law, as it currently stands also seems to acknowledge the notion 
of the neutrality of legal form.
208
 The legal structure of a business activity seems to be 
irrelevant under the freedom of establishment. Established case law of the Court of Justice 
reveals that the Member States are sovereign in their decisions on the taxable entity and who 
is liable to pay tax. European Union Member States are, for example, free to decide on the 
transparency of a legal entity for tax purposes such a partnership, and to tax the persons 
behind it – the underlying partners or shareholders.
209
 However, to establish tax neutrality, the 
Member States may not unilaterally distort the economic operator’s choice of the legal form 
when structuring its intra-European Union business activities (i.e., if and to the extent that it is 
immaterial in a purely domestic). 
 
It follows from this that the plain comparison between the intra-European Union cross-border 
business activity and the intra- European Union business activity is indicative in identifying an 
obstacle. The manner in which the firm has legally arranged its business affairs is 
irrelevant.
210
 In an internal market without internal frontiers, the opinion may be held that this 
should hold true irrespective of the direction of the investment, thus with respect to both home 
state cases regarding outbound investments of domestic firms, and host state cases 
regarding inbound investments of foreign firms.
211
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3.2.4.4 Concepts of export neutrality and import neutrality both unilaterally distort  
A closer look, however, reveals that much is unclear when it comes to discovering the tenets 
of the concept of tax neutrality within the international tax system of a state. In my view, 
neither European Union law as it currently stands nor international tax theory currently 
provides for a theoretically sound tax neutrality concept that is economically efficient both 
when business is conducted in a domestic or cross-border environment. Today’s 
paradigmatic tax neutrality concepts in international tax law do not hold water.
212
 
 
The traditional and generally acknowledged neutrality concepts include the concepts of 
capital and labor export and import neutrality.
213
 The concept of export neutrality addresses 
the residence state, or, in European Union law terms, the home state, with respect to outward 
bound movements of the production factors of capital, labor and enterprise. When export 
neutrality is promoted taxation is linked to the place of residence or the place of effective 
management of the recipient of the business income or some other type of income. The basic 
underlying assumption of the concept is that the tax burden on the taxpayer’s income in the 
state of its residence should be the same irrespective of the geographical location – locally or 
abroad – of its investment. The concept of export neutrality looks at the location of the 
investor, i.e., an approach that seeks tax parity in the home country of the taxable subject. 
The tax burden should be the same irrespective of where the income has been earned. The 
ability to pay principle, as an expression of the equality principle, can be recognized in this 
approach. Export neutrality is generally associated with worldwide taxation in the residence 
state in combination with an ordinary direct or indirect credit for the tax levied at any level in 
the source state. 
 
The concept of import neutrality addresses the source state, or host state in European Union 
law terms, with respect to inward bound movements of the production factors of capital, labor 
and enterprise. When import neutrality is promoted taxation is linked to the place where the 
taxpayer’s income has been produced. The basic underlying assumption of the concept of 
import neutrality is that the tax burden on the income produced within the source state’s 
territory should be the same irrespective of the place of residence or the place of effective 
management of the recipient of the income. The concept of import neutrality looks at the 
location of the investment, i.e., an approach that seeks tax parity in the host state; a level 
playing field in the local market where the taxable object is situated. The place of the 
taxpayer’s residence is irrelevant. The benefits principle, as an expression of the equality 
principle, can be recognized in this approach. Import neutrality is usually associated with a 
territorial, source-based, tax system. Or alternatively, with a system of worldwide taxation in 
the residence state combined with a base exemption for income in the source state abroad. 
 
Vogel argues that the opposing export neutrality and import neutrality concepts cannot exist 
simultaneously if achieving worldwide economic efficiency is the common underlying 
objective.
214
 Both export neutrality and import neutrality merely address one-sided 
movements of production factors, respectively outward bound or inward bound movements. 
That is, rather than the aggregate of cross-border inbound and outbound movements of the 
production factors of capital labor and enterprise. The concept of export neutrality disregards 
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inward bound movements of production factors. Export neutrality promoting tax systems 
therefore distort inbound investment. The concept of import neutrality disregards outward 
bound movements of production factors. Import neutrality promoting tax systems therefore 
distort outbound investment. This is caused by the fact that both export neutrality and import 
neutrality only address one dimension of equality, i.e., respectively the ability to pay principle 
and the benefits principle. 
 
The concepts of export neutrality and import neutrality prove distortive when scrutinized from 
a perspective that is opposite to the production factor movements addressed by either the 
export or import neutrality concepts. That is, respectively when the concept of export 
neutrality is addressed from the perspective of the host state on an inward bound movement; 
and when the concept of import neutrality is addressed from the perspective of the home 
state on an outward bound production movement. It is just a matter of looking at the mirror 
image. 
 
All export neutrality promoting credit systems distort inbound investment 
 
Vogel, in my view fairly – yet contrary to the tax policy objectives generally recognized in 
international tax law – demonstrates that export neutrality promoting tax systems treat 
economic operators who perform their economic activities in both the residence state and 
abroad differently. That is, unequal and therefore non-tax neutral vis-à-vis economic 
operators who perform their economic activities solely in their residence state.
215
 In the event 
that the residence state subjects both to the same domestic, residence state tax burden, the 
residence state imposes an obstacle to the economic operator investing abroad. Abroad, that 
is in the source state, the tax burden and the public goods granted in return are at a different 
level than in the residence state. 
 
Consequently, under the concept of export neutrality, economic operators who direct their 
investments abroad pay tax on their foreign source income at the residence state level, but in 
return receive benefits from public goods provided at the different source state level. This may 
be in accordance with the ability to pay principle, but not in accordance with the benefits 
principle. By applying an export neutrality policy to resident economic operators exporting 
their production factors to abroad, the home state ignores the connection between the level of 
taxation and the public goods provided in return in the source state. A connection which 
indeed may be considered immeasurable, yet does not mean however that it therefore can be 
considered absent – and with that neglected for this purpose. Conversely, this is not the case 
for the economic operator who performs its activities solely in the residence state. Tax 
systems promoting export neutrality hence create inequitable and inefficient tax treatment of 
production factor imports into the host state. 
 
The economic operator who goes abroad suffers a competitive disadvantage in the source 
state vis-à-vis locally active economic operators. This holds up in the event that the level of 
taxation in the residence state exceeds the level of taxation in the source state and the 
residence state taxes the excess by topping-up the effective tax rate to the home state level. 
This is typically achieved in tax practice via the provision of a credit for the foreign tax to be 
offset against the domestic tax on the taxpayer’s worldwide earnings. In that case, the 
economic operator who exports its production factors to another country pays tax at a higher 
level than its local competitors, but, nevertheless, benefits from the same lower level public 
goods as its local peers. 
 
The economic operator who goes abroad benefits from a competitive advantage in the source 
state vis-à-vis locally active economic operators when the level of taxation in the source state 
exceeds the level of taxation in the residence state and the residence state would 
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compensate for the difference by paying out the excess foreign tax. That is, to arrive at the 
effective tax rate that the home state levies on investment proceeds. This may be achieved 
theoretically by providing a so-called full credit. In that case, the economic operator going 
abroad pays tax at a lower level than its local competitors, but, nevertheless, benefits from the 
same higher level public goods. 
 
Both outcomes distort inward bound capital movements from the perspective of the source 
state relative to domestic movements. These distortions are unilaterally imposed by the 
residence state. Consequently, international tax systems that adhere to the concept of export 
neutrality create obstacles. 
 
An example: ‘Pastry Chef Company’ v. ‘Quiche Company’ 
 
The following example may illustrate the obstacles imposed in an international tax system that 
seeks to promote export neutrality. Let us suppose that corporate taxpayer ‘Pastry Chef 
Company’ resides for tax purposes in State R(esidence). Taxpayer Pastry Chef Company 
derives income from a business carried on abroad through a branch situated in state 
S(ource). The operations carried on through the branch yield a positive return at an amount of 
100. 
 
State R has an export neutrality based international tax system and subjects Pastry Chef 
Company’s worldwide income derived through its foreign branch to a corporate income tax at 
a 35% tax rate, while providing for double tax relief under a credit for foreign tax mechanism. 
State S subjects the income derived through the branch at an income tax at a 10% rate. 
 
Consequently, State S will subject Pastry Chef Company to tax levied at an amount of 10. 
State R taxes Pastry Chef Company’s income to a tax of 35 but provides for relief at a 10 
amount resulting in a tax payable of 25. Pastry Chef Company’s overall tax burden amounts 
to 35 (10 + 25), i.e., an amount equal to the tax that Pastry Chef Company would have been 
liable to if his income would have been derived from a business carried on through a branch 
situated within the State R. 
 
A tax policy officer seeking to promote export neutrality would argue that Pastry Chef 
Company’s decision to operate abroad, as seen from the State R angle, is not distorted. 
However, Pastry Chef Company’s local competitor, corporate taxpayer ‘Quiche Company’, 
residing in State S, operating its branch near Pastry Chef Company’s across the street is 
subject to the 10% tax. Accordingly, each marginal currency (€) of income Quiche Company 
earns results in an marginal after tax profit of 0.90 while Pastry Chef Company’s marginal 
after tax profit equals to a mere 0.65, i.e., the ‘top-up effect’ of a system promoting export 
neutrality. 
 
If things are seen from the S State perspective, Pastry Chef Company finds itself in a 
disadvantageous position in comparison with its competitor Quiche Company, as he would 
need to derive a marginal profit amounting to 1,385 (i.e., 0.90 / 0.65) to end up in the same 
after tax position (i.e., 0.90) as its competitor Quiche Company (i.e., 1.385 – 0.35 * 1.385 = 
0.90). Consequently, even though Pastry Chef Company receives the same lower than State 
R level of public benefits provided by State S – which, for the argument’s sake, grosso modo 
corresponds to the 10% tax levied by State S – as its competitor Quiche Company does, 
Pastry Chef Company is subject to a nearly 40% heavier tax burden. 
 
One may argue that Pastry Chef Company benefits from public goods provided by State R 
instead. However, it may be doubted whether this argument holds water as State R is not the 
place where Pastry Chef Company derives its income and accordingly, State R is not the 
place where Pastry Chef Company derives the benefits from public goods provided (rule of 
law, market place, infrastructure, et cetera). State S is. And it is also State S where it finds its 
immediate competitors. Knowing this may drive Pastry Chef Company not to engage in 
business activities in State S in the first place, as it would require Pastry Chef Company to 
apply higher than local, i.e., its competitor Quiche Company’s, price levels for goods sold or 
services rendered. Pastry Chef Company may therefore consider an abroad investment quite 
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a hazardous undertaking as the reality of being subject to a heavier tax burden than its local 
competitors like Quiche Company could very well cause him to run out of business rapidly. 
 
Accordingly, a tax policy officer favoring import neutrality would, in my view fairly, take an 
angle opposite to the tax policy officer favoring export neutrality, and argue that Pastry Chef 
Company’s decision to operate abroad, as seen from the State S angle, i.e., the host state, is 
distorted unilaterally by the origin State R. State R should therefore refrain from ‘topping-up’ 
the S State tax by State R tax. This, if I understand it correctly, exactly is the point made by 
Vogel. Why should State R be entitled to levy such an additional tax on foreign source income 
derived, which is appropriately allocated to state S?
216
 
 
Export neutrality: perhaps to counter tax abuse 
 
Accordingly, due to the distortive features of the concept of export neutrality, the application of 
the ordinary credit method requires a specific justification. A justification for the ordinary credit 
method may be its application as a correction mechanism for the inadequacies in the 
international tax regime that resulted from the 1920s Compromise – which inadequacies are 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 through 6. Since the international tax regime, as it 
applies today, fails to be in line with economic reality, the credit method may be deployed as 
an anti-tax abuse tool to counteract any sheltering of volatile production factors such as liquid 
assets and intangibles in low tax jurisdictions by taxpayers who employ the flawed 
international tax regime for their individual benefit.
217
 Only in such a case, a ‘topping-up’ tax 
imposed by State R (or the home state in European Union law terms) may be justified. 
 
Presented like this, the credit method may function as an anti-tax abuse measure in the fight 
against what is commonly considered by tax lawyers as ‘harmful’ tax competition. Illustrative 
for this is the approach adopted by several states, which states seek to promote import 
neutrality as a default tax policy approach for double tax relief purposes. For instance, the 
Netherlands, applies ‘switch-over-to-credit-mechanisms’ for the purpose of countering any 
sheltering of portfolio investment income in low-tax jurisdictions on the basis of a blend of 
both export neutrality and anti-tax avoidance considerations.
218
 
 
All import neutrality promoting territorial systems distort outbound investment 
 
The concept of import neutrality also has certain shortcomings attached to it. Countries that 
adhere to the notion of import neutrality treat economic operators who perform their economic 
activities both within the source state as well as abroad differently – i.e., unequal and 
therefore non-tax neutral – vis-à-vis economic operators who perform their economic activities 
solely within the source state. 
 
If the source state subjects both to the same domestic tax burden, the source state imposes 
an obstacle on the economic operator investing abroad. Income that is not attributable to the 
source state, foreign income, is ignored upon the calculation of the tax burden in the source 
state. This is in accordance with the benefits principle, but not with the ability to pay principle. 
In determining the domestic tax burden, the source state ignores the ability of the economic 
operator that invests abroad to pay tax; perhaps it produces a loss abroad affecting its ability 
to pay in the source state. Conversely, this is not the case with economic operators that solely 
invest in the source state. Generally, their ability to pay is taken into consideration as 
domestic source profits and domestic source losses may be offset against each other. 
 
This leads to inequality caused by the source state. Tax systems promoting import neutrality 
subject outbound capital movements to taxation. Outbound investment is distorted unilaterally 
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by the taxing source state. Import neutrality promoting tax systems, hence, produce 
obstacles. Tax systems promoting import neutrality create inequitable and inefficient tax 
treatment of production factor exports.
219
 
 
In the international tax literature, the obstacles imposed under import neutrality promoting tax 
systems are sometimes referred to or labeled as ‘disparities’ ‘dislocations’ or ‘tax base 
fragmentations’.
220
 Confronted with their distortive effects these subsequently are generally 
considered as an inherent – and therefore apparently justified – consequence of the adoption 
of a territorial tax system. I find it somewhat difficult to appreciate dislocations in the 
international tax systems of states, merely by reason of their presence in these systems. The 
term ‘dislocations’, in my view, is just another label for unequal treatment in equal 
circumstances. From that perspective the term is just another label for inequity. 
 
An example: ‘Quincy’s Records Company’ 
 
Please let me illustrate the obstacles imposed in a territorial system by way of the following 
numerical example.
221
 Let us suppose a base case (scenario 1) in which corporate taxpayer 
Quincy’s Records Company derives income from sources (e.g. branches) a) and b) situated 
in an imaginary State called X(ypho). Xypho has a territorial tax system. The operations 
carried on through branch A yield a positive return (profit) of 100. The operations carried on 
through branch B yield a negative return (loss) of 40. Xypho takes taxpayer Quincy’s Records 
Company’s ability to pay into account and permits horizontal loss compensation, i.e., the 
offset of losses realized within the tax year, and taxes Quincy’s Records Company on the 
balance of its business income of 60. 
 
Now let us suppose the alternative to the base case – i.e., scenario 2 – in which the same 
taxpayer Quincy realizes the loss of 40 from the operations in branch B, which have now 
been carried out in an imaginary State called Y(phlo). In situation 2, Xypho does not take 
taxpayer Quincy’s Records Company’s ability to pay into consideration, nor does it permit 
horizontal cross-border loss compensation under its territorial tax system. It taxes Quincy’s 
Records Company for the income of 100. Xypho solely takes into account the profit realized 
on the operations in branch A situated within its territories and disregards the loss Quincy’s 
Records Company has suffered through branch b situated in Yphlo. By assessing the taxable 
income of taxpayer Quincy’s Records Company in situation 2 at 100 instead of 60, Xypho 
does not take Quincy’s Records Company ability to pay into consideration, whereas it does so 
in the comparable situation 1. In the event Xypho applies a proportional tax rate, Quincy’s 
Records Company’s tax burden in Xypho increases by a factor of 1.667. Depending on the 
size of the foreign source loss Quincy’s Records Company could even end up paying more 
tax than it earns.
222
 
 
Only because taxpayer Quincy’s Records Company crossed Xypho’s tax border by relocating 
branch B to Yphlo, Xypho unilaterally imposes an obstacle. Even in the event that Yphlo 
acknowledges the loss of 40, allows vertical loss compensation – i.e., compensation of losses 
realized in another tax year – by carrying the loss forward to the next tax year, the obstacle 
imposed by Xypho is still there. Because even under the presupposition that taxpayer 
Quincy’s Records Company will be able to realize a profit from the operations in branch B 
situated in Yphlo in the next year, taxpayer Quincy’s Records Company still suffers a liquidity 
                                                     
219
 Cf. Michael P. Devereux, ‘Debating Proposed Reforms of the Taxation of Corporate Income in the European 
Union’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 71 (2004), at 75. See also Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch 
‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. 
220
 See B.J.M Terra et al, European Tax Law (2012), at 65-66. See also Dennis M. Weber, ‘Vpb 2007. Een stelsel 
gebaseerd op het territorialiteitsbeginsel: EG aspecten en contouren’, 133 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1297 (2004), at 
section 3.2.2. 
221
 See for a comparison, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch ‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the 
Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55, where analytically equivalent reasoning is made use of to 
criticize the replacing in the Dutch corporation tax system per 1 January 2012, of the Dutch style ‘tax exemption with 
regression method’ for something that is referred to as a ‘base exemption for foreign business income’. The ‘base 
exemption for foreign income’ renders outward bound investment comparatively less attractive in a similar manner as 
a territorial system. That is, save for some exceptions which are elaborated upon in that publication. 
222
 See for a comparison Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 
50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 840. 
82
76 
 
disadvantage in situation 2 vis-à-vis situation 1 due to the unfavorable tax treatment of 
taxpayer Quincy’s Records Company in Xypho. After all, taxpayer Quincy is deprived of the 
tax paid on the difference between 100 and 60 for a period of one year, producing what may 
be referred to as a ‘temporization difference’.
223
 
 
All import neutrality-based territorial tax systems, as well as worldwide tax systems that 
provide base exemptions for foreign income currently present in the international tax regime 
fail to properly take the economic operator’s ability to pay into account. By accordingly 
creating a bias towards domestic investment all these systems consequently impose an 
obstacle on outward bound investment.
224
 The Netherlands for example allows resident 
taxpayer individuals with foreign loss-rendering income to offset their cross-border losses 
against their domestic income while depriving it as a rule for non-resident taxpayers with 
losses from foreign sources. The Netherlands accordingly subjects its non-resident taxpayers 
to such an obstacle. One only has to read ‘the Netherlands’ in ‘Xypho’ and ‘non-resident 
taxpayer’ in ‘taxpayer Quincy’s Records Company’ to reach this conclusion. And it was 
exactly this disadvantage that led the Court of Justice in the Renneberg case to observe the 
difference in tax treatment between non-resident taxpayers in comparison with resident 
taxpayers in the Dutch international income tax system to be discriminatory.
225
 
 
Dislocations can lead to both comparatively competitive advantages and comparatively 
competitive disadvantages for both for economic operators going abroad and those staying at 
home. 
 
An example of a distortive advantage that a cross-border economic operator may enjoy vis-à-
vis its domestic peer is that territorial tax systems promote so-called income splits; typically in 
the area of income taxation where the tax rate structures often progressively slope upwards. 
The availability of income splits produced under territorial tax systems allow the internationally 
active economic operator to escape from any progressiveness of rate structures in the 
relevant tax system. As the taxpayer involved derives its income from sources dispersed 
across more than a single tax jurisdiction, these are all taxed locally at moderate 
progressiveness in the countries of source. A comparative reduction in the overall 
progressiveness is the outcome, i.e., relative to the domestic equivalent. 
 
A typical example of a distortive tax-disadvantage that a cross-border economic operator is 
confronted with whereas its domestic peer is not, is the fact that no losses may be imported 
under territorial tax systems whereas domestic losses and profits may typically be offset 
against one another.
226
 Furthermore, territorial tax systems typically subject outward bound 
modes of transfers of capital assets to ‘exit taxes’ that become immediately due upon their tax 
border crossings. Moreover, territorial systems exempt currency exchange results on foreign 
source proceeds from the tax base making outward bound investments less attractive than 
domestic investments. In the aforementioned numerical example of our taxpayer Quincy’s 
Records Company that invested abroad, the dislocation at hand – keeping foreign source 
income outside of the domestic tax base – ends unfavorably. These features, as said, cause 
territorial systems to create a bias towards investment in the country in which the taxpayer is 
already economically active. 
 
European Union law does not provide an answer either 
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Within the context of the European Union, unfortunately European Union law, as it currently 
stands, does not provide a consistent tax neutrality concept either. Both primary European 
Union law and secondary European Union law do not give preference to either import 
neutrality or export neutrality or the corresponding double tax relief methods that seek to 
promote these policy objectives (i.e., respectively exemption and credit).
227
 
 
As far as the application of primary European Union law, more in particular the interpretation 
of the fundamental freedoms, is concerned the Court of Justice’s case law reveals that the 
court considers the pursue of both import neutrality and export neutrality by European Union 
Member States to be both compatible and incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. 
 
The Court of Justice’s ambiguous approach towards the distortive effects of import 
neutrality promoting tax systems 
 
With respect to the Court’s approach towards the distortive effects of an import neutrality 
approach based tax system, the following may be mentioned (see also section 6 of this 
chapter).
228
 
 
In Futura the Court of Justice considered it a disparity that under Luxembourg corporate tax 
law a non-resident taxpayer’s foreign loss cannot be offset against Luxembourg source profits 
– i.e., the distortive effect under an import neutrality based taxation system as referred to in 
the above paragraphs.
229
 In Daily Mail the Court of Justice considered the UK law clearance 
requirement allowing corporate emigration only upon the settlement of the corporate tax 
position – i.e., the levy of an exit tax which is a distortive effect under an import neutrality 
based tax system – to be a disparity as well.
230
 
 
On the contrary, in the Lasteyrie and N. cases the same Court of Justice considered the 
Dutch and French exit taxes levied upon the emigration of substantial shareholders-
individuals to a foreign country – i.e., conceptually the same distortive effect of a territorial 
system as in Daily Mail but in the area of individual taxation – to constitute an unjustified 
restriction if the tax liability becomes immediately due.
231
 In National Grid Indus, the Court 
however observed something else.
232
 Similar to its observations in N. and Lasteyrie it 
observed the levy of an exit tax in corporate taxation that becomes immediately due in the 
event of an outward bound movement of the taxpayer or its operations an unjustified 
restriction. However, contrary to its rulings in N. and Lasteyrie, the court observed in National 
Grid Indus that this only holds true when the taxpayer is ineligible for an interest bearing 
deferral of the tax collection. Accordingly, in National Grid Indus the Court of Justice 
effectively allows for an immediately payable exit tax upon outbound movements – i.e., as an 
interest bearing deferral of the tax collection economically equates an immediate tax 
collection. Oddly enough, in Gielen the Court of Justice observed that the possibility in the 
Dutch tax regime for non-resident taxpayers to opt for non-discriminatory tax treatment was 
insufficient to resolve the non-discriminatory tax treatment of the non-resident taxpayer in the 
case at hand – see further section 5.5.2 of this chapter.
233
 
 
The Court of Justice steers another course yet again in Renneberg, already mentioned 
above.
234
 Renneberg dealt with the impossibility under Dutch tax law for non-resident 
taxpayers to offset a foreign source loss against a Dutch source profit. The issue is 
conceptually akin to that dealt with in Futura, save for the fact that Renneberg was about a 
non-resident taxpayer/individual who suffered a foreign source loss whereas the taxpayer in 
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Futura is a non-resident corporate taxpayer who suffered a foreign source business loss. 
However, contrary to its observation in Futura that the issue constituted a disparity, the Court 
however observed in Renneberg that the differential in tax treatment of the non-resident 
taxpayer vis-à-vis the resident taxpayer constituted an unjustified discrimination. 
 
The Court of Justice conceptually went even a step further in Bosal.
235
 Bosal dealt with the 
non-deductibility of foreign source expenses – expenses incurred for the financing of a 
substantial equity investment in a foreign company – under the Dutch base exemption for 
gross proceeds from substantial equity investments; the Dutch participation exemption 
regime. The non-deductibility of the foreign source expenses is a distortive property of an 
import neutrality based international tax system, as it hinders outbound investment. The Court 
of Justice found the deduction limitation a restriction that could not be justified, even though 
the expenses were effectively incurred abroad. 
 
An approach similar to that in Bosal may be identified in Argenta.
236
 Argenta dealt with the 
notional deduction for the opportunity costs of equity capital in the Belgian corporation tax – 
the allowance for corporate equity concept underlying such a deduction is addressed in 
Chapter 5, section 6. The deduction was however effectively limited to equity capital relating 
to Belgian source profits. In effect Belgium effectively exported the deduction by exempting 
the deduction from the tax base in a manner that corresponded to the exclusion of foreign 
source profits from the Belgian taxable base. This property of the Belgian system is effectively 
a distortive element of an import neutrality based international tax system, as it renders 
outbound investment comparatively less attractive. Similar to its observations in Bosal, the 
Court of Justice found this to be an unjustifiable restriction, even though the deduction 
limitation effectively related to the corporate taxpayers’ foreign source income. 
 
The same holds true for the Court of Justice’s approach in Rewe Zentralfinanz.
237
 Rewe dealt 
with a cash flow disadvantage imposed by Germany with respect to the corporate taxation of 
proceeds from cross-border indirect investments vis-à-vis the taxation of proceeds from 
domestic indirect investments. The timing of the write-off differed depending on the tax 
residence of the respective legal entity in which the German corporate body held its equity 
investment. To the extent an equity investment in a company having its tax place of residence 
in Germany was concerned, the German corporate tax legislation allowed for an immediate 
write-off for corporate tax base calculation purposes in line with business economics reality. If 
it concerned an equity investment in a company having its tax place of residence within 
another Member State, the German corporate tax legislation merely allowed for a write-off for 
tax base calculation purposes to the extent the equity investment produced positive earnings. 
As costs typically precede profits, equity investments in German companies are treated 
favorably for tax purposes – tax write-off today – vis-à-vis equity investment in non-German 
European Union companies – tax write-off perhaps tomorrow. The Court of Justice ruled that 
the different tax treatment was incompatible with the freedom of establishment. It 
substantiated its observation by referring to the imposed cash flow disadvantages hindering 
outward bound investment.
238
 
 
This said, in Marks & Spencer II the court yet again took a different course.
239
 This time the 
observations of the Court of Justice were analytically opposite from its observations in Bosal 
and Renneberg. In Marks & Spencer II, the court reviewed the impossibility to pool domestic 
source intra-firm inter-entity profits and foreign source intra-firm inter-entity losses under the 
United Kingdom group relief regime. That is, an import neutrality promoting taxation system 
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relating to non-repatriated foreign source corporate profits. The court ruled that the inability to 
pool foreign source losses and domestic source profits was a restriction that could be justified 
as long as the vertical loss set-off possibilities in the foreign source taxing jurisdiction had not 
been exhausted – i.e., the so-called ‘M&S-exception’. The court accordingly considered the 
resulting unilaterally imposed timing disadvantage not to constitute an infringement of the 
fundamental freedoms in that instance. A conditional loss set-off entitlement for a foreign 
source business loss suffered today apparently suffices.
240
 Notably, the Court of Justice 
resorted to this approach again in its ruling in A Oy.
241
 
 
Yet, in Lidl the court conceptually moved away from earlier case law yet again.
242
 That is, not 
only from the approaches taken in Marks & Spencer II, but also from that in Bosal and 
Renneberg. In Lidl, the court shows evidence of reverting back towards its original approach 
in Futura. In Lidl the Court of Justice dealt with the impossibility for German resident 
taxpayers to offset foreign source losses against domestic source profits under the German 
import neutrality promoting juridical double tax relief measure, a base exemption for foreign 
source income. The obstacle imposed by Germany is conceptually similar to that in 
Renneberg and Futura, with the exception that the taxpayer in Lidl is a resident taxpayer who 
suffered a foreign source loss. The court ruled that the German tax treatment constituted a 
justified restriction. It did not refer to the aforementioned M&S-exception. 
 
In X Holding the Court of Justice upheld its approach taken in Lidl.
243
 X Holding dealt with the 
impossibility to consolidate foreign group companies under the Dutch corporate tax legislation 
for tax purposes– thereby in effect exempting foreign source intra-firm inter-entity profits from 
the Dutch tax base, i.e., a distortive implication under the import neutrality based Dutch 
business income tax system. The court rules that this was a justified restriction. Also in X 
Holding, the Court of Justice did not refer to the M&S-exception. As a result some have 
argued that the court had disposed of it.
244
 However, in its later A Oy ruling, the court went 
back to the M&S-exception once again. 
 
The final noticeable ruling in the list is K. dealing with the unavailability under the Finnish 
individual income tax regime for resident taxpayers to offset a foreign source loss resulting 
from the disposal of foreign real estate against domestic source income.
245
 The court ruled 
that the Finnish tax treatment constituted a justified restriction. The taxpayer in this case 
however was effectively deprived from its loss-offset possibilities, as the country in which the 
real estate was situated, France, also did not allow for a vertical compensation of the real 
estate loss – at least that seemed to be the case as inferred from the Court’s understanding 
on the facts as submitted to it. The court upheld the Finnish tax treatment paying lip service to 
the M&S-exception. It seems odd that the possibility to invoke the M&S-exception and import 
a foreign source loss into the home state offset against a local profit seems to depend on the 
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question of whether an a priori available loss offset possibility in the host state has been 
exhausted ex post – in which case the M&S-exception can be invoked– or whether such a 
source state loss offset possibility is a priori unavailable – in which case the M&S-exception 
cannot be invoked. Accordingly, the Court of Justice has created a difference in treatment 
under European Union law dependent on whether the case concerns an a priori or an ex post 
exhausted loss compensation possibility. I find it hard to get my mind around this analytically. 
 
The Court of Justice’s ambiguous approach towards the distortive effects of export 
neutrality promoting tax systems 
 
With respect to the Court’s reaction on the distortive effects of adopting an export neutrality 
promoting international tax system, things are not looking up either. In Columbus Container 
the Court of Justice ruled that the ‘top-up’ effect under the application of the German ordinary 
tax credit mechanism – i.e., a double tax relief mechanism promoting a distortive export 
neutrality approach – with respect to foreign source income constituted a disparity.
246
 The 
Court argued that comparable German tax residents with German source income would 
effectively be liable to pay the same amount of tax as the taxpayer in the case at hand. 
 
The Court however did something else in Cadbury Schweppes.
247
 This case involved the 
United Kingdom’s controlled foreign company legislation seeking to tax the low-taxed passive 
income items of a controlled foreign subsidiary in the hands of the resident taxpayer parent 
company while providing a credit for underlying foreign double tax relief purposes. That is, an 
approach promoting export neutrality with respect to non-repatriated foreign source profits, 
‘topping-up’ the tax burden to United Kingdom levels. In contrast to its ruling in Columbus 
Container, the Court of Justice found that a restriction may only be justified under anti-abuse 
considerations. It rejected the argument that comparable domestic firms with domestic source 
income would effectively be liable to pay the same amount of corporation tax as the taxpayer 
in the case at hand. 
 
In stark contrast to its approach in Cadbury Schweppes, the Court of Justice oddly enough 
considered the United Kingdom’s credit for underlying foreign tax with respect to repatriated 
foreign source profits compatible with the fundamental freedoms in FII.
248
 In FII the court ruled 
that the internal market distortions that result from the application of an indirect credit method 
– i.e., an economic double tax relief mechanism promoting export neutrality – a disparity. The 
court considered the top-up effect not problematic under the free movement rights. It repeated 
its observation on the compatibility of export neutrality promoting indirect credit systems upon 
the repatriation of after tax profits at this point in the Haribo and Salinen cases. 
249
 
 
To be honest, this mind-blowing ‘roller-coaster-approach’ of the Court of Justice towards the 
concepts of import neutrality and export neutrality leaves me quite puzzled. 
 
The ambiguous approach in secondary European Union law towards the distortive 
effects of import neutrality and export neutrality promoting tax systems 
 
Things unfortunately are not much better when it concerns the application of secondary 
European Union law, for instance the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest & Royalty 
Directive.
250
 These instruments seek to ensure single taxation of respectively income from 
inter-company equity financing arrangements, debt financing arrangements and licensing 
arrangements. An analysis of these instruments reveals that a decision on a favored neutrality 
concept has not been made in these areas either. It seems that the Parent-Subsidiary 
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Directive does not decide between import neutrality and export neutrality, while the Interest & 
Royalty Directive effectively favors the promotion of export neutrality. 
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive seeks to secure the single taxation of corporate profits at 
source. Under its application, eligible inter-corporate cross-border dividend payments may not 
trigger economic double taxation. That is achieved by prohibiting the countries to which the 
directive applies from levying source taxes on eligible inter-company outbound dividend 
payments. Furthermore, the directive requires that the countries involved grant relief for 
economic double taxation with respect to eligible inter-company inbound – taxable – dividend 
receipts. That is, either under the base exemption method, i.e., an import neutrality promoting 
double tax relief mechanism. Or under an indirect credit method, i.e., an export neutrality 
promoting double tax relief mechanism. Accordingly, as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
allows the European countries involved to decide between these alternative economic double 
tax relief mechanisms, it does not decide on the policy to be followed within the internal 
market, the envisaged area without internal frontiers. Both import neutrality and export 
neutrality are approved. 
 
The Interest & Royalty Directive seeks to secure the single taxation of corporate profits as 
well. Under its application the countries to which the directive applies are prohibited from 
levying source taxes regarding eligible inter-corporate outward bound interest payments and 
royalty payments. Accordingly the choice has been made that the taxation of inter-corporate 
proceeds from debt capital financing and intellectual property licensing arrangements in the 
recipient company’s country of tax residence is allowed. The directive thereby adopts an 
export neutrality favoring policy, at least implicitly. The effective taxation in the recipient’s 
home state has the effect that the creditors and licensees involved are taxed at home state 
levels, irrespective of the geographical location of their debt and intellectual property 
investments. Hence, an approach promoting export neutrality may be understood accordingly. 
 
Murky approach towards tax neutrality in European Union law does not enhance the 
operation of the internal market  
 
I doubt whether such a murky approach towards tax neutrality as taken within the European 
Union enhances the intended objective of equity and neutrality within the internal market 
without internal frontiers. Furthermore, the absence of a European Union tax neutrality 
concept leads to some conceptual complications. For example, where the European Union 
Member States – such as the Netherlands
251
 and Germany
252
 – apply anti-tax abuse 
provisions switching over from exemption (import neutrality) to indirect or direct credit (export 
neutrality) in cases where corporate taxpayers shelter mobile assets in low tax jurisdictions. 
 
Primary European Union law, as it currently stands, does not provide an answer to the 
question whether one is dealing with an acceptable double tax relief method,
253
 or an anti-tax 
abuse measure to be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest
254
.
255
 Secondary, 
European Union law does not make a decision either. Taking the aforementioned 
shortcomings with the import neutrality concept in conjunction with the inadequate 
international tax regime’s building blocks into account, the answer to that question should 
perhaps be the latter: anti-tax abuse considerations.
256
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The concept of ‘inter-nations neutrality’ does not either 
 
As an alternative to the concepts of import neutrality and export neutrality, Vogel introduces 
the notion of ‘inter-nations neutrality’.
257
 Vogel argues that worldwide economic efficiency is 
best promoted when states do not employ their sovereign taxing powers to influence the 
relative prices in other states. 
 
Pointing at the benefits principle, Vogel concludes, if I am not mistaken, that worldwide 
economic efficiency requires that an economic operator that performs economic activities 
within a state or a domestic market and consequently utilizes the public goods provided by 
that state must be subject to the same local tax burden as any other person whose 
circumstances are similar and who utilizes the public goods provided by that state to the 
same extent. Vogel refers to this as inter-nations neutrality.
258
 He argues that inter-nations 
neutrality can only be achieved by allocating the profits from cross-border business activities 
to the geographic location where the economic activities actually take place and where the 
business income is produced – economic presence; nexus.
259
 My impression is that Vogel’s 
neutrality concept basically functions in a manner similar to import neutrality. By only taking 
the benefits principle into account, hence without fully considering the implications of the 
ability to pay principle, the application of the inter-nations neutrality concept produces the 
dislocations considered inequitable in the above. 
 
In sum, both export neutrality and import neutrality – or inter-nations neutrality – result in 
unequal tax treatment in equal circumstances. Hence, the adoption of one of these neutrality 
concepts in an international tax system inevitably leads to unilaterally imposed obstacles. It 
follows from the above that these concepts seem insufficient to satisfactorily provide for an 
overall tax neutrality concept. 
 
3.3 Fairness within an international tax system; internal equity and production 
factor neutrality 
3.3.1 Tax burden should not affect residence location and investment location 
Both the concepts of export neutrality and import neutrality produce inequities in the 
international tax systems of states and with that the imposing of distortive obstacles to the 
functioning of the global market. It accordingly seems necessary to develop an alternative.
260
 
 
An alternative neutrality concept has to meet the following preconditions. The fiscal 
sovereignty of states needs to be respected as a given. That is as in this part of the study the 
object of the assessment is the search for a solution to unilaterally imposed obstacles, rather 
than a solution to disparities and inadequacies. As said, these disparities and inadequacies 
mentioned in Chapter 1 are substantively addressed in Chapters 4 through 6. 
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The required fairness concept should promote equality and neutrality with regards to both 
cross-border and domestic business activities, irrespective of the direction of the capital 
movement. It should accordingly promote equity and neutrality regarding both inbound 
movements and outbound movements of economic operators and their operations. Both the 
benefits principle and the ability to pay principle need to be acknowledged as well. 
 
This means that whenever a state exercises its sovereign taxing powers and subjects an 
economic operator (taxpayer) to tax for having a nexus in that state, the tax burden imposed 
by that state should be equal. The tax burden should be the same regardless of the 
taxpayer’s place of tax residence, i.e., to appreciate the benefits principle. Moreover, the 
burden of tax should be equal irrespective of whether this taxpayer derives its business 
income solely in that state or in various states – i.e., to appreciate the ability to pay principle. 
 
These presuppositions boil down to the following norm: 
 
“the domestic tax burden on the proceeds derived from the cross-border business 
activities of firms should equal the domestic tax burden on the proceeds derived from 
the non-cross-border (i.e., purely domestic) business activities of firms.” 
 
In the event that the tax burden differs because of the taxpayer’s tax place of residence or the 
geographic locations of its investments, an obstacle has been imposed by that taxing state. 
Namely, in such a case the difference in tax burden can necessarily only be caused by the 
taxpayer’s place of residence or the fact that it operates its business activities in various 
states rather than within a single taxing jurisdiction. 
 
This objective can be achieved by combining the – what I consider – best elements in existing 
theories, concepts and practices. The concepts of import neutrality and export neutrality are 
conceptually integrated into one another. From the export neutrality concept, I extract the 
element ‘worldwide taxation’. By doing so, the ability to pay principle is acknowledged. From 
the import neutrality concept, I extract the element ‘economic presence’, or ‘nexus’. Through 
this, the benefits principle is acknowledged. 
 
The fiscal sovereignty of states needs to be respected as a given. Foreign entitlements to 
subject business income to tax should be respected. Single taxation of the taxpayer’s 
business income derived should be ensured as well. That would secure effective taxation as 
close to its geographic source as possible. 
 
To respect the fiscal sovereignty of states and to achieve single taxation of the taxpayer’s 
business income, the adoption of an internally equitable and production factor neutral double 
tax relief mechanism is required to eliminate juridical double taxation. As the commonly 
applied ordinary credit for foreign tax (export neutrality) and the base exemption for foreign 
income (import neutrality) mechanisms prove to distort inbound and outbound investment 
respectively, an alternative is necessary. The required double tax relief method may be 
achieved by the integration of the credit method (export neutrality) and the exemption method 
(import neutrality) into one combined method. 
 
In this way, a concept has been modeled that results into equality – equity and neutrality – 
within an international tax system for taxpayers who operate in various tax jurisdictions. I 
plainly refer to it as ‘internal equity’ and ‘production factor neutrality’. 
 
3.3.2 Worldwide taxation in the event of a domestic nexus; double tax relief in the 
form of a credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income regarding a 
foreign nexus 
3.3.2.1 Worldwide taxation if domestic nexus, irrespective of tax place of residence 
The exercise results into the unlimited tax liability for the worldwide business income of the 
relevant economic operator having nexus within the taxing state – worldwide taxation upon 
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domestic nexus irrespective of the place of residence. The approach advocated leads to 
worldwide taxation of all economic operators who derive income from domestic sources in 
each state in which that economic operator conducts economic activities. That is, irrespective 
of whether these taxpayers reside outside or within the territories of the respective taxing 
state. 
 
A taxpayer would be subject to unlimited tax liability within a tax jurisdiction when that 
taxpayer has an economic presence within that jurisdiction. For instance by conducting a 
business activity within its territories. The threshold of a minimum economic presence has 
then been met. The approach advocated would accordingly link to the source concepts 
utilized in current international taxation such as the concept of permanent establishment and 
the place of effective management.
261
 At least for now, at this step in the analysis undertaken 
in this study. The worldwide taxation as advocated in this study is not inextricably linked to the 
permanent establishment and place of effective management thresholds to establish nexus, 
though. Nexus expressions in the international tax regime are discussed as a separate matter 
in Chapter 6. 
 
3.3.2.2 Double tax relief regarding foreign nexus: credit for domestic tax attributable 
to foreign income to render investment location indifferent regarding tax 
burden imposed 
The exercise further results into the ‘credit for the domestic tax that is attributable to the 
foreign income items’. This double tax relief methodology has been extracted from current 
Dutch tax law by analogy, as it currently applies to resident individual taxpayers deriving 
active income from foreign sources.
262
 This double tax relief mechanism applied in the Dutch 
corporate tax system as well, i.e., with respect to the foreign source active income items of 
Dutch resident corporate taxpayers. However, regrettably the Dutch tax legislator abolished 
this double tax relief mechanism from the Dutch international corporation tax system for 
budgetary reasons with effect from 1 January 2012. In corporate taxation, the double tax relief 
mechanism was replaced by something that is referred to in Dutch tax practice as the ‘base 
exemption for foreign business income’.
263
 
 
The advocated Dutch-style double tax relief provided in respect of foreign business proceeds 
is determined by reference to the geographic profit division methodologies as currently in 
place in the international tax regime – i.e., separate accounting and the arm’s length 
standard, SA/ALS. At least for now, at this step in the analysis undertaken in this study. The 
double tax relief mechanism advocated here is not inextricably linked conceptually to profit 
division methods referring to SA/ALS. The same holds regarding the question as to how to 
define the corporate tax base. Notably, taxable profit determination and taxable profit 
allocation are discussed as analytically separate matters in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
                                                     
261
 One may also consider in this respect the alternative expressions of the source concepts currently in place in the 
international tax regime, such as the place where the immovable property is situated, the place where the company 
paying the dividends has its effective place of management, or the place where the interest and royalties arise. With 
respect to source taxes levied on portfolio dividend, interest and royalty payments one may think of crediting them 
against corporate tax levied. With respect to transactions within a group of affiliated companies (intra-group dividends 
and intra-group transactions), one may think of adopting mandatory cross-border tax consolidation arrangements or 
arrangements dealing with the (mandatory) transparency for corporate tax purposes of group companies. These 
issues however exceed the scope of this chapter and will therefore not be further discussed in detail. Notably, the 
subject of tax grouping is dealt with extensively in Chapter 4. The subject of attributing tax base to taxing jurisdictions 
(nexus and allocation) is extensively dealt with in Chapter 6. 
262
 This double tax relief methodology is laid down in the Dutch Unilateral Double Tax Relief Decree of 2001. See for 
some details on the mechanism, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate 
double taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011), at 
sections 1 and 2. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the 
Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), at section 3. 
263
 See for an in-depth assessment of the current double tax relief mechanism Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New 
Dutch ‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. 
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3.3.2.3 Identical tax systems hypothesized at both sides of the tax border to exclude 
disparities from the analysis; ‘internal consistency’ 
Before leaping to an exploration of the meaning, implications, effects, and consequences of 
this approach in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter, the following remarks should be made as to 
the mode of the analysis undertaken. The purpose of this is the following. 
 
This study seeks to provide a sound assessment of the effects of the advocated approach of 
subjecting taxpayers with domestic nexus to worldwide tax liability, while at the same time 
providing for double tax relief in respect of foreign income in accordance with the Dutch-style 
tax exemption method. For that purpose, the assumption is made that both nation states 
involved in a cross-border economic environment adopt the exact same methodology at both 
sides of the tax border. Only when there are no mutual divergences between the respective 
states international tax systems – i.e., disparities and mismatches in the international tax 
regime
264
 – it is feasible to analytically isolate unilaterally imposed obstacles by the 
international tax systems of the states under review. 
 
Such a ‘thought experiment’ demonstrates that the approach as advocated in this step entails 
an imposition of equal tax burdens in both domestic and cross-border scenarios. The 
approach illustrates that the crossing of a tax border in that event would not affect the tax 
burden whatsoever. The purpose of the exercise therefore is to illustrate that the transfers of 
tax residence or the movements of production factors across tax borders would not result in 
unilaterally imposed obstacles that distort the neutral and equitable operation of the 
increasingly borderless global market envisaged. 
 
Were the tax burden to alter upon such a transfer of the place of tax residence or the 
business operations under the thought experiment, the distortive effects of the tested system 
would be proved. That would accordingly enable the illustration of the existence of an 
obstacle in system. Hence, the thought experiment may also be worth exercising for the 
purpose of illustrating the absence of a distortive feature. As will be shown, the advocated 
system operates in an obstacle-free manner; the tax burden imposed by the taxing state 
would be identical in both domestic and cross-border environments. Under its application all 
countries involved would tax the fraction of the worldwide income to which they are entitled. 
 
The mode of the assessment equals that under the so-called ‘internal consistency test’ as it 
applies under US Constitutional law to assess whether the US state income tax systems 
infringe upon the constitutional rule not to distort interstate commerce relative to intra-state 
commerce. US constitutional law requires the states to adopt a tax system that operates 
“such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary 
business' income's being taxed”, i.e., the ‘internal consistency test’.
265
 A challenged tax 
measure passes this test if the following question is answered in the affirmative: “if all 50 
states enacted the challenged rule, would interstate commerce bear a burden that purely 
domestic commerce would not also bear?”
266
 Accordingly, “a state tax must be structured so 
that if every state were to impose an identical tax, interstate commerce would fare no worse 
than intrastate commerce.”
267
 
 
The ‘internal consistency test’ in US constitutional law is identical to the test in this study and 
demonstrates the ‘internal consistency’ of subjecting taxpayers with a taxable presence in a 
taxing state to unlimited taxation granting double tax relief in the form of the Dutch-style ‘tax 
exemption’ method. 
                                                     
264
 As said, with disparities I mean the mutual divergences between international tax systems in terms of ‘who is 
taxed’ (the taxpayer), ‘what is taxed’ (the tax base) and ‘at which tax rate is taxed’ (the tax rate), as well as mutual 
divergences in terms of applied international taxing principles (nationality, situs, domicile). 
265
 United States Supreme Court, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983), and, e.g., United 
States Supreme Court, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995). 
266
 See Ruth Mason, ‘Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test’, 49 Boston College Law 
Review 1277 (2008), at 1283. 
267
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is Internal Consistency Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on 
State Taxation’, 61 Tax Law Review 1 (2007-2008), at 1. See also the prequel to this article, Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is 
“Internal Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation’, 87 
Michigan Law Review 139 (1988-1989). 
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3.3.2.4  Disregarding the effects at the other side of the tax border to demonstrate the 
presence or absence of an obstacle in an international tax system of a state 
Accordingly, in assessing the internal consistency of the advocated approach, the analyses 
undertaken disregard the tax effects at the other side of the tax border.
268
 That is, as 
disparities are assumed absent. The possibility of effectively cancelling out an obstacle at one 
side of the tax border by means of a reversed obstacle imposed at the other side at the tax 
border is ignored in this analysis. Indeed, no distortion would arise for the taxpayer if the other 
country at the opposite side of the border would unilaterally ‘fix’ the problem imposed at the 
one side of the border.
269-270
 
 
In this study the position is taken that the characteristics of the international tax system of a 
state under review indicating the presence or the absence of an obstacle should be tested on 
their individual merits. That is to say, without looking at the tax effects on the other side of the 
tax border for the reasons given below. Indeed, it may be argued that the distorting tax 
treatment unilaterally imposed, for instance by an European Union Member State, may pass 
muster under primary European Union law if one were to consider the tax effects abroad as 
well. 
 
It is true that European Union case law provides examples of cases in which the Court of 
Justice made the compatibility or incompatibility of a European Union Member State’s tax 
measure with the fundamental freedom rights dependent on the tax effects in another 
European Union Member State.
271
 Having said this, it is worth noting that other examples are 
available as well in which the Court of Justice does not do so.
272
 Regardless of the doctrinal 
confusion that may arise as a consequence of this, some scholars observed that the Court of 
Justice applies an ‘always somewhere approach’, on the basis of which, e.g., the unilateral 
denial by an European Union Member State of a horizontal cross-border loss set-off 
otherwise available in a pure domestic scenario may be justified if some other country allows 
vertical loss set-off.
273
 Others, e.g., Advocate General Kokott in her opinion in Philips 
Electronics, and particularly C-123/11 (A Oy), conversely, argue that one should ignore 
whatever happens in the tax system abroad. 
 
Regardless of what the Court of Justice observed in its case law in this respect, it is – in the 
style of Walter Hellerstein – undesirable to construct a rule the operation of which depends on 
the present configuration of the tax laws of the other nation states.
274
 Such an approach 
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 The approach has been taken identically in Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of 
Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy’, 38 Intertax 281 (2010), Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair 
Corporate Taxation of Groups in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 Intertax 62 (2011), Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X 
Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), 
Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘What if Member States Subjected Non-Resident Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation 
whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 
2011 (Volume 65), No. 6, Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Currency Exchange Results – What If Member States Subjected 
Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation Whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax 
Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 9, Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Intra-Firm 
Transactions – What if Member States Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double 
Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 12, 
as well as Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch ‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 
22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. 
269
 See e.g., Court of Justice, C-379/05 (Amurta). 
270
 The following paragraphs have been drawn from Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch ‘Base Exemption 
Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. 
271
 See e.g. Court of Justice, case C-385/00 (De Groot) – on the tax treatment of personal allowances – and Marks & 
Spencer II, case C-446/03 – on the tax treatment of cross-border losses. See also Court of Justice, C-379/05 (Amurta 
where such an effect is referred to as ‘neutralization’. 
272
 Regarding cross-border losses, reference can be made in this respect to both ‘home state cases’, e.g., (implicitly) 
Court of Justice, case C-337/08 (X Holding and (also implicitly) C-414/06 (Lidl), as well as a ‘host state case’, i.e., 
(explicitly) C‑18/11 (Philips Electronics). 
273
 The approach has originally been stated by Peter Wattel; see his comments on Court of Justice, case C-446/03 
(Marks & Spencer II) in the Dutch tax literature (Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 
2006/72. See also B.J.M Terra et al, European Tax Law (2012), at 465-467. 
274
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is “Internal Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause 
Restraint on State Taxation’, 87 Michigan Law Review 139 (1988-1989), at 170. 
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would make the absence or presence of an obstacle dependent on the shifting complexities of 
the international tax systems of nation states worldwide. Translated into European Union law, 
such an analysis would render the compatibility with European Union law of the tax laws of 
the European Union Member States dependent on the shifting complexities of the tax 
systems of the current twenty eight tax sovereign Member States. The compatibility or 
incompatibility with European Union law of the taxes imposed on an individual taxpayer would 
depend on the other European Union Member State in which it operates. 
 
Such an approach would encroach on the sovereign rights of nation states to tax corporate 
earnings. Which hierarchically equal sovereign state should step back in a particular case to 
resolve the obstacle imposed. The one last to adopt a particular tax rule? ‘Indeed, there is 
something unseemly about determining tax liabilities “on a first-come-first-tax basis”. Given 
the fundamental concerns underlying the fundamental freedoms, it would be perverse indeed 
to establish a rule rewarding beggar-thy-neighbor European Union Member State tax policies 
with the Member State tax collections depending on who won the race to the taxpayer’s 
door.’’
275-276 
 
3.4 The operation of the Dutch double tax relief mechanism explained 
3.4.1 The Dutch double tax relief mechanism’s operation in general 
3.4.1.1 Two-step approach akin to second limitation in common ordinary credit 
method 
In this section first some words are devoted to the general mechanics of the double tax relief 
methodology as it currently applies to resident taxpayers individuals in the Netherlands. 
Please keep in mind that it is the double tax relief methodology itself that is the subject of 
analysis, i.e., on a stand-alone basis rather than the legal context within which it currently 
applies in the Dutch international tax system. 
 
To demonstrate the operation of the combination of unlimited tax liability and Dutch-style 
double tax relief, the methodology is described in general terms first in section 4.1.2 of this 
chapter. The operation of the methodology is subsequently explained on the basis of 
scenarios identifying certain ‘problem areas’. These scenarios deal with: 
 
(1) cross-border business losses – section 3.4.2; 
(2) intra-firm modes of transfer – section 3.4.3, and; 
(3) currency exchange results – section 3.4.4. 
 
The operation of the system is addressed in a default scenario, the ‘Base Case’, referring to a 
hypothetical corporate taxpayer ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’. In the process, 
where relevant or convenient, general references will be made for comparison and illustration 
purposes to the distortive obstacles under the application of the export neutrality promoting 
tax credit mechanism and the import neutrality promoting base exemption mechanism. 
 
Secondly, the overall effects under the application of the advocated approach will be 
assessed hereunder in section 5 of this chapter – i.e., the ‘unlimited tax liability of corporate 
taxpayers with domestic sources of income and double tax relief under the Dutch-style ‘tax 
exemption’ mechanism’. The equitable and efficient properties of the advocated approach will 
be demonstrated by means of the thought experiment as drawn from US constitutional law 
referred to as the internal consistency test in the above paragraphs. 
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 See for the exact same argument on the constitutionality of US state taxes – Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is “Internal 
Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation’, 87 Michigan Law 
Review 139 (1988-1989), at 170. See further, Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is Internal Consistency Dead?: Reflections on an 
Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation’, 61 Tax Law Review 1 (2007-2008). 
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 The above paragraphs as said have been drawn from Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch ‘Base 
Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. 
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The objective of the exercise is to identify the tax burdens imposed in a cross-border context, 
to compare it with the tax burdens in the equivalent domestic environment. If the difference in 
tax burdens is nil the equality and tax neutrality, and hence non-distortive properties of the 
system, would have been proven. As will be shown, the advocated approach achieves that 
objective by demonstrating its equitable and efficient properties. 
 
Dutch-style double tax relief method effectively operates as a credit mechanism 
 
The double tax relief mechanism for active income from foreign sources as currently applied 
in the Netherlands is commonly referred to as the ‘tax exemption with progression method’ in 
the international tax literature.
277
 It is commonly explained in the literature as a base 
exemption mechanism under which ‘the foreign source income is initially included in the 
taxpayer’s income for the limited purpose of determining the average tax rate that taxpayer 
would pay if the foreign income would be taxable’. Subsequently, it is generally said that the 
‘average rate is then used to compute the actual tax due on the taxpayer’s domestic source 
income’. This, unfortunately, is a mistaken understanding of the Dutch juridical double tax 
relief mechanism. Also the Court of Justice shows evidence, e.g., in the X Holding case that it 
does not fully understand the mechanism’s operation.
278
 The Dutch-style tax exemption with 
progression methods does not operate in such a manner, as it does not exempt foreign 
source income from the tax base. It simply does not operate as a base exemption; essentially 
it is a credit. 
 
Despite the commonly used term ‘tax exemption’ – which, notably, is also the clouded Dutch 
term ‘belastingvrijstelling’, a term that literally translates into English as ‘tax exemption’ 
presumably thereby triggering the confusion –, the double tax relief mechanism conceptually 
operates as a credit.
279
 Even in Dutch tax literature the term exemption is used, typically 
without the mechanism being recognized as a credit as well. 
 
 But the credit would equal the amount of domestic tax attributable to foreign income 
 
However, contrary to the tax credit mechanisms that are commonly applied in international 
taxation, it is not the tax levied abroad that is credited against the domestic tax imposed on 
the foreign income. It is a credit for the domestic income tax attributable to the foreign source 
income items. It is the domestic tax on the foreign income that is credited against the tax that 
is levied on the taxpayer’s worldwide income – rather than a credit for the foreign tax as is 
typically the case under a tax credit mechanism. The double tax relief is accordingly 
calculated without looking at the actual foreign tax paid, i.e., as the system seeks for internal 
consistency. 
 
 Crediting the domestic tax attributable to the foreign income in two steps  
 
Under its double tax convention network, the Netherlands reserves the right to include foreign 
source income items, both positive and negative, in the domestic tax base for the purpose of 
taxing Dutch resident taxpayers – the ‘tax base reservation’. First, foreign source income 
items are included in the resident taxpayer’s worldwide tax base; ‘Step 1 – In’. Next, double 
tax relief is provided with respect to the foreign source income items that have been included 
in the Dutch worldwide tax base under Dutch tax law (the ‘tax base requirement’); ‘Step 2 – 
Out’. The Dutch tax payable is subsequently determined by crediting the Dutch tax that is 
attributable to the foreign source income items against the Dutch tax as calculated by 
reference to the respective taxpayer’s worldwide income. 
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 See Brian J. Arnold et al, International Tax Primer (2002), at 33-34. 
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 See Court of Justice case C-337/08 (X Holding) and the comments thereon by Dennis M. Weber, ‘Refusal of 
advantages of a cross-border tax consolidation in some situations an unjustified restriction of the freedom of 
establishment’, Highlights and Insights on European Taxation 2010/1.6. See also Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding 
and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). 
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 See for some details, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double 
taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011), at 
sections 1 and 2. 
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The mechanism that accordingly applies in the Netherlands to resident taxpayers with respect 
to foreign income from active sources, as said, is conceptually a credit for domestic tax 
attributable to the foreign income. In its operation, the methodology works in a manner akin to 
the second limitation as commonly applied in international taxation under an ordinary credit 
mechanism. However, in this case, the second limitation operates on a stand-alone basis. 
That is without making reference to the foreign taxes levied – as is typically the case under 
the first limitation in the common ordinary credit mechanism. At the end of the day, the 
taxpayers pay tax on the domestically sourced fraction of their worldwide income. 
 
3.4.1.2 Some numerical exercises: ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
 
The ‘base case’ scenario 
 
The operation of the Dutch-style double tax relief methodology can be best explained by 
means of some numerical examples. The following subsection explores the effects by 
assessing the application of the double tax relief mechanism with regards to a hypothesized 
corporate taxpayer ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’.  
 
The business income of the Dutch resident taxpayer ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’, 
hereinafter ‘Johnson’, from its Dutch source A, for instance a branch situated within Dutch 
territory, adds up to €140,000 (positive) in year 1. Johnson’s business income from foreign 
source B, for instance a branch situated in State X, for instance Belgium, adds up to €60,000 
(positive). Let us assume that Johnson thereby derives business income in Belgium through a 
permanent establishment situated within Belgian territory. The territorial allocation of business 
income occurs in accordance with OECD concepts and principles. It is assumed that Johnson 
is eligible for double tax relief under the Dutch-style double tax relief methodology for active 
foreign source income. Johnson’s worldwide income equals €200,000.  
 
Notably, it is assumed that Johnson is a single tax entity for corporate tax purposes. The 
effects of the separate entity approach and whether it operates adequately is addressed in 
Chapter 4. Furthermore, the tax base is calculated by reference to that under a conventional 
corporation tax typically applied internationally, i.e., a tax on the nominal returns on equity. 
The question of whether such an approach is adequate is discussed in Chapter 5. The issue 
of profit allocation is further discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
My purpose in this section is to illustrate the effects of the double tax relief mechanism itself. 
To detach the mechanism’s operation from its legal context, i.e., the Dutch international tax 
system. In the following subsections the Netherlands is predominantly referred to as the 
‘home state’ and Belgium is referred to as the ‘host state’. Some distance is accordingly 
created to enable the assessment of the mechanics and its operation without clouding things 
by the operation of local tax law. 
 
The base case in figures (before tax): 
 
Fig. 1. Balance Sheet “branch A” on 1/1 (i.e., start of tax year) 
Balance Sheet “branch A” on 1/1 
Debit Credit 
Assets €3,000,000 Equity €2,000,000 
  Liabilities €1,000,000 
On balance €3,000,000 On balance €3,000,000 
 
Fig. 2. P&L-account “branch A” 1/1 – 12/31 
P&L-account “branch A” 1/1 – 12/31 
Debit Credit 
Expenses €160,000 Receipts €300,000 
Profit before tax €140,000   
On balance €300,000 On balance €300,000 
 
Fig. 3. Balance Sheet “branch A” on 12/31 (i.e., end of tax year) 
Balance Sheet “branch A” on 12/31 
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Debit Credit 
Assets €3,140,000 Equity €2,140,000 
  Liabilities €1,000,000 
On balance €3,140,000 On balance €3,140,000 
 
Fig. 4. Balance Sheet “branch B” on 1/1 
Balance Sheet “branch B” on 1/1 
Debit Credit 
Assets €1,500,000 Equity €1,000,000 
  Liabilities €500,000 
On balance €1,500,000 On balance €1,500,000 
 
Fig. 5. P&L-account “branch B” 1/1 – 12/31  
P&L-account “branch B” on 1/1 – 12/31 
Debit Credit 
Expenses €100,000 Receipts €160,000 
Profit before tax €60,000   
On balance €160,000 On balance €160,000 
 
Fig. 6. Balance Sheet “branch B” on 12/31 
Balance Sheet “branch B” on 12/31 
Debit Credit 
Assets €1,560,000 Equity €1,060,000 
  Liabilities €500,000 
On balance €1,560,000 On balance €1,560,000 
 
Let us further suppose that the corporate income tax rate in the host state Belgium equals a 
linear 18%; the home state the Netherlands applies a progressive tax rate in its profit tax 
system. And let us assume that the tax brackets in the home state are arranged as follows: 
 
Fig. 7. Tax Brackets 
Rate (%) Tax base  Aggregate Tax  
10% €0 – €50,000 - 
20% €50,000 – €100,000  €5,000 
25% €100,000 – excess €15,000 
 
Determining Johnson’s tax liability; taxing the fraction 
 
Johnson’s tax liability is determined, as said, in two steps. First, the home state tax on 
Johnson’s worldwide income is calculated. The home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide 
income of €200,000 amounts to €5,000
280
 + €10,000
281
 + €25,000
282
 = €40,000. Second, the 
double tax relief is calculated by reference to the home state tax attributable to Johnson’s 
foreign income. The functionally separate entity approach in the applicable double tax 
convention is equivalent of Article 7 OECD Model Tax Convention. This functionally separate 
entity approach is taken as a given. The double tax relief is calculated by reference to the 
following fraction: foreign income (€60,000) / worldwide income (€200,000)* home state tax 
on worldwide income (€40,000). The double tax relief therefore amounts to €12,000 in the 
example.
283
 The tax payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €40,000 - €12,000 = 
€28,000. This equals an average effective tax rate in the home state of 20% on the home 
state share of the international tax pie of €140,000.  
 
In this way, the progressiveness in the home state tax rate structure is preserved. This 
explains the element ‘with progression’ in the Dutch-style double tax relief mechanism’s 
wording. Please note that the amount of tax payable in the host state – €10,800
284
 – regarding 
Johnson’s foreign income of €60,000 is ignored for the purpose of calculating the double tax 
relief in the home state. 
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 10% * 50,000 = 5,000. 
281
 20% * 50,000 = 10,000. 
282
 25% * 100,000 = 25,000. 
283
 60,000 / 200,000 * 40,000 = 12,000. 
284
 18% * 60,000 = 10,800. 
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Import neutrality promoting base exemption is distortive 
 
The application of a production factor export distorting but import neutrality promoting base 
exemption for foreign income in this case would have led to a tax payable in the home state of 
€25,000 (tax payable on Dutch-sourced income of €140,000: 10% * 50,000 + 20% * 50,000 + 
25% * 40,000). This would have entailed a ‘dislocation’ or, more accurately put, an unjustified 
unequal treatment by the home state, i.e., the Netherlands in the current example. The home 
state would favor Johnson over its competitors that decided to stay at home and not take their 
business across tax borders in this case.  
 
This effect is caused by the income split. The tax benefit unilaterally granted to Johnson 
would be €3,000 (tax payable on worldwide income less double tax relief of 28,000 – tax 
payable on Dutch sourced income in the case the import neutral base exemption 25,000). 
This ‘what-if-import neutrality-approach’ illustrates the absence of export neutrality in this case 
in an import neutrality promoting territorial tax system. The numbers show that import 
neutrality promoting international tax systems distort outbound investment. 
 
Export neutrality promoting tax credit is distortive 
 
Furthermore, the application of a production factor import distorting but export neutrality 
promoting ordinary credit for foreign tax would have resulted in a tax payable in the home 
state of €29,200 (Dutch tax of €40,000 – Belgian tax of 10,800). This would mean a 
competitive disadvantage for taxpayer Johnson in Belgium in comparison with Johnson’s 
local, i.e., Belgian, competitors in the host state who are merely subject to the 18% linear tax 
rate. In such a ‘what-if-export-neutrality-approach’, the home state, the Netherlands in the 
current example, would have discriminated against Johnson vis-à-vis its competitors in the 
host state – Belgium in the current example.  
 
In this situation the unilaterally imposed tax disadvantage amounts to €1,200 (€29,200 - 
€28,000). To derive an equal amount of after-tax profits, Johnson would have needed to 
increase the prices for his dinghies sold in the host state. That might have caused Johnson to 
rapidly run out of business there. Knowing this, Johnson, might have even considered not to 
engage into business activities in Belgium in the first place. This ‘what-if-export-neutrality-
scenario’ illustrates the absence of import neutrality in an export neutrality promoting tax 
credit system. The example also neatly illustrates the distortive features of an export neutrality 
promoting tax credit system, which brought Klaus Vogel to argue that the use of such a 
system entails the introduction of unilaterally imposed obstacles in the system.
285
 The 
example shows that export neutrality promoting international tax systems distort inbound 
investment. 
 
3.4.2 Foreign and domestic source losses; cross-border loss set-off 
3.4.2.1 The ‘recapture of foreign losses’ and the ‘carry forward of foreign profits’ 
It follows from the adoption of the ‘tax base reservation’ in the double tax convention network 
of the Netherlands that resident taxpayers may include negative income items from foreign 
sources in their domestic tax base. Hence, the Netherlands as home state allows resident 
taxpayers to offset foreign source losses/profits against domestic source profits/losses 
horizontally. In the case of resident taxpayers suffering foreign or domestic source losses, 
single taxation of cross-border business income is subsequently achieved through the 
application of the so-called ‘recapture of foreign losses mechanism’ and the ‘carry forward of 
foreign profits mechanism’.  
 
The single tax principle is thereby acknowledged. This is the effect of the Dutch-style double 
tax relief mechanism that the Court of Justice, unfortunately, failed to fully appreciate in the X 
                                                     
285
 See Klaus Vogel, ‘Which Method Should the European Community Adopt for the Avoidance of Double Taxation?’, 
56 Bulletin for International Taxation 4 (2002). 
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Holding case.
286 
The operation of the ‘recapture of foreign losses mechanism’ and the ‘carry 
forward of foreign profits mechanism’, again, are best explained by way of numerical 
examples. 
 
3.4.2.2 The recapture of foreign losses mechanism 
 
 Exploring some alternatives to the ‘Base Case’; foreign source losses 
 
Suppose that, all other things being equal to the ‘Base Case’, taxpayer Johnson resident in 
the home state suffers a loss from its activities carried on through its branch B in host state 
Belgium in the amount of €60,000 in year 1. Johnson’s taxable base amounts to €80,000, as 
the foreign loss is taken into account to calculate the home state tax base – horizontal loss 
compensation.
287
 Consequently, the tax payable in the home state amounts to €11,000 (i.e., 
5,000 + 6,000).
288 
No double tax relief will be given that year as taxpayer Johnson suffered a 
loss abroad. Johnson receives an administrative notice from the tax inspectorate that the loss 
of €60,000 is recaptured as soon as Johnson manages to derive positive income from its host 
state branch B in a following year. 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
If the home state had a production factor exports distorting but import neutrality promoting 
base exemption for foreign income, the tax payable in the home state would amount to 
€25,000 (10% * 50,000 + 20% * 50,000 + 25% * 40,000) on an income of €140,000. This 
would have led to a ‘dislocation’ disadvantaging taxpayer Johnson in comparison with his 
competitors that decided to stay at home and not take their business across the tax borders, 
i.e., in the Netherlands in the current example .  
 
This would have been caused by the then non-deductibility of the negative income items 
realized through the branch B in the host state Belgium. The unilaterally imposed tax 
disadvantage under such a ‘what-if-import-neutrality-approach’ would equal €14,000 (25,000 
– 11,000), an increase of the tax burden by a factor of roughly 2.28 (2.28 * 11,000 ≈ 25,000). 
Also this example shows the absence of neutrality – in this case export neutrality – under an 
import neutrality promoting territorial tax system. Import neutrality promoting tax systems 
distort outbound investment. 
 
 Back to the Dutch-style double tax relief method 
 
Let us return to the application of the Dutch-style double tax relief method. Let us suppose 
that, in year 2, taxpayer Johnson manages to derive a profit from of its activities carried on 
through its branch B in the host state of €80,000, all other things being equal to the ‘Base 
Case’. In year 2, Johnson’s worldwide income is consequently €220,000.
289
 
 
As said, the double tax relief is determined in two steps. First, the home state tax on 
Johnson’s worldwide income is calculated at €5,000 + €10,000 + €30,000
290
 = €45,000. 
Second, the double tax relief is calculated. The year 1 loss of €60,000 is recaptured in year 2 
under the ‘recapture of foreign losses mechanism’. Technically, this entails that the numerator 
in the fraction decreases to 20,000 (i.e., 80,000 – 60,000). The reduction of the numerator in 
the fraction leads to a reduction of the double tax relief provided – and consequently 
                                                     
286
 See Court of Justice case C-337/08 (X Holding) in which the court, unfortunately mistakenly, recognized double 
dip risks and arbitrary shifting of tax bases across taxing jurisdictions under the application of the Dutch juridical 
double tax relief methodology. See for comments on the court’s ruling in the X Holding case, Dennis M. Weber, 
‘Refusal of advantages of a cross-border tax consolidation in some situations an unjustified restriction of the freedom 
of establishment’, Highlights and Insights on European Taxation 2010/1.6, and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding 
and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). 
287
 140,000 – 60,000 = 80,000. 
288
 5,000 + 20% * 30,000 = 11,000. 
289
 140,000 + 80,000 = 220,000. 
290
 25% * 120,000 = 30,000. 
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increases tax payable in the home state. The double tax relief granted in year 2 amounts to 
€4,090.91.
291
 The tax payable in the home state in year 2 therefore amounts to €40,909.09.
292
 
 
This mechanism accordingly ensures that the year 1 loss is tax-deductible when actually 
suffered, yet only taken into account once instead of twice. Single taxation is guaranteed and 
the single tax principle is respected. The host state sovereign tax entitlements regarding the 
income items that are sourced in the host state are respected. Host state tax implications 
such as the availability of local loss set-off possibilities are ignored. As said this is done to 
keep the assessment analytically sound. This is regarded as a sovereign tax matter of the 
host state, i.e., Belgium in the current example. Notably, it has been argued in the literature 
that cross-border loss offset would mitigate tax competition.
293
 
 
3.4.2.3 The carry forward of foreign profits mechanism; domestic source losses  
Let us now suppose that, all other things being equal to the ‘Base Case’, the taxpayer 
Johnson resident in the home state suffers a loss from its activities carried on through its 
branch A in the home state of €140,000 in year 1. As this domestic loss is taken into account 
for the purpose of calculating the domestic tax base, i.e., ‘horizontal loss compensation’, 
Johnson’s taxable base consequently amounts to €80,000 negative.
294
 As a result of this, the 
tax payable in the home state amounts to nil. No relief is granted as the tax payable in the 
home state is already nil and no cash is refunded. Contrary to the European Union value 
added tax, for example, cash refunds are generally unavailable in corporate taxation – see 
further Chapter 5. Johnson receives an administrative notice from the tax inspectorate that 
the foreign profit of €60,000 is carried forward to a following year in which Johnson manages 
to derive positive income from its activities carried on through its domestic branch A. 
 
Now let us suppose that, in year 2, taxpayer Johnson realizes a profit generated in its 
domestic source a) of €200,000, all other things being equal to the ‘Base Case’. In year 2, 
Johnson’s worldwide income is consequently €260,000.
295
 Again, the home state tax relief is 
determined in two steps. First, the home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income is 
calculated at €5,000 + €10,000 + €40,000
296
 = €55,000. Second, the amount of double tax 
relief is calculated. The year 1 profit of €60,000 derived from the activities carried on through 
branch B in the host state is carried forward to year 2 under the ‘carry forward of foreign 
profits mechanism’. Technically, this entails that the numerator in the fraction increases to 
120,000 (i.e. 60,000 + 60,000). The increase in the numerator in the fraction leads to an 
increase of double tax relief given that year – and as a result to a decrease in tax payable in 
the home state. The double tax relief provided for in year 2 amounts to €25,384.62.
297
 The tax 
payable in the home state in year 2 accordingly amounts to €29,615.38.
298
 
 
This mechanism accordingly ensures that the year 1 profit realized abroad does not diminish 
for double tax relief purposes but, instead, is taken into account as a profit eligible for double 
tax relief in year 2. Accordingly, Johnson’s profits are taken into account once – rather than 
not at all. Single taxation is guaranteed. Again, the sovereign tax entitlements of the host 
state regarding the proceeds derived from the business activities carried on through branch B 
are respected. The host state tax implications are ignored, as the system seeks internal 
consistency. 
 
                                                     
291
 (80,000 - 60,000) / 220,000 * 45,000 = 4,090.91. 
292
 45,000 - 4,090 = 40,909,09.  
293
 See Marcel Gérard and Joann Weiner, ‘Cross Border Loss Offset and Formulary Apportionment: How do they 
affect multijurisdictional firm investment spending and interjurisdictional tax competition?’, CESifo Working Paper 
2003:1004, at 21. 
294
 60,000 - 140,000 = <80,000>. 
295
 200,000 + 60,000 = 260,000. Notably, vertical loss set-off is disregarded. Please assume that the year 1 loss of 
80,000 is carried back for vertical loss-compensation purposes.  
296
 25% * 160,000 = 40,000. 
297
 (60,000 + 60,000) / 260,000 * 55,000 = 25,384.62. 
298
 55,000 – 25,384.62 = 29,615.38. 
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3.4.3 Notional services provided, notional supplies of goods (stock and capital 
assets) 
3.4.3.1 Intra-firm transactions 
 
Profit attribution in international taxation 
 
Before getting into the operation of the Dutch-style tax exemption method in respect of intra-
firm transactions, I would like to make some remarks on profit allocation under current 
international tax concepts (see fig. 8). The question of whether these concepts operate 
properly, as said, is addressed separately in Chapter 6. 
 
Fig. 8. Profit attribution in international taxation 
 
In accordance with the approaches that are commonly made use of in international taxation, the 
allocation of a taxpayer’s business income to tax jurisdictions would occur in two steps.
299
  
 
1. Step 1 – nexus. To be able to allocate a resident taxpayer’s business income to a state other 
than its residence state, that taxpayer’s economic presence in that other state must exceed a 
certain minimum threshold. A qualitative criterion has been chosen for this purpose. Turnover 
is not sufficient. A physical presence is required such as a store similar to taxpayer Johnson’s 
branch B in host state Belgium. The threshold referred to is the permanent establishment, i.e., 
a fixed place of business through which the taxpayer carries on its business activities in that 
other state. 
 
2. Step 2 – allocation. Not until the permanent establishment threshold is met, business income 
may be attributed to that permanent establishment, and with that to the other state, which may 
subsequently tax the income derived by that non-resident taxpayer. 
 
The international tax regime contains two consecutive fictions for profit attribution purposes. These are 
commonly referred to as the ‘two-step analysis’.
 300
 
 
1. Two-step analysis, step 1. The first fiction, or step, is that the permanent establishment, e.g. 
Johnson’s branch B in the home state, is deemed to be an enterprise that is functionally 
separate from the taxpayer’s remaining activities, i.e., the ‘head office’, e.g. Johnson’s branch 
A. This fiction, as already addressed on some earlier occasions, is commonly referred to as the 
‘functionally separate entity approach’.
301
 As a consequence of that, the allocation of the 
production factors of capital and labor by the taxpayer within a cross-border context may result 
into the recognition for profit allocation purposes not only of transactions with third parties, i.e., 
customers and suppliers, but also the recognition of ‘internal dealings’ between the permanent 
establishment, branch B, in the host state or the source state in international tax terminology, 
and the taxpayer’s head office, branch A in the home state or the residence state in 
international tax terminology. Internal dealings recognized for profit allocation purposes may 
comprise intra-firm provisions of services, supplies of goods, or capital asset transfers between 
a head office and a permanent establishment, for instance between Johnson’s branches a) and 
b). Intra-firm transactions are recognized for profit allocation purposes on the basis of a so-
called ‘functional and factual analysis’. The analysis seeks to identify in which location the 
taxpayer’s workers are actually working, (functions performed), or the location in which these 
workers employ the taxpayer’s property (assets used), as well as the location in which the 
taxpayer is accordingly subject to the economic risks involving its business activities (risks 
assumed).
302
 
 
2. Two-step analysis, step 2. A price must be set for intra-firm transactions that are recognized or 
                                                     
299
 See for some details, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double 
taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011), at section 
2.1.2. A similar profit allocation methodology applies to affiliated corporate bodies. 
300
 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010. 
301
 The functionally separate can be found in Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
302
 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010.  
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notionally recognized for tax purposes as if the permanent establishment, branch B, the head 
office, and branch A, are mutually independent business enterprises.
303
 This is the second 
fiction, or second step in the ‘two-step analysis’, referred to as said, as the arm’s length 
principle. The remuneration for the intra-firm transaction, or the ‘transfer price’, is identified on 
the basis of a so-called ‘third party comparability analysis’. The analysis seeks to identify what 
independent, third parties would do under comparable economic circumstances – the 
‘benchmark study’). 
 
Business income that cannot be attributed to the host state, i.e., Belgium in the current example, by 
means of the aforementioned procedure, is attributed to the taxpayer’s, i.e., Johnson’s home state, i.e., 
the Netherlands in the current example.  
 
The purpose of this profit allocation procedure, at the end of the day, is to allocate business income to 
the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer actually employs its production factors of capital (property, assets) 
and labor (workers).
304
 Accordingly, it is sought to allocate income tax to tax jurisdictions on the basis of 
origin-based allocation factors,
305
 echoing the supply side of economics.
306
 This being said, the issue of 
profit allocation is extensively discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Intra-firm, intra-entity, intra-taxpayer notional dealings are disregarded when 
calculating worldwide income  
 
Under Dutch international tax law, the notional proceeds from notional, intra-firm, transactions 
are not recognized for resident taxpayers’ worldwide income calculation purposes. Due to the 
operation of the tax base reservation, a Dutch resident taxpayer’s worldwide income does not 
increase or decrease as a consequence of the recognition of internal dealings.  
 
This makes sense. Profit allocation in international taxation is built on fictions; a world of 
smoke and mirrors as it is referred to in Chapter 6. In reality, however, no profit has been 
made upon the supply of an intra-firm service. All happens within the context of a single 
taxpayer. The only thing that actually occurs is that the taxpayer employs its production 
factors, its workers and assets, in a cross-tax border context within the emerging global 
market. No money is made while doing that. The identification of internal dealings merely 
serves the purpose of the allocation of profits actually made to tax jurisdictions under an 
origin-based, supply side, allocation methodology.  
 
Intra-firm, intra-entity, intra-taxpayer notional dealings are regarded when calculating 
double tax relief  
                                                     
303
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, OECD, Paris, 2010. 
304
 See Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World’, 
2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 310, Klaus Vogel, ‘“State of Residence” may as well be “State of Source” – There 
is No Contradiction’, 59 Bulletin for International Taxation 420 (2005), at 420-422 and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step 
towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 Intertax 62 (2011).  
305
It should be noted that an opposite approach is adopted under value added tax (‘VAT’) systems, such as the VAT 
system as applied in the European Union. In VAT, the value added is allocated to the geographic location, taxing 
jurisdiction, where the goods supplied and services rendered are consumed; the destination principle. The quest for 
the place of taxation adheres to the demand side of economics. As it is unfeasible to determine the place of 
consumption, the place of taxation is typically found by means of proxies, such as ‘place of service rules’ and ‘place 
of supply rules’ as often found in VAT systems, including the European Union VAT. See further Rebecca Millar, 
‘Echoes of Source and Residence in VAT Jurisdictional Rules’, Sydney Law School Research Paper 2009:44, 
Rebecca Millar, ‘Intentional and Unintentional Double Non-Taxation Issues in VAT’, Sydney Law School Research 
Paper 2009:45. Worth noting is that the sharing mechanism as envisaged by the CCCTB Working Group seeks an 
intermediary approach between origin based, supply side, and destination based, demand side, allocation factors. 
The envisaged key to share the tax base within the European Union, ‘formulary apportionment’, contains a 
combination of factors aiming at both the supply side (‘payroll’, ‘assets’) and the demand side (‘sales’) of economics. 
See further, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9 . See also Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary 
Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-
General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8.This subject is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
306
 See for a comparison Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU 
Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, 
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9. See also Willem 
Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, Investment, 
Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 41-45.  
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Under Dutch international tax law, internal dealings are however recognized for double tax 
relief calculation purposes. Notional profits are acknowledged to calculate the double tax relief 
under the Dutch-style tax exemption method. Accordingly, the amount of relief granted is 
affected by the presence of intra-firm dealings. That is, to acknowledge common profit 
attribution methodologies in international taxation. 
 
If it is assumed that the applied profit allocation methodology entails a fair allocation of tax 
base amongst tax jurisdictions – which it is for now; this issue is further dealt with in Chapter 6 
– the application of the Dutch-style tax exemption method entails a fair allocation of tax 
amongst these tax jurisdictions. 
 
In cases where notional business income arises in the home state, i.e., the Netherlands in the 
current example, the amount of double tax relief provided reduces to the extent that positive 
amounts of notional income have been derived in the home state from internal dealings. The 
amount of double tax relief provided increases to the extent that negative amounts of notional 
income have been derived in the home state from internal dealings. 
 
Notional proceeds from internal dealings arise in the home state when resident taxpayers 
employ their workers (labor) and property (capital) in the home state for the benefit of their 
foreign business activities. This is the case when the taxpayer’s workers actually perform their 
functions within the territories of the home state and when the taxpayer’s assets are 
functionally utilized by these workers within the territories of the home state.
307
  
 
In cases where notional business income arises in the host state, i.e., Belgium in the current 
example, the double tax relief methodology applies in an opposite manner. The amount of 
double tax relief provided increases to the extent that positive amounts of notional income 
have been derived in the host state from internal dealings. The amount of double tax relief 
provided decreases to the extent that negative amounts of notional income have been derived 
in the host state from the internal dealings undertaken.  
 
Notional proceeds from internal dealings arise abroad when resident taxpayers employ their 
workers (labor) and property (capital) in the host state for the benefit of their business 
activities in the home state. This is the case when the resident taxpayer’s workers actually 
perform their activities within the geographic territories of the host state and when the resident 
taxpayer’s assets are functionally used within the territories of the host state.  
 
In the event that production factors are transferred from the ‘head office’ in the home state to 
the ‘permanent establishment’ in the host state, a ‘split is made for double tax relief 
calculation purposes. It particularly concerns the transfer of property on a company’s balance 
sheets to a foreign country; the capital factor – i.e., as the factor labor is not capitalized on a 
company’s balance sheets. Under commonly applied international profit allocation concepts, 
the property transferred is calculated at fair value upon its transfer abroad; i.e., the internal 
dealing that is recognized for geographic profit attribution purposes.  
 
The scenarios are further explored by means of numerical examples in sections 3.4.3.2 
through 3.4.3.4 hereunder – ‘effects under current Dutch international tax law’ – and 3.5.3.3 – 
‘effects under the advocated approach’. For this purpose, reference is made to both intra-firm 
provisions of services and intra-firm supplies of goods. Regarding the latter, a further 
reference is made to intra-firm transfers of stock and intra-firm transfers of capital assets. 
 
3.4.3.2 Intra-firm provisions of services 
 
                                                     
307
 Difficulties arise in cases where it concerns taxpayers employing mobile capital (financial and intangible assets). 
These items can easily be transferred across taxing jurisdictions legally due to their volatile characteristics, and 
relocated for instance into a low-taxing jurisdiction. In consequence, the adoption of origin based allocation factors 
has the consequence of enabling tax base transfers across taxing jurisdictions just as easily. This reality lies at the 
heart of the international profit allocation issue. 
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Outward bound notional services rendered 
 
The operation of the double tax relief mechanism in these cases again may be best explained 
through numerical examples. Let us, therefore, return to our taxpayer Johnson in the ‘Base 
Case’. The business income derived from Johnson’s home state branch A adds up to 
€140,000. Johnson’s business income derived from its branch B in host state Belgium adds 
up to €60,000. Consequently Johnson’s worldwide income again is €200,000. Let us 
suppose, in addition, that one of taxpayer Johnson’s workers in branch A renders an internal 
service such as a notional financial service or a service under a leasehold, or license 
arrangement for the benefit of the business activities carried on through branch B. The 
dealing is recognized as an internal dealing upon a functional and factual analysis for which 
an at arm’s length consideration should be taken into account for corporate tax purposes. Let 
us further suppose that the fair market value of the service rendered equals to €15,000, an 
amount determined under the arm’s length principle – i.e., an amount, which, at this time, for 
argument’s sake, is assumed to be determined conceptually in an adequate manner. 
 
Under the Dutch-style double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income does not 
alter as a result of the intra-firm service rendering. That is as an effect caused by the 
operation of the tax base reservation in the Dutch double tax convention network. It continues 
to amount to €200,000. This is conceptually sound as taxpayer Johnson has not actually 
earned a profit upon the supply of the internal service by its worker in branch A. Johnson 
does not actually make money at that time. 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
Notably, would the home state have applied an import neutrality promoting base exemption 
mechanism, the intra-firm supply of services would have led to a taxable event at this time, 
resulting in corporate tax due on the notional, fictitious item of income. The levy of such an 
exit tax at that time is conceptually unsound as it is distortive because the taxpayer has not 
actually derived income at that time. In fact no profit has been made. Notional income is not 
actual income, but fictitious ‘smoke and mirror’ income. 
 
Back to the Dutch-style double tax relief method 
 
Let us return to the operation of the Dutch-style double tax relief method. The home state tax 
on Johnson’s worldwide income continues to amount to €5,000 + €10,000 + €25,000 = 
€40,000. The tax is imposed at an average effective tax rate of 20%.
308
 Subsequently, the 
double tax relief is calculated. The amount of relief alters in comparison with the equivalent 
under the ‘Base Case’ since an intra-firm dealing, the intra-firm service rendered by 
Johnson’s worker, has been recognized for double tax relief purposes under the functionally 
separate entity approach. Contrary to the ‘Base Case’ the application of the fraction means 
that the double tax relief amounts to €9,000
309
 instead of €12,000.
310
  
 
This makes sense in terms of the allocation of business income under origin based, supply 
side allocation factors – as is the case in international taxation today. Viz., Johnson employs 
its production factor labor, i.e., its home state worker, for the benefit of its activities abroad, 
i.e., in host state Belgium. In effect, as a consequence of the notional remuneration ‘paid’ by 
the host state to the home state, i.e., the Netherlands in return for the notional service 
rendered in the home state for the benefit of Johnson’s activities in the host state, the tax 
base is transferred from the host state to the home state. The tax payable in the home state 
amounts to €40,000 - €9,000 = €31,000 and equals an average effective tax rate in the home 
state of 20% on the home state share of the tax pie of €155,000, i.e., €140,000 + €15,000. 
The amount of relief that is granted regarding the host state, i.e., Belgian, share of the tax pie 
effectively equals 20% as well.
311
 
 
                                                     
308
 40,000 / 200,000 * 100% = 20%. 
309
 (60,000 – 15,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 9,000. 
310
 60,000 / 200,000 * 40,000 = 12,000. 
311
 9,000 / (60,000 – 15,000) * 100% = 20%. 
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Inward bound notional services rendered 
 
Now let’s look at the reverse situation and let us suppose that one of the workers in branch B 
renders the intra-firm service for the benefit of the business carried on through branch A. 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income again does not alter in 
such a reversed scenario. The home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income accordingly 
continues to amount to €40,000, an average effective tax rate of 20%. Again the double tax 
relief, as subsequently calculated alters in comparison with the ‘Base Case’ since an intra-firm 
dealing has been recognized for double tax relief purposes. The double tax relief calculated 
alters in the exact opposite manner as described in the above paragraph. The application of 
the fraction results in a double tax relief in the amount of €15,000
312
 instead of €12,000.  
 
In terms of the allocation of business income under origin based supply side allocation 
factors, this makes sense. Viz., Johnson employs its production factor labor, i.e., its host state 
worker for the benefit of its activities in the home state. In effect, due the notional 
remuneration ‘paid’ in the home state to the host state in return for the notional service 
rendered in the host state for the benefit of Johnson’s activities in the home state this entails a 
transfer of tax base from the home state to the host state. The tax payable in the home state 
accordingly amounts to €40,000 – €15,000 = €25,000. An amount of home state tax payable, 
which again entails an average effective tax rate in the home state of 20% on the home state 
share of the tax pie, is now calculated at €125,000, i.e., €140,000 – €15,000. The double tax 
relief provided with respect to the host state share of the tax pie effectively equals a 20% rate 
also.
313
 
 
3.4.3.3 Intra-firm supplies of goods (stock transfers) 
 
Outward bound notional stock transfers 
 
Let us suppose that in addition, to all other things being equal to the ‘Base Case’ stock – a 
dinghy – has been produced through branch A to be sold on the market. Suppose that the 
manufacturing costs of the boat equal €5,000 and the wholesale value of the dinghy equals 
€12,000. Suppose that the good is transferred to branch B situated in the host state and 
suppose that the good, is sold through branch B on the market at a resale price of €20,000. 
 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s income does not alter upon the intra-firm 
supply of goods from branch A to branch B. Again, this is caused by the operation of the tax 
base reservation. And again, this, in my view, is conceptually sound as taxpayer Johnson has 
not in fact derived a profit by just shipping the good abroad to its branch in the host state. 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
Notably, under an import neutrality promoting base exemption mechanism, the intra-firm 
supply of goods would have led to a taxable event at this time – the levy of an ‘exit tax’, 
resulting in corporate tax due. In my view, the levy of such a tax at this time is conceptually 
unsound, since it is distortive because the taxpayer has not actually derived income at that 
time. In fact no profit was made upon the transfer of the dinghy to the host state branch B.
314
 
So why pay tax? 
 
Back to the Dutch-style double tax relief method 
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 (60,000 + 15,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 15,000. 
313
 15,000 / (60,000 + 15,000) * 100% = 20%. 
314
 In cases falling within the confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, the levying of such a tax 
conceptually infringes upon the freedom of establishment. See Court of Justice, cases C-9/02 (De Lasteyrie du 
Saillant) and C-470/04 (N.). Contra, Court of Justice, cases C-250/95 (Futura), C-414/06 (Lidl) and C-337/08 (X 
Holding). See on the Court of Justices ambiguous approach on these matters, Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding 
and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). See also 
Dennis M. Weber, ‘Refusal of advantages of a cross-border tax consolidation in some situations an unjustified 
restriction of the freedom of establishment’, Highlights and Insights on European Taxation 2010/1.6. 
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Let us return to the application of the Dutch-style double tax relief method. Taxpayer Johnson 
first realizes the profit, calculated at €15,000 upon the sale of the good in the marketplace. At 
that time, Johnson’s worldwide income amounts to €215,000, i.e., €200,000 + €15,000.
315
 
This makes sense as Johnson actually derives income upon the sale of the dinghy. At that 
time, the home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income amounts to €43,750,
316
 which 
equals an average effective tax rate of 20.3%.
317
 The profit of €15,000 needs to be split for 
this purpose between the home state and the host state as from an origin based profit 
allocation perspective value has been added in both jurisdictions.  
 
In terms of the allocation of business income under origin based supply side allocation factors 
this makes sense. Viz., Johnson employs the combination of its production factors labor, i.e., 
its home state workers (wholesale activities) and host state workers (retail activities), and 
capital, i.e., the dinghy, for the benefit of its activities in both the home state and the host 
state. Due to a notional remuneration ‘paid’ in the host state to the home state in return for the 
notional supply of goods from the home state to host state, this entails a transfer of Johnson’s 
worldwide tax base of €15,000 from the host state to the home state. The profit realized on 
the sale of the good at the market place attributable to branch A in the home state equals to 
€7,000.
318
 The profit share attributable to branch B in the host state equals to €8,000.
319
 
 
Under the double tax relief mechanism subsequently applied, the fraction equals to 
€13,837.21.
320
 The tax payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €43,750 – 
€13,837.21 = €29,912.79. The amount of home state tax payable on the profit realized on the 
sale of the good that is attributable to branch A, i.e., €7,000, equals €1,424.42.
321
 
Consequently, the amount of home state tax payable thus determined equals to an average 
effective tax rate in the home state of 20.3% on the home state share of the tax pie calculated 
at €147,000 (i.e., €140,000 + €7,000
322
).
323
 The amount of double tax relief provided with 
respect to the host state share of the tax pie effectively equals a 20.3% rate also.
324
 
 
Inward bound notional stock transfers 
 
Now imagine the reverse situation and suppose that the good is produced through branch B 
and subsequently transferred to branch A followed by a sale of the good in the marketplace. 
Again, Johnson’s worldwide income does not alter upon the intra-firm supply of goods from 
branch B to branch A. Again, taxpayer Johnson first realizes the profit of €15,000 upon the 
sale of the good in the marketplace. Again, things result into an overall worldwide income of 
€215,000 producing a home state tax calculated at €43,750, i.e., an average effective tax rate 
of 20.3%. The profit of €15,000 needs to be split for this purpose between the host state and 
the home state as value has been added in both jurisdictions, at least, from an origin based 
perspective that is. 
 
In terms of the allocation of business income under origin based, supply side allocation 
factors, this makes sense. Viz., Johnson employs the combination of its production factors 
labor, i.e., its home state workers (retail activities) and host state workers (wholesale 
activities), and capital, i.e., the dinghy, for the benefit of its activities in both the host state and 
the home state. Due to a notional remuneration ‘paid’ in the home state to the host state in 
return for the notional supply of goods from the host state to the home state Johnson’s 
worldwide tax base is increased by €15,000 as a result of the transfer of this tax base from 
the home state to the host state, respectively The Netherlands and Belgium in the current 
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 The latter amount being calculated as 20,000 – 5,000 = 15,000.  
316
 10% * 50,000 + 20% * 50,000 + 25% * 115,000 (i.e. 100,000 + 15,000) = 43,750. 
317
 43,750 / 215,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
318
 12,000 - 5,000 = 7,000. 
319
 20,000 - 12,000 = 8,000. 
320
 (60,000 + 8,000) / (200,000 + 15,000) * 43,750 = 13,837.21. 
321
 (7,000 / 15,000) * (43,750 / 215,000) * 15,000 = 1,424.42. 
322
 (1,424.42 / 7,000) * 100% = 20.3%. 
323
 29,912.79 / 147,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
324
 13,837.21 / (60,000 + 8,000) * 100% = 20.3%. 
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example. This time the profit realized on the sale of the good in the market place attributable 
to branch A equals €8,000.
325
 The profit share attributable to branch B equals to €7,000.
326
  
 
Under the double tax relief mechanism subsequently applied, the fraction equals to 
€13,633.72.
327
 The tax payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €43,750 – 
€13,633.72 = €30,116.28. The amount of tax payable that can be attributed to the profit 
realized on the sale of the good that is attributable to branch A, i.e., €8,000, equals to 
€1,627.91.
328
 Consequently, the amount of tax payable in the home state corresponds to an 
average effective tax rate in the home state of 20.3% on the home state share of the tax pie, 
which is now calculated at €148,000 (i.e., €140,000 + €8,000
329
). The same is true regarding 
the amount of double tax relief that is effectively provided with respect to the host state share 
of the tax pie. That amount also equals 20.3%.
330
 
 
3.4.3.4 Intra-firm supplies of goods (capital asset transfers)  
 
Outward bound notional capital asset transfers 
 
Suppose that, all other things being equal to the ‘Base Case’, a capital asset, for instance an 
assembling machine is transferred from the home state branch A to the host state branch B 
for the purpose of durably employing it for the benefit of Johnson’s business operations 
carried on through its branch B. Let us suppose that the capital asset was acquired 5 years 
ago and that its acquisition price was €600,000. Suppose that its economic lifetime equals 20 
years, its residual value equals nil, and that the yearly tax deductible depreciation amount to 
€30,000. These are deducted from Johnson’s worldwide operational profit of €200,000 
resulting in a worldwide income of €170,000. Prior to the notional capital transfer, the asset 
was recorded on branch A’s balance sheet for an amount of €450,000.
331
 Suppose that at that 
time, its fair value, for whatever commercial reason, equals to €500,000 and that the 
remaining economic lifetime remains the same. Accordingly, taxpayer Johnson faces a latent 
corporate tax claim on the hidden reserve of €50,000. 
 
Under the Dutch-style double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income does not 
alter upon the intra-firm capital transfer. The latent corporate tax claim on the hidden reserve 
does not become immediately due when transferring the capital asset abroad. Again, this is 
caused by the operation of the tax base reservation. And again, this is conceptually sound as 
taxpayer Johnson has not made a profit of €50,000 by just shipping the capital asset to its 
foreign branch abroad. Instead, the hidden reserve is added to the domestic taxable base 
year by year in an amount that varies directly proportional to the annual depreciation during 
the remaining economic lifetime of the transferred capital asset.
332
 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
Notably, would the home state have adopted an import neutrality promoting base exemption 
mechanism in this case, the intra-firm capital asset transfer would have led to a taxable event 
at this time – i.e., the levy of an ‘exit tax’ – resulting in corporate tax charge. This would have 
been conceptually unsound as Johnson has not actually derived income at that time. In fact 
no profit has been made upon the transfer of the assembling machine to a foreign country.
333
 
So why pay tax at that time? 
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 20,000 - 12,000 = 8,000. 
326
 12,000 - 5,000 = 7,000. 
327
 (60,000 + 7,000) / (200,000 + 15,000) * 43,750 = 13,633.72. 
328
 (8,000 / 15,000) * (43,750 / 215,000) * 15,000 = 1,627.91. 
329
 1,627.91 / 8,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
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 13,633.72 / (60,000 + 7,000) * 100% = 20.3%. 
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 600,000 - 5 * 30,000 = 450,000. 
332
 See on this matter Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 12 February 1964, No. 15 068, Beslissingen in 
Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1964/95 (Hopperzuiger). See also Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X 
Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). 
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 In cases falling within the confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, the levying of such a tax 
conceptually infringes upon the freedom of establishment. See Court of Justice, cases C-9/02 (De Lasteyrie du 
 
107
101 
 
 
Back to the Dutch-style double tax relief method 
 
Let us return to the application of the Dutch-style double tax relief method. Technically things 
work out as follows. Irrespective of the capital asset transfer, taxpayer Johnson’s worldwide 
income continues to amount to €170,000. Accordingly, the home state tax on Johnson’s 
worldwide income amounts to €5,000 + €10,000 + €17,500
334
 = €32,500, which equals an 
average effective tax rate of 19.1%.
335
 For the purpose of subsequently calculating the double 
tax relief, the intra-firm dealing, i.e., the notional capital asset transfer is recognized for double 
tax relief purposes. The latent corporate tax claim needs to be allocated to the home state as 
value has been added, i.e., income has accrued, in the home state – at least, from an origin 
based perspective that is. 
 
In terms of the allocation of business income under origin based supply side allocation factors 
this makes sense. Viz., Johnson durably employs its capital asset, the assembling machine, 
for the purpose of its business in the home state to the time of the machine’s transfer abroad. 
Following its transfer, the capital asset is further employed for Johnson’s activities in the host 
state. Hence, this calls for a split of tax base between the home state and the host state. In 
terms of the allocation of profits on an origin basis, the unrealized capital gain of €50,000 
should be allocated to the home state as the production factor capital, the machine, was 
employed in the home state during the period of capital accrual. Movements in the machine’s 
value subsequent to its transfer to the host state should be allocated to the host state – that 
is, in terms of applying an origin based allocation factor. 
 
In effect, due to a notional remuneration ‘paid’ in the host state to the home state of €500,000 
in yearly instalments in return for the notional supply of goods from the home state to the host 
state, i.e., the capital asset transfer, this part of Johnson’s worldwide tax base is transferred 
from the host state to the home state. The amount of the tax base transferred corresponds to 
€50,000 (500,000 – 450,000) i.e., the amount of notional ‘capital gain’ divided into yearly 
instalments. To ensure this, the asset is recorded on the host state branch B’s balance sheets 
at its fair value of €500,000 rather than the lower book value for tax purposes of €450,000. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of calculating the double tax relief, the (tax deductible) yearly 
depreciation is taken into consideration against that fair value, i.e., €33,333.33,
336
 instead of 
the book value for tax purposes, i.e., €30,000. The latter amount, notably, is the depreciation 
to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining Johnson’s worldwide income in 
the home state. 
 
Consequently, under the double tax relief mechanism, the numerator in the fraction is 
calculated at €60,000 – €33,333.33, while the contribution of branch B to Johnson’s 
worldwide income in the denominator of the fraction is calculated at €60,000 – €30,000. The 
increased amount of €3,333.33 (i.e., 33,333.33 - 30,000) equals to the difference between the 
capital asset’s book value and its fair value as divided by the number of years corresponding 
to its remaining economic lifetime (i.e., €50,000 / 15 depreciation). The application of the 
fraction results in an amount of double tax relief of €5,098.04.
337
 The tax payable in the home 
state accordingly amounts to €32,500 - €5,098.04 = €27,401.96. The home state tax due 
equals an average effective tax rate in the home state of 19.1% on the home state share of 
the tax pie, calculated at €143,333.33 (i.e., €140,000 + €3,333.33).
338
 The same is true for the 
amount of double tax relief that is effectively granted with respect to the host state share of 
the tax pie. That amount also equals 19.1%.
339
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Saillant) and C-470/04 (N.). Contra, Court of Justice, cases C-250/95 (Futura), C-414/06 (Lidl) and C-337/08 (X 
Holding). See on the Court of Justices ambiguous approach in this respect Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and 
the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). See also Dennis M. 
Weber, ‘Refusal of advantages of a cross-border tax consolidation in some situations an unjustified restriction of the 
freedom of establishment’, Highlights and Insights on European Taxation 2010/1.6. 
334
 25% * 70,000 = 17,500. 
335
 (32,500 / 170,000) * 100% = 19.1%. 
336
 500,000 / 15 year terms = 33,333.33. 
337
 (60,000 – 33,333.33) / (200,000 – 30,000) * 32,500 = 5,098.04. 
338
 27,401.96 / 143,333.33 * 100% = 19.1%. 
339
 5,098.04 / (60,000 – 33,333.33) * 100% = 19.1%. 
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Hence, the double tax relief methodology results in an annual reduction of the amount of 
double tax relief for a period that corresponds to the remaining economic lifetime of the 
respective transferred capital asset. And this leads to a pro rata parte increase of the 
corporate tax annually payable in the home state during that same period. In this case, the 
hidden reserve is taxed in 15 annual instalments of €3,333.33. Were all things to remain 
equal during the remaining economic lifetime of the transferred capital asset, the increased 
amount of tax yearly due equals €637.25,
340
 an amount that corresponds to an average 
effective tax rate of 19.1%.
341
 On an overall basis, the tax payable on the hidden reserve of 
€50,000 in the home state amounts €9,558.82 (i.e., 15 terms * 637.25). This equals an 
average effective tax rate of 19.1% on the hidden reserve (i.e., 9,558.82 / 50,000) – inflation 
and mutations in the applicable tax rate not considered. 
 
Notably, if the capital asset would have been disposed of against its fair value immediately 
following its transfer abroad, the corporate tax would become due in the home state on the 
capital gain of €50,000 realized at that time. No double tax relief would be available as the 
capital gain would not be attributed to the operations carried on through branch B. That is, the 
capital gain attributable to branch B would amount to nil, i.e., 500,000 – 500,000, as the 
capital asset is recorded on branch B’s balance sheet at its fair value. Accordingly, the 
numerator in the fraction would amount to nil. Furthermore, if the capital asset is disposed for 
an amount of say €540,000 later that tax year, the capital gain attributable to branch B would 
amount to €40,000, i.e., 540,000 – 500,000. That amount would be included in the numerator 
in the fraction, having the effect that, to that extent, double tax relief is granted to our taxpayer 
Johnson. If the capital asset is sold at a loss, that capital loss would reduce Johnson’s 
worldwide income, and in conjunction with that simultaneously reduce the amount of foreign 
income included in the numerator of the fraction. 
 
Inward bound notional capital asset transfers 
 
Now imagine the reverse situation and suppose that the capital asset is transferred from 
branch B to branch A. Again, Johnson’s worldwide income does not alter upon the intra-firm 
capital transfer. It continues to amount to €170,000. Prior to the notional capital transfer, the 
asset was recorded on branch B’s balance sheet at an amount of €450,000.
342
 Accordingly, 
taxpayer Johnson has a latent double tax relief entitlement on the foreign source hidden 
reserve of €50,000. 
 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income does not alter upon the 
intra-firm capital transfer. The latent double tax relief entitlement on the hidden reserve does 
not, or at least should not, become available at the time of the transfer of the capital asset 
from abroad to the home state of Johnson. Viz., the capital asset transfer does not affect 
taxpayer Johnson’s worldwide income. Again, this is caused by the operation of the tax base 
reservation. And again, this is conceptually sound as taxpayer Johnson has not in fact derived 
a capital gain of €50,000 by just shipping the capital asset from its branch abroad to its 
domestic branch with respect of which double tax relief should be made available. Instead, 
substantially the latent double tax relief entitlement becomes available in yearly terms which 
vary directly proportional to the annual depreciation during the remaining economic lifetime of 
the capital asset transferred. These terms increase the amount of foreign source income and, 
accordingly, the amounts of double tax relief provided. This reduces the corporate tax 
annually payable.
 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
Notably, would the intra-firm capital asset transfer from branch B to branch A at this time be 
recognized as a taxable event in the host state and resulting in a corporate tax charge i.e., the 
levy of an ‘exit tax’ as is the case under an import neutrality promoting base exemption 
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 3,333.33 / 170,000 * 32,500 = 637.25. 
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 637.25 / 3,333.33 * 100% = 19.1%. 
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 600,000 - 5 * 30,000 = 450,000. 
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system, this would be conceptually unsound as the taxpayer has not actually derived income 
at that time. No profit was in fact made.
343
 So why pay tax?  
 
Back to the Dutch-style double tax relief method 
 
Let us return to the application of the Dutch-style double tax relief method. Technically things 
should work out as follows. Irrespective of the capital asset transfer, taxpayer Johnson’s 
worldwide income continues to amount to €170,000, i.e., €200,000 - €30,000. Accordingly the 
home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income amounts to €32,500, which again equals an 
average effective tax rate of 19.1%.
344
 For the purpose of subsequently calculating the double 
tax relief, the intra-firm dealing, i.e., the notional capital asset transfer is recognized for double 
tax relief purposes. The latent corporate tax claim on the hidden reserve needs to be 
allocated to the host state as value has been added, i.e., income has accrued in the host 
state – at least, from an origin based perspective that is. 
 
In terms of the allocation of business income under origin based supply side allocation factors 
this makes sense. Viz., Johnson durably employs its capital asset, the assembling machine, 
for the purpose of its business in the host state to the time of the machine’s transfer to the 
home state. Following its transfer, the capital asset is further employed for Johnson’s 
activities in the home state. Hence, this calls for a split of the tax base between the host state 
and the home state. In terms of the allocation of profits on an origin basis, the unrealized 
capital gain of €50,000 should be allocated to the host state as the production factor capital, 
the machine, was employed in the host state during the period of capital accrual, i.e., Belgium 
in the current example. Movements in the machine’s value subsequent to its transfer to the 
home state should be allocated to the home state, i.e., the Netherlands in the current 
example. That is, again in terms of applying an origin based allocation factor. Due to a 
notional remuneration of €500,000 ‘paid’ in the home state – i.e., in yearly instalments – to the 
host state in return for the notional supply of goods from the host state to the home state, i.e., 
the capital asset transfer, part of Johnson’s worldwide tax base is transferred from the home 
state to the host state corresponding to a notional ‘capital gain’, i.e., in yearly instalments of 
€50,000 (500,000 – 450,000). 
 
Under the double tax relief mechanism the numerator is calculated at €60,000 + €3,333.33.
345
 
The latter amount equals the pro rata parte capital gain recognized upon the notional capital 
asset transfer at the level of branch B for double tax relief purposes. That amount equals the 
difference between the capital asset’s book value for tax purposes and its fair value as 
divided by the number of years corresponding to its remaining economic lifetime (i.e., €50,000 
/ 15 times the annual depreciation). Consequently, the application of the fraction results in an 
amount of double tax relief of €12,107.84.
346
 The tax payable in the home state accordingly 
amounts to €32,500 - €12,107.84 = €20,392.16. The home state tax due equals an average 
effective tax rate in the home state of 19.1% on the home state share of the tax pie, 
calculated at €106,666.67.
347
  
 
Notably, that latter amount, i.e., the home state share of the tax pie, can be understood as 
follows. Upon its transfer from the branch located abroad, the capital asset should be 
recorded on branch A’s balance sheets at its fair value of €500,000 rather than its book value 
of €450,000. Viz., the hidden reserve has a foreign source. That amount of €500,000 
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 In cases falling within the confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, the levying of such an exit 
tax conceptually infringes upon the freedom of establishment. See Court of Justice, cases C-9/02 (De Lasteyrie du 
Saillant) and C-470/04 (N.). See also Court of Justice case C-527/06 (Renneberg). Contra, Court of Justice, cases C-
250/95 (Futura), C-414/06 (Lidl) and C-337/08 (X Holding). See on the Court of Justices ambiguous approach in this 
Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax 
Review 170 (2010). See also Dennis M. Weber, ‘Refusal of advantages of a cross-border tax consolidation in some 
situations an unjustified restriction of the freedom of establishment’, Highlights and Insights on European Taxation 
2010/1.6. 
344
 (32,500 / 170,000) * 100% = 19.1%. 
345
 33,333.33 - 30,000 = €3,333.33. The increased amount of €3,333.33 again equals the difference between the 
capital asset’s tax bookkeeping value and its fair value as divided by the number of years corresponding with its 
remaining economic lifetime.  
346
 (60,000 + 3,333.33) / (200,000 – 30,000) * 32,500 = 12,107.84. 
347
 20,392.16 / 106,666.67 * 100% = 19.1%.  
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subsequently constitutes the basis on which the annual deprecation, i.e., €33,333.33,
348
 is 
calculated. Accordingly, the contribution of branch A to taxpayer Johnson’s worldwide income 
upon the notional capital asset transfer amounts to €140,000 - €33,333.33 = €106,666.67. 
The amount of double tax relief granted with respect to the host state share of the tax pie 
effectively equals 19.1% as well.
349
 
 
Hence, the double tax relief methodology results in an annual increase of the amount of 
double tax relief provided in the home state for a period that corresponds to the remaining 
economic lifetime of the capital asset transferred. And this leads to a pro rata parte reduction 
of the corporate tax annually payable in the home state during that same period. In this case, 
the double tax relief entitlement regarding the foreign source hidden reserve is granted in 15 
annual instalments of €3,333.33. Were all things to remain the same during the remaining 
economic lifetime of the transferred capital asset, the reduction of corporate tax yearly due 
equals €637.25,
350
 an amount corresponding to an average effective tax rate reduction of 
19.1%.
351
 On an overall basis, the reduction of tax payable in the home state would amount to 
€9,558.82 (i.e., 15 * 637.25). This equals an effective tax reduction of 19.1% on the hidden 
reserve (i.e., 9,558.82 / 50,000) – inflation not considered. 
 
Notably, would the capital asset have been disposed of at its fair value immediately following 
its transfer abroad, double tax relief would be granted on the capital gain of €50,000 realized 
at that time. Double tax relief would be available as the capital gain would be attributed to the 
operations carried on through branch B. The numerator of the fraction would increase by 
€50,000. Notably, the capital gain attributable to branch A would amount to nil (i.e., 500,000 – 
500,000) as the capital asset is recorded on branch A’s balance sheets at fair value. 
Furthermore, would the capital asset have been disposed of later that tax year at an amount 
of, again say €540,000, the capital gain attributable to branch A would amount to €40,000 
(i.e., 540,000 – 500,000). That amount would not be included in the numerator in the fraction 
resulting in no double tax relief for our taxpayer Johnson to that extent. The capital gain 
attributable to branch B would still amount to €50,000. And only to that extent, double tax 
relief would be provided. 
 
3.4.4 Currency exchange results 
3.4.4.1 Allocation of currency exchange pro rata parte 
The Dutch-style double tax relief mechanism entails an allocation of tax across tax 
jurisdictions proportional to income derived in cases where currency exchange results are 
realized. In this respect, three scenarios may occur: 
 
1. Currency exchange results arise at home, scenario (i); 
2. Currency exchange results arise abroad, scenario (ii), and; 
3. Currency exchange results arise both at home and abroad, scenario (iii); 
 
Ad scenario (i) 
 
Currency exchange results that arise in the home state are not included in the double tax 
relief mechanism.
352
 Such currency exchange results remain part of the home state part of the 
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 500,000 / 15 year terms = 33,333.33. 
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tax base and influence the home state tax burden imposed on home state source income 
accordingly. Positive currency exchange results are taxed, negative currency exchange 
results are tax deductible.
353
 Save for the hedging of currency exchange risks, currency 
exchange results arise in the home state in cases where resident taxpayers keep their tax 
books with respect to their foreign operations in the host state currency – i.e., where they 
have locally situated assets and liabilities in local currencies whereas their worldwide income 
is calculated in the home state currency, i.e., the Euro in the current example. Accordingly, 
tax deductible/taxable currency exchange results are recognized for home state corporate tax 
purposes where the taxpayer carries on economic activities in tax jurisdictions employing 
currencies other than the Euro. 
 
Subsequently, no double tax relief is provided regarding such home state source currency 
exchange results. This is conceptually sound. These results do not arise abroad as host state 
tax reporting occurs in local currencies – just as the home state (i.e., Dutch) tax reporting 
occurs in Euro. Accordingly, currency exchange results realized due to differences in values 
between the Euro and the respective host state currencies do not arise in those host state tax 
jurisdictions as these income items, by their nature, are not recognized in those jurisdictions 
for local tax calculation purposes. Accordingly, there is no need to take such currency 
exchange result into account for double tax relief purposes in the home state.  
 
Double tax relief is only granted with respect to income that arises in the host state and is 
taxed abroad. This scenario is further explored by means of numerical examples in sections 
3.4.4.2 – effects under current Dutch international tax law – and 3.5.3.4 – effects under 
advocated approach – hereunder. Notably, in practice, this may be referred to as the typical 
scenario. Under European Union law, a similar case was at hand in Deutsche Shell, in which 
the Court of Justice, notably thereby ruling the German tax rules applied incompatible with the 
European Union fundamental freedoms, adopted the same approach as set out in the above 
set of paragraphs. 
 
Ad scenario (ii) 
 
In the second, opposite, scenario, i.e., in cases where currency exchange results do arise in 
the host state, these results are included in the double tax relief mechanism in the home state 
and do not influence the home state tax burden imposed on home state source income 
accordingly. Such currency exchange results in effect are considered part of the foreign tax 
base. 
 
Save where currency exchange risks are hedged, currency exchange results arise in the host 
state in cases where resident taxpayers keep their tax books with respect to their foreign 
operations in the home state currency, the Euro in the current example, i.e., where they have 
locally situated assets and liabilities in Euro, whereas their worldwide income is calculated in 
Euro. Accordingly, tax deductible/taxable currency exchange results are recognized in the 
host state if such taxpayers carry on economic activities in host state tax jurisdictions that 
employ currencies other than the Euro. Such currency exchange results are deemed not to 
have arisen in the home state, as home state tax reporting occurs in Euro. Therefore such 
currency exchange results are not taken into account for home state corporate tax purposes. 
 
Subsequently, double tax relief is provided regarding such host state source currency 
exchange results realized. This is conceptually sound. These results arise abroad since the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Article 7, fifth indent, Dutch CITA). These are not further discussed. The Court of Justice takes a similar stand in 
case C-293/06 (Deutsche Shell). 
353
 An alternative to recognize currency exchange results for corporate tax purposes would be to exempt them from 
the taxable corporate base. Such an approach would not be conceptually sound. Currency exchange risks are actual 
commercial risks. These risks – in the event that they have not been hedged – may lead to actual mutations in the 
taxpayer’s equity capital. In my view, this economic reality should be acknowledged for corporate tax purposes, 
irrespective of the technical difficulties that may emerge from this when calculating the corporate tax liability. Hedge 
accounting could be applied for corporate tax purposes in scenarios where the currency exchange risks have been 
hedged. The aforementioned issues involving the corporate tax implications of currency exchange results would then 
not arise. That is, as currency risks do not commercially materialize to the extent that the risks involved are effectively 
hedged. 
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foreign tax burden is calculated in host state currencies. Consequently, currency exchange 
results realized due to differences in values between the Euro and the respective host state 
currencies arise in these host state tax jurisdictions. Accordingly, such currency exchange 
results are taken into account for home state double tax relief purposes. This scenario is 
further explored by means of numerical examples in sections 3.4.4.3 and 3.5.3.4. 
 
Ad scenario (iii) 
 
In the third scenario, i.e., the scenario in which currency exchange results arise in both the 
home state and the host state, these results are partially included in the double tax relief 
mechanism and partially influence the home state tax burden imposed on home state source 
income accordingly. Save where currency exchange risks are hedged, this occurs in cases in 
which home state resident taxpayers keep their tax books with respect to their foreign 
operations in the currency of a third country. That is, where they have locally situated assets 
and liabilities in the currency of a third country, i.e., a currency other than the local currency or 
the Euro, while their worldwide income is being calculated in the home state currency, i.e., the 
Euro in the current example. 
 
Under the application of the Dutch-style tax exemption mechanism, the effects are as follows 
in such a scenario. Tax deductible/taxable currency exchange results arise locally when home 
state resident taxpayers carry on economic activities in foreign jurisdictions that have a 
currency other than the Euro. Local currency exchange results in event of fluctuations 
between the currency of the third country and the local currency. In addition, tax 
deductible/taxable currency exchange results arise in the home state as well. Home state 
source currency exchange results when the value currency of the third country fluctuates 
against the Euro. 
 
Subsequently, double tax relief is provided regarding the currency exchange results ‘third 
country currency / the local currency’. This makes sense. Such currency exchange results 
arise abroad. These foreign source income items are taken into account for double tax relief 
purposes. On the contrary, no double tax relief is provided regarding the currency exchange 
results ‘third country currency / Euro’. This makes sense also. Such currency exchange 
results arise in the home state. Home state source income items are not taken into account 
for double tax relief purposes. Hence, at the end of the day, in terms of tax burdens imposed 
regarding home state source income, the home state acknowledges the currency exchange 
results ‘third country currency / Euro’. And the host state in which the home state resident 
taxpayer carries on its business operations recognizes the local/third country currency 
exchange result for which the home state provides double tax relief by means of the Dutch-
style tax exemption method. This scenario is further explored by means of numerical 
examples in sections 3.4.4.4 and 3.5.3.4. 
 
These effects can be best explained again through numerical examples. Let us therefore 
return to our taxpayer Johnson and elaborate a bit further.  
 
3.4.4.2 Scenario (i) – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in US Dollar 
Let us introduce a currency exchange issue into our ‘Base Case’. Suppose that, contrary to 
the ‘Base Case’ as referred to in section 3.4.1., State X now is the United States of America 
(instead of in Belgium). Viz., currency exchange issues in the relationship between the 
Netherlands and Belgium do not arise as both states are part of the European Monetary 
Union. Both apply the Euro as their currency. Hence, it is necessary to analytically ‘relocate’ 
Johnson’s branch B to a state that applies a currency than the Euro, for instance the United 
States. The United States of America adopts the US Dollar ($) as its currency for US 
corporate tax calculation purposes. Johnson’s worldwide income is calculated in Euro for 
Dutch corporate tax purposes. Suppose that, contrary to the default scenario, Johnson’s tax 
books of branch B are kept in the US Dollar and the books of branch A are kept in the Euro. 
Accordingly, branch B’s assets, liabilities and equity, as well as its expenses and receipts are 
booked in US Dollars. Branch A’s equivalents are kept in Euro. 
 
 Case a); US Dollar increases in value 
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In addition, let us suppose that $1 is worth €1 at the start of the tax year. And suppose that 
the exchange rate of the US Dollar increases in value during the tax year: at the end of this 
period $1 is worth €1.25. Obviously, the Euro rate concurrently decreases during this period. 
At the end of the tax year, €1 is worth $0.80.
354
 Notably, it is taken as an presupposition that 
the global currency exchange rate markets clear.
355
 
 
Under the Dutch-style double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income increases 
as the value of US Dollars increases. The currency exchange result is not recognized for 
double tax relief purposes as the income arises in the home state. Before proceeding to the 
technical overview, the following side note should be made (see fig. 9).  
 
Fig. 9. Some assumptions for simplicity reasons 
 
1. Currency exchange rate effects are calculated by reference to changes in equity during tax 
accounting period 
 
For the sake of simplicity, the currency exchange effects are calculated by reference to the currency 
exchange rate fluctuation on the branch’s equity movement. In Dutch tax practice, the currency 
exchange results are calculated by reference to the value of the taxpayer’s individual assets and 
liabilities. Furthermore, under the Dutch approach adopted for the purpose of allocating business 
proceeds to tax years, the so-called principle of sound business practice (‘goed koopmansgebruik’), a 
further distinction is made between the taxpayer’s individual long-term and short-term tangible and 
intangible assets and liabilities. Subsequently, a distinction is made, where appropriate, between the 
currency exchange results realized on profits and on capital gains, to be calculated, by reference to 
historical rates or the average monthly rates or daily rates depending on facts and circumstances. This 
makes things technically somewhat more complex in practice. Conceptually, however, things are not 
materially different for double tax relief calculation purposes. Hence, it is assumed that all in currency 
exchange rates fluctuation result in a realization of a taxable profit or tax-deductible loss for Dutch 
income tax purposes. 
 
Moreover, it is assumed that the currency exchange result may be calculated by reference to the 
fluctuation in the respective currency’s value during the accounting period. This enables a relatively 
straightforward determination of the currency exchange result in the examples by multiplying the change 
in the currency exchange rate with Johnson’s overall equity movement. 
 
Furthermore, the currency exchange rate effect on Johnson’s equity capital issued (nominal equity 
capital and equity premium) is ignored. Only the effects of currency exchange rate fluctuations on the 
changes to in Johnson’s equity capital are taken into consideration. Accordingly, the currency effect on 
the issued equity capital is deemed to be realized for tax purposes when the business is no longer 
operated and the company is liquidated or wound up. This is assumed both for the sake of simplicity and 
to avoid that the currency exchange effects would otherwise overshadow Johnson’s operational 
business proceeds. 
 
2. Currency exchange rate effects are calculated by reference to spot rate on the first day of the 
accounting period 
 
And finally, for reasons of simplicity, the currency exchange result on the business profits realized is 
calculated by reference to the spot rate at the opening of the accounting period, i.e., on 1/1. In Dutch tax 
practice the currency exchange results are calculated by reference to the average currency exchange 
rate in the accounting period – i.e., the approach in Dutch tax practice considers business profit realized 
at the average spot rate (rather than the 1/1 spot rate as used in the following numerical exercises). 
 
 
This being said, technically, things work out as follows. Johnson’s worldwide income amounts 
to €215,000 (i.e., 200,000 + 15,000). The latter amount, i.e., the profit of €15,000 is equal to 
                                                     
354
 1 / 1.25 = 0.80. 
355
 Short-term imbalances occur in practice. These may be commercially exploited. This may be illustrated by pointing 
at the possibilities in practice to derive income from currency carry trading, i.e. the (short-term) borrowing of money in 
a low-interest rate currency (typically of a stronger economy) for the purpose of using the funds to invest in an asset 
(e.g. a long-term bond) in a different currency with a higher interest rate (i.e. typically of a weaker economy). This 
may enable a currency carry trader to make money by capturing the difference between the rates. Substantial profits 
(or losses) may be derived through carry trade when leverage is taken into consideration. 
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the increase in value recognized upon the conversion of branch B’s profit of $60,000 into Euro 
(i.e., 60,000 * 1.25 – 60,000 * 1). The home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income 
amounts to €5,000 + €10,000 + €28,750
356
 = €43,750 which equals an average effective tax 
rate of 20.3%.
357
  
 
For the purpose of subsequently calculating the double tax relief, the currency exchange 
result is not recognized for double tax relief purposes as there is no currency exchange result 
in the host state, the United States in the current example. Consequently, under the double 
tax relief mechanism the numerator in the fraction is calculated at €60,000. The fraction 
subsequently applied under the double tax relief mechanism equals to €12,209.30.
358
 The tax 
payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €43,750 – €12,209.30 = €31,540.70. The 
home state tax due equals an average effective tax rate in the home state of 20.3% on the 
home state share of the tax pie calculated at €155,000 (i.e., €140,000 + €15,000).
359
 The 
same is true regarding the amount of double tax relief that is effectively granted with respect 
to the host state’s share of the tax pie, i.e., the United States in the current example. That 
amount equals 20.3% as well.
360
 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
If the home state would have adopted an import neutrality promoting base exemption system, 
the currency exchange result realized for tax purposes on Johnson’s income derived through 
its host state branch B in US Dollars would not be taken into account for home state tax 
purposes. In such a case Johnson’s branch B income, including the currency exchange result 
Euro/ US Dollar would have been exempt from the tax base. Only the home state source 
income, i.e., branch A’s income derived of €140,000 would have been taxable in the home 
state. Consequently, the payable home state tax would have amounted to €5,000
361
 + 
€10,000
362
 + €10,000
363
 = €25,000. 
 
Please note that the home state tax burden imposed in such a case is not 17.9%.
364
 As 
Johnson actually realizes a currency exchange result on its US branch B’s income, this 
should be taken into account for tax burden calculation purposes. The application of an import 
neutrality promoting base exemption rather than the Dutch-style tax exemption method does 
not mean that currency exchange results all of a sudden would not arise in the home state 
any more. The only thing changed is the application of a different double tax relief method. 
The tax payable in the home state under a base exemption method of €25,000 would 
substantially mean the levy of an effective tax imposed at a rate of 16.1%,
365
 rather than the 
above mentioned 20.3%. 
 
What does this mean? This means that an import neutrality promoting base exemption 
mechanism arbitrarily affects the tax burden imposed, as it disregards economically 
substantive income items for tax calculation purposes. Despite the fact that macro-economic 
currency exchange effects cannot be influenced on a micro-economic level, i.e., at the level of 
individual taxpayers, currency exchange results actually impose commercial risks and 
currency exchange results actually affect income levels. 
 
Taxpayer Johnson would have been better off in the example. The tax burden imposed 
equals 16.1% instead of 20.3%. However, this is just by chance. The relaxed burden is the 
consequence of the fact that the US Dollar increased in value, whilst the increase is not taken 
into account for tax calculation purposes. Moreover, the application of the base exemption 
                                                     
356
 25% * 115,000 = 28,750. 
357
 (43,750 / 215,000) * 100% = 20.3%. 
358
 60,000 / (200,000 + 15,000) * 43,750 = 12,209.30. 
359
 31,540.70 / 155,000 * 100% = 20.3% 
360
 12,209.30 / 60,000 * 100% = 20.3%. Notably, the sum of 12,209.30 and 31,540.70 equals 43,750. 
361
 10% * 50,000 = 5,000. 
362
 20% * 50,000 = 10,000. 
363
 25% * 40,000 = 10,000. 
364
 25.000 / 140.000 * 100% = 17.9%. 
365
 25,000 / (140,000 + 15,000) * 100% = 16.1%. 
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mechanism moderates the internationally commonplace progressiveness effects in the 
employed tax rate structures. Johnson would have benefited from the income split effect. 
 
But tomorrow, reality may be different. The US Dollar may decrease in value. Johnson may 
have suffered a loss from its foreign operations. That would cancel out the advantages. The 
dices would have rolled against Johnson. At the end of the day by exempting currency 
exchange results from the tax base the market is distorted. Currency exchange results cannot 
be influenced individually. The question of whether the tax burden imposed ends up in a more 
relaxed or heavier burden is a game of chance.  
 
This clearly distorts the decision of whether or not to do business across a tax border as one 
cannot oversee the outcome hereof in terms of tax burdens imposed beforehand. Internal 
equity and capital and labor neutrality call for equal tax treatment in equal cases. 
 
Court of Justice agrees; Deutsche Shell 
 
Worth mentioning is that the Court of Justice has ruled in line with the aforementioned 
reasoning in the Deutsche Shell case
366
 which ruling is applicable in cases falling within the 
confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, The Deutsche Shell case dealt 
with the compatibility or incompatibility with the European Union fundamental freedoms of the 
German tax treatment of currency exchange losses suffered in the course of business 
operations carried on abroad. Until the Court of Justice’s ruling Germany exempted resident 
taxpayer’s currency exchange losses realized on their foreign business operations from the 
German tax base. The Deutsche Shell case involved a German resident taxpayer that 
operated a business in Italy. The German taxpayer’s Italian activities were reported in Liras 
for tax purposes (this was prior to the introduction of the Euro). As the German Mark 
increased in value vis-à-vis the Italian Lira the German taxpayer suffered a currency loss. 
This loss was not tax-deductible in Germany as Germany exempted such losses from the tax 
base. 
 
As a consequence of the application of such a base exemption, the German international tax 
system made it less attractive for German resident taxpayers to get involved in intra- 
European Union cross-border economic activities. Viz., these taxpayers did not have any 
upfront knowledge as to the German tax burden imposed in respect of their income realized 
at the end of the day. Currency exchange rates cannot be influenced individually yet impose 
real economic risks. By not taking into account actual currency exchange losses for German 
income tax purposes, i.e., by means of exempting these income items from the tax base, the 
Court of Justice considered the German tax rules to infringe upon the ‘market access 
principle’ and accordingly found these rules to be a restriction that was incompatible with the 
European Union fundamental freedoms. Now let us return to the effects of the Dutch-style 
double tax relief method. 
 
 Case b); US Dollar drops in value 
 
Let us imagine the reverse situation in which the US Dollar drops in value during the tax year. 
At the end of this period $1 is worth €0.80. The Euro rate concurrently increases: at the end of 
the tax year, €1 is worth $1.25.  
 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income decreases as the 
value of the US Dollar decreases. The currency exchange result is not recognized for double 
tax relief purposes. Technically, things work out as follows. Taxpayer Johnson’s worldwide 
income amounts to €188,000 (i.e., 200,000 – 12,000). The latter amount, i.e., the loss of 
€12,000 is equal to the decrease in value recognized upon the conversion of branch B’s profit 
of $60,000 into Euro (i.e., 60,000 * 0.80 – 60,000 * 1). The home state tax on Johnson’s 
worldwide income amounts to €5,000 + €10,000 + €22,000
367
 = €37,000, which equals an 
average effective tax rate of 19.7%.
368
 For the purpose of subsequently calculating the double 
                                                     
366
 Court of Justice, case C-293/06 (Deutsche Shell). 
367
 25% * 88,000 = 22,000. 
368
 (37,000 / 188,000) * 100% = 19.7%. 
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tax relief, the currency exchange result is not recognized for double tax relief purposes as 
there is no currency exchange result in the host state, the United States. Consequently, under 
the double tax relief mechanism, the numerator in the fraction is calculated at €60,000. The 
fraction subsequently applied under the double tax relief mechanism equals to €11,808.51.
369
 
The tax payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €37,000 – €11,808.51 = 
€25,191.49. The home state tax due equals an average effective tax rate in the home state of 
19.7% on the home state share of the tax pie, calculated at €128,000 (i.e., €140,000 – 
€12,000).
370
 The same is true regarding the amount of double tax relief that is effectively 
granted with respect to the host state’s share of the tax pie. It also equals 19.7%.
371
 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption would prove distortive 
 
If the home state would have adopted an import neutrality promoting base exemption system, 
the currency exchange result realized for tax purposes on Johnson’s income derived through 
its US branch B in US Dollars would not be taken into account for home state tax purposes. 
Again the income of Johnson’s branch B, including the currency exchange result Euro/US 
Dollar would have been exempt from the tax base. Only the income derived from the activities 
carried on through branch A of €140,000 would have been taxable in the home state. As said, 
the tax payable in the home state would have amounted to €25,000. That would substantially 
entail the levy of an effective tax at a rate of 19.5%
372
 instead of the above-mentioned 19.7%.  
 
Johnson would have been lucky. The dices would have rolled in Johnson’s favor. He would 
be better off in terms of tax burdens imposed. The disadvantage imposed as a consequence 
of the non-recognition of the currency exchange loss on the US Dollar would have been 
compensated by the benefits derived from the progressiveness moderating income split 
alongside Dutch and US tax borders. Back to the Dutch-style tax exemption. 
 
3.4.4.3 Scenario (ii) – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in Euro 
Now suppose that, contrary to the two cases referred to in the above section 3.4.4.2, both the 
books of branch B and branch A are kept in Euro for tax purposes. Accordingly, both branch 
A’s and branch B’s assets, liabilities and equity, as well as its expenses and receipts are 
recorded in Euro. 
 
 Case c); US Dollar increases in value 
 
Furthermore suppose that the US Dollar conversion rate again increases from €1 to €1.25 
during the tax year. 
 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income does not alter. It 
continues to be €200,000. This is conceptually sound as taxpayer Johnson keeps its books in 
Euro for home state corporate tax purposes and, accordingly, no currency exchange result 
arises in the home state. The home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income accordingly 
amounts to €5,000 + €10,000 + €25,000
373
 = €40,000, an average effective tax rate in the 
home state of 20%. Subsequently, the double tax relief is calculated. The amount of relief 
alters in comparison with the default scenario since a currency loss of $12,000 (60,000 * 0.80 
– 60,000 * 1) arises in the host state. The amount of $12,000 equals the decrease in value 
recognized upon the conversion of the branch B’s profit of €60,000 into $48,000. This effect is 
recognized for double tax relief purposes. The application of the fraction entails double tax 
relief amounting to €9,600.
374
 The tax payable in the home state accordingly amounts to 
€40,000 – €9,600 = €30,400, an average effective tax rate in the home state of 20% on the 
home state share of the tax pie, calculated at €152,000 (i.e., €140,000 + €12,000). The same 
                                                     
369
 60,000 / 200,000 – 12,000) * 37,000 = 11,808.51. 
370
 25,191.49 / 128,000 * 100% = 19.7% 
371
 11,808.51 / 60,000 * 100% = 19.7%. Notably, the sum of 11,808.51 and 25,191.49 equals 37,000. 
372
 25,000 / (140,000 – 12,000) * 100% = 19.5%. 
373
 25% * 100,000 = 25,000. 
374
 (60,000 – 12,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 9,600. 
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is true regarding the double tax relief that is effectively granted with respect to the host state’s 
share of the tax pie; that equals 20% as well.
375
 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption is distortive 
 
If the home state were to have adopted an import neutrality base exemption system, the 
payable home state tax would again have amounted to €25,000. That would substantially 
entail the levy of an effective tax at a rate of 16.4%
376
 instead of the above mentioned 20%.  
 
Again, Johnson would have been lucky. The US Dollar increased, whilst this fact arbitrarily 
would not have been taken into account for home state tax calculation purposes indeed. 
Moreover, Johnson would have benefited from the income split. Back to the Dutch-style tax 
exemption method. 
 
 Case d); US Dollar drops in value 
 
Now imagine the reverse situation in which the US Dollar drops in value during the tax year. 
Again, $1 is worth €0.80 at the end of this period. And the Euro rate concurrently increases 
from €1 to $1.25. 
 
Under the double tax relief methodology again Johnson’s worldwide income does not alter. It 
still amount to €200,000. And again this is conceptually sound as taxpayer Johnson keeps its 
books in Euro for home state corporate tax purposes and accordingly there is no currency 
exchange result in the home state. The home state tax on Johnson’s worldwide income 
accordingly amounts to €40,000. Again, the amount of relief alters in comparison with the 
default scenario as a currency gain of $15,000 is realized in the host state. The amount of 
$15,000 is equal to the increase in value recognized upon the conversion of branch B’s profit 
of €60,000 into $75,000 (i.e., 60,000 * 1.25 – 60,000 * 1). As this effect is recognized for 
double tax relief purposes, the application of the fraction entails double tax relief amounting to 
€15,000.
377
 The tax payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €40,000 – €15,000 = 
€25,000, an average effective tax rate in the home state of 20% on the home state share of 
the tax pie, calculated at €125,000 (i.e., €140,000 – €15,000). The same is true regarding the 
double tax relief that is effectively granted with respect to the host state’s share of the tax pie; 
that equals 20% also.
378
 
  
Import neutrality promoting base exemption is distortive 
 
If the home state would have adopted an import neutrality promoting base exemption system, 
the tax payable in the home state tax would again have amounted to €25,000. That would 
substantially entail the levy of an effective tax at a rate of 20%.
379
 The tax burden would be 
equal to the tax burden as imposed under the Dutch-style tax exemption method as referred 
to in the above paragraph; a tie. The US Dollar decreased in value whilst this fact would not 
have been taken into account for home state tax calculation purposes. A split of Johnson’s 
income between the home state and host state alongside the tax border would have barely 
compensated for this. Chances are. Now back to the Dutch-style tax exemption. 
 
3.4.4.4 Scenario (iii) – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in Japanese Yen 
Now let us suppose that contrary to the four cases referred to in the above two sections the 
books of branch B are kept in Japanese Yen for tax purposes and that the books of branch A 
are kept in Euro. Accordingly, branch B’s assets, liabilities and equity, as well as its expenses 
and receipts are recorded in Yen. Branch A’s equivalents in Euro. 
 
 Case e); US Dollar increases in value 
                                                     
375
 9,600 / 48,000 * 100% = 20%. Notably, the sum of 9,600 and 30,400 equals 40,000. 
376
 25,000 / (140,000 + 12,000) * 100% = 16.4%. 
377
 (60,000 + 15,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 15,000. 
378
 15,000 / 75,000 * 100% = 20%. Notably, the sum of 15,000 and 25,000 equals 40,000. 
379
 25.000,00 / (140.000 – 15.000) * 100% = 20%. 
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Furthermore, let us suppose that $1 is worth €1 and ¥1 at the start of the tax year. And 
suppose that the exchange rate of the US Dollar increases during the tax year in respect of 
both the Euro and the Yen: at the end of this period $1 is worth €1.25 and ¥1.50. The Euro 
and Yen exchange rates concurrently decrease during this period. Accordingly, at the end of 
the tax year, ¥1 is worth €0.83
380
 and $0.67.
381
 €1 is worth $0.80.
382
 And €1 is worth ¥1.20.
383
 
In a table (fig. 10): 
 
Fig. 10. Exchange rates at the end of the accounting period 
Exchange rates ($: €: ¥) 
 $ € ¥ 
$1 1 1.25 1.50 
€1 0.80 1 1.20 
¥1 0.67 0.83 1 
 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income alters as a tax 
deductible currency exchange result is recognized for home state corporate tax purposes with 
respect to fluctuation in value between the Yen and the Euro. Taxpayer Johnson’s worldwide 
income amounts to €190,000 (i.e., 200,000 – €10,000). The latter amount, i.e., the loss of 
€10,000 equals to the decrease in value recognized upon the conversion of branch B’s profit 
of ¥60,000 into Euro (i.e., 60,000 * 0.83 – 60,000 * 1). The home state tax on Johnson’s 
worldwide income amounts to €5,000 + €10,000 + €22,500
384
 = €37,500 which equals an 
average effective tax rate of 19.7%.
385
 No double tax relief is granted with respect to this 
currency exchange result. This makes sense as this currency exchange result arises in the 
home state. 
 
Subsequently, the double tax relief is calculated. For double tax relief purposes a currency 
exchange result is recognized with respect to fluctuation in value between the Yen and the 
US Dollar. This is conceptually sound as a currency loss of $20,000 (60,000 * 0.67 – 60,000 * 
1) arises in the host state. The amount of $20,000 equals the decrease in value recognized 
upon the conversion of branch B’s profit of ¥60,000 into $40,000. The application of the 
fraction entails double tax relief amounting to €7,894.74.
386
 The tax payable in the home state 
accordingly amounts to €37,500 – €7,894.74 = €29,605.26, an average effective tax rate in 
the home state of 19.7% on the home state share of the tax pie, calculated at €150,000 (i.e., 
€140,000 + €10,000). The latter amount, i.e., the increase of €10,000 equals the difference in 
the value fluctuations between the Yen and the Euro on the one hand and the Yen and the 
US Dollar on the other (i.e., 60,000 * 0.83 – 60,000 * 0.67). In addition, the amount of double 
tax relief granted with respect to the host state share of the tax pie equals an effective relief of 
19.7% as well.
387
 Accordingly, the home state recognizes a tax deductible Euro/Yen currency 
exchange result of €10,000 for tax purposes when branch B’s profits of ¥60,000 are 
converted into €50,000 (i.e., 60,000 * 0.83). In addition, the host state effectively recognizes a 
tax deductible US Dollar/Yen currency exchange result of $20,000 when branch B’s profits of 
¥60,000 are converted into $40,000 (i.e., 60,000.00 * 0.67). 
 
Import neutrality promoting base exemption is distortive 
 
Notably, were the home state to have adopted an import neutrality promoting base exemption 
system, the tax payable in the home state tax would again have amounted to €25,000. That 
would substantially entail the levy of an effective tax at a rate of 16.7%,
388
 instead of the 
above mentioned 19.7%.  
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 1.25 / 1.50 = 0.83. 
381
 1 / 1.50 = 0.67. 
382
 1 / 1.25 = 0.80. 
383
 1 / (1.25 / 1.50) = 1.20.  
384
 25% * 90,000 = 22,500. 
385
 (37,500 / 190,000) * 100% = 19.7%. 
386
 (60,000 – 20,000) / (200,000 – 10,000) * 37,500 = 7,894.74. 
387
 7,894.74 / 40,000 * 100% = 19.7%. Notably, the sum of 7,894.74 and 29,605.26 equals 37,500. 
388
 25,000 / (140,000 + 10,000) * 100% = 16.7%. 
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Johnson would have been lucky. The US Dollar increased in value, whilst this fact, indeed on 
an arbitrary basis again, would not have been taken into account for home state tax 
calculation purposes. Moreover, Johnson would have benefited from the income split 
alongside home state and host state tax borders. Let us return to the Dutch-style double tax 
relief method. 
 
Case f); US Dollar drops in value 
 
Now imagine the reverse situation. The US Dollar drops in value during the tax year in 
respect of both the Euro and the Yen. At the end of this period $1 is worth €0.80
389
 and 
¥0.67.
390
 The Euro and Yen exchange rates concurrently increase in value during this period. 
Accordingly, at the end of the tax year, the Euro rate increases in value to $1.25.
391
 The Yen 
rate concurrently increases in value, i.e., to $1.50
392
 and €1.20.
393
 At that time, €1 is worth 
¥0.83.
394
 In a table (fig. 11): 
 
Fig. 11. Exchange rates 
Exchange rates ($: €: ¥) 
 $ € ¥ 
$1 1 0.80 0.67 
€1 1.25 1 0.83 
¥1 1.50 1.20 1 
 
Under the double tax relief methodology, Johnson’s worldwide income again alters as a 
taxable currency exchange result is recognized for home state corporate tax purposes with 
respect to fluctuation in value between the Yen and the Euro. Taxpayer Johnson’s worldwide 
income amounts to €212,000 (i.e., 200,000 + 12,000). The latter amount, i.e., the profit of 
€12,000 equals the increase in value recognized upon the conversion of branch B’s profit of 
¥60,000 into Euro (i.e., 60,000 * 1.20 – 60,000 * 1). The home state tax on Johnson’s 
worldwide income amounts to €5,000 + €10,000 + €28,000
395
 = €43,000 which equals an 
average effective tax rate of 20.3%.
396
 Again no double tax relief is granted with respect to 
this currency exchange result. And again this makes sense as this currency exchange result 
arises in the home state.  
 
Subsequently, the double tax relief is calculated. For double tax relief purposes a currency 
exchange result is recognized with respect to fluctuation in value between the Yen and the 
US Dollar. This is conceptually sound as a currency exchange result of $30,000 (60,000 * 
1.50 – 60,000 * 1) arises in the host state. The amount of $30,000 is equal to the increase in 
value recognized upon the conversion of branch B’s profit of ¥60,000 into $90,000. The 
application of the fraction entails double tax relief amounting to €18,254.72.
397
 The tax 
payable in the home state accordingly amounts to €43,000 – €18,254.72 = €24,745.28, an 
average effective tax rate in the home state of 20.3% on the home state share of the tax pie, 
calculated at €122,000 (i.e., €140,000 – €18,000). The latter amount, i.e., €18,000 equals the 
difference in the fluctuations in value between the Yen and the Euro on the one hand and the 
Yen and the US Dollar on the other (i.e., 60,000 * 1.20 – 60,000 * 1.50). In addition, the 
amount of double tax relief granted with respect to the host state’s share of the tax pie equals 
an effective relief of 20.3% as well.
398
 Accordingly, the home state effectively recognizes a 
taxable Euro/Yen currency exchange result of €12,000 for tax purposes when branch B’s 
profits of ¥60,000 are converted into €72,000 (i.e., 60,000 * 1.20). In addition, the host state 
effectively recognizes a taxable US Dollar/Yen currency exchange result of $30,000 when 
branch B’s profits of ¥60,000 are converted into $90,000. 
 
                                                     
389
 1 / 1.25 = 0.80. 
390
 1 / 1.50 = 0.67. 
391
 1 / (1 / 1.25) = 1.25. 
392
 1 / (1 / 1.50) = 1.50. 
393
 1 / (1.25 / 1.50) 1.20. 
394
 1.25 / 1.50 = 0.83. 
395
 25% * 112,000 = 28,000. 
396
 (43,000 / 212,000) * 100% = 20.3%. 
397
 (60,000 + 30,000) / (200,000 + 12,000) * 43,000 = 18,254.72. 
398
 18,254.72 / 90,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
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Import neutrality promoting base exemption is distortive 
 
If the home state were to have adopted an import neutrality promoting base exemption 
system, the payable home state tax would again have amounted to €25,000. That would 
substantially entail the levy of an effective tax at a rate of 20.5%,
399
 instead of the above 
mentioned 19.7%.  
 
Johnson would have run out of luck. The US Dollar decreased in value, whilst this fact would 
not have been taken into account for home state tax calculation purposes, indeed again on an 
arbitrary basis. The progressiveness moderating fact of Johnson’s income being split 
alongside the home state and host state tax border would not have compensated for this. 
Things would even be worse if the host state branch B activities would have been loss-
rendering. 
 
3.5 The route to Rome; taxing the fraction 
3.5.1 Had the Dutch tax legislator applied the Dutch style-double tax relief 
mechanism non-discriminatorily it would have enhanced fairness, but it did 
not… 
3.5.1.1 The system itself operates equitably and efficiently as the tax burden is 
untouched by border crossages 
Many other examples can be thought of that demonstrate the operation of the double tax 
relief mechanism. But the purpose of the aforementioned in-depth elaboration on the Dutch-
style credit methodology’s operation is to illustrate that the tax burden imposed in the home 
state remains the same, irrespective of whether resident taxpayer Johnson carries out its 
business activities in a cross-border context or not. 
 
Due to its pro rata parte fractional operation, it neither acts a tax incentive nor a tax 
disincentive for taxpayer Johnson to cross the tax border vis-à-vis staying at home. The tax 
burden in the home state is not affected by such a decision. Accordingly, both the ability to 
pay principle and the benefits principle are respected concurrently. From a unilateral home 
state perspective the change of tax jurisdictions consequently takes place in a tax neutral and 
equitable manner.
400
 
 
3.5.1.2 Common to international taxation practices, the system is however only 
available to Dutch resident taxpayers; non-resident taxpayers receive a 
different tax treatment 
Unfortunately, the Netherlands reserves this equity and neutrality enhancing double tax relief 
mechanism for its resident taxpayers only. As a rule, its non-resident taxpayers are not 
granted access to the mechanism. The system applies only where the Netherlands is the 
home state. It does not apply where it is the host state. With that, the system is essentially 
applied in a discriminatory fashion.  
 
As is the case with virtually all international tax systems, the Dutch international tax system 
typically distinguishes between resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers when 
calculating the tax charge. Resident taxpayers, i.e., persons who have their place of tax 
residence within the territories of the taxing state (‘residence state’), are subject to unlimited 
tax liability and taxed on their worldwide income. In cases where resident taxpayers have 
eligible foreign source income items, juridical double tax relief is subsequently provided by 
means of the Dutch-style double tax relief method elaborated on in the above – the ‘credit for 
domestic tax attributable to foreign income items’. 
                                                     
399
 25,000 / (140,000 – 18,000) * 100% = 20.5%. 
400
 Contra Court of Justice, cases C-279/93 (Schumacker) and C-385/00 (De Groot). Cf. B.J.M Terra et al, European 
Tax Law (2012), at Section 19.4. 
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Non-resident taxpayers, i.e., persons who have their place of tax residence outside the 
territories of the Netherlands (‘source state’) are treated differently. When the Netherlands is a 
host or source state the Dutch tax treatment is different. Non-resident taxpayers are subject to 
limited tax liability and are taxed on income derived from domestic sources only. To the extent 
that non-resident taxpayers derive foreign source income items, these items of income are 
not included in the source state’s tax base. As foreign income is excluded from taxation in the 
source state (the Netherlands), these non-resident taxpayers’ foreign source income items 
are substantially exempt from taxation in the respective source state (the Netherlands). 
Accordingly, as a host state ‘double tax relief’ is provided in a manner that is akin to the base 
exemption given by import neutrality promoting home states with respect to resident 
taxpayers with foreign source income (see 3.4.3.2). For reasons of convenience and 
conceptual reasons let’s forward to the conclusion that by doing so the Netherlands provides 
for ‘double tax relief’ regarding the non-resident taxpayer’s foreign income by way of a ‘base 
exemption mechanism’. 
 
It should be mentioned that this approach neatly fits the concepts and principles common in 
international taxation. The differential in the unlimited tax liability of resident taxpayers and the 
limited tax liability of non-resident taxpayers is the typical approach in the international tax 
regime. As already described above also the OECD Model Tax Convention shows evidence 
of embracing the differential in tax treatment depending on the taxpayer’s place of residence. 
 
3.5.1.3 Notwithstanding its alignment to international taxation, the difference in tax 
treatment is essentially unfair 
 
Divergent tax treatment of resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers; for better 
or for worse 
 
However, notwithstanding its acceptance in international taxation, non-resident taxpayers are 
not only materially and formally subject to different income tax treatment, they are also 
subject to a diverging tax burden in comparison with resident taxpayers. Compared to 
resident taxpayers, non-resident taxpayers may be worse off or better off depending on the 
facts and circumstances. 
 
 Sometimes the tax burden is lighter; income split effects 
 
Non-resident taxpayers are, for example, subject to a more relaxed tax burden in cases 
involving ‘income splits’. The fragmentation of a non-resident taxpayer’s tax base across tax 
jurisdictions moderates any progressiveness effects in tax rate structures in the international 
tax system of the taxing jurisdiction involved. Viz., rather than on worldwide earnings non-
resident taxpayers are subject to tax on their income to the extent that it is derived from 
domestic sources.  
 
Mechanisms seeking to do justice to the progressiveness effects of tax rate structures, such 
as the internationally commonplace tax exemption with progression mechanisms – i.e., a 
species of the generalis base exemption – are typically only applied with respect to resident 
taxpayers who are unlimitedly subject to tax for their worldwide income. Non-resident 
taxpayers who derive income both from domestic and foreign sources may benefit from this 
difference in tax treatment. The effects of a non-resident taxpayer favoring income split have 
been addressed in section 4.1 above. Notably, under a strict territorial system, also resident 
taxpayers would benefit vis-à-vis the taxpayers that decided to stay at home, i.e., save for the 
application of a base exemption with progression mechanism. 
 
Sometimes the tax burden is heavier 
 
1 – No loss-imports, 2 – exit taxes, 3 – exemption of currency exchange results 
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Non-resident taxpayers may be worse off and be subject to a heavier tax burden in 
comparison with resident taxpayers. In practice, this may be the case regarding the tax 
treatment of cross-border losses, internal dealings and currency exchange results. 
 
 Ad 1 – No imports of losses from foreign investments 
 
As a first example, take the scenario where a non-resident taxpayer suffers losses from 
cross-border business activities. Typically, non-resident taxpayers are excluded from the 
possibility to offset foreign source losses suffered against domestic source profits while such 
a ‘horizontal’ loss set-off possibility is typically available in cases where the items of income 
would have been derived within the same taxing jurisdiction. 
 
It is not too uncommon that nation states enable their resident taxpayers to horizontally offset 
foreign source losses against domestic source profits – e.g. the Netherlands,
401
 and 
Austria.
402
 Notably, if the home state were to adopt a territorial system it would comparatively 
give a favorable tax treatment to the taxpayer that decided to stay at home vis-à-vis the 
taxpayer that decided to cross the tax border. By disabling foreign source loss imports, 
territorial systems distort outbound investment. 
 
The distortive effects have been demonstrated in the above section 3.4.2. Non-resident 
taxpayers who suffer losses abroad are dependent on local (i.e., foreign) vertical loss set-off 
possibilities. Consequently non-resident taxpayers are put in a disadvantageous tax position – 
a liquidity disadvantage at best – in comparison with taxpayers who have been allowed to 
horizontally offset any losses suffered against the profits derived.
403
 If our taxpayer Johnson 
were to have resided for instance in Brussels, Cologne, Rome, Beijing, or Washington for 
Dutch tax purposes, it would have been impossible to deduct Belgian source losses from its 
Dutch state tax base. Solely because of its foreign tax residency. 
 
And, as also said, the Netherlands does not stand alone in this respect. Virtually all 
international tax systems of states subject non-resident taxpayers to this difference in tax 
treatment with the abovementioned consequence of the non-deductibility of foreign losses. 
 
 Ad 2 – Exit taxes upon outbound movements of property 
 
The second example of a heavier tax burden imposed on taxpayers crossing the tax border 
vis-à-vis those staying at home is the levy of an ‘exit tax’ – i.e., a latent tax claim on a hidden 
reserve which immediately becomes due upon transfers of property from the respective taxing 
state’s territories to another country. No such exit tax is typically levied upon the movement of 
property within the territories of that state. 
 
It is not uncommon for nation states – e.g. the Netherlands – to refrain from imposing such an 
exit tax in cases where resident taxpayers transfer property containing a hidden reserve to 
another country.
404
 Well, that is at least to the extent that these resident taxpayers do not also 
                                                     
401
 See for some details, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double 
taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011), at section 
2.3. 
402
 See Sec. 2(2) of the Austrian Income Tax Code (Einkommensteuergesetz, EStG). The Austrian Supreme 
Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichthof, VwGH) explicitly ruled that resident taxpayers may offset foreign 
sources losses against their domestic source profits, also in cases where a double tax convention applies providing 
for the exemption mechanism for double tax relief purposes; VwGH, 25 September 2001, 99/14/0217. A recapture 
rule (Nachversteuerung) applies to secure single taxation of cross-border business income; Sec. 2(8)(3) EStG. 
403
 See on this matter also Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the 
Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). 
404
 In the Netherlands, for example, latent income tax claims on hidden reserves do not become immediately due 
when resident taxpayers transfer capital assets from Dutch territory to another country. Instead, the hidden reserve is 
substantially added to the domestic taxable base in yearly instalments, which vary in directly proportion to the annual 
depreciation during the remaining economic lifetime of the transferred asset. Technically, the assets transferred from 
the Dutch head office to the foreign permanent establishment (‘PE’) are placed on the PE’s balance sheet at fair 
value rather than the (lower) tax bookkeeping value. Subsequently, for the purpose of determining the PE’s tax 
exempt profit, the annual (tax deductible) depreciation is calculated against that fair value (instead of the tax 
bookkeeping value). Accordingly, this leads to an annual reduction of the tax-exempt PE income for a period that 
corresponds with the remaining economic lifetime of the respective transferred asset. In addition, this leads to an 
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transfer their tax residence to another country as well.
405
 This has been demonstrated in the 
above section 3.4.3. 
 
Ad 3 – Exemption of currency exchange results from foreign investments 
 
As a third example of a heavier, i.e., at least an arbitrary additional tax burden is the 
exemption of currency exchange results from the tax base. As non-resident taxpayers are 
merely subject to tax to the extent of income derived from domestic sources, currency 
exchange results realized by non-resident taxpayers’ on income items earned on outward 
bound investments, i.e., as seen from the perspective of the source state, are exempt from 
the source state’s tax base. 
 
Consequently, just as is the case with the adoption of an import neutrality promoting base 
exemption mechanism, the tax burden imposed by source states to non-resident taxpayers is 
arbitrary as it disregards economically substantive income items for tax calculation purposes. 
Whether the tax burden moves in a favorable or unfavorable direction for the individual non-
resident taxpayer has been left to a game of chance or speculation. Consequently, the 
decision to take business cross-border is affected by the tax system.  
 
The application of a base exemption in respect of a non-resident taxpayer’s foreign source 
income items and, with that, the exemption of currency exchange results from the tax base is 
akin to the German exemption of currency exchange losses regarding German resident 
taxpayers ruled incompatible with the fundamental freedoms by the Court of Justice in 
Deutsche Shell. In order to acknowledge this comparison it should be appreciated that a 
different place of residence does not entail that all of a sudden currency exchange results 
arise in another taxing jurisdiction. This is not the case. The mere difference is a difference in 
place of residence, not a difference in the location where the currency exchange results 
arises. Moreover, within the context of a borderless global market a difference in residence 
should not be considered a difference in circumstances. 
 
Divergent tax treatment is based on a sole ground: the tax place of residence 
 
The difference in tax treatment of non-resident taxpayers vis-à-vis resident taxpayers is 
founded on the sole ground of the place of residence for tax purposes. The question of 
whether such an unequal tax treatment should actually be considered to be fair has not often 
been addressed in the international tax literature.
406
 In itself, this may be considered 
remarkable. Namely, one may ask oneself whether this unequal treatment of taxpayers that is 
                                                                                                                                                        
increase in the corporate tax annually payable at the level of the head office during that same period. See Dutch 
Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 12 February 1964, No. 15 068, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse 
Belastingrechtspraak 1964/95 (Hopperzuiger). 
405
 Reference should be made to the ruling of the Court of Justice in case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus). National 
Grid Indus involved such an exit tax levied by The Netherlands upon an outbound movement of a production factor. 
The Court of Justice considered the exit tax compatible with the free movements provided that it is coupled with the 
possibility to opt for an interest bearing deferral of the tax collection. It should be noted that an immediate collection of 
the tax or an interest bearing deferral of the tax collection is equivalent in terms of the net present value worth of the 
tax debt imposed. Accordingly, the court ruling may be considered to be understood as effectively sanctioning the 
imposition of exit taxes under primary European Union law. This is quite difficult to understand conceptually. The idea 
of the internal market without internal frontiers is that the tax burden imposed by a single European Union Member 
State in a cross-border environment should be identical to that in an equivalent domestic environment. And this 
exactly was the problem in the case at hand. The exit tax imposed upon the outward bound border-crossing while no 
such a tax impost arises in the purely domestic equivalent case renders the outward movement to bear a 
comparatively higher burden relative to its domestic counterpart. This contradicts the rationale of the internal market 
without internal frontiers. It follows that – instead of approving it – the Court of Justice should have ruled the Dutch 
exit tax incompatible with the fundamental freedoms. See for a comparison, Court of Justice, case C-164/12 (DMC 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft) in which the Court dealt with a German exit tax in a somewhat similar matter. 
406
 Noticeable exceptions are Frans Vanistendael, ‘Tax revolution in Europe: the impact of non-discrimination’, 40 
European Taxation 3 (2000), Kees Van Raad (who referred to the subject in the context of the income taxation of 
individuals), in Kees van Raad, ‘Non-Residents – Personal Allowances, Deduction of Personal Expenses and Tax 
Rates’, 2 World Tax Journal 154 (2010), at 154-161, Cornelis van Raad, ‘Fractional Taxation of Multi-State Income of 
EU Resident Individuals – A Proposal’, in Krister Andersson et al (eds.), Liber Amicorum Sven-Olof Lodin: Modern 
Issues in the Law of International Taxation - Series on International Taxation v. 27 (2001) 211, at 211-221, and Kees 
van Raad, ‘Non-discriminatory Income Taxation of Non-resident taxpayers by Member States of the European Union: 
a Proposal’, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1481 (2000-2001), at 1481-1492. Notably, Terra and Wattel 
seem to move in a similar direction as well. See B.J.M Terra et al, European Tax Law (2012), at 26. 
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solely based on their place of residence is compatible with the fundamental freedoms in those 
cases covered by the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. After all, on many 
occasions the Court of Justice has ruled that a difference in tax treatment – where taxpayers 
make use of their fundamental freedoms – on the basis of that taxpayer’s place of tax 
residence infringes primary European Union law.
407
  
 
Why would such a difference in the tax treatment often established in the first few paragraphs 
of a typical country’s tax code which provide for a taxpayer’s limited or unlimited liability to tax, 
escape an equal treatment test? I fail to see why such income tax provisions deserve some 
kind of special status in this respect. It seems to me that this unequal tax treatment of non-
resident taxpayers, solely on the basis of their place of residence, survived in international 
taxation just long enough to have become a tenet, a truism, based on nothing but its own 
merits, the fairness of which is no longer discussed in any way, shape, or form. 
 
Seen from the perspective of a borderless global market, or at least from the perspective of 
the internal market without internal frontiers, such differences in tax treatment between 
resident and non-resident taxpayers should not occur. In a European Union law context, this 
encroaches upon the ‘market access principle’ and the ‘market equality principle’. Such 
unilaterally imposed differences in tax burdens imposed entail market distortions and 
unjustified unequal treatment and, hence, should not occur.  
 
The Court of Justice was essentially right in Renneberg 
 
Observing things from that angle, perhaps the ruling of the Court of Justice in Renneberg is 
not that odd. In Renneberg, the Court of Justice essentially held that a difference in tax 
treatment between resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers is incompatible with the 
fundamental freedoms. I can only agree, as a difference in tax treatment on the sole ground 
of the taxpayer’s place of residence is plainly indirectly discriminatory. 
 
Notably, in my view, conceptually it makes no difference that the Renneberg case dealt with a 
Belgian resident individual who due to his fiscal domicile was entitled to the Dutch tax subsidy 
for his Belgian private dwelling. Insofar as the interpretation of the fundamental freedoms is 
concerned, the Court of Justice is not a tax court. Rather, it may be characterized as a 
constitutional court reviewing the interpretation and assessment of the legal implications in 
the European Union Member States of undertaking activities or economic activities in an intra-
European Union, cross-border context, in view of the European Union equality principle. 
 
Notably, I further fail to see why it should make a difference in direct tax related cases 
whether the taxpayer involved is a private individual or a corporate body having legal 
personality. Moreover, the question of whether the non-deductibility of certain expenditures 
due to the taxpayers’ tax residency abroad involves a ‘tax subsidy’ also seems irrelevant to 
me. 
 
At the end of the day, all that matters is the application of the equality principle. Are economic 
equal circumstances being treated unequally by European Union Member States for tax 
purposes (or vice versa)? If so, such a difference in tax treatment (in cases falling within the 
confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union) encroaches upon the 
fundamental freedoms where the differences in tax treatment result in different tax burdens. 
And this currently is the case in basically all European Union Member States and virtually all 
other States.  
 
                                                     
407
 See for instance Court of Justice, cases C-527/06 (Renneberg), C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal), C-307/97 
(Saint Gobain), C-311/97 (RBS) and 270/83 (Commission v. France). It should be noted that the Court of Justice has 
not adopted a consistent line of reasoning in this matter and decided otherwise in cases C-250/95 (Futura), C-414/06 
(Lidl) and C-337/08 (X Holding). This is further discussed in section 6 of this chapter. 
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3.5.2 The difference in tax treatment of resident taxpayers and non-resident 
taxpayers should end 
3.5.2.1 So what we need is…  
Consequently, it seems that the fairness enhancing double tax relief system should not only 
apply to resident taxpayers, but its application should also be extended to non-resident 
taxpayers. In my view the issue not only involves the Dutch international tax system. 
Essentially, it involves all nation states international tax systems worldwide. In today’s 
globalizing market no real economic difference exists between the internal market without 
internal frontiers and the global market. Tax border crossings of economic operators or their 
economic operations should not produce different tax burden within the international tax 
system of the taxing nation state. That would be internally unfair as it is inequitable and 
inefficient. 
 
The point I wish to make is the following. Section 3.4 illustrates that the Dutch double tax 
relief mechanism enhances fairness within an international tax system. The system 
conceptually trumps territorial taxation systems, worldwide taxation/base exemption systems 
as well as worldwide taxation/tax credit systems provided it is employed in a non-
discriminatory fashion. As it currently is not, the mechanism’s application should be extended 
apply to all taxpayers irrespective of their place of residence. The double tax relief mechanism 
in the Dutch international tax system is reserved for resident taxpayers only. Non-residents 
are subject to a distortive territorial tax system as is the case in the current application of 
basically all international tax systems of nation states worldwide. So that is the problem that 
should be resolved by thinking of an equitable and tax neutral alternative. That would be 
worldwide taxation in conjunction with the Dutch-style tax exemption. 
 
3.5.2.2 … unlimited tax liability upon domestic nexus and Dutch-style double tax relief 
for foreign nexus 
 
The building blocks emerge 
 
The building blocks of an internally fair international tax system start to emerge. Fairness 
within an international tax system requires that: 
 
 Each economic operator with an economic presence in a taxing jurisdiction is subject 
to an unlimited tax liability. That taxpayer would accordingly be taxed on its worldwide 
business income. Its place of residence would then become irrelevant for corporate 
tax purposes. The approach is completely non-discriminatory. 
 The fiscal sovereignty of states and the principle of single taxation would 
subsequently be honored by granting double tax relief with respect to the foreign 
income. The double tax relief would be granted under the mechanism referred to in 
this study as the ‘credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income’ – i.e., the 
Dutch-style double tax relief mechanism. The geographical location of the taxpayer’s 
income items would become irrelevant for corporate tax burden calculation purposes 
within the taxing state. The double tax relief mechanism would operate completely 
neutral. 
 
Only this approach would bring fairness to the international tax system of a single nation 
state. Cross-border movements of economic operators and their operations would not affect 
the corporate tax burden imposed by that state. The application of this methodology would 
cancel out all discriminatory differences in tax treatment between resident and non-resident 
taxpayers as currently in place in the international corporate tax systems of states. Moreover, 
it would cancel out all restrictive differences in tax treatment between taxpayers moving their 
business activities between the respective domestic markets of states and taxpayers 
maintaining their business activities within the domestic market of a single state. In this way, 
the foreign source income of taxpayers is kept outside the domestic tax base in an equitable 
and economically efficient manner. The obstacles as defined in Chapter 1 of this study would 
be gone. 
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Introducing the ‘thought experiment’ to illustrate the internal consistency of the system 
 
Things become evident if one imagines that the exact same methodology were to apply at 
both sides of the tax border – cancelling out the disparities. Were the same mechanism to 
apply at both sides of the tax border, the systems operating in conjunction would act like 
communicating vessels. This effect would be that border-crossings of taxpayers or their 
production factors would effectively not alter the tax burden. And with that, the advocated 
system proves to enhance an equitable and tax neutral division of taxing powers. 
 
Indeed, these analytical steps require a fundamental change in the way of thinking on the 
concepts of source combined with territorial taxation (limited tax liability) and residence 
combined with worldwide taxation (unlimited tax liability) in the field of international taxation 
today. The effects are further explored in subsection 3.5.3 below. Again numerical examples 
referring to Johnson’s dinghies will be used for clarification purposes. The difference will be 
the introduction of the system at the opposite side of the tax border, i.e., the reverse situation. 
 
3.5.3 The operation of the advocated system; taxing the fraction 
3.5.3.1 The tax burden is exactly the same in both domestic and cross-border 
environments 
What would the effect be if the advocated fractional approach were to be adopted? What if 
states would subject all corporate taxpayers with income from sources in domestic sources to 
unlimited tax liability? What if all corporate taxpayers deriving income from domestic sources 
in each state in which it operates economic activities – irrespective of whether these 
taxpayers reside for tax purposes outside or within the territories of the respective taxing state 
– would be subject to tax in that state for their worldwide income? And what if all these states 
would subsequently provide for juridical double tax relief with respect to these taxpayers’ 
foreign source income items under the ‘credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income’? 
 
Let us do the thought experiment. It is assumed that there are no disparities and that all 
international tax systems have adopted the same international tax system and same 
approaches towards the taxable entity, the tax base and the tax rate.
408
 Furthermore, it is 
assumed that all international tax systems follow the advocated approach, i.e., subject all 
resident and non-resident taxpayers to unlimited income tax liability while providing for double 
tax relief under the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption’ method. Moreover, it is assumed that the 
international tax regime that resulted from the 1920s Compromise operates adequately in 
capturing the geographic location of the income produced. 
 
Then, the outcome would be that the tax burden imposed is exactly the same in both 
domestic and cross-border scenarios, i.e., regarding all proceeds derived from cross-border 
business activities. 
 
 Discrimination would be gone. It would become immaterial in which state corporate 
taxpayers reside. The corporate tax treatment of a cross-border business activity 
would be exactly the same vis-à-vis the tax treatment of a non-cross-border activity. 
With respect to corporate taxation, it would be immaterial where the taxpayer resides. 
The tax burden imposed would be identical. No difference would exist. All direct and 
indirect discrimination or obstacles in the international tax systems of countries would 
be eliminated.  
 
 Restrictions would be gone. It would be immaterial whether the corporate taxpayer 
performs its business in a cross-border context or purely domestic environment. All 
restrictions or obstacles in the international tax systems of countries would be 
eliminated. The unilaterally imposed tax burden would be the same in both domestic 
                                                     
408
 The approach taken accordingly adheres analytically to the internal consistency test as applied under US 
constitutional law. 
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and cross-border environment. Differences in tax burdens unilaterally imposed upon 
the crossing of tax borders would fade out to nil. 
 
The crossing of tax borders within the emerging global market would not be hindered 
whatsoever. Fairness in the allocation of corporate tax among taxpayers and between states 
would be achieved. Within the context of the European Union, the approach as advocated in 
this study would provide the desired equilibrium between the tax sovereignty of the European 
Union Member States and the internal market without internal frontiers.
409
 The approach 
would be completely non-discriminatory and tax-neutral and appreciate the European Union’s 
fundamental freedoms to their fullest extent. 
 
The way in which the system as advocated would operate may be illustrated by means of 
numerical examples. Let us for that purpose refer back to the tax positions of Johnson in the 
‘Base Case’ and the variations put forward in the previous section under the additional 
assumption that the same approach is adopted on both sides of the tax borders of the states 
involved. 
 
3.5.3.2 Communicating vessels: foreign and domestic source losses; cross-border 
loss set-off 
With respect to the tax treatment of cross-border losses, the mutual operation of the 
‘recapture of foreign losses’ and ‘carry forward of foreign profits’ mechanisms at both sides of 
the tax border would operate as communicating vessels. Where one state allows recapture, 
the other state allows a carry forward. And vice versa.  
 
To clarify this, let us return to our taxpayer Johnson. Note that his place of residence has 
become irrelevant. Similar to the Base Case scenario, Johnson operates its dinghy trading 
activities through branches a) and b). Johnson is now subject to unlimited tax liability in both 
the home state and the host state due to its nexus in both states. And let us suppose that 
similar to the scenario in 3.4.2.2, taxpayer Johnson suffers a loss from the activities carried on 
through branch B in year 1. The loss adds up to €60,000. Moreover, let us assume that 
taxpayer Johnson, again similar to the scenario in 3.4.2.2, manages to derive a profit from its 
branch B of €80,000 in year 2. 
 
The effects may be best demonstrated by using tables. 
 
 Figure 12. ‘domestic scenario – loss set-off’ deals with the case that both taxpayer 
Johnson’s branches of activities are situated within the territories of one state, say the 
home state, i.e., the Netherlands in the current example. 
 Figure 13. ‘cross-border scenario – cross-border loss set-off’ deals with the case 
where taxpayer Johnson’s branches A and B are situated across the territories of 
different states. Say, branch A is situated in what has been referred to as the home 
state, and branch B is situated in what has been referred to as the host state, i.e., the 
Netherlands and Belgium respectively. 
 
Please note that the designation of the countries involved as ‘home state’ and ‘host state’ 
have now lost their analytical significance as the tax treatment in both countries involved has 
become identical. 
 
Fig. 12. ‘domestic scenario – loss set-off’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year 1 
                                                     
409
 Contra Weber in Dennis M. Weber, In search of a (new) equilibrium between tax sovereignty and the freedom of 
movement within the EC (2006), at 11-18. Weber shows evidence of favoring an import neutrality promoting territorial 
system. By pointing at the Court of Justice’s ruling in case C-250/95 (Futura), Weber argues that unilaterally imposed 
market distortions resulting from European Union Member States expressing the territoriality principle in their 
international tax systems are disparities. I respectfully disagree. The distortions imposed re outbound investment 
under territorial tax systems are the result of unilateral legislative activity rather than the product of mutually diverging 
internally neutral international tax systems of the respective countries involved. It follows that these distortions 
analytically cannot be considered the consequence of disparate tax systems. 
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Income branch A in NL 140,000 
Income branch B in NL <60,000> 
On balance 80,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
11,000 
Tax burden imposed by NL 13.8% 
 
Taxpayer Johnson Year 2 
Income branch A in NL 140,000 
Income branch B in NL 80,000 
On balance 220,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
45,000 
Tax burden imposed by NL 20.5% 
 
Fig. 13. ‘cross-border scenario – cross-border loss set-off’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year 1) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Income 
tax 
before 
double 
tax 
relief 
 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Recapture 
foreign 
losses 
(admin. 
notice) 
Carry 
forward 
foreign 
profits 
(admin. 
notice) 
Income 
tax after 
double 
tax relief 
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position 
in NL 
140,000 80,000 11,000 0 60,000 0 11,000 
(i.e., tax 
due in NL) 
n/a 
Tax 
position 
in 
Belgium 
<60,000> 80,000 11,000 11,000
410
 0
411
 60,000 0  
(i.e., tax 
due in 
Belgium) 
n/a 
On 
balance 
80,000 80,000 11,000 n/a n/a n/a 11,000 
(i.e., 
overall 
corporate 
tax due) 
13.8%
412
  
(i.e., 
overall tax 
burden 
imposed) 
 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year 2) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Income 
tax 
before 
double 
tax 
relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Recapture 
foreign 
losses 
Carry 
forward 
foreign 
profits 
Income tax 
after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position 
in NL  
140,000 220,000  45,000 4,090.91
413
 0 0 40,909.09
414
 
(i.e., tax 
due in NL) 
n/a 
Tax 
position 
in 
Belgium 
80,000 220,000 45,000 40,909.09
415
 0 0  4,090.91
416
 
(i.e., tax 
due in 
Belgium) 
n/a 
On 
balance 
220,000 220,000 45,000 n/a n/a n/a 45,000 
(i.e., overall 
corporate 
tax due) 
20.5%
417
 
(i.e., 
overall 
tax 
burden 
imposed) 
 
As illustrated in the above tables, the tax burden on taxpayer Johnson’s income is identical in 
both the domestic (solely Dutch) and cross-border (intra-European Union, i.e., in the current 
example the Belgian-Dutch) scenario under the advocated approach. In both scenarios the 
                                                     
410
 80,000 / 80,000 * 11,000. The fraction is maximized at 1 (80,000/80,000 instead of 140,000 / 80,000) as Belgium 
would otherwise refund the tax in cash to Johnson. The excess of 60,000 (i.e. the excess foreign profit calculated at 
140,000 – 80,000) is carried forward to the next year under the carry forward of foreign profits mechanism. 
411
 11,000 – 11,0000 = 0. 
412
 11,000 / 80,000 * 100% = 13.8%. 
413
 (80,000 – 60,000) / 220,000 * 45,000 = 4,090.91. 
414
 45,000 – 4,090.91 = 40,909.09. 
415
 (140,000 + 60,000) / 220,000 * 45,000 = 40,909.09. 
416
 45,000 – 40,909,09 = 4,090.91. 
417
 45,000 / 220,000 * 100% = 20.5%. 
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tax due would equal €11,000 in year 1 and €45,000 in year 2. The average effective tax rates 
in both the domestic and the cross-border scenario are identical as well. The rate effectively is 
13.8% in year 1 and 20.5% in year 2. 
 
Accordingly, under the assumed circumstances, i.e., the absence of disparities it has become 
completely irrelevant in which nation state taxpayer Johnson has its place of residence for tax 
purposes. Johnson may migrate to whichever nation state he chooses. The tax burden 
imposed, in this case by the Netherlands and Belgium, would not alter as a consequence. 
 
It has also become irrelevant whether Johnson performs its business activities solely in one 
nation state, in this case the Netherlands, or whether its activities are spread across various 
nation states, in the current example the Netherlands and Belgium. Johnson may decide to 
open another dinghy trading business in any other nation state without the consequence of 
losing horizontal loss set-off entitlements. Taxing principles are distributed equitably.  
 
Hence, Johnson and its operations – to the extent that it concerns the levy of corporate 
taxation – can move completely unhindered between the states’ national markets. That is, to 
the extent that it concerns the matter of cross-border loss compensation. The outcome 
coincides with the envisaged elimination of unilaterally imposed tax obstacles within the 
emerging global market as well as the internal market without internal frontiers within the 
European Union. To that end, fair (equitable, i.e., non-discriminatory) and free (economically 
efficient, i.e., tax neutral) competition within the internal market would be enabled.
418
 Viz., 
changing tax jurisdictions would not alter the tax burden. Movements of economic 
operators/taxpayers and their operations/production factors/sources of income within the 
internal market are therefore not affected/distorted. This seems tax neutral to me.  
 
Interestingly, this holds true with respect to both the inward-bound movements (‘import’) and 
outward-bound movements (‘export’) of the production factors capital, labor and enterprise. 
The advocated approach hence simultaneously promotes both capital and labor import 
neutrality and capital and labor export neutrality. 
 
 Effects in a multiple country scenario; introducing a third country into the equation 
 
Notably, in a multiple-country scenario the loss-imports and subsequent recapture obligations 
and carry forward entitlements would need to be distributed among the countries involved in 
proportion to the attribution of taxable base. That is to secure a single taxation of the taxable 
base. 
 
Let us return to our taxpayer Johnson to clarify how such a proportional attribution of the 
recapture mechanism and carry forward mechanism would operate. A third branch is put into 
the equation, branch C. Let us suppose that, in addition to the facts and circumstances in the 
previous scenario, Johnson now operates its dinghy trading activities at three locations, 
through branches A, B, and the newly introduced branch C. The profits Johnson derives from 
branch A in years 1 and 2 are similar to those in the previous scenario. Let us further suppose 
that taxpayer Johnson, again, suffers a loss from its activities carried on through branch B in 
year 1. As in the previous scenario, the loss adds up to €60,000. Moreover, let us assume 
that taxpayer Johnson, again similar to the previous scenario, manages to derive a profit from 
its branch B of €80,000 in year 2. Let us further assume that Johnson derives a profit from its 
branch C in both taxable years. The profit realized through its branch C equal €100,000 in 
both years. 
 
The effects may be best demonstrated by using tables. 
 
                                                     
418
 In the event that our taxpayer Johnson would emigrate abroad, the taxing jurisdiction from which Johnson would 
emigrate should be enabled to adopt the administrative measures needed to ensure the effective taxation of any 
commercial benefits derived from domestic sources at some later moment in time (e.g. the realization of a hidden 
reserve subsequent to the emigration abroad). This is not further discussed. 
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 Figure 12a. ‘domestic scenario – loss set-off’ deals with the case that all taxpayer 
Johnson’s branches of activities are situated within the territories of one state, i.e., the 
Netherlands in the current example. 
 Figure 13a. ‘cross-border scenario – cross-border loss set-off’ deals with the case 
where taxpayer Johnson’s branches A, B, and C are situated across the territories of 
different states. Branches A, B, and C are situated in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The newly introduced branch C is situated in Germany. 
 
Fig. 12a. ‘domestic scenario – loss set-off’’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year 1 
Income branch A in NL 140,000 
Income branch B in NL <60,000> 
Income branch C in NL 100,000 
On balance 180,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
35,000 
Tax burden imposed by NL 19.4% 
 
Taxpayer Johnson Year 2 
Income branch A in NL 140,000 
Income branch B in NL 80,000 
Income branch C in NL 100,000 
On balance 320,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
70,000 
Tax burden imposed by NL 21.9% 
 
Fig. 13a. ‘cross-border scenario – cross-border loss set-off’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year 1) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Income 
tax 
before 
double 
tax 
relief 
 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Recapture 
foreign 
losses 
(admin. 
notice) 
Carry 
forward 
foreign 
profits 
(admin. 
notice) 
Income 
tax after 
double 
tax relief 
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position 
in NL 
140,000 180,000 35,000 14,583.33
419
 35,000
420
 0 20,416.67 
(i.e., tax 
due in 
NL) 
n/a 
Tax 
position 
in 
Belgium 
<60,000> 180,000 35,000 35,000
421
 0
422
 60,000
423
 0  
(i.e., tax 
due in 
Belgium) 
n/a 
Tax 
position 
in 
Germany 
100,000 180,000 35,000 20,416.67
424
 25,000
425
 0 14,583.33  
(i.e., tax 
due in 
Germany) 
n/a 
On 180,000 180,000 35,000 n/a n/a n/a 35,000 19.4%
426
  
                                                     
419
 (100,000 – 60,000 + 35,000) / 180,000 * 35,000 = 14,583.33. The branch C profit of 100,000 is reduced with the 
branch B loss that is proportionally attributable to The Netherlands in the current example. The proportional loss-
import amount is calculated by reference to the domestic income to worldwide proceeds ratio (140,000 / 240,000 * 
100% = 58.3%). Accordingly, the apportioned loss-import amount equals 35,000 (140,000 / 240,000 * 60,000). 
420
 140,000 / 240,000 * 60,000 = 35,000. 
421
 180,000 / 180,000 * 35,000 = 35,000. The fraction is maximized at 1 (180,000 / 180,000 instead of 240,000 / 
80,000) as Belgium would otherwise refund the tax in cash to taxpayer Johnson. The excess of 60,000 (i.e., the 
excess foreign profit calculated at 240,000 – 180,000) is carried forward to the next year under the carry forward of 
foreign profits mechanism. 
422
 35,000 – 35,000 = 0. 
423
 The amount carried forward equals the branch B loss of 60,000. The carry forward amount relating to the loss-
import amount apportioned to The Netherlands equals 35,000 (140,000 / 240,000 * 60,000). The carry forward 
amount relating to the loss-import amount apportioned to Germany equals 25,000 (100,000 / 240,000 * 60,000 = 
25,000). 
424
 (140,000 – 60,000 + 25,000) / 180,000 * 35,000 = 20,416.67. The branch A profit of 140,000 is reduced with the 
branch B loss that is proportionally attributable to Germany in the current example. The loss-import amount is 
calculated by reference to the domestic income to worldwide proceeds ratio (100,000 / 240,000 * 100% = 41.6%). 
Accordingly, the apportioned loss-import equals 25,000 (100,000 / 240,000 * 60,000). 
425
 100,000 / 240,000 * 60,000 = 25,000. 
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balance (i.e., 
overall 
corporate 
tax due) 
(i.e., 
overall 
tax 
burden 
imposed) 
 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year 2) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Income 
tax 
before 
double 
tax 
relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Recapture 
foreign 
losses 
Carry 
forward 
foreign 
profits 
Income tax 
after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position 
in NL  
140,000 220,000  70,000 31,718.75
427
 0 0 38,281.25
428
 
(i.e., tax 
due in NL) 
n/a 
Tax 
position 
in 
Belgium 
80,000 220,000 70,000 65,625
429
 0 0  
27,343.75
430
 
(i.e., tax 
due in 
Belgium) 
n/a 
Tax 
position 
in 
Germany 
100,000 100,000 70,000 42,656.25
431
 0 0  4,375
432
 
(i.e., tax 
due in 
Germany) 
n/a 
On 
balance 
320,000 320,000 70,000 n/a n/a n/a 70,000 
(i.e., overall 
corporate 
tax due) 
21.9%
433
 
(i.e., 
overall 
tax 
burden 
imposed) 
 
The calculations reveal that the observations set forth in the above paragraphs do not alter in 
a multiple country scenario. As illustrated in the tables above, the tax burden imposed on 
taxpayer Johnson’s income, again, is identical in both the domestic (solely Dutch) and cross-
border (intra-European Union, i.e., in the current example the Belgian-Dutch-German) 
scenario under the advocated approach. In both scenarios the tax due would equal €35,000 
in year 1 and €70,000 in year 2. The average effective tax rates in both the domestic and the 
cross-border scenario are identical as well. The rate effectively is 19.4% in year 1 and 21.9% 
in year 2. 
 
3.5.3.3 Communicating vessels: notional services provided, notional supplies of 
goods  (stock and capital assets) 
If the advocated approach is applied at both sides of the tax border, the mechanisms in their 
mutual operation at both sides of the tax border produce a system that operates as 
communicating vessels in respect of notional services provided, notional supplies of goods 
and notional capital asset transfers. Where one state recognizes an increase in the double tax 
relief granted, the other state recognizes a decrease; and vice versa. This effect may also be 
clarified through numerical examples. 
 
Intra-firm provisions of services 
 
Let us return to the scenario referred to in section 3.4.3.2 through 3.4.3.4. As mentioned, one 
of taxpayer Johnson’s workers in branch A renders an internal service for the benefit of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
426
 35,000 / 180,000 * 100% = 19.4%. 
427
 (80,000 + 100,000 – 35,000) / 320,000 * 70,000 = 31,718.75. The loss-import amount of 35,000 as apportioned to 
The Netherlands in year 1 is recaptured in year 2. 
428
 70,000 – 31,718.75 = 38,281.25. 
429
 (140,000 + 100,000 + 60,000) / 320,000 * 70,000 = 65,625. The carried forward amount in year 1 is recognized for 
double tax relief purposes in year 2. 
430
 70,000 – 42,656.25 = 27,343.75. 
431
 (80,000 + 140,000 – 25,000) / 320,000 * 70,000 = 42,656.25. The loss-import amount of 25,000 as apportioned to 
Germany in year 1 is recaptured in year 2. 
432
 70,000 – 65,625 = 4,375. 
433
 70,000 / 320,000 * 100% = 21.9%. 
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business activities carried on through branch B. The fair market value of the service rendered 
equals €15,000. Again, things are illustrated best through figures. 
 
 Figure 14. ‘Domestic scenario – intra-firm provisions of services’ deals with the 
scenario that both taxpayer Johnson’s branches of activities are situated within the 
territories of the Netherlands.  
 Figure 15. ‘Cross-border scenario – intra-firm provisions of services’ deals with the 
case where taxpayer Johnson’s branch A is situated in the Netherlands and branch B 
is situated in Belgium. 
 
Fig. 14. ‘Domestic scenario – intra-firm provisions of services’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL 140,000 
‘Added’: notional service 
fee received by branch A  
15,000 
Income branch B in NL 60,000 
‘Deducted’: notional service 
fee paid by branch B  
<15,000> 
On balance 200,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
40,000 
Tax burden imposed by NL 20% 
 
Fig. 15. ‘Cross-border scenario – intra-firm provisions of services’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double tax 
relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax burden 
after double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position in 
NL  
155,000
434
 
 
200,000  40,000 9,000
435
 31,000
436
 
(i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
20.0%
437
  
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed by 
NL) 
Tax 
position in 
Belgium  
45,000
438
 200,000 40,000 31,000
439
  9,000
440
 
(i.e., tax due 
in Belgium) 
 20.0%
441
  
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed by 
Belgium) 
On 
balance 
200,000 200,000 40,000 n/a 40,000  
(i.e., overall 
corporate tax 
due) 
20.0%
442
 
(i.e., overall 
tax burden 
imposed) 
 
Under the advocated approach the tax burden of taxpayer Johnson is the same in both the 
domestic and the cross-border scenario. In both cases, taxpayer Johnson would pay €40,000 
corporate tax, an effective tax imposed at a 20% rate in both the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Again, it is irrelevant where Johnson has its place of residence for tax purposes. It is also 
irrelevant whether taxpayer Johnson performs its business activities solely in the Netherlands 
or spread across nation states, in this case the Netherlands and Belgium. Taxpayer Johnson 
and its business activities can move unhindered across-tax borders within the global market, 
while both the Netherlands and Belgium receive their fair share of the tax pie.  
 
                                                     
434
 140,000 + 15,000 = 155,000. 
435
 (60,000 – 15,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 9,000. 
436
 40,000 – 9,000 = 31,000. 
437
 31,000 / 155,000 * 100% = 20.0%. 
438
 60,000 – 15,000 = 45,000. 
439
 (140,000 + 60,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 31,000. 
440
 40,000 – 31,000 = 9,000. 
441
 9,000 / 45,000 * 100% = 20%. 
442
 40,000 / 200,000 * 100% = 20%. 
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Intra-firm supplies of goods (stock transfers) 
 
Let us return to the first scenario referred to in 3.4.3.3. As mentioned, a good (the dinghy) is 
produced through branch A, subsequently transferred to branch B from which it is sold on the 
market. As said the boat’s manufacturing costs equal €5,000, its wholesale value is €12,000 
and the resale price on which the boat is sold on the market equals €20,000. 
 
 Figure 16. ‘Domestic scenario – intra-firm supplies of goods’ deals with the domestic 
scenario, i.e., both taxpayer Johnson’s branches of activities are situated within the 
territories of the Netherlands. 
 Figure 17. ‘Cross-border scenario – intra-firm supplies of goods’ deals with the cross-
border scenario, i.e., the case where taxpayer Johnson’s branch A is situated in the 
Netherlands and branch B is situated in Belgium. 
 
Fig. 16. ‘Domestic scenario – intra-firm supplies of goods’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL 140,000 
‘Added’: notional 
consideration received by 
branch A upon intra-firm 
good supply 
12,000 
 
‘Deducted’: manufacturing 
costs. 
<5,000> 
Income branch B in NL 60,000 
‘Deducted’: notional 
consideration paid by 
branch B upon intra-firm 
good supply 
<7,000> 
Added: sales price upon 
sale of good on market 
15,000 
 
On balance  215,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 
7) 
43,750 
Tax burden imposed by 
NL 
20.3% 
 
Fig. 17. ‘Cross-border scenario – intra-firm supplies of goods’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double tax 
relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax burden 
after double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position in 
NL  
147,000
443
 
 
215,000  43,750 13,837.21
444
 29,912.79
445
 
(i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
20.3%
446
  
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed by 
NL) 
Tax 
position in 
Belgium  
68,000
447
 215,000 43,750 29,912.79
448
  13,837.21
449
 
(i.e., tax due 
in Belgium) 
 20.3%
450
  
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed by 
Belgium) 
On 215,000 215,000 43,750 n/a 43,750  20.3%
451
 
                                                     
443
 140,000 + 7,000 = 147,000. 
444
 (60,000 + 8,000) / 215,000 * 43,750 = 13,837.21. 
445
 43,750 – 13,837.21= 29,912.79. 
446
 29,912.79 / 147,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
447
 60,000 + 8,000 = 68,000. 
448
 (140,000 + 7,000) / 215,000 * 43,750 = 29,912.79. 
449
 43,750 – 29,912.79 = 13,837.21. 
450
 13,837.21/ 68,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
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balance (i.e., overall 
corporate tax 
due) 
(i.e., overall 
tax burden 
imposed) 
 
The tax burden of taxpayer Johnson is the same in both the domestic as the cross-border 
scenario. In both cases taxpayer Johnson would pay €43,750 corporate tax, a tax burden of 
20.3%. Johnson’s place of residence is irrelevant for tax purposes. The same is true with 
respect to the question of whether taxpayer Johnson performs its business activities solely in 
the Netherlands or spread across the Netherlands and Belgium. Accordingly, taxpayer 
Johnson can do business within the global market without being hindered whatsoever, while 
both the Netherlands and Belgium receive their fair share of the tax pie.  
 
Intra-firm supplies of goods (capital asset transfers) 
 
In the first scenario referred to in 3.4.3.4 a capital asset is transferred from branch A to branch 
B for the purpose of durably employing it for the benefit of Johnson’s business operations 
carried on through its branch B. As said, it is assumed that the capital asset was acquired 5 
years ago. Its acquisition price was €600,000, its economic lifetime 20 years, and that the 
yearly, tax deductible, depreciation is €30,000. In addition, it was mentioned that, at the 
moment prior to the notional capital transfer, the asset was placed at branch A’s balance 
sheet at an amount of €450,000,
452
 while at that time, its fair value equals to €500,000.  
 
 Figure 18. ‘Domestic scenario – intra-firm capital asset transfers’ again deals with the 
domestic scenario.  
 Figure 19. ‘Cross-border scenario – intra-firm capital asset transfers’ deals with the 
cross-border scenario. 
 
Fig. 18. ‘Domestic scenario – intra-firm capital asset transfers’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL 140,000 
‘Added’: notional 
consideration received by 
branch A upon intra-firm asset 
transfer 
500,000 
 
Income branch B in NL 60,000 
‘Deducted’: notional 
consideration paid by branch 
B upon intra-firm capital asset 
transfer 
<500,000> 
Deducted: depreciation 
capital asset upon capital 
asset transfer 
<30,000> 
On balance  170,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
32,500 
Tax burden imposed by NL 19.1% 
 
Fig. 19. ‘Cross-border scenario – intra-firm capital asset transfers’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double tax 
relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax burden 
after double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 143,333.33
453
 170,000  32,500 5,098.04
454
 27,401.96
455
 19.1%
456
  
                                                                                                                                                        
451
 43,750 / 215,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
452
 600,000 – 5 * 30,000 = 450,000. 
453
 140,000 + 3,333.33 = 143,333.33. 
454
 (60,000 – 33,333.33) / (200,000 – 30,000) * 32,500 = 5,098.04. 
455
 32,500 – 5,098.04 = 27,401.96. 
456
 27,401.96 / 143,333.33 * 100% = 19.1%. 
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position in 
NL  
 (i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed by 
NL) 
Tax 
position in 
Belgium 
26,666.67
457
 170,000 32,500 27,401.96
458
  5,098.04
459
 
(i.e., tax due 
in Belgium) 
 19.1%
460
  
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed by 
Belgium) 
On 
balance 
170,000 170,000 32,500 n/a 32,500  
(i.e., overall 
corporate tax 
due) 
19.1%
461
 
(i.e., overall 
tax burden 
imposed) 
 
Again, the tax burden imposed is the same in both the domestic and the cross-border 
scenario. In both cases taxpayer Johnson would pay €32,500 corporate tax. The effective tax 
burden imposed would equal 19.1%. Neither the place of Johnson’s residence nor the 
question of whether taxpayer Johnson performs its business activities in a cross-border 
setting is relevant for corporate tax purposes. This would enable taxpayer Johnson to do 
business within the global market without corporate taxation hindering this. Moreover, both 
the Netherlands and Belgium receive their fair share of the tax pie. 
 
3.5.3.4 Currency exchange results  
The proportional effects would also arise regarding the corporate tax treatment of currency 
exchange results realized. Again, things may be clarified through numerical examples. 
 
Scenario (i) – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in US Dollars 
 
Let us, for this purpose, return to the cross-border scenario referred to in 3.4.4.2, i.e., 
scenario (i), case a). Taxpayer Johnson’s branch A tax books are kept in Euro. The books of 
branch B are kept in the US Dollar. The Netherlands employs the Euro for corporate tax 
calculation purposes. State X, the United States of America employs the US Dollar for this 
purpose. The US Dollar increases in value during the tax booking period in a manner as 
referred to in 3.4.4.2. In figures: 
 
 Figure 20. ‘Domestic scenario – NL – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange 
results realized’ deals with the purely domestic scenario in which both branches are 
situated within Dutch territory; 
 Figure 21. ‘Domestic scenario – USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange 
results realized’ deals with the purely domestic scenario in which the branches are 
situated within USA territory, and; 
 Figure 22. ‘Cross-border scenario – NL and USA – US Dollar rate increases – 
currency exchange results realized’ deals with the cross-border scenario, i.e., where 
branch A is situated within Dutch territory and branch B in United States’ territory. 
 
Fig. 20. ‘Domestic scenario – NL – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results realized’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL €140,000 
Income branch B in NL $60,000 
Added: currency exchange 
result realized 
€15,000 
On balance €215,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
€43,750 
                                                     
457
 60,000 – 33,333.33 = 26,666.67. 
458
 (140,000 + 3,333.33) / (200,000 – 30,000) * 32,500 = 27,401.96. 
459
 32,500 – 27,401.96 = 5,098.04. 
460
 5,098.04 / 26,666.67 * 100% = 19.1%. 
461
 32,500 / 170,000 * 100% = 19.1%. 
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Tax burden imposed by NL 20.3% 
 
Fig. 21. ‘Domestic scenario – USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results realized’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in USA €140,000 
Deducted: currency exchange 
result realized 
<$28,000> 
Income branch B in USA $60,000 
On balance $172,000 
Tax due in USA 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
$33,000 
Tax burden imposed by USA 19.2% 
 
Fig. 22. ‘Cross-border scenario – NL and USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results 
realized’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double tax 
relief 
Average 
effective 
tax rate 
before 
double 
tax relief 
Credit for 
domestic tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position in 
NL 
€155,000
462
 
 
€215,000
463
  €43,750
464
 20.3%
465
 €12,209.30
466
 €31,540.70
467
 
(i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
20.3%
468
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by NL) 
Tax 
position in 
USA  
$32,000
469
 $172,000
470
 $33,000
471
 19.2%
472
 $26,860.47
473
  $6,139.53
474
 
(i.e., tax due 
in USA) 
19.2%
475
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by USA) 
 
Under the advocated approach, the tax burdens imposed by the Netherlands and the United 
States of America would be the same in both domestic and cross-border scenarios. The tax 
burden of Johnson in the Netherlands would equal 20.3% as a positive currency exchange 
result of €15,000 would have been realized. The United States of America would impose a 
19.2% effective tax as a consequence of the currency loss of $28,000. Both the Netherlands 
and the United States of America would receive their fair share of the tax pie.  
 
Notably, overall calculations are of no argumentative value at this point as the currency 
exchange results are calculated on different bases, i.e., the mutually diverging branch A and 
branch B profits. That is, at least since the tax base is defined by reference to a realization 
based nominal return to equity tax base standard at this place in this study. Currency risks 
cannot be influenced by taxpayers individually. The distortive effects of fluctuating currency 
exchange rates due to the presence of varying currencies in the global marketplace 
(monetary disparities) may only be resolved by means of monetary harmonization, i.e., a 
monetary union such as the European monetary union. For an overview of the effects of the 
advocated system regarding currency exchange results, i.e., where also the tax base and tax 
base allocation have been assessed; see section 4.5.3 of Chapter 6. 
 
                                                     
462
 140,000 + 15,000 = 155,000. 
463
 140,000 + 60,000 + 15,000 = 215,000 
464
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0.25 * 115,000 = 43,750. 
465
 43,750 / 215,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
466
 60,000 / (200,000 + 15,000) * 43,750 = 12,209.30. 
467
 43,750 – 12,209.30 = 31.540,70. 
468
 31,540.70 / 155,000 * 100% = 20.3%. 
469
 60,00 – 28,000 = 32,000. 
470
 140,000 – 28,000 + 60,000 = 172,000. 
471
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 72,000 = 33,000. 
472
 33,000 / 172,000 * 100% = 19.1%. 
473
 140,000 / 200,000 – 28,000) * 33,000 = 26,860.47. 
474
 33,000 – 26,860.47 = 6,139.53. 
475
 6,139.53 / 32,000 * 100% = 19.2%. 
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In the reverse situation in which the US Dollar drops in value referred to in the above as 
scenario (i), case b), things would work out in the exact opposite manner. Again the tax 
burden imposed by the Netherlands and the United States of America is the same in both 
domestic and cross-border scenarios. In figures: 
 
Fig. 23. ‘Domestic scenario – NL – US Dollar rate decreases – currency exchange results realized’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL €140,000 
Income branch B in NL $60,000 
Deducted: currency 
exchange result realized 
<€12,000> 
On balance €188,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
€37,000 
Tax burden imposed by NL 19.7% 
 
Fig. 24. ‘Domestic scenario – USA – US Dollar rate decreases – currency exchange results realized’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in USA €140,000 
Added: currency exchange 
result realized 
<$35,000> 
Income branch B in USA $60,000 
On balance $235,000 
Tax due in USA 
(under brackets as in fig. 7) 
$48,750 
Tax burden imposed by 
USA 
20.7% 
  
Fig. 25. ‘Cross-border scenario – NL and USA – US Dollar rate decreases – currency exchange results 
realized’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double 
tax relief 
Average 
effective 
tax rate 
before 
double 
tax relief 
Credit for 
domestic tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
position in 
NL 
€128,000
476
 
 
€188,000
477
 €37,000
478
 19.7%
479
 €11,808.51
480
 €25,191.48
481
 
(i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
19.7%
482
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by NL) 
Tax 
position in 
USA 
$95,000
483
 $235,000
484
 $48,750
485
 20.8%
486
 $29,042.55
487
 $19,707.44
488
 
(i.e., tax due 
in USA) 
20.7%
489
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by USA) 
 
 
Scenario (ii) – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in Euro 
 
                                                     
476
 140,000 – 12,000 = 128,000. 
477
 140,000 + 60,000 – 12,000 = 188,000. 
478
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 88,000 = 37,000. 
479
 37,000 / 188,000 * 100% = 19.7%. 
480
 60,000 / (200,000 – 12,000) * 37,000 = 11,808.51. 
481
 37,000 – 11,808.51 = 25,191.48. 
482
 25,191.48 / 128,000 * 100% = 19.7%. 
483
 60,00 + 35,000 = 95,000. 
484
 140,000 + 35,000 + 60,000 = 235,000. 
485
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 135,000 = 48,750. 
486
 48,750 / 235,000 * 100% = 20.7%. 
487
 140,000 / 200,000 + 35,000) * 48,750 = 29,042.55. 
488
 48,750 – 29,042.55 = 19,707.44. 
489
 19,707.44 / 95,000 * 100% = 20.7%. 
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If the tax books of both Dutch branch B and US branch A were kept in Euro while the US 
Dollar increases in value in a manner comparable to the case referred to in 3.4.4.3, scenario 
(ii), case c) the effects under the advocated approach would be as follows. In figures: 
 
Fig. 26. ‘Domestic scenario – NL – US Dollar rate increases – no currency exchange results realized’  
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL €140,000 
Income branch B in NL €60,000 
On balance €200,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 
7) 
€40,000 
Tax burden imposed by 
NL 
20.0% 
 
Fig. 27. ‘Domestic scenario – USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results realized’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in USA €140,000 
Deducted: currency 
exchange result realized 
<$28,000> 
Income branch B in USA $60,000 
Deducted: currency 
exchange result realized 
<$12,000> 
On balance $160,000 
Tax due in USA 
(under brackets as in fig. 
7) 
$30,000 
Tax burden imposed by 
USA 
18.8% 
  
Fig. 28. ‘Cross-border scenario – NL and USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results 
realized’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double tax 
relief 
Average 
effective 
tax rate 
before 
double 
tax relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
position in 
NL 
€152,000
490
 
 
€200,000
491
 €40,000
492
 20.0%
493
 €9,600
494
 €30,400
495
 
(i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
20.0%
496
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by NL) 
Tax 
position in 
USA 
$20,000
497
 $160,000
498
 $30,000
499
 18.75%
500
 $26,250
501
 $3,750
502
 
(i.e., tax due 
in USA) 
18.8%
503
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by USA) 
 
Again, the tax burdens imposed by the Netherlands and the United States of America would 
be the same in both domestic and cross-border scenarios. The Netherlands would 
                                                     
490
 140,000 + 12,000 = 152,000. 
491
 140,000 + 60,000 = 200,000. 
492
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 100,000 = 40,000. 
493
 40,000 / 200,000 * 100% = 20.0%. 
494
 (60,000 – 12,000) / 200,000 * 40,000 = 9,600. 
495
 40,000 – 9,600 = 30,400. 
496
 30,400 / 152,000 * 100% = 20.0%. 
497
 60,00 – 28,000 – 12,000 = 20,000. 
498
 140,000 + 60,000 – 28,000 – 12,000 = 160,000. 
499
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 60,000 = 30,000. 
500
 30,000 / 160,000 * 100% = 18.8%. 
501
 140,000 / 160,000 * 30,000 = 26,250. 
502
 30,000 – 26,250 = 3,750. 
503
 3,750 / 20,000 * 100% = 18.8%. 
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consistently impose a tax at an effective rate of 20.0%. The United States of America would 
subject Johnson to a tax of 18.8%. Both the Netherlands and the United States of America 
would receive their fair share of the tax pie. 
 
In the reverse situation in which the US Dollar drops in value referred to in the above as 
scenario (ii), case d), things would work out in the exact opposite manner. Again the tax 
burden imposed by the Netherlands and the United States of America is the same in both 
domestic and cross-border scenarios. I do not forward the non-discriminatory and neutral 
effects by means of a schedule. I respectfully dare the reader to determine these effects 
himself.  
 
Scenario (iii) – US Branch B’s tax books are kept in Japanese Yen 
 
In the case in which the books of Dutch branch A are kept in Euro and those of US branch B 
in Yen, while the US Dollar increases in value in respect of both the Euro and the Yen in the 
same manner as referred to in 4.4.4, scenario (iii), case e), things would turn out as follows 
under the advocated approach. In figures: 
 
Fig. 29. ‘Domestic scenario – NL – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results realized’  
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in NL €140,000 
Income branch B in NL ¥60,000 
Deducted: currency 
exchange result realized 
<€10,000> 
On balance €190,000 
Tax due in NL 
(under brackets as in fig. 
7) 
€37,500 
Tax burden imposed by 
NL 
19.7% 
 
Fig. 30. ‘Domestic scenario – USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results realized’ 
Taxpayer Johnson Year X 
Income branch A in USA €140,000 
Deducted: currency 
exchange result realized 
<$28,000> 
Income branch B in USA ¥60,000 
Deducted: currency 
exchange result realized 
<$20,000> 
On balance $152,000 
Tax due in USA 
(under brackets as in fig. 
7) 
$28,000 
Tax burden imposed by 
USA 
18.4% 
  
Fig. 31. ‘Cross-border scenario – NL and USA – US Dollar rate increases – currency exchange results 
realized’ 
Taxpayer 
Johnson 
(Year X) 
Domestic 
income 
Worldwide 
income 
Corporate 
tax before 
double tax 
relief 
Average 
effective 
tax rate 
before 
double 
tax relief 
Credit for 
domestic 
tax 
attributable 
to foreign 
income 
Corporate 
tax after 
double tax 
relief  
 
Tax 
burden 
after 
double 
tax relief  
 
Tax 
position in 
NL 
€150,000
504
 €190,000
505
 €37,500
506
 19.7%
507
 €7,894.74
508
 €29,605.26
509
 
(i.e., tax due 
in NL) 
19.7%
510
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
                                                     
504
 140,000 + 10,000 = 150,000. 
505
 140,000 + 60,000 – 10,000 = 190,000. 
506
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 90,000 = 37,500. 
507
 37,500 / 190,000 * 100% = 19.7%. 
508
 (60,000 – 20,000) / (200,000 – 10,000) * 37,500 = 7,894.74. 
509
 37,500 – 7,894.74 = 29,605.26. 
510
 29,605.26 / 150,000 * 100% = 19.7%. 
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imposed 
by NL) 
Tax 
position in 
USA 
$12,000
511
 $152,000
512
 $28,000
513
 18.4%
514
 $25,789.47
515
 $2,210.53
516
 
(i.e., tax due 
in USA) 
18.4%
517
 
(i.e., tax 
burden 
imposed 
by USA)  
 
Yet again the tax burdens imposed by the Netherlands and the United States of America 
would not alter in the cross-border scenario when compared with the purely domestic 
scenario. Again the tax burden imposed would not be affected as a consequence of taxpayer 
Johnson’s place of residence or the geographical locations of its sources of income. The 
Netherlands would maintain to tax taxpayer Johnson at an effective rate of 19.7%. The United 
States would tax Johnson at a rate of 18.4%. Moreover, both the Netherlands and the United 
States of America would receive their fair share of the tax pie. Equity and neutrality within the 
Netherlands and the United States of America would be achieved, even in the case of 
taxpayers keeping their tax books in a third country currency. 
 
In the reverse situation in which the US. Dollar drops in value, referred to in the above as 
scenario (iii), case f), things would work out in the exact opposite manner. Again the tax 
burden imposed by the Netherlands and the United States of America is the same in both 
domestic and cross-border scenarios. Again I did not forward the non-discriminatory and 
neutral effects by means of a schedule. Also on this occasion, the reader is respectfully 
challenged to determine these effects himself. 
 
3.5.4 Not all distortions would be resolved… 
3.5.4.1 Analysis builds on assumption of absence of disparities 
It needs to be repeated that the aforementioned numerical examples are based on the 
assumption that all nation states involved operate the exact same international tax system. It 
is assumed accordingly that no disparities exist. 
 
This is obviously untrue in the real world. Disparities between international tax systems can 
and do exist. This is true even within the European Union’s internal market without internal 
frontiers. All Member States operate their own system and employ a variety of mutually 
diverging approaches towards the recognition of the taxable entity, the calculation of the 
taxable base, the applied tax rate and the international tax principles upon which they 
mutually distribute taxing entitlements.  
 
These disparities or mismatches result in distortions in the functioning of the emerging global 
marketplace. From the perspective of seeking equity and neutrality in a global market, the 
presence of disparities in the international tax regime is undesirable. Nevertheless, these 
distortions will remain in place as long as further international coordination remains absent. 
 
3.5.4.2 Analysis builds on assumption of adequate building blocks of international 
taxation 
Moreover, the examples are also based on the assumption that the cross-border sourcing of 
business income of branches A and B occurs in a manner corresponding with economic 
reality. It accordingly builds on the assumption that the building blocks of the international tax 
regime, which find their origins in the 1920s Compromise, operate adequately – e.g. the 
permanent establishment threshold and the separate entity approach.  
                                                     
511
 60,00 – 28,000 – 20,000 = 12,000. 
512
 140,000 + 60,000 – 28,000 – 20,000 = 152,000. 
513
 5,000 + 10,000 + 0,25 * 52,000 = 28,000. 
514
 30,000 / 160,000 * 100% = 18.8%. 
515
 140,000 / (200,000 – 28,000 – 20,000) * 28,000 = 25,789.47. 
516
 28,000 – 25,789.47 = 2,210.53. 
517
 2,210.53 / 12,000 * 100% = 18.4%. 
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The common building blocks of international taxation however operate in a distortive manner. 
As elaborated upon in the introduction in section 1.4.3 of Chapter 1, the international tax 
regime has become outdated and flawed. The concept of separate accounting produces 
arbitrage in the organizational form (see further Chapter 4), the nominal return to equity tax 
base standard produces financing discrimination issues (see further Chapter 5) and the 
separate accounting / arm’s length standard fails to properly allocate the tax base 
geographically (see further Chapter 6). 
 
The consequence of this is that, despite its merits, the advocated system elaborated upon in 
the above sections would be unable to resolve the occurring market distortions that arise as a 
consequence of the disparities and the inadequacies in the international tax regime. These 
distortions would uphold even were the advocated fractional system to be adopted in the real 
world. 
 
3.5.5 But distortions due to obstacles would be... 
3.5.5.1 Discriminations and restrictions internal to the international tax systems of 
nation states would be eliminated 
However, having said this, the hypothesis that the approach as advocated in the above – 
were it to be actually implemented in each state’s international tax system – would render the 
remaining distortions in the functioning of the international markets to no longer be caused by 
unilaterally imposed obstacles is not analytically disproved. Accordingly, each single 
international tax system would in itself operate in an internally equitable and production factor 
neutral manner. Viz., as seen from their unilateral perspectives, all would impose identical tax 
burdens on proceeds from both domestic and cross-border economic activities – or intra-
European Union to the extent that the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union applies. 
That is, essentially as European Union law requires the Member States to produce under the 
application of the fundamental freedoms. 
 
The tax sovereignty of the nation states in the field of direct taxation would be respected. The 
advocated approach would merely take away the discriminations and restrictions internal to 
the international tax systems of states. In cases falling within the scope of application of the 
Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, the European Union fundamental freedoms 
would be respected to its fullest extent at the same time. That is because the tax burden in 
the domestic scenario and cross-border scenario would be identical. 
 
Hence, it should be appreciated that the occurring distortions in the operation of the global 
market subsequent to an introduction of the approach as advocated in the above would no 
longer be the result of an obstacle unilaterally imposed by a taxing state. Under the 
advocated approach, this issue would have been resolved. The resulting market distortions 
would then only be caused by the disparities and inadequacies in the formula as defined in 
Chapter 1.
518
 These distortions may only be removed through harmonization and a rethinking 
of the concepts commonly applied in international taxation (see the upcoming chapters 4 
through 6). 
 
3.5.5.2 Van Raad’s ‘fractional taxation’ and the ‘resident taxpayer treatment’ of non-
‘resident taxpayers individuals’ in Dutch individual income taxation 
 
Van Raad’s ‘fractional taxation’ 
 
A system that is similar in some ways to the approach advocated in the above has been 
suggested by Van Raad in the late 1990s and early 2000s with respect to the taxation of 
                                                     
518
 See for a comparison Court of Justice, case C-336/96 (Gilly) in which the court considered the distortive effects of 
applying the second limitation under the ordinary credit method, i.e., no double tax relief for foreign tax levied 
exceeding an amount equal to the domestic tax that is attributable to the foreign income items, to be a disparity. 
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individuals with their place of residence within the territories of the European Union. Van 
Raad refers to it as “fractional taxation”.
519
 He repeated his arguments in 2010 with a 
particular focus at the individual income tax treatment of personal allowances and personal 
expenses.
520
 Conceptually, there seems to be no reason not to extend the reach of such a 
fractional approach and extend its application to the area of corporate taxation. 
 
The opting in for resident taxpayer treatment of non-resident individuals in Dutch 
individual income taxation 
 
Notably, in 2001 the Dutch tax legislator – on non-discrimination grounds – allowed 
individuals who are taxed as non-resident taxpayers in the Netherlands to opt for tax 
treatment as resident taxpayers. The provision is laid down in Article 2.5 of the Dutch 
Individual Income Tax Act of 2001 (Dutch IITA 2001). The objective of this – to my knowledge 
rather exceptional – mechanism is to remove the difference in tax treatment between resident 
and non-resident taxpayers individuals. Non-resident taxpayers who opt for resident taxpayer 
tax treatment are taxed on their worldwide income. The Dutch-style double tax relief 
mechanism is subsequently available with respect to these non-resident taxpayer’s foreign 
source income items.  
 
Accordingly, non-resident taxpayers individuals opting-in for the application of resident 
taxpayer treatment are essentially granted the tax treatment basically advocated in this study. 
Accordingly the advocated system is already available in the current international tax regime 
– i.e., albeit in some rudimentary form.  
 
The ‘option for resident taxpayer tax treatment’ in Dutch individual income taxation is, 
however, only available to taxpayers/individuals who have their place of residence within a 
European Union Member State or a state with which the Netherlands has concluded a double 
taxation convention. Accordingly, the difference in discriminatory income tax treatment of non-
resident taxpayers in comparison with resident taxpayers is sought to be resolved by way of 
an ‘opting-in for equal treatment rule’. 
 
Furthermore, no full tax-parity has been achieved. Some differences in treatment have been 
kept in place initiating non-discrimination issues.
521
 In addition, the tax-parity sought entails a 
divergent approach under domestic law and the double tax convention networks that the 
Netherlands has concluded. The opting-in regime has the effect that the foreign income of a 
non-resident taxpayer is included in Dutch tax base (worldwide taxation of non-resident 
taxpayers) for calculation purposes, even if the foreign income is taxable only in the non-
resident taxpayer’s residence state abroad (source taxation of non-resident taxpayers). As 
this system is not in line with the double tax conventions, the domestic opting-in regime has 
attracted discussions in the Dutch tax literature as to whether it is compatible with the double 
tax conventions that the Netherlands has concluded; these matters are not further discussed.  
 
Court of Justice in Gielen: ‘no non-discriminatory tax treatment per option’  
 
Moreover, the mechanism does not apply automatically. Accordingly, the difference in tax 
treatment still applies in cases where individuals do not opt for equal treatment.  
 
In the Gielen case however the Court of Justice held, in my view on fair grounds that the 
Netherlands cannot justify a discriminatory difference in the tax treatment of non-resident 
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taxpayers vis-à-vis resident taxpayers under European Union law by simply referring to the 
option to elect for non-discriminatory tax treatment under a specific provision in the Dutch IITA 
2001.
522
 Discriminatory tax treatment is incompatible with the fundamental freedoms and 
should therefore be abolished from the Dutch tax system: in jure rather than by option. 
 
Worth noting at this place are the steps taken by the Dutch tax legislator in response to the 
decision rendered by the Court of Justice in the Gielen case.
523
 The tax legislator could have 
chosen to apply aforementioned ‘option for resident taxpayer tax treatment’ in jure, i.e., to all 
(European Union) taxpayers with income from Dutch sources. Such a response would have 
removed all unilaterally imposed tax obstacles in the current Dutch direct tax system with the 
stroke of a pen. However, instead the Dutch tax legislator decided to merely amend the 
specific discriminatory element that had been under the scrutiny of the Court of Justice in the 
Gielen case – the case involved the ‘working hours test’ on the basis of which only working 
hours spent by non-resident taxpayers/individuals within Dutch territories were eligible for 
being granted a tax incentive, a certain taxable base reduction for self-employed individuals. 
The discrimination issue arose as the working hours spent abroad by equivalent resident 
taxpayers were eligible for the tax incentive. The tax legislator responded by including the 
working hours spent abroad by non-resident taxpayers in the incentive regime. 
 
In my view, by doing so, the tax legislator failed to see that the discriminatory ‘working hours 
test’ that was under scrutiny in the Gielen case was just a symptom of an underlying illness in 
the Dutch tax system: the difference in tax treatment of non-resident taxpayers – who are 
subject to a limited tax liability – in comparison with resident taxpayers – who are subject to 
an unlimited tax liability. The ‘working hours test’ was just one of the many features of the 
underlying discrimination issue. It is just a symptom. If the problem that arose in the Gielen 
case had not been created by the Dutch tax legislator in the first place, i.e., had not created 
the arbitrary difference between resident and non-resident taxpayers in the first few 
paragraphs of the Dutch IITA 2001, Mr. Gielen’s foreign working hours would have made him 
eligible for the ‘self-employed persons’ deduction automatically. Then the discrimination issue 
would never have occurred in the first place. The effect of the application of Article 2.5 Dutch 
IITA 2001 shows evidence of this. And a problem that does not arise does not have to be 
resolved. 
 
To avoid arbitrage, the system as advocated should apply in jure rather than per option. 
European Union law seems to require this as well.
524
 At first glance, the fractional approach 
as advocated in this chapter may be considered somewhat odd; or at least counterintuitive 
perhaps. The thinking process required, however, seems less substantial than it initially 
seems perhaps. Viz., the approach is already present within the international tax regime. It is 
already there; under Article 2.5 of the Dutch IITA 2001. The next step in the thinking process 
is to look at the approach on an autonomous basis, i.e., taken out of the legal context within 
which it applies and to introduce it in the international corporate tax system of any nation 
state. 
 
Resident taxpayer treatment of ‘qualifying’ non-resident individuals in Dutch individual 
income taxation as of 1 January 2015 
 
The notion of automatic application of the system may not be considered as far-fetched as 
perhaps initially thought. In fact, as of 1 January 2015 the Dutch opting-in regime will be 
replaced by a mandatory regime. Per 2015 the so-called ‘qualifying’ non-resident taxpayers 
individuals will be treated as resident taxpayers/individuals for tax purposes.  
 
Although no full tax-parity has been achieved and non-discrimination issues are initiated once 
again, albeit this time vis-à-vis both resident taxpayers and non-qualifying non-resident 
taxpayers. Furthermore, the pool of eligible non-resident taxpayers is reduced in scope vis-à-
vis the current opting-in regime. Only residents of the Caribbean part of the Netherlands, 
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residents of a European Union Member State, and residents of a European Free Trade 
Association Member State are eligible. Furthermore, these Dutch non-resident taxpayers 
must derive at least 90% of their income from Dutch sources.
525
 That hardly may be seen as a 
step in the right direction, but still. At least the system applies automatically.  
 
3.5.5.3 Tax-parity of residents and non-residents is attainable: it is also done in value 
added taxation 
It is by no means impossible to treat residents and non-residents on par for tax purposes. It 
has been done in value added taxation (‘VAT’), i.e., at least within the context of the 
European Union. The VAT system in the European Union, for instance, does not distinguish 
between resident and non-resident taxpayers at all.  
 
Under the European Union-style VAT, the taxpayer is ‘any person who, independently, carries 
out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity’.
526
 
Actual VAT becomes due within a certain European Union Member State subsequently when 
goods or services are supplied within the territory of that European Union Member State. 
Liability to VAT arises upon establishing nexus with the territories of the taxing state.  
 
As this European consumption tax does not distinguish between taxpayers on the basis of 
their place of residence, no discrimination issues arise as a consequence of that. Accordingly, 
the VAT lacks the discrimination issues as often recognized in direct taxation. This is no 
coincidence. 
 
3.5.5.4 Advocated system in treaty scenarios; administrative assistance called for 
The tax system advocated could be implemented by a particular nation state and apply in jure 
in scenarios falling within the scope of application of a nation state’s double tax convention 
network, or within the confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union – the latter 
regarding intra-European Union investment. In such cases, the approach advocated could 
apply on the basis of the reciprocity principle. 
 
Various administrative tools supporting the advocated system would need to be implemented 
for it to function properly. Taxpayers, for instance, would have to provide information on their 
cross-border business activities. Intensive mutual administrative assistance and cooperation 
between states would be required. Legal remedies such as international arbitration 
procedures would need to be introduced. The presence of accompanying administrative 
mechanisms would be of significant importance. These provisions would need to be made 
available in the respective states’ international tax systems. One may think of the 
administrative provisions in domestic legislations and double tax conventions networks 
involved, as well as the Mutual Assistance Directive and Arbitration Convention in a European 
Union context.  
 
Indeed, this may lead to administrative difficulties. However, these practical challenges would 
not necessarily be insurmountable. At the end of the day, the political willingness of nation 
states to assist each other administratively that is required may prove to be the bottleneck for 
a proper functioning of the approach advocated above. In the event that a system in line with 
advocated approach would give rise to practical problems in assessing the corporate tax – 
e.g. if practice would show that the relevant information for the determination of the taxpayer’s 
tax position has not been provided– the solution to that problem would have to be found in the 
improvement of international administrative assistance. Worth noting is that it may be 
recognized that a globalizing marketplace in the end just calls for cross-border administrative 
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assistance mechanisms in corporate taxation. The recent developments in ‘country-by-
country reporting’ – which would require multinationals to make a per-country break-down of 
their profits– show evidence of a trend towards an international consensus on the need for 
global transparency in tax administrative matters.
527
 
 
The potential for issues of an administrative nature would not render the advocated approach 
analytically invalid. Worth noting by means of an illustration is that the Court of Justice does 
not consider administrative difficulties such as a lack of information on the foreign income of 
taxpayers a ground to justify obstacles imposed by European Union Member States regarding 
intra-European Union economic activity.
528
 In these cases the court consistently rejects this 
argument by pointing out that relevant information can be obtained on the basis of the Mutual 
Assistance Directive, for instance. 
 
3.5.5.5 Switch-over to credit mechanism to counter potential for tax-abuse 
The potential shelter of passive income in a foreign low-tax jurisdiction
529
 that is perhaps 
available under the advocated approach may be countered by making use of a switch-over 
mechanism. To tackle the potential of tax abuse beforehand, the relief system could switch-
over the commonly applied ordinary credit for foreign tax method instead of the advocated 
Dutch-style double tax relief mechanism in those cases. Such a switch-over could accordingly 
be based on anti-tax abuse considerations.
530
 
 
The switch-over could be made available in cases where neither a double tax convention nor 
the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union applies. The switch-over could apply on the 
basis of a motive test. Inspiration for the design of such a motive test can be found in the case 
law of the Court of Justice’s as developed in its Cadbury Schweppes and Part Service 
rulings.
531
 In that event, the switch-over to the direct credit mechanism would apply to artificial 
arrangements that lack economic substance and that have been set up with the intention of 
escaping any domestic corporate tax normally payable.
532
 The switch-over could be combined 
with a ‘subject to a reasonable tax clause’.
533
 If the taxpayer demonstrates that its passive 
income abroad is subject to a reasonable tax, the switch-over would not kick in. That is 
because in such a case the motive of dodging corporation tax liabilities may be deemed to be 
absent. 
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Taking the principle of administrative convenience into account, the switch-over mechanism 
may for example be combined with a rule that places the burden of proof, i.e., the burden of 
providing conclusive evidence in support of the position that no tax sheltering is engaged in, 
at the level of the taxpayer invoking double tax relief. Notably, this would require some 
international consensus on what constitutes a reasonable tax. One may for instance 
internationally agree on effective average tax rate bandwidths (see for some analytical 
comparison Chapter 6 at section 4.6.  
 
The merits of introducing a switch-over mechanism to tackle the potential for abuse under the 
approach as advocated up until this point of the current analysis, is not further discussed as 
this study ultimately advocates a destination basis profit allocation mechanism. That would 
resolve the tax sheltering issue conceptually through alternative means. 
 
3.6 The Court of Justice’s alternative, pragmatic, route to Rome: the territoriality 
principle  
3.6.1 The Court of Justice seeks equilibrium between Member State tax 
sovereignty and the fundamental freedoms 
3.6.1.1 Pragmatically balancing tax sovereignty and the free movement rights; the 
territoriality principle to justify an obstacle imposed 
 
Balancing tax sovereignty and the free movement rights 
 
In its case law on the fundamental freedoms in the field of direct taxation, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union tries to unify the internal market without internal frontiers and the 
current European Union Member States’ sovereignty in direct tax matters. As referred to in 
the above, the fiscal sovereignty of the European Union Member States cannot conceptually 
coincide with the concept of the internal market without internal frontiers. Yet, the sovereignty 
of the Member States in the field of direct taxation is a given as long as their sovereign 
powers in this field are not transferred to the European Union. 
 
In balancing the internal market and the sovereign competences of the European Union 
Member States in direct tax matters, the Court of Justice has developed the so-called 
territoriality principle.
534
 Under its ‘rule of reason’ the Court of Justice currently regards 
territoriality as a ground to justify an obstacle imposed by a Member State. The territoriality 
principle basically entails that European Union Member States are allowed to effectively keep 
foreign source income items out of their domestic tax base and to ensure that domestic 
income is actually being taxed.
535
 The Court of Justice accordingly recognizes the sovereignty 
of European Union Member States in direct tax matters by recognizing the territoriality 
principle. 
 
                                                     
534
 Cf. Frans Vanistendael, ‘In Defense of the European Court of Justice’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 90 
(2008), at section 3. Contra Dennis M. Weber, ‘Vpb 2007. Een stelsel gebaseerd op het territorialiteitsbeginsel: EG 
aspecten en contouren’, 133 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 1297 (2004), at section 3.2.2. For some details on the 
territoriality principle, see B.J.M Terra et al, European Tax Law (2012), at 69-70, and 455-458. For an extensive 
analysis of the ‘territoriality principle’ in EU law, see Otto Marres, ‘The Principle of Territoriality and Cross-Border 
Loss Compensation’, 39 Intertax 112 (2011, No. 3), at 112-125. 
535
 The Court of Justice has put this into words in case C-414/06 (Lidl) as the “need to preserve the allocation of the 
power to impose taxes between the EU Member States concerned (…) and to prevent the danger that losses may be 
taken into account twice”. In addition to this the Court of Justice referred to a ground for justification founded on anti-
tax abuse considerations, i.e. the “risk of tax avoidance” in case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer II). Cf. Court of Justice, 
cases C-231/05 (Oy AA) and C-157/07 (Krankenheim). Other grounds for justification are the need to guarantee the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision in situations falling outside the scope of application of the Mutual Assistance 
Directive (see Court of Justice, cases C-101/05 (Swedish A) and C-446/04 (FII)) and anti-tax abuse considerations in 
situations where wholly artificial arrangements are set up with the purposes of “circumventing the application of the 
legislation of the Member State concerned” (see Court of Justice, cases C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes) and C-
425/06 (Part Service); see also Opinion of A-G Mengozzi in Court of Justice, case C-298/05 (Columbus)). 
147
141 
 
However, the rationale of the internal market without internal frontiers dictates that European 
Union Member States expressing the territoriality principle in their international tax systems 
should do so in a manner that least distorts the functioning of the internal market – the 
‘proportionality test’. The expression of the territoriality principle in Member State’s 
international tax system needs to be both effective and economically efficient – i.e., the tax 
measure involved needs to be suitable to achieve the objective of keeping foreign/domestic 
income outside/inside the domestic tax base and to not go beyond what is necessary to 
obtain that objective.
536
 
 
At the end of the day this means that European Union Member States are required to arrange 
their tax systems in a manner which ensures that taxpayers can cross the tax borders without 
being hindered by unilateral tax measures. In other words, the European Union Member 
States are required to unilaterally enable a change of tax jurisdictions by economic operators 
and its economic operations in an internally equitable (‘market equality principle’) and 
internally neutral (‘market neutrality principle’) manner. 
 
Balancing pragmatically, as justified obstacles conceptually cannot exist since an 
obstacle-free system is feasible 
 
The Court of Justice pragmatically brings together the internal market without internal frontiers 
and the European Union Member States’ sovereignty in the field of direct taxation. The Court 
of Justice’s approach is pragmatic; under the Court’s decision scheme no obstacle justified by 
the territoriality principle can exist conceptually. Viz., as soon a Member State’s tax border is 
actually crossed in an equitable and tax-neutral fashion, i.e., compliance with the requirement 
under the proportionality test, there is no obstacle. 
 
From the perspective of the international tax system of the individual Member State, the 
fundamental movements essentially require an intra-European Union business activity to 
receive the exact same tax treatment as a non-intra- European Union business activity in 
terms of the tax burdens imposed. As it is possible to develop an approach that allows a 
completely neutral and non-discriminatory border crossing of taxpayers and their sources of 
income it is equally possible to remove obstacles all together. Obstacles would be gone if a 
country were to adopt the obstacle-free international tax system as advocated in the above. 
 
Accordingly, each apparent justification under the territoriality principle of an obstacle 
imposed in the international tax system of a particular European Union Member State proves 
that tax measure at hand disproportional, and with that incompatible with the fundamental 
freedoms. That is because an obstacle-free alternative is available. The approach advocated 
in the above would enable the single taxation of domestic income in both an effective and an 
efficient way. Accordingly, each international tax system that conceptually moves away from 
the approach advocated in the above implies the presence of an obstacle that cannot be 
justified as an equitable and neutral alternative is available. The remaining distortions within 
the internal market would then only be caused by a disparity or the inadequate building blocks 
of international taxation. 
 
3.6.1.2 Doing the math would lead to the same point of destination as the approach 
advocated in this study 
It follows that the interpretation of the fundamental freedoms necessarily promotes the same 
system as the notions of internal equity and production factor neutrality. That is, the worldwide 
taxation by a taxing jurisdiction of economic operators having domestic nexus whereby 
double tax relief is granted regarding foreign nexus under the ‘credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income’. The maths reveal that the tax burdens on the domestic and 
cross-border investment proceeds of resident taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers under 
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such a system are identical in all countries where the taxpayer involved has nexus. Since 
there are no tax burden differentials there are no obstacles. 
 
Accordingly, only this taxing methodology truly promotes the equal tax treatment of resident 
taxpayers and non-resident taxpayers. And only this taxing methodology truly promotes the 
economic efficient tax treatment regarding their inward bound and outward bound 
investments. In sum, also the fundamental freedoms conceptually necessarily arrive at the 
same destination at the end of the road as the approach advocated in the above sections of 
this study.  
 
3.6.2 The Court of Justice’s pragmatic interpretations have however produced 
ambiguities 
3.6.2.1 The Court of Justice’s reasoning has been ambivalent 
However, as the Court of Justice’s case law currently stands, the Court unfortunately takes an 
ambivalent approach when it comes to the interpretation of its rule of reason – particularly its 
interpretation of the territoriality justification ground.
537
 A review of its case law reveals that it 
is unclear whether or not the Court of Justice allows the Member States some leeway to 
uphold unilaterally imposed obstacles when expressing the territoriality principle in their 
international tax systems. 
 
3.6.2.2 ‘Territoriality effectively achieved suffices’ 
An affirmative answer to this question can be derived from the observations of the Court of 
Justice in the Futura, Marks & Spencer II, Lidl, X Holding, A Oy and K. cases.
538
 In these 
cases the Court of Justice allows the Member States involved to treat the proceeds from 
cross-border business activities and proceeds from domestic economic activities differently 
for corporate tax purposes. 
 
X Holding, Marks & Spencer II, and A Oy deal with the effects of the failure to grant taxpayers 
an offset of their foreign source losses against their domestic source profits, i.e., under a 
‘base exemption’ for foreign source income derived from intra-European Union business 
activities of groups of affiliated companies. Futura, Lidl, A Oy, and K. also deal with the effects 
of not granting taxpayers an offset of foreign source losses against domestic source profits, 
i.e., a base exemption for foreign source income derived from intra-European Union business 
activities of single corporate taxpayers.  
 
In all cases the Court of Justice shows evidence that it does not have a problem – at least not 
to some extent – with the liquidity or other disadvantages that the Member States unilaterally 
created in their tax systems regarding the tax treatment of foreign source losses vis-à-vis the 
tax treatment of domestic source losses. Notably, the same holds true with regards to the levy 
of exit taxes on outward bound intra-firm supplies of goods, capital asset transfers or services 
rendered. In National Grid Indus the Court of Justice effectively allowed the Member State 
involved to impose such an exit tax upon the transfer of assets abroad – i.e., even though the 
Member State involved did not levy such a tax on equivalent transfers within its territories.
539
 
 
In these cases the Court of Justice approved unilaterally imposed obstacles – i.e., the liquidity 
or other disadvantages that result from the application of an import neutrality promoting 
                                                     
537
 See further, Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the Proportionality 
Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). See also Dennis M. Weber, ‘Refusal of advantages of a cross-border tax 
consolidation in some situations an unjustified restriction of the freedom of establishment’, Highlights and Insights on 
European Taxation 2010/1.6. Contra, Tom O’Shea, ‘European Tax Controversies: A British-Dutch Debate: Back To 
Basics and Is the ECJ Consistent?’, 5 World Tax Journal 100 (2013), at 100-127, who argues that the Court of 
Justice is extremely consistent and that much of the criticism of its case law in the scholarly literature is wrong. 
538
 See respectively Court of Justice, cases C-250/95 (Futura), C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer II), C-414/06 (Lidl), C-
337/08 (X Holding), C-123/11 (A Oy) and C-322/11 (K.). 
539
 See Court of Justice, case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus). 
149
143 
 
territorial tax system by the European Union Member States involved.
540
 The European Union 
Member States apparently may to some extent unilaterally distort outbound investment 
accordingly. As demonstrated in section 3.2.3.2, these obstacles occur where horizontal loss 
compensation is not allowed for intra-European Union cross-border business activities, while 
such a loss-compensation is made available for intra-European Union domestic business 
activities. In such an event taxpayers with business activities abroad can only rely on local 
vertical loss set-off possibilities, if available – i.e., the compensation of losses realized in 
another tax year. This results in liquidity or other disadvantages in respect of outbound 
investment.
 541
 The Court of Justice apparently has no problem with that in these cases. 
 
It may be inferred from these court rulings that the European Union Member States have a 
certain margin of appreciation in deciding on the manner in which they keep their taxpayers’ 
foreign income items outside their domestic tax bases. Apparently, the European Union 
Member States are ‘more or less’ entitled to maintain certain unilaterally imposed obstacles. It 
may be argued that the Court of Justice embarked upon a slippery slope by allowing for such 
a margin of appreciation, and encroaches upon the objective of attaining an area without 
internal frontiers within which economic operators and their economic activities can move 
unimpaired. In the end, the Court’s case law does not promote equity and neutrality. 
 
Under this case law the court accordingly seems to have created a gap between the 
freedoms as to how they ought to apply and the manner in which the court has interpreted 
them. A difference between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ accordingly. 
 
3.6.2.3 Territoriality effectively achieved is insufficient; it should be achieved 
efficiently 
A negative answer to the question as to whether the Member States’ have some leeway to 
uphold the obstacles in their tax systems can be derived from the Court of Justice’s case law. 
That is, particularly in its observations in the cases Renneberg, Metallgesellschaft/Hoechst 
and FII 1.
542
 Contrary to Futura, Marks & Spencer II, Lidl, X Holding, A Oy and K,
543
 these 
cases do not demonstrate a permissible margin of appreciation available to European Union 
Member States seeking to effectuate the territoriality principle in their international tax 
systems. In these cases the Court of Justice – in my view fairly – considered the unilaterally 
imposed liquidity disadvantages incompatible with the fundamental freedoms.
544
 
 
Moreover and more fundamentally, in Renneberg the Court of Justice – in my view fairly – 
ruled that the difference in tax treatment of non-resident taxpayers vis-à-vis resident 
taxpayers was discriminatory. As said, the non-resident taxpayers’ foreign income is typically 
effectively base exempt under the application of a territorial system, while the resident 
taxpayer’s foreign income is typically included in the taxable base. Subsequently double tax 
relief is provided. The case at hand, as explained, involved the Dutch-style tax exemption 
mechanism that the Netherlands did not make available to the non-resident taxpayer 
involved. Notably, a similar approach of the Court of Justice may be derived from the N. and 
Lasteyrie cases. In these cases the Court of Justice considers the levy of exit taxes payable 
in the event of outward bound movements of equity capital – i.e., an expression of a territorial 
tax system – incompatible with the fundamental freedoms.
545
 Indeed, the observations of the 
court in N. and Lasteyrie are analytically opposite to those in National Grid Indus. 
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In these cases the Court of Justice disapproved unilaterally imposed obstacles – i.e., the 
liquidity or other disadvantages that result from the application of an import neutrality 
promoting territorial tax system, as the court ruled that the Member States involved in these 
cases infringed on the free movement rights. According to these court rulings the Member 
States apparently may not unilaterally distort outbound investment. This case law shows that 
the Court of Justice has a problem with the Member States maintaining liquidity or other 
disadvantages in their territorial tax systems.  
 
3.6.2.4 Dislocations thus sometimes upheld and sometimes struck down 
In consequence, the Court of Justice adopted a somewhat ambivalent approach when it came 
to the justification of an obstacle imposed on the basis of the territoriality argument. 
Sometimes the Court upholds the dislocations (Futura, Marks & Spencer II, Lidl, X Holding, A 
Oy, K, National Grid Indus), and sometimes it dismisses them as discriminatory (Renneberg) 
or restrictive (Lasteyrie, N.). 
 
Indeed, by basically acknowledging the base exemption as a proportional expression of the 
territoriality principle in Futura, Marks & Spencer II, Lidl, X Holding, A Oy, K, National Grid 
Indus, yet refuting it in Renneberg, Lasteyrie, and N., the Court of Justice seems to have 
taken a somewhat arbitrary course. That is, with respect to the question whether the 
fundamental freedoms require the European Union Member States to make sure that 
taxpayers who change tax jurisdictions are treated equitably and neutrally for tax purposes. 
 
3.6.3 Legal uncertainty is the Court of Justice’s case law’s product 
3.6.3.1 Lack of clarity in how the Court of Justice’s rulings mutually relate 
This analytically inconsistent body of case law has left it somewhat unclear how the 
observations of the Court of Justice in the aforementioned cases relate to each other. 
Although the rulings of the Court of Justice should be consistent in theory, in practice they are 
not, i.e., at least so it seems. Theoretically, the body of case law should be internally 
consistent as requests for a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice on the interpretation of 
the free movements is analytically the same, time and again. ‘Is there an obstacle?’ In 
practice the Court of Justice’s case law may even provide sufficient grounds for diverging, 
perhaps even random, conclusions. 
 
In addition, the inconsistencies in the Court of Justice’s case law create legal uncertainty. 
Illustrative are the opposite Opinions of the Dutch Advocate General Wattel that he delivered 
within a period of less than a year on the compatibility or incompatibility of the Dutch tax 
consolidation regime with the freedom of establishment on which the Court of Justice later 
ruled in X Holding (see chapter 4 for some analysis). In July 2007, the Advocate General had 
some serious doubts as to the compatibility of the regime with the freedoms.
546
 However, in 
September 2008, he considered the regime compatible with the freedoms due to some later 
developments in the Court of Justice’s case law.
547
 
 
This is unfortunate. Taxpayers crossing the tax border deserve to be treated internally 
equitable and neutral for tax purposes. And to have legally certainty as well. 
 
                                                     
546
 See the Opinion of Advocate General Wattel, 4 July 2007, Vakstudie-Nieuws 2007/47.16. 
547
 See the Opinion of Advocate-General Wattel, 11 September 2008, Vakstudie-Nieuws 2008/47.14. See for a 
comparison the Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, 19 November 2009, Court of Justice, case C-337/08 (X 
Holding) in which Kokott opined that the Dutch tax consolidation regime may generally be regarded as being 
compatible with the freedom of establishment. 
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3.6.3.2 Relying on the Court of Justice’s observations or taking an autonomous 
course? 
The following may be inferred from the above as well. The Court of Justice does not seem to 
provide a sufficient guideline to identify an unambiguous normative framework for the purpose 
of answering the question of when European Union Member States impose an obstacle.  
 
The inconsistencies in the court’s reasoning have therefore made it analytically necessary in 
this study to bypass its body of case law and proceed to finding such a normative framework 
autonomously. For this purpose the analysis relies on international tax theory and the 
underlying objective of pursuing an internal market without internal frontiers, rather than the 
Court of Justice’s interpretation. The analysis has subsequently been taken outside the legal 
context of the internal market and has been put into the perspective of an emerging global 
market. This exercise produced the notions of internal equity and internal neutrality and their 
effects as a logical corollary. The equitable and neutral effects of the advocated approach 
boiled down from this exercise have been extensively demonstrated by reference to the tax-
effects regarding taxpayer Johnson’s dinghy selling operations. The maths simply do not lie. 
 
3.7 Final remarks 
This chapter addresses the question of how to the obstacles in the current international tax 
systems of states should be removed. The chapter accepts that the fiscal sovereignty in 
corporate taxation lies at the nation state level – i.e., as currently is the case in reality. 
 
Inspired by the approaches found in international tax theory and European Union law in direct 
taxation, the argument is made that a nation state’s international tax system should be 
internally fair – a notion of ‘tax fairness within the international tax system of a state’. Equal 
circumstances should be treated equally under the operation of the international tax system of 
the nation state involved. This produces a notion that has been referred to in this chapter as 
‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’. 
 
It has been demonstrated that the international adherence to the widely known tax policy 
notions of capital and labor import neutrality and capital and labor export neutrality actually do 
not promote a neutral tax treatment. Import neutrality promoting tax systems distort 
production factor exports. Export neutrality promoting tax systems distort production factor 
imports. The same holds true for the double tax relief systems commonly used in international 
taxation. Alternatively, a concept has been developed that is referred to as ‘production factor 
neutrality’. This concept promotes neutrality in taxation of both inbound and outbound 
movements of the production factors of capital, labor and enterprise. 
 
The point made is that ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’ call for a 
worldwide taxation of business proceeds of firms that have nexus in a taxing state. Under this 
approach it is irrelevant where a taxpayer has its place of residence or its place of 
incorporation. It fully operates in a non-discriminatory fashion.  
 
To acknowledge the single tax principle, unlimited tax liability should be combined with an 
equitable and neutral double tax relief mechanism. For that purpose, reference is made to a 
double tax relief mechanism referred to as the ‘credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign 
income’. The approach advocated accordingly produces a system in which all countries 
involved tax their share or fraction of the worldwide income derived by the taxpayer, in other 
words: ‘Taxing the fraction’. In terms of tax burdens it is irrelevant under this approach 
whether the taxpayer involved operates its business activities in a cross-border or purely 
domestic environment; the same holds true for the direction of the investment. It accordingly 
operates in a non-distortive fashion. 
 
The equitable and non-distortive operation of the advocated fractional approach has been 
illustrated by means of numerical examples, respectively dealing with progressive tax rates, 
cross-border losses, intra-firm modes of transfers and currency exchange rate fluctuations. To 
illustrate all this, the assessment engages into a thought experiment in which identical tax 
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systems apply at both sides of the tax borders. That is to exclude the effects of disparities in 
the system from the analysis. The approach taken at this point conceptually equals the 
‘internal consistency test’ in US constitutional law. 
 
It has further been argued that a consistent interpretation of the fundamental freedoms under 
the application of European Union law in the field of direct taxation would necessarily arrive at 
the same system. That is because the advocated system is comprehensively non-
discriminatory and non-restrictive from a European Union law perspective. Unfortunately, in 
its interpretations of these freedoms, the Court of Justice, however, resorts to ambiguous 
reasoning in its case law and arrives at analytically inconsistent approaches. 
 
Indeed, the approach advocated in this chapter does not remove any distortions that may 
arise as a consequence of divergences between the tax systems of the nation states involved 
– i.e., the disparities and mismatches in the international tax regime. These however render 
the analysis in the current chapter not invalid. The approach advocated in this chapter merely 
constitutes a building block towards a fair international tax regime. 
 
The remaining disparities in the current discoordinated international tax regime may be 
resolved through adequately approximating the international tax systems of the nation states. 
The questions as to the approaches to be taken to adequately coordinate the international tax 
regime into a corporate tax 2.0 are addressed in part IV of this study, i.e., the upcoming 
chapters 4, 5, and 6. These respectively seek to discover the pieces of the international tax 
jigsaw puzzle involving the definitions of the tax entity and the taxable base and the 
methodology to be employed to geographically divide that tax entity’s taxable base.  
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Chapter 4 The group as a taxable entity 
4.1 Introduction
548
  
 Building on findings in previous chapters 
 
Chapter 2 of this study concludes with the observation that the notion of fairness in the 
international tax regime ultimately calls for a worldwide coordination of the international 
corporate tax systems of nation states. Fairness calls for an approximation of tax systems into 
an adequately operating coherent international tax regime. However, tax coordination 
necessarily involves the acceptance of an erosion of the nation state competences to design 
their corporate tax systems autonomously. 
 
Chapter 3 concludes with the observation that the notion of fairness within the international 
tax system of a single nation state calls for the appreciation of the concepts of internal equity 
and internal neutrality, i.e., in the event that the concept of tax sovereignty were taken as an 
analytical presupposition. The concept of fairness within an international tax system of a state 
boils down to the worldwide taxation of economic operators having domestic nexus whereby 
double tax relief is granted regarding foreign nexus under the ‘credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income’. The math has shown that under such a system, the tax 
burdens of domestic and cross-border investment proceeds of corporate taxpayers would be 
identical in all countries where the taxpayer involved has nexus. The absence of differentials 
proves the absence of obstacles under the advocated system. 
 
This chapter builds on the assumption that nation states would be politically willing to mutually 
coordinate their international tax systems. It is devoted to answering the question of who to 
tax in an alternative international corporate tax regime. What may be considered the 
appropriate taxable entity or ‘tax subject’ in a corporate tax 2.0? Who should be considered 
the corporate taxpayer to resolve taxable entity mismatch issues? 
 
 Tax-treating multinationals as a single entity… 
 
The analysis in the current chapter is inspired by Coase’s ‘theory of the firm’.
549
 It further 
builds on the notion that equity requires nation states to subject a group of affiliated corporate 
entities, which jointly operate a business enterprise to an overall tax burden that is equal to 
the tax burden to which a single corporate entity operating a business enterprise is subject. 
This notion has been addressed in Chapter 2 and is commonly referred to in the literature as 
the unitary business approach.
550
 
 
The argument is made that to resolve the arbitrage in the system, nation states should subject 
the integrated firm as a single entity to corporation tax rather than its constituent individual 
corporate bodies as separate taxable entities. The separate entity approach should be let go. 
The international tax regime should abolish the classical system of corporate taxation in which 
each (affiliated) corporate body forms a separate taxable entity, and where permanent 
establishments are hypothesized as distinct and separate enterprises for profit attribution 
purposes. That approach needs to be abandoned and replaced with the unitary business 
approach. The multinational should be treated as a single taxable entity for corporate tax 
                                                     
548
 This chapter draws from and further builds on Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of 
Groups in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 Intertax 62 (2011). 
549
 Originally stated by Coase in Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 Economica 386 (1937), at 386-405. 
See also Jean-Francois M. A. Hennart, ‘Theories of the Multinational Enterprise’, in Alan M. Rugman (Ed.), Oxford 
Handbook of International Business (2009), at 125-145, Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: 
Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World’, 2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 293-294, Jinyan Li, ‘Global 
Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 
826. See also Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286, Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary Taxation of International 
Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201 (2008), at 201-215, and Walter Hellerstein, ‘International 
Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 103-111. 
550
 See Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 826. 
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purposes. This may technically be achieved by means of mandatory tax consolidation. That 
would enable a matching of the taxable entity and economic entity, i.e., the multinational 
group. The ultimate parent company could be assigned as the (principal) taxpayer for tax 
assessment purposes. 
 
From there, a framework is created to identify the taxable entity for corporation tax purposes. 
The objective is to identify the economic entity that would constitute the taxable entity. To 
identify the taxable entity, the argument is made that tax consolidation should occur with 
respect to: (a) corporate interests that provide the ultimate parent company a decisive 
influence over the underlying business affairs of its subsidiaries, provided that (b) the parent 
company holds its corporate interest as a capital asset. In addition, tax consolidation should 
be mandatory in both domestic and cross-border scenarios. That is, a ‘worldwide tax 
consolidation’. The concept is akin to the concept of worldwide ‘unitary combination’ or 
‘combined reporting’ known in US state income taxation. 
 
Following the building blocks of an international tax system that is internally equitable and 
production factor neutral, developed in Chapter 3, it is argued that the firm should be subject 
to an unlimited corporate tax liability in each tax jurisdiction in which it exceeds a minimum 
threshold of economic activity, i.e., where it has nexus. In cross-border scenarios, double tax 
relief would subsequently be provided regarding the firm’s foreign nexus by reference to the 
credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income, i.e., the approach as developed and 
advocated in the previous chapter. 
 
 would enhance fairness… 
 
Such an approach would enhance fairness in the corporate taxation of multinationals. It would 
bring the corporate tax treatment of corporate groups and single corporate entities on par in 
both domestic and cross-border scenarios. The coordination of the taxable entity would 
further promote the neutrality of the legal form. Corporate tax burden and revenue levels 
would not be influenced by the multinationals’ legal structuring or the question of whether 
business is conducted in a domestic or cross-border context. To that extent, spill-over effects 
would be eliminated. Such an approach would further cancel out all unilaterally imposed 
distortions in the taxation of multinationals under the nation states international tax systems. 
The system would accordingly remain obstacle-free. 
 
 but only as a next step… 
 
However, such an approach would only provide an answer to the distortive allocation of 
corporate tax among corporate taxpayers and between states in a global marketplace; that is, 
it would not resolve the other distortive properties of the current international tax regime. 
 
Indeed, the legal structuring of the multinational’s business activities would cease to influence 
the territorial allocation of the taxable base. It would however not provide a solution for the 
issues in the definition of the tax base or its geographic division.
551
 It would not resolve the 
arbitrage in the tax treatment of third-party debt and equity financing. The common nominal 
return to equity standard would still tax-favor debt over equity financing. It would also not 
resolve the arbitrage in the concepts utilized to establish corporate tax jurisdiction. Nexus 
would still be established by reference to the fairly criticized concepts of ‘place of effective 
management’ and ‘permanent establishment’. It would remain problematic to adequately tax 
the business proceeds from inbound investments by third party shareholders, creditors, and 
lessors in the source state. The same would hold for the flaws in the current profit allocation 
methodologies. The system would still attribute tax base by reference to the fairly criticized 
concepts of separate accounting and the arm’s length standard. 
                                                     
551
 See e.g., Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century 
(2008), Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and 
Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120, Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion 
Paper 2010, Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448, as well as Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global 
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08. 
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However, the definition of the taxable entity by reference to the economic entity may provide 
the first piece of the international tax jigsaw puzzle. Perhaps resolution of the distortions 
under the utilization of the separate entity approach via the adoption of the unitary business 
approach renders this first piece of the puzzle to have fallen into place. This paves the way for 
discovering the place of the remaining two pieces in Chapters 5 (tax base identification) and 6 
(tax base allocation mechanism). 
 
4.2 The multinational firm: a rents producing single economic entity 
4.2.1 Multinational firms economically exist as single entities 
As it has already been set forth in Chapter 2 multinational firms may be considered to exist in 
the real world as economic entities separate from their owners.
552
 Firms may be considered 
real as they are homogenous units created economically to maximize profit production for the 
benefit of its portfolio shareholders. Accordingly, they exist as economic ‘joint ventures’ or 
‘partnerships’ of the firms’ owners who have ‘outsourced’ the management of their venture to 
the firm’s management.  
 
The presence of a firm’s corporate management entails that a firm actually exists as a 
business venture economically separate from its shareholders. The firm accordingly can be 
seen as a separate economic operator – an agent with a governance structure.
553
 This makes 
it a homogenous value creator – i.e., more than a mere conduit of the income that is derived 
by its portfolio investors.
554
 As a single economic unit the firm is represented by its corporate 
management that carries on the business enterprise through its direct investments. If the firm 
operates its business activities in more than a single country, it is typically labeled as a 
multinational.  
 
A firm may comprise of a single legal entity or a group of economically integrated legal 
entities under the common control of an ultimate parent company. Such a decision to legally 
incorporate the various business operations into separate legal entities may be based on the 
desire to limit the firm’s corporate liabilities for debts under the domestic company laws under 
which the respective entities have been formed. The liability limitations under the respective 
applicable civil laws governing the legal entities involved that make up the firm, can be seen 
as some form of public subsidy. The liability limitation allows the firm involved to engage in 
taking commercial risks that have otherwise not been taken, i.e., without the available liability 
limitations. The allowance of greater risk-taking enables the firm that incorporated its business 
operations to potentially produce a higher return on investment.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the limitations in company law liabilities do not say anything about 
the volume of corporate profit produced. “[T]he form of business organization may have 
nothing to do with the underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise.”
555
 Accordingly, it 
should also be immaterial in calculating the taxable corporate profit – i.e., the neutrality of 
legal form.  
 
                                                     
552
 Avi-Yonah refers to the firm’s existence to argue that the imposition of a corporate tax is justified as a means to 
control the accumulation of economic power in the hands of corporate management. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
‘Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax’, 90 Virginia Law Review 1193 (2004), at 1193-
1255. 
553
 This may be considered true to the extent that it concerns a publicly or widely held company. With respect to a 
controlling shareholding of an individual in a privately or closely held company, the presence of a single economic 
operator may be argued to exist by reference to the ultimate shareholder/individual and the shareholding companies, 
i.e., as seen in conjunction. This may be the case where the investor/individual holds a controlling corporate interest 
in the company involved for the purpose of employing that controlling interest for the benefit of carrying on his 
underlying business enterprise on a continuing basis. This, as said, is not further discussed. 
554
 See for a comparison Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the 
End of the World’, 2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 293-294 linking this rationale to the theory of the firm. 
555
 United States Supreme Court, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 100 S. Ct. 
1223 (1980). 
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4.2.2 Multinational firms derive economic rents; the ‘theory of the firm’ 
Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 2 multinational firms are widely known to have the ability 
to produce economic rents. By operating their business activities in a financially, economically 
and organizationally integrated manner on a global scale, multinational firms have proven 
able to produce above-normal investment returns. These are commonly also referred to as 
‘pure profits’, ‘inframarginal’ or ‘returns’, ‘excess earnings’, ‘business cash-flow’, or ‘economic 
rents’; that is, investment returns in excess of the normal returns to the production factors of 
labor (wage) and capital. 
 
Economic rents have been commonly explained by reference to the theory of the firm as 
originally stated by Coase.
556
 The theory of the firm submits that substantively a multinational 
firm constitutes a single economic unit seeking to obtain and maximize economic rents on a 
global scale. Fueled by globalization, the multinational firm integrates or internalizes its 
business operations under an umbrella of common control to derive these rents, rather than 
outsourcing business functions to third market parties. The integration typically occurs both 
vertically and horizontally, i.e., respectively, the integration of activities within a single value 
chain and the integration of activities within two or more value chains.
557
 Multinational 
integration generally occurs regardless of whether the firm involved operates its business 
enterprise through a branch structure or a subsidiary structure.
558
 
 
There is an economic rationale for integrating or internalizing multinational business 
processes within the firm, rather than relying on market forces for these purposes: It is more 
profitable. The theory of the firm or internalization theory submits that the existence of 
multinationals can be explained by reference to the commercial benefits available from 
economic integration relative to market transactions.
559
 The internalization of business 
activities takes place to avoid the costs that arise as a result of market inefficiencies that are 
apparent to third-party dealings, such as transaction costs involved, the costs of mutual trust 
issues and the costs of risk management.
560
 The functional integration occurs to obviate these 
hazards external to the firm – e.g. quality control, security of information, and reputational 
issues. By internalizing business activities, multinationals are able to reduce costs accordingly 
through synergy by taking advantage of economies of scope and scale.
561
  
                                                     
556
 See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 Economica 386 (1937), at 386-405. See also Jean-Francois M. 
A. Hennart, ‘Theories of the Multinational Enterprise’, in Alan M. Rugman (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of International 
Business (2009), at 125-145. 
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 Vertical integration occurs when a multinational engages into two or more primary economic activities within the 
same value chain (e.g., manufacturing and distribution of a product or product line). Horizontal integration occurs 
when a multinational engages into economic activities within two or more value chains (e.g. manufacturing and 
distribution of two or more products or product lines). See for some discussion David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s 
Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing 
Journal 55 (2004), at 58. 
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 Cf. Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 199, and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275. 
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 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines A Proposal for 
Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 5. 
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 Cf. Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 239 and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a 
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 
8-9.  
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 See also Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer Pricing Journal 30 
(2001), at 34. Further see Richard M. Bird, ‘Shaping a New International Tax Order’, 42 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 292 (1988), at 292-299. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, respectively at par. 9.1. and 9.57 on the commercial rationales for 
business restructuring: “Since the mid-90’s, business restructurings have often involved the centralisation of 
intangible assets and of risks with the profit potential attached to them,” and: “Business representatives who 
participated in the OECD consultation process explained that multinational businesses, regardless of their products 
or sectors, increasingly needed to reorganize their structures to provide more centralized control and management of 
manufacturing, research and distribution functions. The pressure of competition in a globalised economy, savings 
from economies of scale, the need for specialization and the need to increase efficiency and lower costs were all 
described as important in driving business restructuring.” Cf. Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of 
Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), 
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These risks are managed through the common control. The common control is the instrument 
that is used to financially, economically and organizationally integrate the business activities 
of the aggregate of corporate entities into a single economic operator. The costs of market 
imperfections are minimized where interdependent business is brought under common 
ownership and control. This explains why multinationals arise where business integration 
through control mechanisms offers economic advantages over entering into market 
transactions.
562
 Within the multinational enterprise market, transactions are eliminated and 
replaced by the entrepreneur coordinator. Effectively, this entails the supersession of the 
price mechanism due to the available costs savings from internalizing business.
563
 The ability 
of avoiding (internalizing) transaction costs lies at the heart of the firm’s structure. It provides 
economic advantages and the sources of profitability for the multinational firm. 
 
In its BEPS Report referring to global business models, the OECD also recognizes the 
process of global integration of the multinational’s business operation: “Globalisation (…) has 
resulted in a shift from country specific operating models to global models based on matrix 
management organisations and integrated supply chains that centralise several functions at a 
regional or global level. (…) In today’s MNEs the individual group companies undertake their 
activities within a framework of group policies and strategies that are set by the group as a 
whole. The separate legal entities forming the group operate as a single integrated enterprise 
following an overall business strategy.”
564
 
 
4.2.3 This explains the unitary business approach in international tax theory 
The notion of the firm as an economic single entity deriving economic rents explains why 
various commentators have resorted to advocating the unitary business approach;
565
 that is 
the approach taken to come to a tax system in which, basically, the multinational group is 
treated as a single taxable entity for corporate tax purposes. Such an approach could be 
                                                                                                                                                        
at 5, and Patrick Cauwenbergh et al, ‘The New German Transfer Pricing Rules on Cross-Border Relocation of 
Functions: A Preliminary Analysis’, 48 European Taxation 514 (2008), at 514, referring to the “stripping out” of 
functions. 
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 See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 Economica 386 (1937), at 386-404 and Ronald H. Coase, 
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See also Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 237-238, as well as Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 
Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275. 
563
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achieved technically by means of a cross-border tax consolidation or an otherwise cross-
border aggregation of taxable profits.
566
 
 
As the firm constitutes a single economic entity, it should perhaps be treated as a single entity 
as well. And as the firm creates rents, it seems sensible to tax these rents from the firm 
directly through the corporate tax system, rather than indirectly from its portfolio shareholders. 
The firm as the economic entrepreneur would be taxed accordingly for its returns on the 
production factor of enterprise; this would contribute to the finance of public goods and 
services provided by the state, from which it also benefits. 
 
4.3 Tax consolidation remedies the separate entity approach’s distortive features 
4.3.1 Seeking to capture multinationals for corporate tax purposes 
4.3.1.1 Taxing multinationals on the basis of a common tool; the separate entity 
approach  
The international corporate tax systems of basically all modern democratic constitutional 
nation states share a common objective: They all seek to effectively ‘capture’ the 
multinationals that are economically present within the respective taxing state’s geographical 
borders for corporate tax purposes. Basically all tax jurisdictions attempt to geographically 
localize business activities and the business income produced. The purpose is to ensure that 
business income generated within the territory of the taxing state is taxed by that state. 
Business income generated outside that state’s territory – i.e., foreign source income – is 
generally intended to be excluded from domestic taxation. 
 
States have established their international tax systems on common building blocks to attain 
this objective. As a general rule, taxable corporate bodies are individually taxed on their 
earnings, i.e., the (functionally) separate entity approach or the classical system of corporate 
taxation. Typical examples of taxable corporate bodies are publicly and privately held limited 
liability companies. Partnerships generally are tax transparent. This holds save for a range of 
exceptions. Some countries consider limited liability companies tax transparent. Some 
countries provide tax transparency even by option. Others consider (limited) partnerships to 
constitute corporate taxpayers. As addressed in Chapter 1, matters differ greatly by country in 
this area. No legal paradigm exists. The absence of a paradigm lies at the heart of the hybrid 
entity mismatch issues in the international tax regime. These essentially are the result of the 
lack of a paradigm in the design of the taxable entity for corporation tax purposes. 
 
4.3.1.2 The separate entity approach produces arbitrage 
The approach of subjecting corporate bodies as separate taxable entities to corporate 
taxation holds up regardless of whether the corporate bodies involved are part of a 
functionally integrated multinational firm. This is particularly true in cross-border 
environments. 
 
It follows that under the operation of the classical system of corporate taxation, states 
arbitrarily affect corporate tax burdens and revenue levels. First, firms are tax-treated 
differently, depending on their legal structuring. This influences decisions regarding the choice 
of legal forms. Second, the corporate tax implications differ depending on whether the 
economic activities of the firm involved are performed in a (non-)cross-border context. States, 
for instance, subject corporate taxpayers that are part of a group to different tax burdens 
depending on their place of incorporation or place of tax residence, the place of tax residence 
of their corporate affiliates, or whether the firm’s business operations involved are conducted 
across various tax jurisdictions. These respectively produce (in)direct discrimination issues, 
so-called second-tier discrimination issues, and jurisdiction entry and exit restriction issues. 
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The tax differentials imposed affect the corporate decision of the firm involved as to whether 
or not to cross the tax border. Accordingly, this affects the corporate tax burden imposed. 
From this it follows that corporate taxation influences the distribution of the production factors 
of capital and labor. This in turn affects the corporate tax revenues of countries. 
 
The arbitrary tax differentials in corporate taxation may work out for the benefit or to the 
detriment of individual multinationals or tax administrations in individual cases. Well-advised 
multinationals may even be able to tax-structure their way around the distortive features of the 
international tax regime. They perhaps may even be able to have the system operate to their 
benefit, for instance by making use of the disparities in taxable entity classifications, i.e., the 
use of hybrid entity mismatches in tax-optimization. Multinationals accordingly may be able to 
influence the effective average tax rates they are subject to in the countries within which they 
are economically active.
567
 
 
If observed as a whole, it can nevertheless be said that the international tax systems of states 
distort the functionality of domestic markets, the internal market within the European Union 
and the emerging global market. This is problematic for all parties involved in the corporate 
taxation of proceeds from multinational business operations. The steady flow of the Court of 
Justice’s case law on the fundamental freedoms in the field of direct taxation in European 
Union cases may be considered a noteworthy illustration of this. As mentioned in the 
introduction of this study, perhaps, everyone may pay at the end of the day. 
 
4.3.1.3 Some elaboration; effects of distorting separate entity approach is inefficient 
and inequitable  
Please let me devote some additional words on the distortive effects of the utilization of the 
separate entity approach in corporate taxation. As said, typically, states maintain the 
approach of taxing corporate entities on an individual basis if these entities belong to a 
group.
568
 This influences the group’s decisions on the manner in which it (legally) arranges its 
business affairs. The separate entity approach distorts the choice of legal form.
569
  
 
A comparison between a group of affiliated corporate entities operating a business enterprise 
and a single corporate entity operating a business enterprise reveals that the separate entity 
approach entails different corporate tax treatment in comparable circumstances. Groups and 
single entities are taxed differently, despite the fact that they are subject to equal economic 
circumstances.  
 
Legal transactions between the corporate affiliates – intra-firm inter-entity transactions – are 
recognized as a taxable event for corporate tax purposes. An arm’s length transfer price 
needs to be considered with respect to intra-group provision of services and supply of goods. 
This typically holds in both domestic and cross-border economic environments. 
 
This is not the case with the equivalent ‘dealings’ between the branches of a single legal 
entity, i.e., intra-firm intra-entity dealings. Intra-firm dealings are disregarded for corporate tax 
purposes. This holds at least to the extent that these internal dealings occur within a single 
tax jurisdiction. In cross-border environments, permanent establishments are hypothesized for 
profit attribution purposes as separate enterprises operating distinctly from the taxable 
corporate body of which it is legally part, i.e., the ‘functionally separate entity approach’. In 
such cases internal dealings are recognized in corporate taxation. 
 
Furthermore, the intra-group distributions of after-tax corporate earnings that are issued for 
the purpose of reinvesting the means available in the firm’s multinational business enterprise 
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are considered taxable events as well. This, for instance, holds up in regards to intra-firm 
dividends and intra-firm capital gains on intra-firm shareholding interests. No such taxable 
event occurs where a single entity reinvests its branches’ after-tax earnings in the single 
entity’s business enterprise.  
 
Moreover, where the aggregation of the business income earned through branches of a single 
corporate body is granted, such an aggregation for corporate tax purposes of the group’s 
business income is unavailable – i.e., an aggregation of losses and profits realized by the 
various affiliates within the tax year, or ‘horizontal loss-compensation’.  
 
As a consequence of this, when multinational groups of affiliated corporate bodies are taxed 
under the classical system they are put at a competitive disadvantage comparatively due to 
the differential corporate tax treatment relative to the tax-treatment of single corporate bodies. 
This in effect results in liquidity and cash flow disadvantages as well as the economic double 
taxation of the business income realized by the firm involved. Groups of affiliated corporate 
bodies and single corporate bodies are subject to a different tax burden in comparable 
circumstances. This is both inefficient and inequitable. 
 
4.3.1.4 Countering the arbitrage; tax consolidation 
 
 Tax consolidation reinforces the neutrality of the legal form in corporate taxation 
 
Fortunately, the tax legislators in various states recognize the distorting effects that the 
application of the separate entity approach to groups entails. Equity and economic efficiency 
considerations inspired several legislators to remedy the distortions through the application of 
tax consolidation regimes for groups of companies, thereby neutralizing intra-firm legal 
realities for corporate tax purposes.
570
 This makes economic sense because internal 
transactions do not contribute to the firm’s profit making.
571
 Notably, the consolidation 
technique used in corporate taxation is the same as their widely known equivalents in 
commercial accounting, i.e., essentially a relatively straightforward procedure finding its 
origins in long standing accounting practices.
572
 
 
Without the intention of being conclusive, tax consolidation regimes can, for example, be 
found in the international tax systems of France (‘régime de l’intégration fiscale’ and ‘regime 
du bénéfice mondial consolidé),
573
 Italy (‘consolidato fiscale nazionale’ and ‘consolidato 
mondiale’),
574
 Luxembourg (régime d'intégration fiscale),
575
 the Netherlands (‘fiscale-
eenheidsregime’),
576
 the United States (‘privilege to file consolidated returns’),
577
 Australia 
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(‘consolidated groups’),
578
 New Zealand (‘consolidated groups of companies’)
579
 and Japan 
(‘consolidated tax return filing system’).
580
 Moreover, the efforts of the European Commission 
to adopt a harmonized corporate tax base for European business enterprises in combination 
with a tax consolidation regime, referred to as the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
or CCCTB, should be mentioned here as well. Also the CCCTB provides for a tax-
consolidation mechanism. 
 
The application of a full tax consolidation regime whereby intra-group transactions are 
eliminated for tax calculation purposes basically entails the acknowledgement of the business 
economics reality of the group as one economic operator operating an integrated business 
enterprise for corporate tax purposes. Essentially, the unitary business approach is adopted 
as a correction mechanism for the distortive effects that ensue from making use of the 
separate entity approach as a point of departure. Indeed, “[t]he (…) rationale for taxing 
affiliated companies on a consolidated basis is acknowledging the fact that taxing businesses 
on a separate entity approach artificially divides up the profits earned by unitary 
enterprises.”
581
 
 
Full tax consolidation analytically has the effect that the group of affiliated corporate entities is 
treated as a single entity for corporate tax purposes and accordingly regarded as the taxable 
entity. The corporate veils are being pierced for corporate tax purposes. The parent company 
constitutes the taxpayer; all affiliated corporate entities are effectively tax transparent – i.e., 
the ‘all-in approach’. 
 
As a result of the tax consolidation procedure, the group of affiliated corporate bodies is taxed 
in the same manner as a single corporate body conducting its business enterprise through 
branches. Tax consolidation allows for the aggregation of losses and profits realized by the 
various affiliates within the tax year. Furthermore, tax consolidation takes back the initial 
recognition of intra-group transactions for corporate tax purposes.  
 
As a result thereof, tax consolidation allows groups to organize their business affairs (legally) 
to meet their commercial needs without the distortion of corporate taxation. The single 
taxation of the business income of groups is achieved in an equitable and economically 
efficient manner. The market distortions that ensue from applying the separate entity 
approach are resolved. Economically comparable circumstances are treated equally for 
corporate tax purposes. Economic reality is appreciated. This is both efficient and equitable. 
 
Tax consolidation resolves the arbitrage potential in recognizing intra-group 
(financing) transactions 
 
Tax consolidation also resolves the market distortions that occur from the arbitrary yet 
commonly applied differences in the corporate tax treatment of proceeds from debt and equity 
financing arrangements within groups of affiliated corporate entities.
582
 On the one hand, most 
international corporate tax systems effectively do not tax the proceeds from intra-firm equity 
financing arrangements, i.e., the exemption of dividend receipts and capital gains on 
(substantial) corporate shareholders interests. But on the other hand, these often do 
recognize for corporate tax purposes intra-firm debt financing arrangements, i.e., the taxation 
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 See Division 703 (Consolidated groups and their members) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
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of interest receipts and the allowance of tax-deductible interest payments and impairments of 
receivables.
583
  
 
Tax consolidation remedies this arbitrary corporate tax treatment, that is, at least to the extent 
that it concerns intra-group debt and equity financing arrangements. The undertaking of 
financing arrangements within a group of affiliated corporate entities should not be recognized 
for corporate tax purposes as they do not affect the overall business profit realized by the 
group. Intra-group dividend streams or interest payments do not add value to the economic 
entity. Hence, there is no economic reality that could support the recognition of intra-group 
interest payments or dividend distributions for corporate tax purposes. 
 
Under the separate entity approach, however, intra-group financing arrangements are 
recognized for corporate tax purposes. This effect is remedied when tax consolidation is 
applied. After all, derecognizing intra-group transactions for corporate tax purposes entails 
that intra-group debt and equity financing arrangements are derecognized as well. 
 
Distortive effects are kept in place where tax-consolidation is not made available 
 
The aforementioned distortions are kept in place in cases where a state’s international tax 
system does not allow groups to be regarded as a single taxable entity under a tax 
consolidation regime. This may be the case when the respective taxing state simply does not 
have a tax consolidation regime available in its international tax system, or where it does not 
allow a group to apply the tax consolidation regime and form a consolidated tax group under 
the terms of the regime’s application, even though the group involved operates economically 
as a single entity.  
 
In such cases, the separate entity approach is maintained. Liquidity (cash flow) 
disadvantages and the economic double taxation of the business income realized by the 
group will then be the inevitable consequence. 
 
 Seeking to resolve the arbitrage by means of halfway mechanisms 
 
Disregarding proceeds from intra-firm equity investments; common 
 
In scenarios where firms are not enabled to form a consolidated tax group, states commonly 
counter the resulting distortions on the basis of alternative, specific or ad hoc, correction 
mechanisms, all of which have been introduced for equity and/or economic efficiency 
reasons. For example, the single taxation of proceeds from equity interests in non-tax 
consolidated group companies - such as intra-group dividends and capital gains - is 
commonly achieved by states on the basis of an indirect credit or a participation exemption 
mechanism. These regularly apply in conjunction with the application of a 0% dividend tax 
rate or dividend tax exemption with respect to intra-group dividend distributions. 
 
Participation exemption regimes can, for example, be found in Australia
584
 Luxembourg,
585
 the 
Netherlands,
586
 France,
587
 Belgium,
588
 Austria,
589
 Denmark,
590
 Finland,
591
 Norway,
592
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Germany,
593
 Italy
594
 Spain,
595
 and Japan.
596
 (Dividend) imputation credit regimes can, for 
example, be found in New Zealand
597
 and the United States.
598
 The European Union Parent 
Subsidiary Directive, requiring the Member States to adopt an exemption or indirect credit 
mechanism with respect to inter-company dividend distributions can be mentioned in this 
respect as well. These are accompanied with a dividend withholding tax exemption. 
 
 Disregarding proceeds from intra-firm debt investments; uncommon  
 
Notably, mechanisms exempting proceeds from intra-group debt interests such as interest 
expenses, interest receipts and impairment losses on debt receivables – introduced for the 
purpose of removing the arbitrary differences in the corporate tax treatment of income from 
debt and equity financing – are quite rare. 
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Some examples could be found in Hungary and the Netherlands. In Hungary a 50% 
exemption for intra-group interest payments had been in place for some time. This regime has 
been repealed as of 1 January 2010.
599
 In the past, The Netherlands tax legislator had 
proposed and later withdrawn the so-called ‘mandatory group interest box’.
600
 The regime 
would have allowed for an 80% exemption for proceeds from intra-group debt arrangements. 
 
 The utilization of interest deduction limitations; common 
 
Instead of derecognizing intra-group debt arrangements for corporate tax purposes 
altogether, nation states commonly have put interest deduction limitation regimes in place to 
counter the arbitrary creation of deductible interest expenses by taxpayers attempting to 
reduce their local corporate tax bases and/or shifting the locally produced corporate income to 
low-taxing jurisdictions.  
 
Thin capitalization measures and earnings-stripping rules are noteworthy examples of 
commonly applied correction mechanisms.
601
 Thin capitalization regimes can for instance be 
found respectively in the international tax systems of Denmark, France, Spain, Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan.
602
 Earnings and stripping rules can be found in the international tax 
systems of Denmark, Germany, Italy and the United States, as well as in the suggested 
alternatives to the CCCTB proposal forwarded by the Presidency of the Council.
603
 These 
measures have in common that they apply where corporate taxpayers take-up (intra-group) 
loans producing tax-deductible interest payments to levels that are considered inappropriate 
by the respective tax jurisdictions involved. 
 
 The utilization of profit-pooling regimes; quite common 
 
Moreover, it is not uncommon in the international tax regime that the international tax systems 
for states allow for an aggregation of the group’s business income. This is made available in a 
variety of states on the basis of so-called ‘profit-pooling regimes’ or tax-grouping regimes. 
 
Examples of tax-grouping regimes allowing for an aggregation of income realized by the 
various group companies can be found in Germany (‘Organschaft’),
604
 Austria 
(‘Organschaft’),
605
 the United Kingdom and Ireland (‘group relief regime’),
606
 Portugal 
(‘Regime Especial de Tributação de Grupo de Sociedades’),
607
 Denmark (‘national’ and 
‘international joint taxation regime’),
608
 Norway
609
 and Finland
610
 (‘group contribution regime’). 
Further noteworthy examples can be found in US state income where various US states allow 
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New Zealand ITA and Article 66-5 Japanese Special Taxation Measures Law (‘Japanese SMTL’). Until 2013 the 
Netherlands’ international tax regime contained a thin capitalization regime in Article 10d Dutch CITA. This regime 
has been replaced as of 2013 by the aforementioned Article 13l Dutch CITA. 
603
 Respectively to be found in §11C Danish CTA, §4h of the German Einkommensteuergesetz (‘German Income Tax 
Code’ or ‘EStG’), articles 167 and 168 of the Italian Tax Code and §163(j) (Limitation on deduction for interest on 
certain indebtedness) US IRC. The earnings and stripping provision (Article 14a) suggested by the Presidency of the 
Council can be found in the comments of the Presidency of the Council on the CCCTB proporsal (doc. 8387/12 FISC 
49) published by the Council of the European Union, 16 April 2012, no. 2011/0058(CNS). 
604
 See §§14–19 German Corporate Tax Code. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
605
 See §9 Austrian Corporate Tax Code. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. See for details on the 
functioning of the Austrian regime Werner Wiesner et al, Gruppenbesteuerung: Praxiskommentar (2005). 
606
 See Part 5 of the United Kingdom’s Corporation Tax Act 2010 (‘UK CTA’) and Section 420 of the Irish Taxes 
Consolidation Act 1997 (‘Irish TCA’). Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
607
 See Articles 69-71 of the Portuguese Imposto sobre o rendimento das pessoas colectivas (‘Portuguese Corporate 
Tax Act’ or ‘Portuguese IRC’. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
608
 See §31 and 31A Danish CTA. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
609
 See §§10-2 to 10-4 Norwegian TA. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
610
 See Articles 1-8 of the Finnish Law on Intra-group Financial Transfers (Laki konserniavustuksesta verotuksessa of 
21 November 1986 (‘Finnish KonsAvL’). Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
170
161 
 
for the pooling of the corporate profits of affiliated corporate bodies under the concept of 
combined reporting.
611
 
 
 The utilization of shareholding impairments; not too common 
 
As an alternative means to profit-pooling regimes, some nation states allow for a tax 
deductible impairment of equity interests in respect of (foreign) loss-making subsidiary 
companies, for instance Spain, and The Netherlands until 2007.
612
 To secure the single 
taxation of the underlying business income, the tax-deductibility is typically paired with a 
recapture mechanism . 
 
As an alternative for the allowance of a deduction of losses at the level of a shareholding 
company when realized, some countries make such a loss-offset available upon the 
liquidation of a loss-making non-consolidated (foreign) group company. An example of such a 
regime can be found in the current international tax system of The Netherlands, i.e., the 
‘liquidation losses set-off regime’.
613
 
 
 The allowance of tax-free intra-group asset transfers; quite common 
 
Furthermore, some nation states allow for tax-neutral asset transfers between group 
companies. These are made possible, for instance, in the international tax systems of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland under the so-called ‘capital gains tax group relief regime’.
614
 
 
The capital gains tax group relief regime in place in these countries allows groups of affiliated 
corporate bodies to transfer assets amongst the affiliates on a no gain/no loss basis. That is 
to the extent that the transferred assets remain within the charge of the corporation tax, 
respectively, of the United Kingdom and Ireland. The objective of the eligibility requirement 
that the assets involved have to remain situated within these states’ territories is to ensure 
that the hidden reserves contained in the assets involved do not escape British or Irish 
corporate taxation. The eligibility requirement in the respective tax systems essentially is an 
expression of an import neutrality promoting territorial tax system. 
 
Correction mechanisms common property: resolving distortive effects of separate 
entity approach on ad hoc basis 
 
These alternative correction mechanisms can all be seen as examples of approaches 
conceptually moving away from the separate entity approach towards a unitary business 
approach. On the basis of the same equity and economic efficiency arguments underlying tax 
consolidation regimes, these alternative measures deviate from the starting point that each 
group company is treated as a single taxpayer. That is, at least to some extent. 
 
But contrary to tax consolidation, they do not fully appreciate the economic integration of the 
affiliated corporate entities into one single economic operator. That is, as these alternative 
                                                     
611
 See for some reading and analysis, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, 
in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, who describes the 
concept of combined reporting at 256: “The basic theory of combined reporting is that the income earned by a group 
of related corporations engaged in a common enterprise is, in substance, the income of the enterprise, not the 
income of the various members that make up that enterprise. The members of the enterprise are established for 
various intra-group reasons. The branches and affiliates that make up the enterprise, however, are merely tools used 
by the enterprise for earning income, just as ownership of equipment is a tool used by the enterprise for earning 
income. There may be legal reasons for attributing a portion of the income of the enterprise to one or more members, 
typically to facilitate collection of the taxes assessed. In an apportionment formula, there also may be a reason for 
linking income with equipment or other property. These attribution rules, however, are not fundamental in determining 
the taxes paid by the enterprise. What is fundamental is the determination of the total income of the enterprise and 
the attribution of that income to various taxing jurisdictions based on the characteristics (factors) of the enterprise as 
a whole.” 
612
 See Article 13ca Dutch CITA (2006). 
613
 See Article 13d Dutch CITA. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. For some analysis see Maarten F. de 
Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business income’, in International 
Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011), at section 2.3.2. 
614
 See Section 171 of the United Kingdom’s Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (‘UK TCGA’) and Section 617 
Irish TCA. Eligibility criteria are left out of consideration. 
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measures only counter some specific distortive effects that the adoption of the separate entity 
approach entails. The separate entity approach has not been abandoned completely and the 
unitary business approach has not been adopted to its full extent.  
 
These alternative correction mechanisms are basically ‘per-element solutions’ combating the 
symptoms that are caused by the underlying problems that ensue from taxing affiliated 
corporate entities on an individual basis. They can therefore be considered examples of 
‘halfway approaches’ conceptually ending up somewhere in the middle between the separate 
entity approach and the unitary business approach. And with that, these alternative measures 
may also be considered ‘halfway solutions’ for the problems that the underlying separate 
entity approach causes when groups of companies are being taxed by states in today’s 
globalizing economy. 
 
For that reason, the correction mechanisms alternative to tax consolidation are left out of any 
further consideration in this paper. The focus lies on tax consolidation for the concept 
providing a comprehensive solution to the distortive effects of the separate entity approach. 
 
4.4 Tax consolidation regimes do not adequately cover the economic entity; an 
alternative  
4.4.1 Reconsidering the scope of application of the typical tax consolidation 
regimes 
To remedy the distortions that ensue from the utilization of the separate entity approach in the 
international tax regime, the tax consolidation regime should not only be present within an 
international tax system of a state. It should also be designed in a manner that adequately 
covers the economic entity, i.e., the group of affiliated corporate entities that have been 
integrated into one economic operator.  
 
The purpose of this section is to attempt to demonstrate that – where present in the current 
international tax systems of nation states – the tax consolidation regimes often do not 
adequately cover the economic entity when it involves the corporate taxation of groups of 
affiliated corporate bodies. This results in market distortions. 
 
This is true in both domestic and cross-border contexts. Consequently, the scope of 
application of the tax consolidation regimes as typically put in place in the international tax 
systems of states needs to be reconsidered. In the following subsections 4.4.2 (domestic 
context) and 4.4.3 (cross-border context), the objective is to provide for an equitable and 
efficient model tax consolidation framework; that is to adequately identify the economic entity 
as a single taxable entity under a corporation tax 2.0 meeting the requirements of a global 
market environment. 
 
4.4.2 Remedying distortive effects in a domestic context  
4.4.2.1 Decisive influence  
 
 Addressing common control  
 
When determining the scope of application of a tax consolidation regime, states allowing for 
tax consolidation – to my impression – seek to express the power of the parent company to 
direct their subsidiaries’ business activities. That is, they seek to address that the operations 
of the group of economically integrated corporate entities take place under the common 
control of the ultimate parent company.
615
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 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. 
International Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, John M, Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper 
No. 07-017 (2007), at section IV, and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global 
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 Expressing control via shareholding volume test; examples 
 
In an attempt to identify the group or economic entity to which the respective tax consolidation 
regime may subsequently apply, several tax legislators have introduced requirements that 
address the volume of shares (in)directly held by the respective parent company in their 
subsidiaries.
616
  
 
The shareholding interests required for tax consolidation vary widely and range between 50% 
or more and 100%. Italy for example, requires a shareholding interest exceeding 50% in the 
corporate entity’s equity capital.
617
 In the CCCTB proposal a two-part test applies, i.e., the 
right to exercise more than 50% of the voting rights and an ownership right amounting to 
more than 75% of the company’s capital or more than 75% of the rights giving entitlement to 
profit.
618
 The United States requires a shareholders’ interest representing 80% or more of the 
total value and voting power of the stock of the company in which the shares are held.
619
 The 
Dutch ‘fiscale-eenheidsregime’ and the French’ ‘régime de l’intégration fiscale’ call for a 
shareholders’ interest of at least 95%.
620
 In Japan, Australia and New Zealand, only wholly 
owned companies are eligible to form a consolidated tax group.
621
 
 
Easy to apply yet necessarily insufficient to adequately express control 
 
With such relatively easy-to-apply shareholding volume requirements, as said, it is my 
impression that tax legislators seek to express the power of the parent company over the 
organization and management of the underlying business activities of the subsidiaries in 
which the shares are held. Namely, the parent company’s control over the financial, economic 
and organizational affairs of the (sub)subsidiaries is the necessary means with which the 
intended economic integration of the group is shaped.
622
 The property rights attached to the 
shares that provide the shareholder with a say in the corporate entity’s business – such as the 
voting rights in the shareholders meeting and/or rights of appointment and dismissal of 
executives – provide for the required power to direct the underlying business activities. 
 
However, although having the advantage of administrative simplicity with the easy application 
for a shareholding volume, the level of shares held by the shareholder merely provides for an 
indication of the level of power. The power of the shareholder to steer the underlying business 
activities of its subsidiary does not necessarily vary directly in proportion to the volume of 
shares held.
623
 This is due to the fact that economic power can be manifested in numerous 
(legal) ways.  
 
In practice, for example, it is possible to establish various types of property rights regarding 
the say in the shareholders meeting to various types of shares. Moreover, the say in a 
corporate business may even be founded on property rights other than equity interests (e.g. 
on contractual arrangements). Mentionable examples in this respect are group agreements 
(‘Beherrschungsvertrag’), or (voting) arrangements amongst shareholders and/or between 
                                                                                                                                                        
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 12 
and 20. 
616
 See also Wolfgang Schön, ‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part II)’, 2 World Tax Journal 
65 (2010), at 66. 
617
 See Articles 117-142 Italian Tax Code. 
618
 See Article 54(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). See for a comparison Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working 
group (CCCTB WG) Working Paper No. 57, CCCTB: possible elements of a technical outline, Taxud E1, 
CCCTB/WP057\doc\en, Brussels, 26 July 2007. 
619
 See §1504 (Consolidated Returns) US IRC. 
620
 See respectively Article 15 Dutch CITA and Article 223A French CGI. 
621
 See respectively Article 4-2 Japanese CTL, Section 703.15 Australian IITA 1997 and Section FM 31 New Zealand 
ITA.  
622
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’, 74 Texas Law 
Review 1301 (1996), at 1309, as well as OECD Investment Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, 
OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4
th
 Edition, OECD, Paris, 2008, at 15. 
623
 Under German company law for instance a 25% minority can block pivotal corporate business decisions; see 
Sections 179(2) and 262(1) no. 2 of the German AktG. 
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shareholders and persons having other corporate (e.g. debt) interests in the business 
enterprise. 
 
Consequently, the size of the shareholding may – in effect – be indifferent in determining 
whether the respective corporate entities are economically integrated into one economic 
entity. The potential consequence is arbitrage: it may allow a firm to legally arrange its 
business affairs in a manner that avoids corporate taxation.
624
 
 
At the end of the day, only the actual economic power counts. As a result of this, all 
shareholding volume requirements will ultimately prove to be arbitrary.
625
 Therefore, in my 
view, a shareholding volume criterion alone is not suitable for identifying the group for the 
purpose of applying the corporate tax consolidation. 
 
 Expressing control via decisive influence test 
 
In order to bring about the economic integration into a group, the parent company needs to 
have some form of corporate interest that gives it in fact a decisive influence on the 
underlying business affairs of its (sub)subsidiaries (centralization of management). Only in 
that case may the financial, organizational and economic integration of the aggregate of 
corporate entities into one economic entity operating one business enterprise be present. And 
only in the situation where the parent company has a decisive influence may the aggregate of 
corporate entities be comparable with a single entity that operates its business enterprise 
through one or more branches. 
 
Namely, from a business economics perspective, there is no difference between operating a 
business enterprise (directly) through a branch or (indirectly) through the branch of a 
controlled group company. Notably, the aforementioned may also explain the reason why the 
Court of Justice adopted its ‘definite influence and control test’ or ‘Baars criterion’ under the 
freedom of establishment in its case law on fundamental freedoms in the field of direct 
taxation, preceding its comparison between a secondary establishment of an economic 
operator through a permanent establishment or a group company.
626
 
 
These observations boil down to the position that tax consolidation should, as a rule, be 
allowed with respect to corporate interests that provide the parent company with a decisive 
influence over the underlying business affairs of its subsidiaries.
627
  
 
A decisive influence criterion may cause some legal uncertainty.
628
 This effect however 
should not be overstated. For instance, it also commonly applies in commercial accounting. 
                                                     
624
 Cf. Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of 
Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 243, at 267. 
625
 See for a comparison F.A. Engelen et al, ‘Wijziging van belastingwetten met het oog op het tegengaan van 
uitholling van de belastinggrondslag en het verbeteren van het fiscale vestigingsklimaat’, 137 Weekblad Fiscaal 
Recht 891 (2008). The authors suggest a similar criterion – a corporate interest of ‘more than half’ –to define an 
affiliate corporate entity under their proposals for a set of group interest deduction limitations alternative to those 
currently found in the Netherlands’ international tax regime. 
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 See Court of Justice, cases C-251/98 (Baars), C-307/97 (Saint-Gobain), C-446/04 (FII), C-524/04 (Thin Cap 
GLO), C-157/05 (Holböck), C-298/05 (Columbus), C-284/06 (Burda), C-182/08 (Glaxo) C-311/08 (SGI), and C-35/11 
(Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation – FII 2). On the concurrent application of the fundamental freedoms, see 
Erwin Nijkeuter et al, ‘FII 2 and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in Third Country Situations’, 22 EC Tax 
Review 250 (2013), at 250-257, and Daniel S. Smit, ‘The relationship between the free movement of capital and the 
other EC Treaty freedoms in third country relationships in the field of direct taxation: a question of exclusivity, 
parallelism or causality?’, 16 EC Tax Review 252 (2007). 
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 See for a comparison International Accounting Standards (‘IAS’) 27 (‘Consolidated and Separate Financial 
Statements’) on the basis of which a ‘control’ test has been adopted to identify the group of affiliated entities required 
to present its financial statements as those of a single economic entity (consolidated financial statements). See also 
the Letter of the Dutch State Secretary for Finance to Parliament of 15 June 2009, DB/2009/227U in which the Dutch 
State Secretary for Finance chose a decisive influence criterion in the draft proposal for a mandatory group interest 
box (an 80% base exemption for proceeds on intra-group debt capital arrangements). Note that the group interest 
proposal was withdrawn in the Letter of the Dutch State Secretary for Finance to Parliament of 5 December 2009, 
DB2009/674M. 
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 For some analysis on the question as to whether to adopt a legal test or an economic test for tax grouping 
purposes, see e.g., Charles E. Mclure, Jr., ‘Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union: The Commission’s 
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Indeed, inspiration for the interpretation of such a decisive influence criterion may be found in 
the control test as commonly applied under commercial accounting consolidation rules (e.g. 
IAS 27). Moreover, a decisive influence criterion cannot be manipulated as easily as is the 
case with a shareholding volume criterion. Therefore, a decisive influence criterion should be 
favored over a shareholding criterion. Notably, in addition to this criterion, the parent company 
in my view should hold its corporate interest as a capital asset (see section 4.5.2.2). 
 
No tax consolidation of minority interests; dealing with economic double taxation via 
other means 
 
It should be noted that in the scenarios in which the interest does not provide the shareholder 
with a decisive influence on the underlying business affairs, there can necessarily be no 
economic integration into one economic entity when the firm is regarded as an economic unit 
and its minority shareholder. Adhering to established commercial accounting practices, the 
minority shareholder could be accounted technically by means of a full tax consolidation 
whereby the minority interest appears on the consolidated entity’s balance sheet. 
 
Regarding minority shareholder scenarios, the interest does not provide the holder with 
sufficient economic power to steer the underlying business affairs of its participations. In that 
case, the aggregate of shareholders and participation is not comparable with a group of 
affiliated corporate entities or a single entity that operates its business enterprise through one 
or more branches (or permanent establishments).
629-630 
Consequently, the tax consolidation of 
the aggregate of the shareholder and its non-controlling participation(s) would be incorrect. 
Regarding proceeds from minority shareholdings, the single taxation of corporate income 
should be achieved by other means than tax consolidation. This issue is dealt with in Chapter 
5 at sections 4.4.3 and 6.4.2.
631
 
 
 Necessity of a clearing mechanism 
 
Notably, were the ultimate parent company to be assigned as the (principal) taxpayer for tax 
assessment purposes and held accordingly liable to pay the corporation tax due, some kind of 
‘clearing mechanism’ should apply so as to secure and facilitate that both the majority and 
minority shareholder(s) involved effectively contribute to the corporation taxes payable on the 
underlying business activities of the respective subsidiary company in proportion to their 
shareholding interest. The mechanism, for instance, would allow the parent company, for 
instance, to on-charge the corporation tax due to the subsidiary company involved. Clearing 
payments initiated for this purpose should not attract an additional tax liability.
632
 The clearing 
                                                                                                                                                        
Proposals’, 36 Tax Notes International 45 (4 October 2004), at 54-55, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The 
Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: 
A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working 
Paper 2006:9, at 11-15, and Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 176-178. 
629
 Notably, the Court of Justice’s comparison between corporate taxpayers with a domestic participation and 
taxpayers with a foreign participation accordingly is analytically sound in cases where the shareholder does not have 
a decisive influence in its participation’s business affairs. Where the shareholder’s interest is held as a capital asset 
and provides the shareholder with a decisive influence in the underlying business affairs, the comparison between 
the (foreign) group company and (foreign) branch – i.e., a permanent establishment under the current nexus 
approach in international taxation – seems the most appropriate. See for a comparison the Opinions of Advocate 
General Maduro in Court of Justice, cases C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer II) and C-168/01 (Bosal). 
630
 This may also explain why the Court of Justice applies the freedom of capital in scenarios where the shareholder’s 
interest does not provide the shareholder with a definite influence. See, e.g., Court of Justice, case C-446/04 (FII 1). 
For some analytical comparison see Court of Justice, cases C-208/00 (Überseering), C-251/98 (Baars), and C-
284/06 (Burda); the latter two notably a contrario. For some further reading and analysis, see Erwin Nijkeuter et al, 
‘FII 2 and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in Third Country Situations’, 22 EC Tax Review 250 (2013), at 250-
257. 
631
 The argument is made there that this may be achieved by means of an allowance for corporate equity mechanism 
in conjunction with an ‘indirect tax exemption’ mechanism at the level of the holder of the corporate interest to 
eliminate the economic double taxation of the underlying business proceeds derived at the level of the company in 
which the interest is held. This is further assessed in Chapter 5. 
632
 An example may illustrate the operation of such a clearing mechanism. Consider ParentCo holding an 70% 
shareholding in SubsidiaryCo. ThirdCo holds the remaining 30% of the shares. ParentCo tax consolidates 
SubsidiaryCo for it having a controlling shareholding interest. The business operations carried on through 
SubsidiaryCo produce a stand-alone taxable profit of $100. Let us assume that the corporate tax rate equals 20%. 
ParentCo is liable to pay $20 tax as it constitutes the principal taxpayer for corporate tax assessment purposes. A 
clearing mechanism applies to ensure that ThirdCo proportionally shares in the corporate tax liability. ParentCo is 
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mechanism would need to recognize intra-firm transactions to the extent that a minority 
shareholder is involved.
633
 
 
Worth mentioning is that 50-50 joint ventures would constitute a taxable entity separate from 
its joint venture partners since the shareholding interests of respective joint venture partners 
involved would not provide them a controlling shareholding in the underlying firm. That would 
render the joint venture a separate economic entity and, therefore, a taxable entity separate 
from the joint venture partners. 
 
4.4.2.2 Motive: the corporate interest granting parent decisive influence should be 
held as a capital asset 
 
Decisive influence test is necessary but insufficient 
 
Under the appreciation of the unitary business approach the decisive influence is a necessary 
condition for identifying the group for corporate tax purposes. But it is an insufficient 
delimitation criterion as well. The concept of control does address the motive of the parent 
company involved to pursue or maintain the economic integration of the group of affiliated 
corporate entities into one economic entity operating the business enterprise.  
 
A decisive influence merely provides for an indication of the parent company’s motive. 
Indeed, the chances are that the definite influence providing corporate interest is held for the 
purpose of establishing or maintaining the economic integration into a single economic entity. 
However, this does not necessarily need to be the case. It is conceivable that the shareholder 
holds its corporate interest with another purpose. The interest may, for example, be held for 
the purpose of trading it as stock. Or the interest may be held as a portfolio investment. 
 
A motive test is also required  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
allowed to on-charge the $20 tax payable to SubsidiaryCo, whose shares in consequence decrease in value with that 
same amount. The clearance payment does not attract a corporate tax implication. The effect accordingly is that 
ParentCo’s after-tax profit equals $56 (70% * (100 - 20)). ThirdCo’s equals $24 (30% * (100 – 20)). The corporate tax 
liability is accordingly spread among ParentCo en ThirdCo evenly, i.e., in proportion to their shareholding interest. 
633
 An example may illustrate the operation of the clearing mechanism in the presence of an inter-company 
transaction. Consider ParentCo holding a 100% shareholding in Sub1Co and a70% shareholding in Sub2Co. ThirdCo 
holds the remaining 30% of the shares in Sub2Co. ParentCo tax-consolidates both SubCos for it having controlling 
shareholding interests in these entities. The business operations carried on through Sub1Co produce a stand-alone 
taxable profit of $300. The business operations carried on through Sub2Co produce a taxable profit of $700. Let us 
assume that, in addition, Sub1Co provides a service to Sub2Co worth $60 for which Sub2Co pays Sub1Co a 
corresponding remuneration. In consequence, Sub1Co’s stand-alone profit increases with $60 to $360. Sub2Co’s 
stand-alone profit decreases with $60 to $740. The corporate tax rate equals 20%. ParentCo is liable to pay $200 tax 
as it constitutes the principal taxpayer for corporate tax assessment purposes. The intra-firm transaction is not 
recognized for tax purposes as the transaction is eliminated in the tax consolidation process. A clearing mechanism 
applies to ensure that ThirdCo proportionally shares in the corporate tax liability. The mechanism requires that the 
internal transaction is recognized for clearing purposes as the service provided by Sub1 Co to Sub2Co indirectly 
constitutes a service provided by the group to ThirdCo in proportion to its shareholding interest in Sub2Co. The $60 
fee paid by Sub2Co to Sub1Co reduces Sub2Co’s $700 profit to $640 for clearing purposes. The tax paid by 
ParentCo attributable to Sub2Co accordingly equals $128 (20% * 700 - 60). The $60 service fee received by Sub1Co 
from Sub2Co increases its $300 profit for clearing purposes to $360. The tax paid by ParentCo attributable to 
Sub1Co equals $72 (20% * 300 + 60). ParentCo is allowed to on-charge $128 of its corporate tax payable to 
Sub2Co, whose shares in consequence decrease in value with that same amount. (ParentCo on-charges $72 of its 
tax payable to Sub1Co.) The clearance payments do not attract a corporate tax implication. The effect accordingly is 
that ParentCo’s after-tax profit attributable to Sub1Co equals $228 (100% * (300 - 72)). ParentCo’s after-tax profit 
attributable to Sub2Co equals $400.40 (70% * (700 - 128)). ThirdCo’s after-tax profit on its investment in Sub2Co 
equals $171.60 (30% * (700 – 128)). The corporate tax liability is accordingly spread among ParentCo en ThirdCo 
evenly, i.e., in proportion to their shareholding interest in Sub2Co. Economically, the operation of the clearing 
mechanism enables ThirdCo to effectively account for its pro rata share in the service fees paid by Sub2Co to 
Sub1Co for the service rendered (30% * 60 = 18). The recognition of the service fee for clearance purposes 
translates into a lower amount of corporate tax attributed to Sub2Co which in consequence translates into a 
proportionally lower reduction in Sub2Co’s shareholding value (i.e., relative to the scenario in which no internal 
transaction would have occurred). Please note that the entering into the $60 service transaction would be driven by 
market forces as ParentCo and ThirdCo mutually are third-parties. 
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Accordingly, the motive of the holder of the corporate interest should be taken into 
consideration when determining the scope of application of the respective tax consolidation 
regime. This requires an answer to the factual question of the intention of the taxpayer 
employing the respective interest. The intention of the shareholder may be objectified by 
means of a functional analysis of the position that the involved property right fulfills in the 
taxpayer’s property.  
 
Motives available: interest held as portfolio investment, trading stock or capital asset 
 
In this respect, one can distinguish between property rights that are held as a current floating 
asset – i.e., as a portfolio investment, or trading stock – or as a capital asset.
634
 One may 
speak of a: 
 
 portfolio investment in the event that a taxpayer holds a property right for the purpose 
of earning a yield that may be expected from normal portfolio asset management.
635
 
In return for a fee, the taxpayer makes its property available for the benefit of the 
economic activities of another (i.e., third) party; 
 trading stock in the event that a taxpayer holds a property right for the purpose of 
trading it with third parties in return for a selling price; 
 capital asset in the event that a taxpayer holds a property right for the purpose of 
employing it for the benefit of its business enterprise on a continuing basis. 
 
Where property rights are held as trading stock or as a capital asset, the taxpayer involved 
makes its property available for the benefit of its own business activities.
636
 The difference 
between trading stock and a capital asset is that property held as trading stock lasts for one 
production process, where property held as a capital asset lasts for multiple production 
processes. 
 
In the event that the commercially exploited property right is a corporate (shareholding) 
interest, the aforementioned mutatis mutandis, in my view, holds true as well, since there 
seems to be no reason to analytically differentiate dependent on the nature of the respective 
property – i.e., tangible, intangible, or monetary. The nature of the property entitlement 
involved should not make a difference in qualifying it as a portfolio investment, trading stock, 
or capital asset. 
 
Tax consolidation allowed only when interest is held for business reasons 
 
Tax consolidation should only be allowed in scenarios where the parent company holds its 
corporate interest – which grants it decisive influence – for the purpose of employing it for the 
benefit of the underlying business enterprise on a continuing basis – i.e., the property rights 
last for more than one production process. The unitary business approach requires that the 
shareholding interest reflects the integration of the group of affiliate corporate entities into one 
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 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax 
policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), distinguishing between active income and 
passive income at 701 and section iii). 
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 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification’, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1996), at 1305-1310. 
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economic entity, operating a business enterprise. This requirement in my view is only met in 
the event that the interest is held as a capital asset. Only then is the corporate interest 
employed on a continual basis for the benefit of the business enterprise that is operated by 
the economic entity. 
 
The unitary business approach cannot be reconciled with a consolidation of corporate 
interests that are held as a portfolio investment or as trading stock. To that extent, there is no 
presence of a single economic entity operating a business enterprise. With respect to 
corporate interests held as a portfolio investment or trading stock, the function of the interests 
as security or merchandise has primary meaning. The underlying property or (business) 
activities of the corporate entity in which the interest is held is merely of secondary 
importance to the holder of the interest.  
 
Consequently, the tax consolidation of portfolio or trading stock interests should not be 
possible. The single taxation of corporate income should then be achieved through alternative 
means; see Chapter 5 at sections 4.4.3 and 6.4.2. Notably, the nature of the underlying 
property should not be of pivotal importance to identify the intention (motive) of the taxpayer 
employing its corporate interest. It merely provides for an indication of the taxpayer’s intention 
as the nature of the underlying property influences the interest’s liquidity.  
 
Motive tests in tax consolidation regimes uncommon in the international tax regime 
 
Not many states have adopted a motive test in their international tax system for the purpose 
of defining the group which is eligible to apply the tax consolidation regime; at least, I did not 
come across one in my research. Why is that? I would say basically because a motive test 
may be considered administratively inconvenient to apply in practice as the tax authorities will 
have to decide on the taxpayers’ intention.  
 
Substantially, the adoption of a motive test in the tax consolidation regime does not always 
seem very relevant for states to introduce, politically that is. Such is the case when things are 
seen from the perspective of securing corporate tax revenue. When there is no risk of losing 
tax revenue, there is no practical necessity to exclude majority interests in corporate entities 
that are held as trading stock or as a portfolio investment from the tax consolidation. This is 
true in the event that the company in which the interest is held is, in effect, subject to 
corporate tax in the respective tax jurisdiction. The consolidation of such an interest for 
corporate tax purposes does not lead to a loss of tax revenue. Indeed, the taxable entity does 
not correspond with the economic entity. But why bother? 
 
A side note; full tax liability requirement for tax consolidation rather than motive test in 
domestic scenario? 
 
Accordingly, one may expect the presence of a motive test in a tax consolidation regime when 
the risk of losing tax revenue appears for the tax jurisdiction involved. Let us address the 
matter as a side note to the current analysis. 
 
The risk of losing tax revenue may, for example, appear in a case where a corporate interest 
is held in an entity that is exempt from corporate tax. Notably, it needs to be said first that 
there may be a valid reason to exempt (corporate entities conducting) certain activities from 
corporate taxation. In this respect, one may think of charitable institutions and/or other entities 
conducting activities that benefit the public without having the objective of yielding a business 
profit. Such entities may not be taxed on the ground that they do not operate a business 
enterprise. Moreover, one may think of portfolio investment institutions similarly. Some states, 
such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland, exempt such institutions from corporate 
tax.
637
 Conceptually, there is nothing wrong with that. From a tax perspective, portfolio 
investment institutions conceptually do not have an independent stance. Investment institution 
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 The investment institutions in these countries that are eligible to be subject to the specific tax treatment are 
referred to as the ‘Vrijgestelde beleggingsinstelling’ and the ‘Fiscale beleggingsinstelling’ (the Netherlands), the 
‘Société d’Investissement à Capital Variable’ and the ‘Fonds Commun de Placement’ (Luxembourg) and the 
‘Common Contractual Fund’ (Ireland). These regimes are not further discussed. 
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regimes exist solely to meet the societal need for the availability of benefits of scale and the 
distribution of risks to small-time portfolio investors by means of an intermediary collective 
investment vehicle. The imposition of a corporate tax at the level of the intermediary would 
nullify this aim, as the tax cost at the level of the underlying portfolio investor holding its 
investment through the intermediary would increase in comparison with the tax cost for 
portfolio investors holding their investments directly. For the purpose of attaining tax neutrality 
between directly held portfolio investments and portfolio investments that are indirectly held, 
i.e., through an intermediary, investment institutions should be considered as ‘not present’ for 
corporate tax purposes. Technically, this may be arranged by considering the institution to be 
transparent (‘transparence fiscale’), exempting the taxable entity from tax (‘subject 
exemption’), exempting the proceeds from tax (‘base exemption’), or adopting a 0% tax rate. 
The fund management, of course, would need to be taxed on its profits derived from its fund 
management services rendered. 
 
Indeed, the adoption of such exemption regimes may result in some perhaps undesired side-
effects (arbitrage). The tax consolidation of exempt and taxed entities for corporate tax 
purposes would entail that taxable profits could be set off against exempt losses with the 
consequence of the taxable income remaining untaxed. Consequently, the risk of losing tax 
revenue would become apparent. This may trigger taxpayers to utilize tax avoidance 
arrangements. 
 
Typically however, rather than applying a motive test, states that have adopted tax exemption 
regimes commonly counter the aforementioned arbitrage effects by including provisions 
stipulating that only (fully) taxable entities are eligible to be part of a consolidated tax group. 
The Netherlands, for example, has adopted such a requirement on the basis of which tax 
exempt portfolio investment institutions, for example, cannot form a consolidated tax group 
with regularly taxed entities.
638
  
 
Applying the requirement that exempt entities are not eligible to become part of the 
consolidated tax group is administratively convenient. Moreover, an interest held in an exempt 
portfolio investment institution indicates that the holder’s intention is to hold the interest as a 
portfolio investment rather than as a capital asset. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s motive appears 
in an implicit manner.  
 
However, this approach is conceptually unsound as it does not cover all scenarios in which a 
unitary business is absent. Namely, the adoption of such a requirement entails that corporate 
entities in which the interest is directly held (i.e., without an investment institution as an 
intermediary), yet with the intention of holding it as a portfolio investment asset, would 
become eligible to be part of the consolidated tax group. Substantially, however, a corporate 
interest does not necessarily have to be held through a portfolio investment institution in order 
to qualify as a portfolio investment.
 
Corporate interests held as a portfolio investment may 
very well be held directly rather than through an intermediate portfolio investment institution. 
Consequently, when interests held as a portfolio investment or trading stock are consolidated, 
the taxable entity does not correspond with the economic entity. Market distortions may occur 
as a consequence of this.  
 
My impression is that states take this effect for granted in domestic scenarios, as it does not 
seem likely that tax revenue will diminish due to this. From the perspective of securing tax 
revenue, it suffices to adopt a rule providing that exempt entities are not eligible to become 
part of the consolidated tax group. Yet, the unitary business approach requires that each 
shareholders interest held as a portfolio investment (or as stock) should be excluded from tax 
consolidation. Not only when the interest is indirectly held via a portfolio investment institution. 
Accordingly, only a motive test would provide a conceptually sound outcome in this respect.
639
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 See Article 15 Dutch CITA. Under Dutch tax law entities subject to a special tax regime (e.g. exempt from tax, or 
subject to a 0% tax rate – and with that effectively tax exempt) are ineligible to be part of the consolidated tax group. 
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 Notably, the same would hold true for interests in tax exempt charitable institutions. The tax consolidation of such 
an interest would be disallowed under a motive test as such an interest would not be held as a capital asset. 
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Back to the present analysis; tax consolidation is typically unavailable in cross-border 
environments 
 
Let us return to the current analysis. Furthermore, of relevance for the current analysis is that 
nation states typically do not allow tax consolidation in cross-border scenarios – see also 
section 4.4.3. Cross-border tax consolidation is a rare phenomenon in the international tax 
regime.  
 
If the eligibility to form a consolidated tax group remains limited to (the) domestic (part of) 
groups, it follows that there is no practical need for introducing a motive test. This is true since 
no risk of losing tax revenue emerges as the tax consolidation only applies in domestic 
scenarios. By inference, this perhaps explains the common absence of motive tests in tax 
consolidation regimes. Notably, the distortive effects of disallowing cross-border tax 
consolidation are discussed hereunder in section 4.4.3. 
 
Motive tests are common in relation to correction mechanisms that operate across the 
tax-border 
 
Despite their absence in tax consolidation regimes, motive tests in themselves are not 
uncommon. They do exist. In practice motive tests are found with respect to the application of 
the alternative correction mechanisms referred to in the above section 3 of this chapter. 
Motive tests are made use of in those mechanisms whose scope of application – contrary to 
tax consolidation regimes – in effect typically does extend beyond the domestic tax borders. 
And in those cross-border scenarios, the possibility of tax avoidance emerges. In practice, 
this reality has often been countered by states on the basis of motive tests adopted within the 
context of their alternative ad hoc countermeasures. 
 
In this respect, one may look for the motive tests commonly applied with regard to 
participation exemption and indirect credit mechanisms, as well as interest deduction 
limitation and anti-deferral (controlled foreign company or ‘CFC’) mechanisms. These 
mechanisms basically seek to: 
 
a) achieve single taxation of active (i.e., business) income in the jurisdiction in which the 
income has been produced geographically, and; 
b) counter the sheltering of passive (i.e., portfolio investment) income in, or the arbitrary 
shifting of active income to, low-taxing jurisdictions.  
 
To attain these objectives, many states subject the application of these mechanisms to motive 
tests, amongst others. For example, the Netherlands denies the application of the 
participation exemption and switches over to an indirect credit mechanism with respect to 
proceeds from equity interests in (foreign) low-taxed companies that are held as a portfolio 
investment.
640
 Similar ‘switch-overs’ from exemption to credit can be found in the Austrian and 
German international tax systems.
641
  
 
Moreover, the various anti-deferral legislations adopting ‘look through’ or ‘deeming dividend 
receipts’ approaches, as a rule, apply in cross-border scenarios. That is, they apply where the 
controlling corporate interests involved are held in legal entities that are tax-established in 
low-taxing jurisdictions. Anti-deferral legislation typically applies when these controlling 
shareholdings are passively held, i.e., to shelter portfolio investment income from taxation.  
 
Anti-deferral regimes can, for example, be found in the tax legislation of the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Germany, Italy, Spain, Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan.
642
 Worth noting is that the US anti-deferral regime – i.e., the so-called Subpart F 
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 See Article 13, ninth indent, Dutch CITA. For some details see Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key 
practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit 
fiscal international (2011), at sections 1 and 3. 
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 See respectively §10(3) Austrian Corporate Tax Code and, e.g., §20 German AStG. 
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 See respectively Chapter IV of Part XVII of the United Kingdom’s Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (‘UK 
ICTA’), Subpart F (Controlled Foreign Corporations) US IRC, §32 Danish CTA, §1-8 of the Finnish Act on the 
Taxation of Shareholders in Controlled Foreign Companies (1217/1994), §§10-60 to 10-68 of the Norwegian TA, §§7-
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regime, referring to its location in the US tax legislation – under its original proposal in the 
1960s addressed both foreign source passive income and foreign source active income. The 
ratio originally was to uphold the export neutrality underlying the US international tax system 
regarding foreign source active income derived from foreign subsidiaries as well. However, as 
such a system would render the competitive position of the US multinationals’ overseas 
investment operations comparatively disadvantageous – i.e., the import neutrality argument – 
it was decided to limit the scope of the US Subpart F regime’s application to foreign source 
passive income.
643
 
 
By adopting motive tests with respect to the application of these alternative correction 
mechanisms, the respective tax legislators – to my impression – seek to express the intention 
of the parent company to establish or maintain the economic integration of the group of 
affiliate corporate entities into one business enterprise. 
 
When the taxpayers’ actual intention differentiates from the required motive of establishing or 
maintaining a business enterprise, the application of the correction-mechanism is triggered – 
e.g. interest deduction limitation, anti-deferral – or denied – e.g. participation exemption is 
disallowed and a credit mechanism is applied alternatively. Obviously, the required motive is 
absent in the event that it is intended to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. The same is true 
in the event that the corporate interest is held as a portfolio investment asset or for the 
purpose of trading it as stock. 
 
A notable exception: eligibility tests for combined reporting in US state taxation  
 
A notable exception may be found in the experiences in US state income taxation to define 
the unitary business for the purposes of establishing the eligibility tests for unitary 
combination.
644
 Notably, US state income taxation is extensively addressed in Chapter 6. 
 
For the purpose of drawing a line around the group of affiliated corporate bodies for US state 
income tax purposes US jurisprudence in this area provides a range of approaches,
645
 that is, 
even though a ‘bright line’ definition of a unitary business has not been established.
646
 
 
Worth addressing are the concepts of ‘three unities’ and ‘contribution or dependence’ that 
were developed in California. The California Supreme Court articulated its ‘three unities of 
ownership, operation and use test’ in Butler Bros.: “[I]t is in our opinion that the unitary nature 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 of the German Außensteuergesetz (‘German Foreign Transaction Tax Law’, or ‘German AStG’), Articles 167 and 
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Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-
General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 27-32, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The 
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 The paragraphs until the upcoming header have been drawn from Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether 
the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing 
Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 243, at 263-266. 
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 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 29. 
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of the appellant’s business is definitely established by the presence of the following 
circumstances: (1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of operation as evidenced by central 
purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions and (3) unity of use in its 
centralized executive force and general system of operation.”
647
 Under the ‘contribution and 
dependence test’ which was validated by the California Supreme Court in Edison Stores, 
unity exists “[i]f the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent 
upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state ...”
648
 
 
The US Supreme Court elaborated on the definition of the unitary business for state tax 
purposes in Mobil and Container. In Mobil the court focused on “functional integration, 
centralization of management, and economies of scale”.
649
 In Container, the court observed 
that a flow of goods between the corporate bodies involved is not necessary.
650
 Further to the 
common control, it is the ‘flow of value’ that counts: [t]he prerequisite to a constitutionally 
acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of goods.”
651
 The approach 
of the US Supreme Court looking at functional integration, centralization of management, and 
economies of scale is commonly referred to as the ‘modern test’.
652
 
 
Observing US state tax practices McLure and Weiner have suggested to define the unitary 
business basically by assessing whether there is common control and whether there are 
substantial amounts of transactions or economic interdependencies within the group: “[o]ne 
suggested approach is to ask [a] whether there is common ownership, [b] whether there are 
significant amounts of transactions or economic interdependence within the group, and [c] 
whether these could be so important that separate accounting could not be expected to give a 
reliable result [at least compared with formula apportionment].”
653
 
 
To my impression, the connecting factors in US state taxation share the purpose of 
establishing a more or less objective approach to identifying the underlying motive of the 
firm’s management of its controlling interests for active business reasons. That is to optimize 
profit through functional integration, creating interaffiliate economic interdependencies by 
engaging in intra-firm transactions thereby benefitting amongst others from economies of 
scale and scope. Accordingly, the question of whether the controlling interests involved have 
an active function in the firm’s overall business process seems to be of relevance in the end. 
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Motive test for tax consolidation to acknowledge the unitary business approach; ‘held 
as capital asset criterion’ 
 
The observations in the above seem to basically boil down to the position that a functional 
criterion should be introduced in the respective tax consolidation regime in order to respect 
the unitary business approach. This criterion should apply in addition to the decisive influence 
criterion mentioned in section 4.4.2.1. Notably, this analytically holds up in both purely 
domestic and cross-border scenarios.  
 
For this purpose of establishing such a functional criterion, one may think of introducing a 
‘held as capital asset’ test in the respective tax consolidation regime of the taxing state. Is the 
controlling shareholding held as a capital asset, i.e., for business reasons? If yes one would 
proceed to consolidate the corporate entities involved for taxation purposes. An alternative 
would be to adopt a ‘not held as trading stock’ criterion
654
 and a ‘not held as portfolio 
investment’ criterion.
655
 Moreover, such a functional approach may, for example, also be 
arranged as a tool to distribute the burden of proof between the taxpayer and the tax 
authorities.
656
 
 
Essentially, such an approach would reflect the notion of the firm deriving its economic rents 
through its internalization processes. The discovery of these processes for instance by 
reference to the presence of flows of value, economic interdependencies, and intra-group 
transactions would accordingly be used to verify the firm management’s objective of using its 
control to conduct an integrated business enterprise. That would subsequently identify the 
unitary business directing the tax consolidation of affiliate corporate bodies.  
 
Mandatory tax consolidation required to counter arbitrage 
 
In order to avoid arbitrary outcomes or ‘cherry-picking’ the tax consolidation should apply in 
jure rather than on request. The system would adopt a mandatory ‘all-in’ approach.
657
 The 
application of the mandatory tax consolidation regime may be attended by a declaratory 
resolution issued by the respective competent tax authorities (which would be available to 
litigate through the tax court system). That is for administrative convenience and legal 
certainty reasons. 
 
Indeed, matters are much similar to the in jure grouping of affiliates for value added tax 
(‘VAT’) purposes as currently available in the VAT-systems of several of the Member States 
of the European Union. Known as ‘VAT Grouping’, “each Member State may regard as a 
single taxable person any persons established in the territory of that Member State who, while 
legally independent, are closely bound to one another by financial, economic and 
organisational links.”
 658
 Accordingly, also in European Union value added taxation, the notion 
of the group as a single taxable entity appears. By treating the group as a single taxable 
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183
174 
 
entity, European Union value added taxation accordingly appreciates economic reality where 
the business activities of an aggregate of corporate entities are integrated financially, 
economically and organizationally into a single economic entity. 
 
Separate accounting where interests are held as trading stock or as a portfolio 
investment; tax cascading issues to be resolved outside the consolidation system 
 
Excluding tax consolidation with respect to shareholders’ interests held as trading stock or as 
a portfolio investment entails that the separate entity approach would be applied in those 
circumstances. Market distortions would be the consequence: economic double taxation on 
similar types of business income (e.g. portfolio investment yields). Value mutations of the 
underlying property may lead to taxable income at both the level of the corporate entity 
(taxpayer A) holding the property and the corporate entity (taxpayer B) holding the 
shareholders’ interest, i.e., tax cascading problems.  
 
Solutions for the distortive effects of the separate entity approach with respect to income from 
shareholders’ interests held as stock or as portfolio investments, from my perspective, should 
nevertheless be sought outside a tax consolidation regime. This issue is addressed in 
Chapter 5 at sections 4.4.3 and 6.4.2. 
 
4.4.2.3 Equivalent approach to decide on applicable fundamental freedom in primary 
European Union law? 
 
Perhaps an equivalent approach to decide on which of the fundamental freedoms 
applies 
 
It is worth mentioning that the adoption of a functional approach through such a ‘held as 
capital asset test’ in addition to the aforementioned ‘decisive influence test’ may also be of 
some use in answering the question of whether a particular case at hand would fall within the 
scope of application of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. That is, would the 
case involve a third country scenario.  
 
The relevance of this lies in the legal fact that the confines of European Union law regarding 
economic operators extend universally where the freedom of capital applies, while its confines 
are limited to economic operations within the territories of the European Union where the 
freedom of goods, services and establishment apply. Accordingly, the Member States are 
required to adhere to European Union law universally when the freedom of capital applies. 
Notably, the universal application of European Union law under the freedom of capital holds 
save for the application of the standstill provision and the justification grounds. The standstill 
provision sanctions distortive tax measures in place as at December 31, 1993. That is, in 
respect of direct investments; the standstill does not apply to tax measures regarding portfolio 
investments. 
 
 Some certainty as to the applicable freedom in third-country scenarios since FII 2 
 
Since the Court of Justice rendered its decision in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation – 
FII, some legal certainty seems to exist as regards applicable treaty freedom in third country 
situations.
659
 In FII 2 the Court of Justice adopts the following approach.  
 
 Tax measures whose subject matter is restricted to majority participations must be 
assessed as acts of establishment. These are exclusively governed by the freedom of 
establishment.
660
 This could involve regimes dealing with groups of affiliated 
corporate entities, such as tax grouping regimes or thin capitalization rules.  
                                                     
659
 See Court of Justice, case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation – FII 2). For an analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice involving the deciding on the applicable freedom, see Erwin Nijkeuter et al, ‘FII 2 
and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in Third Country Situations’, 22 EC Tax Review 250 (2013), at 250-257. 
660
 See Court of Justice, case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation – FII 2), Observation 91. 
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 Tax measures relating to portfolio investment interests, or measures relating to 
combating abuse, must be assessed as capital movements or the combating thereof. 
Such situations are exclusively governed by the free movement of capital.
661
 An 
example is the application of anti-abuse measures in respect of portfolio investments 
made through subsidiaries/companies in low-taxing jurisdictions, such as controlled 
foreign company regimes. Another example is the application of regimes that seek to 
counter dividend stripping operations.  
 Tax measures of general application must be assessed in light of the free movement 
of capital in third country situations.
662
 This applies to both minority and majority 
interests, and irrespective of the active or passive nature of the investment.’
663
 
 
The applicable freedoms of the advocated tax consolidation approach 
 
Transposing to the current analysis, the freedom of establishment would apply exclusively in 
scenarios where the shareholder has (a) a decisive influence and (b) holds its corporate 
interest as a capital asset. That is, in the scenarios where the tax system under the advocated 
approach would proceed to the tax consolidation. In the scenarios where the shareholder 
would not hold its majority interest with this intention, there would be room for applying the 
freedom of services – e.g. when the shares are held as trading stock or the freedom of capital 
– e.g. when the shares are held as a portfolio investment.  
 
Notably, in regards to the latter, i.e., the freedom of capital in passively held majority 
shareholdings, the standstill provision would possibly not apply. That is, as it only applies to 
‘direct investments’ under the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. This provision 
seems to adhere to the commercial definition of ‘direct investments’ i.e. as distinct from 
‘portfolio investments’.
664
 In line with this interpretation, the limitation of the standstill provision 
would only apply to investments in shareholdings held as business assets. The standstill 
provision would then not apply to majority shareholdings held for investment purposes, 
leading to the traditional distinction – as is also typically recognized in income and capital 
gains taxation – between passively held portfolio investments and actively held direct 
investment activities.
665
 
 
4.4.3 Remedying distortive effects in a cross-border context; subject group to 
unlimited tax liability and provide double tax relief by means of credit for 
domestic tax attributable to foreign income  
4.4.3.1 Typically no cross-border tax consolidation is available 
As briefly touched upon in section 4.2.2 of this chapter, nation states typically do not allow for 
cross-border tax consolidation.
666
 
 
There are just a few exceptions. In regards to nation states’ international tax systems, to my 
knowledge, only France (‘regime du bénéfice mondial consolidé’)
667
 and Italy (‘consolidato 
mondiale’)
668
 allow for full cross-border tax consolidation in some specific circumstances. A 
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 Ibidem, Observation 92. 
662
 Ibidem, Observation 104. 
663
 This paragraph has been drawn from Erwin Nijkeuter et al, ‘FII 2 and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in 
Third Country Situations’, 22 EC Tax Review 250 (2013), at 250-257 (republication permission co-author granted). 
664
 The Court of Justice also seems to make this distinction in its case law, for instance in cases C-282/04 and C-
283/04 (Cie/Nederland), Observation 19, the joined cases C-437/08 C-436/08 (Haribo & Salinen) and case C-194/06 
(Orange Small Cap Fund).  
665
 The analysis in Erwin Nijkeuter et al, ‘FII 2 and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in Third Country Situations’, 
22 EC Tax Review 250 (2013), at 257 concludes as follows: “It seems that the broader justification grounds in third 
country situations and, of course, the standstill provision will be given more prominence. As regards the standstill 
provision, we believe that the shareholder’s reason for investing in a shareholding will prove to be relevant. Is the 
shareholding interest held as a portfolio investment (no standstill) or is it held for business purposes (possibly 
standstill)? Such a distinction could produce interesting case law. We will follow developments with interest.” 
666
 See also Andreas Oestreicher et al, ‘How to Reform Taxation of Corporate Groups in Europe’, 3 World Tax 
Journal 5 (2011), at 5-38. 
667
 See Article 209 quinquies French CGI. France has adopted an optional ‘all-in’ or ‘all-out’ approach. 
668
 See Articles 130-142 Italian Tax Code. Italy applies an optional ‘all-in’ or ‘all-out’ approach as well.  
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further notable exception can be found in US state income taxation where the practice of 
combined reporting as a rule extends across US interstate tax-borders, allowing interstate tax 
grouping within the US Notably, some US states even allow for worldwide combined 
reporting, a concept known as ‘worldwide unitary combination’. That concept allows groups to 
form a worldwide tax group, accordingly extending the concept of tax grouping across the US 
nation state’s tax-borders also. The concept of unitary combination is extensively discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
 
To the extent that tax consolidation is made available, nation states typically only allow for 
such a tax grouping to the extent that the group companies involved qualify as resident 
taxpayers in the respective taxing state. That is, foreign group companies are generally 
ineligible to become part of the consolidated tax group. This is, for example, the case in 
Australia,
 669
 New Zealand,
 670
 Japan
671
 and the United States
672
 (see scenarios 1 to 3 
hereunder).  
 
Alternatively, the tax consolidation does apply in regards to foreign tax resident group 
companies, but only to the extent that:  
 
a) these foreign companies are subject to domestic corporate tax due to the presence of 
a permanent establishment in the respective tax jurisdiction that is applying the 
consolidation regime, and;  
b) the shareholders’ interest in the underlying group company is attributable to that 
permanent establishment on the basis of a functional and factual analysis. 
 
Examples of the latter approach may be found in the international tax systems of 
Luxembourg
673
 and the Netherlands
674
 (see scenarios 4 to 6 hereunder).
675
 The Court of 
Justice shows evidence to support allowance by the Member States to limit the scope of 
application of their tax grouping regimes regarding foreign tax resident corporate bodies to the 
business proceeds these derive through permanent establishments situated in the respective 
territories of the taxing Member State involved.
676
 
 
Notably, this holds up, save for the exceptions of France and Italy which, as previously stated, 
have adopted optional (‘all-in’ or ‘all-out’) worldwide tax consolidation regimes in their 
international tax systems. However, the formation of cross-border consolidated tax groups 
under the French and Italian tax consolidation regimes is only possible to the extent that the 
ultimate parent company is respectively a French or Italian resident taxpayer.
677
 France and 
Italy do not allow non-resident parent companies to be part of the cross-border consolidated 
tax group.  
 
Under the concept of worldwide unitary combination in US state taxation, the worldwide tax 
grouping concept extends to both foreign, i.e., out of US nation state subsidiary companies 
and foreign, i.e., non-US parent companies.
678
 The US Supreme Court has constitutionally 
approved the adoption by the US states of worldwide unitary combination regarding both 
foreign parents and foreign subsidiaries.
679
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 See Divisions 703 (Consolidated groups and their members) and 719 (MEC groups) Australian IITA. 
670
 See Section FM 31 New Zealand ITA. 
671
 See Article 4-2 Japanese CTL. 
672
 See §1504 (Consolidated Returns) US IRC. 
673
 See Article 164bis Luxembourg ITL. 
674
 See Article 15 Dutch CITA. 
675
 Germany adopts similar requirements re the application of its ‘Organschaft’ (profit pooling) regime. See §18 
German Corporate Tax Code. Accordingly, the German ‘Organschaft’ does not allow for cross-border profit pooling 
(contrary to its Austrian counterpart in §9 Austrian Corporate Tax Code). 
676
 See Court of Justice case C-337/08 (X Holding) and for a comparison case C‑18/11 (Philips Electronics). 
677
 See respectively Article 209 quinquies French CGI and Articles 130-142 Italian Tax Code. 
678
 See for extensive analyses of the concept of Worldwide Unitary Combination Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The 
State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984). 
679
 The US Supreme Court constitutionally sanctioned worldwide unitary combination in Container Corp. v. Franchise 
Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983). Worldwide unitary combination for US corporations having non-US affiliates (both 
non-U.S. subsidiaries and non-US parents) has been sanctioned by the US Supreme Court in Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
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4.4.3.2 Categorizing the ineligibilities to cross-border tax consolidation 
 
 Effects when only resident taxpayers are eligible to form a tax consolidated group 
 
Where nation states only allow for the formation of consolidated tax groups to the extent that 
the string of group companies qualifies as resident taxpayers in the respective taxing state, 
the following scenarios are unavailable: 
 
1. The tax consolidation of resident taxpayer parent companies with resident taxpayer 
sub-subsidiaries (group companies) in the event that the intermediate shareholding 
company has its tax residency outside the respective taxing state’s territory;
680
 
2. The tax consolidation of same-tier resident taxpayer group companies (‘sister 
companies’) in the event that their mutual (ultimate) parent company has its tax 
residence outside the respective taxing state’s territory, and;
681
 
3. The tax consolidation of a parent company or subsidiary having its tax residence 
outside the respective taxing state’s territory (foreign group companies). 
 
Effects when only non-resident taxpayers are eligible to form a tax consolidated 
group, save for the meeting of the permanent establishment threshold 
 
Where nation states enable tax consolidation of foreign group companies, but only to the 
extent that these companies are subject to corporate tax in the respective tax jurisdiction that 
is applying the consolidation regime, the following scenarios are unavailable: 
 
4. The tax consolidation of resident taxpayer parent companies with resident taxpayer 
sub-subsidiaries (group companies) in the event that the intermediate shareholding 
company: 
o has its tax residence outside the respective taxing state’s territory, and; 
o does not conduct business in the taxing state through a permanent 
establishment to which the shareholders’ interest in the underlying resident 
taxpayer group company is attributable. 
5. The tax consolidation of same-tier resident taxpayer group companies with their 
mutual (ultimate) parent company in the event that this parent company: 
o has its tax residence outside the respective taxing state’s territory; and 
o does not conduct business in the taxing state through a permanent 
establishment to which the shareholders’ interest in the underlying resident 
taxpayer group companies (sister companies) is attributable. 
6. The tax consolidation of a parent company or subsidiary having its tax residence 
outside the respective taxing state’s territory (foreign group companies) without a 
permanent establishment situated within the taxing state’s territory to which the 
shareholders’ interest is attributable. 
 
4.4.3.3 Eligibility depends on tax residence and investment location; differential upon 
tax-border crossing 
 
Differentials in tax-treatment are based on residence and investment location 
 
                                                     
680
 The Court of Justice has ruled this limitation to be incompatible with the fundamental freedoms under European 
Union law in cases falling within the confines of the TFEU; see Court of Justice cases C-39/13 (SCA Group Holding 
BV), C-40/13 (X AG), and C-41/13 (MSA International Holdings BV). The Court of Justice has ruled such a limitation 
incompatible with EU law also in analytically similar cases. See Court of Justice, cases C-418/07 (Papillon) and C-
80/12 (Felixstowe). For some further reading and analyses on cross-border tax grouping in EU law, see Bruno da 
Silva, ‘From Marks & Spencer to X Holding: The Future of Cross-Border Group Taxation in the European Union’, 39 
Intertax 257, (2011, No. 5), at 257-265. 
681
 Ibidem. 
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In the aforementioned six cross-border scenarios, tax consolidation is not allowed with 
respect to the group’s foreign source business income to the extent that the group of affiliated 
corporate entities conducts its foreign source business activities abroad through foreign tax 
resident group companies.  
 
Notably, even Italy and France, which do allow for cross-border consolidated tax grouping, 
limit the application of their tax consolidation regimes to foreign subsidiaries, rather than also 
including foreign parent companies. As said, foreign parent companies are ineligible to be 
part of the French or Italian consolidated tax group. By disallowing the formation of 
consolidated tax groups in these cross-border scenarios, states do not adopt the unitary 
business approach with respect to the cross-border (and/or intra-European Union) business 
activities of groups of affiliated corporate entities. Instead, the separate entity approach is 
maintained in those cases. 
 
Limitations effectively entail a distortive base exemption of foreign source profit… 
 
Substantially, by disallowing the formation of consolidated cross-border tax groups, the 
group’s foreign source business income is excluded from the domestic corporate tax base 
substantially through a ‘base exemption for foreign income’.
682
  
 
Under a base exemption the market distortions imposed under the separate entity approach 
are maintained.
683
 The aggregation of business losses and profits realized by the respective 
group companies is not allowed, for example. Cross-border loss offset is unavailable. This 
results in (liquidity) disadvantages for the internationally active group in comparison with 
purely domestic scenarios where tax consolidation is possible.
684
 See for some comparison 
the example of Quincy’s Records Company in Chapter 3 and the analyses in sections 2.4.2, 
2.4.4, as well as 4.2 and 5.3.2 of that chapter. Analytically, the effects are the same. A 
noteworthy exception in this respect is Denmark, whose international tax system (upon 
request) allows for the pooling of income realized by domestic and foreign group companies 
(both foreign parents as well as subsidiaries; the all-in approach) under its ‘international joint 
taxation’ regime.
685
 I understand that a ‘claw-back’ mechanism applies under the Danish 
international tax system for the purpose of ensuring single taxation.
686
 
 
In addition to not making cross-border profit pooling available, intra-group transactions are 
recognized for corporate tax purposes.
687
 This, for example, leads to the imposition of exit 
taxes on cross-border intra-group asset transfers. (Liquidity) disadvantages are the necessary 
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 Corporate entities having their tax residence outside a taxing jurisdiction and without having a permanent 
establishment situated within that respective taxing jurisdiction’s territory are excluded from corporate taxation. 
Corporate entities having their tax residence outside a taxing jurisdiction, but nevertheless having a permanent 
establishment situated within that respective taxing jurisdiction’s territory are excluded from corporate taxation to the 
extent that the business income has been earned outside that respective taxing jurisdiction’s territory (or, at least, to 
the extent that the income cannot be attributed to that permanent establishment). That is, a differential in tax 
treatment solely on the basis of the respective corporate taxpayer’s tax place of residence. 
683
 This is true with respect to all (substantial) applications of the base exemption methodology. That is, including the 
application of a base exemption for business income realized abroad through a permanent establishment or head 
office as well as the application of a base exemption to business income realized abroad through a non-resident 
group company. 
684
 See also Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy’, 
38 Intertax 281 (2010), at section 8 and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach 
towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), at section 3. 
685
 See §31A Danish CTA. It should be noted that Austria also allows for cross-border profit pooling under its 
‘Organschaft’ (profit pooling) regime laid down in §9 Austrian Corporate Tax Code. Yet, contrary to its Danish 
counterpart, cross-border profit pooling is only enabled under the Austrian ‘Organschaft’ to the extent that it concerns 
profits realized abroad through foreign subsidiaries (Austria enables an optional profit pooling on a per subsidiary 
basis). Profits realized abroad by foreign parent companies are excluded from the Austrian profit pooling regime. As 
with the Danish system, the Austrian regime contains a ‘claw-back mechanism’ implemented for the purpose of 
ensuring single taxation: the foreign losses are recaptured if these losses are available to be utilized abroad by way 
of a local loss carry-back or carry forward. 
686
 See §31A Danish CTA. 
687
 Again, it should be noted that this holds true with the exception of proceeds from shareholding interests in group 
companies, with respect to which a participation exemption or indirect credit mechanism applies in conjunction with 
the application of a dividend withholding tax exemption (or a 0% rate on dividend distributions). 
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consequence. These effects have already been addressed analytically in sections 3.2.4.2, 
3.2.4.4, 3.4.3 and 3.5.3.3 . Again, the issues are analytically identical. 
 
… producing inequities and inefficiencies in the international tax system of the 
respective state 
 
In the aforementioned six cross-border scenarios, the single taxation of the group’s business 
income is not achieved in an equitable and tax-efficient manner.
688
 The limited scope of 
application of the respective states’ tax consolidation regimes in scenarios 1 to 6 entails that 
multinationals that are economically present within a taxing state and taxed on that basis 
accordingly are subject to a different corporate tax burden in that state relative to purely 
domestic scenarios. The different domestic burden imposed is dependent on the question of 
whether: 
 
 The place of residence of the respective group companies lies within or outside the 
borders of the respective taxing state’s territory, and/or; 
 The business activities of the group are solely performed within the respective taxing 
state’s territory, or spread across various states. 
 
Despite the reality that groups of affiliated companies operating a business enterprise in 
today’s emerging global market are comparable from a business economics perspective, 
irrespective of whether the business activities are performed in a cross-border or purely 
domestic context,
689
 they are nevertheless subject to a different domestic corporate tax 
burden. By doing so, the tax legislation in the respective taxing states distorts the decision of 
groups of companies as to whether or not to conduct business activities in a cross-border 
context. Cross-border business activities are made less attractive in comparison with their 
non-cross-border equivalents. This is unfair. An alternative is therefore required. 
 
4.4.3.4 Fairness requires worldwide cross-border tax-consolidation akin to worldwide 
unitary combination 
 
Worldwide tax consolidation; treating the multinational firm as a single taxable entity 
 
The concept of fairness in corporate taxation as developed in Chapter 2 calls for consistent 
adoption of the unitary business approach, and hence allowing for tax-consolidation to 
appreciate the economic entity to constitute the taxable entity. The concept of fairness within 
the international tax system of a nation state as developed in Chapter 3 calls for the tax 
consolidation in both domestic and cross-border scenarios (‘worldwide consolidation’).  
 
Following precedents in France, Italy and US state income taxation, nation states should 
enable multinational groups of companies to form cross-border consolidated tax groups. But 
contrary to the French and Italian regimes that only allow for the consolidation of foreign 
subsidiaries, tax consolidation should be applied in jure with respect to all group companies 
(‘all-in-approach’) irrespective of their place of tax residence, i.e., including foreign parent 
companies. That would accordingly produce an approach conceptually akin to the concept of 
unitary worldwide combination as traditionally found in US state income taxation. 
 
As argued in section 4.4.2, the tax consolidation of subsidiaries should occur to the extent 
that the ultimate parent company has a decisive influence on the underlying business 
activities (see section 4.4.2.1) and holds its corporate interest as a capital asset (see section 
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 Contra Court of Justice, case C-337/08 (X Holding). The Court of Justice does not recognize an infringement of 
the freedom of establishment regarding the Dutch tax consolidation regime not allowing tax consolidation as in 
scenarios 4 to 6. See Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the 
Proportionality Test’,19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). 
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 See for a comparison Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the 
Proportionality Test’,19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010). Contra Court of Justice, case C-337/08 (X Holding) in which the 
court recognizes a difference in circumstances as a consequence of the differential tax treatment of domestic and 
cross-border scenarios under the application of the double tax conventions involved. 
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4.4.2.2). That would effectively entail the treatment for corporate tax purposes of the 
multinational firm as the taxable entity. 
 
 Full pass-through taxation of group companies 
 
The subsidiaries included in the tax consolidation would basically become transparent for 
corporate tax purposes in a manner comparable to the transparency of disregarded affiliated 
entities that achieved branch status under the US’s ‘check the box’ regulations. Further, the 
approach is much like the tax-transparency treatment of partnerships in the international tax 
regime. The mandatory element in the advocated approach would accordingly render such a 
full pass-through corporate taxation of both domestic and foreign group companies to become 
the default approach rather than the exception to the rule.
690
  
 
4.4.3.5 Worldwide taxation in the event of a domestic nexus; double tax relief in the 
form of a credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income regarding a 
foreign nexus 
 
 Same approach as advocated in Chapter 3 
 
Adhering to the building blocks for an internally equitable and production factor neutral 
international tax system as advocated in Chapters 2 and 3, the group would need to be 
subject to an unlimited corporate tax liability in each tax jurisdiction in which it exceeds a 
minimum threshold of economic activity. That is, the multinational firm would be fully liable to 
corporation tax in each jurisdiction in which it operates a business.  
 
The multinational firm’s unlimited tax liability within a tax jurisdiction would arise when the 
taxable entity involved has nexus by conducting a business activity within the territories of the 
respective tax jurisdiction. The threshold of a minimum economic presence has then been 
met. Due to the current lack of adequate alternatives to locate the geographic ‘source’ of 
business income in practice, the advocated approach would link up with the currently 
generally applied source concepts like the concept of permanent establishment and the place 
of effective management.
691
 Notably however, the worldwide taxation as advocated in this 
study is not inextricably linked to the permanent establishment and place of effective 
management thresholds to establish nexus. Nexus expressions in the international tax regime 
are discussed as a separate matter in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                     
690
 Contra Wolfgang Schön, ‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I)’, 1 World Tax Journal 67 
(2009), at 67 et seq., and Wolfgang Schön, ‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part II)’, 2 
World Tax Journal 65 (2010), at 68. Schön takes the position that a full pass-through taxation of foreign subsidiaries 
does not make sense. I respectfully disagree. As a first argument to denounce pass-through taxation, Schön refers to 
the universal acceptance of the separate entity approach. I however do not see why the separate entity approach 
would have to be accepted merely because of its current status quo in international taxation. The separate entity 
approach is just one of the (many) problems in the international tax regime that faces countries attempting to 
adequately tax multinationals. Referring to its common application in practice for the purpose of denouncing an 
alternative does not seem to make sense. That is throwing in the towel. As addressed in the introduction to this study 
legal instruments should not be considered valid or right by simply pointing at their existence. Legal systems 
including international tax systems are man-made intellectual achievements. They can be shaped, formed and 
altered to our wishes. If one establishes a rule that does not function properly the response should be to start thinking 
of an alternative that does work – rather than pointing at the status quo of the flawed rule involved. Moreover, as a 
second argument, Schön refers to the gap that would otherwise emerge between domestic group companies 
(taxation on an individual basis) and foreign group companies (pass-through taxation). This gap would become too 
striking. In my view, the domestic and cross-border scenarios should be tax-treated alike. Provided that this would be 
achieved no gap would emerge in the first place, as the pass-through taxation mechanism would be applied to both 
domestic and foreign group companies. 
691
 One may also consider in this respect the alternative expressions of the source concepts currently in place in the 
international tax regime, such as the place where the immovable property is situated, the place where the company 
paying the dividends has its effective place of management, or the place where the interest and royalties arise. With 
respect to source taxes levied on portfolio dividend, interest and royalty payments one may think of crediting them 
against corporate tax levied. These issues however exceed the scope of this chapter and will therefore not be further 
discussed in detail. Notably, the subject of attributing tax base to taxing jurisdictions (nexus and allocation) is 
extensively dealt with in Chapter 6. 
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 No differences in tax burden upon tax-border crossing  
 
The ultimate parent company would accordingly be subject to corporate taxation as soon as 
the group, irrespective of the place of its corporate seat, operates its commercial activities 
within a tax jurisdiction, e.g., through a fixed place of business or a place of management. As 
the respective taxing state would subject the parent company to unlimited tax liability it would 
tax the group on its worldwide business income earned. As a result of this, corporate seats 
would cease to be of any relevance for the purpose of levying corporate tax. The system 
would operate devoid of discriminatory obstacles. 
 
To appreciate the sovereignty of states in the field of direct taxation and to acknowledge the 
single tax principle as well, the adoption of a fair double tax relief mechanism would be 
required regarding the multinational’s foreign business income items. To achieve internal 
equity and production factor neutrality regarding both cross-border business activities and 
purely domestic business activities, the double tax relief method would need to be the (per 
country) ‘credit for domestic tax that is attributable to the foreign income’ in conjunction with 
the ‘recapture of foreign losses methodology’ and the ‘carry forward of foreign profits 
methodology’. That is, the Dutch-style double tax relief method as elaborated upon in Chapter 
3.
 692
 
 
The application of this double tax relief mechanism as demonstrated in the previous chapter 
renders irrelevant the question of whether the taxable entity’s business income has been 
generated across various tax jurisdictions. The domestic corporate tax burden imposed would 
not alter upon a change of tax jurisdiction. Finally, as a complementary measure, withholding 
taxation on intra-group dividend distributions, as well as intra-group interest and intra-group 
royalty payments, would need to be abolished as well, i.e., to secure single taxation under the 
single tax principle. 
 
4.4.3.6 Advocated system in treaty scenarios; administrative assistance called for 
The advocated taxing system could be implemented to apply in jure in scenarios falling within 
the scope of application of a nation state’s double tax convention network, or within the 
confines of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union – the latter regarding intra-
European Union investment, that is. In such cases, the advocated approach could be made to 
apply on the basis of the reciprocity principle. Accordingly, things could apply in a manner 
similar to that as set forth in section 3.5.5.4. 
 
Similar to the remarks made in section 3.5.5.4, the proper operation of the advocated system 
would require the implementation of various administrative tools in support of that system. 
Taxpayers, for instance, would need to be required to provide information on their cross-
border business activities. Intensive mutual administrative assistance and cooperation 
between states would need to be made available. Legal remedies, like international arbitration 
procedures, would need to be introduced. The presence of accompanying administrative 
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 There is some practical experience with the technical consequences of applying a cross-border tax consolidation, 
for example in the Netherlands as the former (pre 2003) tax consolidation regime – to a certain extent – allowed for 
the consolidation of non-Dutch tax resident companies. The consolidation of non-Dutch resident companies was 
possible, save for meeting the requirement that these companies were incorporated under Dutch company law. In 
this respect, reference can be made to Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 16 March 1994, No. 27 764, Beslissingen 
in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1994/191, Dutch Supreme Court, 29 June 1988, No. 24 738, 
Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1988/331, Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 13 
November 1996, No 31 008, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1998/47, and Dutch 
Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 3 February 2012, No 10/05383, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse 
Belastingrechtspraak 2012/126. Possible technical double-tax treaty complications of cross-border tax consolidation 
are left out of consideration. See on this matter Frank P.G. Pötgens et al, ‘Cross-border Fiscal Unities and Tax 
Treaties: Nothing New under the Sun?’, 42 Intertax 92 (2014), at 92-105, and C. van Raad, ‘Internationale aspecten 
van het herziene regime inzake de fiscale eenheid’, 129 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 85 (2000). For some analysis in 
conceptually equivalent matters – i.e., re the compatibility of CFC regulations with double tax conventions – see 
Michael Lang, ‘CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties’, 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 51 (2003), at 
51-58. Note that double tax treaty implications should be irrelevant in scenarios falling within the scope of application 
of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. The reason for this is that the international tax systems of the 
European Union Member States (i.e. both their domestic tax legislation and their double tax treaty network) are 
subordinate to supranational European Union law. 
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mechanisms would be of significant importance. These provisions would need to be made 
available in the respective states’ international tax systems. One may think of the 
administrative provisions in domestic legislations and double tax convention networks 
involved, as well as the Mutual Assistance Directive and Arbitration Convention in a European 
Union context.  
 
Indeed, this may lead to administrative difficulties. However, practical challenges should not 
necessarily be insurmountable. At the end of the day, it is the required willingness of nation 
states to assist each other administratively that may prove to be the bottleneck for a the 
approach to function properly, as advocated in the above. In the event that a system adhering 
to the advocated approach would lead to practical problems in assessing the corporate tax – 
e.g. if practice would show that the relevant information for determining the taxpayer’s tax 
position is not made available – the solution to that problem would need to be sought by 
improving international administrative assistance. And as mentioned already in section 
3.5.5.4, the recent developments in ‘country-by-country reporting’ show evidence of a trend 
towards an international consensus on the need for global transparency in tax administrative 
matters. 
 
Moreover, the potential for administrative problems would not render the advocated approach 
analytically invalid. Indeed, the Court of Justice, for instance, does not recognize 
administrative difficulties, such as a lack of information on the foreign income of taxpayers, as 
grounds to justify obstacles imposed by European Union Member States regarding intra-
European Union economic activity.
693
 In these cases the court consistently rejects this 
argument by pointing out that relevant information can be obtained on the basis of the Mutual 
Assistance Directive, for instance. 
 
4.4.3.7 Switch-over to credit mechanism to counter potential for tax-abuse 
The possibility under the advocated approach of an allowance for a sheltering of passive 
income in a foreign low-tax jurisdiction may be countered by making use of a switch-over 
mechanism to the credit method.
694
 To tackle the potential for tax abuse beforehand, the relief 
system would switch-over to the commonly applied credit for foreign tax method, rather than 
operate the Dutch-style double tax relief mechanism advocated, which I elaborated on in the 
above. The switch-over would accordingly be based on anti-tax abuse considerations.
695
 The 
mechanism could operate as an indirect credit mechanism, e.g., by reference to a typical 
look-through approach taxing the sheltered passive investments directly, or by reference to a 
mark-to-market valuation of the shareholding interests held in the legal entities involved in 
which the portfolio investments are sheltered.
696
 
 
The switch-over could be made available in cases where neither a double tax convention nor 
the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union applies. The switch-over could apply on the 
basis of a motive test. Inspiration for designing such a motive test can be found in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice as developed in its Cadbury Schweppes and Part 
Service rulings.
697
 In that event, the switch-over to the direct credit mechanism would apply 
regarding artificial arrangements lacking economic substance set up with the intention of 
escaping the domestic corporate tax normally payable.
698
 The switch-over could be combined 
                                                     
693
 See e.g. Court of Justice, cases C-101/05 (Swedish A) and C-446/04 (FII), as well as (joined) cases C-437/08 and 
C-436/08 (Haribo & Salinen), and C‑72/09 (Rimbaud). 
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 See on anti-abuse rules generally and particularly in respect of the anti-abuse clause in the European 
Commission’ s CCCTB proposal, Peter Harris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or Russian Roulette?’, in 
Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012), at 271-297.  
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 Cf. Court of Justice, case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes). Contra Court of Justice, case C-403/03 (Egon 
Schempp). 
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 The latter approach e.g., is adopted in the Netherlands international tax system; see Article 13a Dutch CITA. 
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 See Court of Justice, cases C-196/04 (Cadbury) and C-425/06 (Part Service). 
698
 See on anti-abuse rules generally, and particularly re the anti-abuse clause in the European Commission’ s 
CCCTB proposal, Peter Harris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or Russian Roulette?’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), 
CCCTB Selected Issues (2012), at 271-297.  
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with a ‘subject to a reasonable tax clause’.
699
 Were the taxpayer involved to demonstrate that 
its passive income abroad is subject to a reasonable tax, the switch-over would not kick in. 
That is, as in such a case it may be considered verified that the motive for dodging 
corporation tax liabilities would be absent. 
 
Adhering to the principle of administrative convenience, the switch-over mechanism could be 
combined with a rule placing the burden of proof, i.e., the burden of providing conclusive 
evidence in support of the position of not engaging into a tax sheltering, at the level of the 
taxpayer invoking the double tax relief. The merits of introducing a switch-over mechanism to 
tackle potential abuse under the approach as advocated up until this point in the current 
analysis is not further discussed, as this study, in the end, advocates a destination basis profit 
allocation mechanism. That would resolve the tax sheltering issue conceptually via an 
alternative means.
700
 
 
4.5 Consequences  
4.5.1 Weighing the pros and cons: the pros 
4.5.1.1 The system would enhance fairness  
 
The system would be fair as the tax burden of multinational firms would be indifferent 
to legal organization, tax residence and investment direction 
 
The unlimited corporate tax liability of multinational firms that are economically present within 
the respective tax jurisdiction in conjunction with a ‘credit for domestic tax that is attributable 
to the foreign income’ would entail fairness within the corporate tax system of a state. The tax 
treatment of firms would be brought up to the exact same level in both cross-border and non-
cross-border (i.e., purely domestic) scenarios. 
 
The intra-firm legal organization of business affairs would become immaterial for corporate 
tax calculation purposes. Such an approach would remove all distortions that are currently 
caused by the commonly adopted approach of treating each group company as a single 
taxable entity for corporate tax purposes. Also the residency of the taxable entity would be 
rendered immaterial for tax purposes. Corporate tax burden and revenue levels would not be 
influenced by the multinationals’ legal structuring or the question of whether business is 
conducted in a domestic or cross-border context. It would fully appreciate the neutrality of the 
legal form. This perhaps requires some clarification. 
 
4.5.1.2 The system would be obstacle-free 
First, an international tax system as proposed would not lead to any obstacles imposed with 
respect to the corporate taxation of multinationals as addressed in the first and third chapter 
of this study.
701
 The domestic corporate tax levied on the group’s business income would be 
the same under all circumstances. It would promote internal equity and production factor 
neutrality. 
 
The advocated approach would resolve the following current issues in the international tax 
regime: 
 
                                                     
699
 See for a comparison Vogel’s remarks on introducing a subject to tax clause in Klaus Vogel, ‘Which Method 
Should the European Community Adopt for the Avoidance of Double Taxation?’, 56 Bulletin for International Taxation 
4 (2002), at 6. 
700
 Notably, under the CFC-rules in the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), no credit is granted for the tax paid by the 
controlled foreign company. Under the advocated approach an indirect credit would become available, though. 
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 See for a comparison Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach towards the 
Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), at 170-182, at section 7. 
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 The corporate seat of the group would not entail any differences in corporate tax 
treatment. Therefore, discrimination issues would not arise; see section 5.3 of 
Chapter 3 for some comparison;  
 It would not make any difference whether the group realizes its business profits solely 
within one tax jurisdiction or spread across various tax jurisdictions. The way in which 
the production factor movements are directed – i.e., inward bound or outward bound 
– would have no influence whatsoever on the tax burden in the respective taxing 
state. Jurisdiction entry and jurisdiction exit restriction issues would accordingly not 
arise; see section 5.3.1 of Chapter 3 for some comparison;  
 The aggregation of losses and profits realized by the various (foreign) affiliates of the 
same group within the tax year would be enabled – i.e., cross-border horizontal loss 
compensation. Liquidity disadvantages would not arise since the legal transactions 
between the affiliates would be treated for corporate tax purposes on par with the 
economically equivalent internal dealings between the branches of a single entity, 
i.e., tax parity of intra-firm inter-entity transactions and intra-firm intra-entity dealings; 
see section 5.3.2 of Chapter 3 for some comparison; 
 Intra-firm cross-border asset movements would not lead to the immediate imposition 
of exit taxes on hidden reserves. Foreign source income items would be kept outside 
the domestic tax base both in an effective and economically efficient manner; see 
section 5.3.3 of Chapter 3 for some comparison; 
 In scenarios falling within the scope of the Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union, such an international tax system would be in full compliance with the freedom 
of establishment; see section 6.1 of Chapter 3 for some comparison.  
 The unlimited corporate tax liability for groups in conjunction with a ‘credit for 
domestic tax that is attributable to the foreign income’ would have consistently 
resolved the conceptual challenges that the Court of Justice was faced with in, for 
example, the Futura and X Holding cases; see section 6.2 of Chapter 3 for some 
comparison.
702
 
 
4.5.1.3 The system would operate invariantly regarding the legal organization of the 
firm; no paper profit shifting incentives through intra-firm legal structuring 
Second, under the advocated approach, the legal structuring of the business activities of the 
group would cease to have any influence on the territorial allocation of the group’s business 
profits. Under all circumstances, the profit allocation would take place on the basis of the two-
step analysis as developed by the OECD with respect to the allocation of profits realized 
through permanent establishments. Notably, profit allocation, as stated above, is addressed 
as a separate issue in Chapter 6. 
 
The neutralization of legal realities within the group of affiliated corporate entities would entail 
that the distortions caused by the separate entity approach would dissolve. Hence, the 
treating of the group as the taxable entity for corporate tax purposes would render the 
adoption of the ad hoc measures or ‘halfway solutions’ mentioned in the above section 3.1.4 
of this chapter superfluous. Specifically, one may think of measures countering the distortive 
effects that are caused by: 
 
1. The arbitrary differences in corporate tax treatment between intra-group debt 
and equity financing arrangements; 
2. The arbitrary differences in corporate tax treatment between income realized out 
of business activities conducted through branches (permanent establishments) 
and (non-consolidated (foreign)) group companies; 
3. The arbitrary jurisdictional mismatches with respect to the territorial allocation of 
(financing) costs and (business) earnings. 
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 See Court of Justice, cases C-250/95 (Futura) and C-337/08 (X Holding). Contra, Court of Justice, case C-527/06 
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Ad. 1. Neutralizing arbitrage involving intra-firm financing arrangements 
 
The unlimited tax liability of groups in conjunction with a credit for domestic tax attributable to 
foreign income would entail that all intra-group financing arrangements would be disregarded 
for the purpose of levying corporate tax. Accordingly, the current arbitrary differences in 
corporate tax treatment between intra-firm debt and equity financing transactions would be 
resolved as the corporate tax treatment of such arrangements would be identical (i.e., non-
existent for corporate tax purposes).  
 
Traditionally, internal debt financing arrangements within a single corporate entity, i.e., 
between a permanent establishment and its head office, is not recognized for the purpose of 
allocating corporate profits to tax jurisdictions. Notional interest between a permanent 
establishment and its head office is non-deductible and non-taxable. An impairment of 
notional debt receivables is impossible. With regards to notional debt financing arrangements, 
this is, for example, current international tax law in the Netherlands.
703
 To my knowledge, the 
same holds true in many international tax systems with respect to internal equity financing. A 
notional shareholding between the head office and its permanent establishment is not 
recognized for corporate tax purposes. 
 
Non-recognition of intra-firm financing makes economic sense 
 
In my view, such an approach makes sense economically. Internal financing arrangements 
between the head office and a permanent establishment do not affect the overall business 
profit realized by the respective taxpayer.
704
 No value has been added at the level of the 
multinational firm involved. Accordingly, there is no economic reality that could support the 
recognition of notional interest payments or notional dividend distributions (or ‘branch 
remittances’) for corporate tax purposes.  
 
Cross-border tax consolidation, in a manner as advocated in the above, would widen the 
scope of the traditional approach in which internal financing arrangements are not recognized 
for corporate tax purposes by intra-group financing arrangements. In my view, that would be 
the favorable approach. 
 
It can be said that intra-group debt and equity financing arrangements, substantively, do not 
lead to value mutations in the capital of the group, the economic entity.
705
 From a business 
economics perspective, intra-group dividend distributions or interest payments do not lead to 
value mutations for the group as a whole (this only holds true with respect to financing 
arrangements between third parties). It conflicts with economic reality to recognize intra-group 
financing arrangements for corporate tax purposes (e.g. allowing a deduction for intra-group 
interest payments as is the case under virtually all international tax systems currently in place 
throughout the world). 
 
OECD steps toward recognition of intra-firm financing in 2010; steps in the wrong 
direction 
 
For the same reason, I do not believe that the trend launched by the OECD with its 2010 
amendments to its Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention to widen the scope of 
application of the functionally separate entity approach to notional debt financing 
arrangements between permanent establishments and their head offices is 
recommendable.
706
 Doing so would only offer a tool for multinationals to shift their business 
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 See Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 7 May 1997, No. 30 294 and No. 31 795, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken 
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 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010. 
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profits to low-taxing jurisdictions through intra-firm notional debt financing dealings. It would 
introduce the same problems that international tax systems are currently facing when seeking 
to tax the proceeds from intra-group financing arrangements.  
 
The consequence would be the necessity felt to implement specific measures, such as 
notional interest deduction limitations, notional thin capitalization rules, or notional earnings 
and stripping regimes, to counter the subsequent distortion caused by the extension of the 
functionally separate entity approach to notional debt financing dealings. This is the case with 
respect to intra-group debt financing arrangements in most international tax systems in place 
today.  
 
 Cross-border tax consolidation instead 
 
I would therefore choose another course. Derecognizing intra-group debt and equity financing 
arrangements for corporate tax purposes in accordance with economic reality is achieved with 
cross-border tax consolidation (provided that the traditional approach with respect to 
permanent establishments and their head offices is being maintained). Accordingly, 
participation exemption or indirect credit mechanisms with respect to (cross-border) intra-
group proceeds on equity interests for the purpose of mitigating economic double taxation 
(paraphrased as ‘equity interest box regimes’) would become superfluous. There would be no 
need for such correction mechanisms as there would be no distortions that would need to be 
countered in the first place. 
 
Notably, from this perspective, the solution that has received heavy criticism internationally, 
the ‘halfway’ solution that had been proposed by The Netherlands in 2009 mentioned in the 
above to introduce a mandatory group interest box – i.e., an exemption for intra-group interest 
payments for corporate tax purposes – conceptually would have been a step in the right 
direction rather than the adoption of a harmful tax measure as had been argued by some 
commentators.
707-708 
From that perspective, it may be considered unfortunate that the 
proposal has been withdrawn before it ever saw the light of day.
 
 
There is nothing wrong with a derecognition of intra-group debt financing arrangements for 
corporate tax purposes, simply because no value has been added when one considers things 
from the perspective of the economic entity, i.e., the group as a whole. Accordingly, the 
conceptual problem does not lie at the level of the state not taxing the intra-group interest 
proceed. The conceptual problem lies at the level of the state that allows for the tax deduction 
of the intra-group interest payments, as this is not in accordance with business economics 
realities. The jurisdiction from which the intra-group interest has been paid gives rise to 
problems (disparities) by allowing a tax deduction with respect to economically non-existent 
debt interests. Consequently, as the non-taxation of intra-group debt proceeds concurs with 
economic reality (the unitary business approach), regimes exempting intra-firm debt proceeds 
should not be regarded as illegal state aid or (harmful) tax competition.  
 
Nevertheless I favor tax consolidation over a group interest exemption regime as tax 
consolidation would entail the derecognition of intra-group debt financing arrangements in 
jure, rather than on the basis of an ad hoc countermeasure such as a specific exemption 
regime. Accordingly, in that event, the need to introduce a group interest exemption regime by 
way of analogy to a group equity interest exemption regime would become obsolete – i.e., a 
participation exemption or ‘equity interest box’. 
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System reform as advocated would render the need for interest deduction limitations 
obsolete 
 
In addition to this, derecognizing intra-group financing arrangements with a system reform in 
a manner as described above would also entail that the issues with respect to refinancing 
arrangements within the group – i.e., the transformation of intra-group debt capital into intra-
group equity capital and/or vice versa – for the purpose of benefiting from the differences in 
the corporate tax treatment of such financing arrangements would become a relic of the past 
as well.  
 
Today, tax systems that provide for a participation exemption or indirect credit mechanism 
intrinsically allow for the possibility to impair an intra-group debt receivable for corporate tax 
purposes (and consequently to suffer a tax loss). Subsequently, they convert the impaired 
debt receivable into a corporate shareholding to benefit from a following tax-exempt or 
creditable increase of the shareholding’s worth under the participation exemption or indirect 
credit mechanisms. In such a case, the deductible tax loss is not compensated with a 
corresponding taxable profit. Some states, such as the Netherlands, have adopted technically 
complex measures to counter this undesired effect (no exemption / credit to the extent that 
the loss has not been recaptured).
709
  
 
Moreover, various international tax systems which distinguish between intra-group debt and 
equity financing arrangements intrinsically enable the possibility to finance equity capital 
payments with debt capital (e.g. a corporate entity lends sums of money from its affiliate to 
finance a dividend distribution or an equity contribution). By doing this, non-tax-deductible 
intra-group equity capital payments (e.g. dividends, equity contributions) may be arbitrarily 
converted into tax-deductible intra-group debt capital payments (interest). The Netherlands, 
again for example, and arguably many other states have adopted specific anti-abuse 
measures (interest deduction limitations) for the purpose of countering such possibilities.
710
  
 
The abolishment of the recognition of intra-group financing arrangements would eliminate the 
advantage of employing such arrangements for the purpose of reducing the corporate tax 
base. Accordingly, intra-group refinancing arrangements would cease to have any effect with 
respect to the levying of corporate tax within a given tax jurisdiction. As a result of this, the 
various countermeasures as commonly adopted by states to counteract these refinancing 
arrangements would become obsolete. 
 
Ad 2. Neutralizing arbitrage involving branch versus subsidiary differentials 
 
With an unlimited tax liability for groups and the tax exemption as a double tax relief method, 
the sense of specific correction mechanisms aimed at countering the distortive effects that 
result from the arbitrary differences in corporate tax treatment between the incomes realized 
from businesses operated through branches and those of group companies would disappear. 
That would dissolve the arbitrage involving branch structure versus subsidiary structure 
decisions. 
 
The transparency of group companies that result from applying the tax consolidation would 
make such countermeasures superfluous as the legal structuring of the business activities of 
the group would no longer influence the corporate tax liability. The aggregation of current 
business losses and profits, for example, would apply in jure. Single taxation is achieved in a 
cross-border context by applying the Dutch-style double tax relief methodology.  
 
System reform as advocated would render the need for profit pooling regimes 
obsolete 
 
There would be no need for specific profit pooling regimes as currently in place in Germany 
and Austria (‘Organschaft’), the United Kingdom and Ireland (‘group relief regime’), Portugal 
(‘Regime Especial de Tributação dos Grupos de Sociedades’), Denmark (‘national’ and 
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‘international joint taxation regime’), Norway and Finland (‘group contribution regime’).
711
 Or, 
alternatively, the relevance for regimes enabling tax-deductible impairments of equity 
interests in foreign loss-making group companies (Spain), or liquidation losses set-off regimes 
(the Netherlands),
712
 would become obsolete as well. In addition to this, intra-group 
transactions would be dealt with in a tax efficient manner. In a domestic context, intra-group 
transactions would not be recognized for corporate tax purposes.  
 
System reform as advocated would render the need for intra-firm asset transfer 
regimes and intra-firm mergers and acquisitions regimes obsolete 
 
In a cross-border context, the application of the separate entity approach would not entail any 
distortions due to the application of the advocated double tax relief mechanism.
713
 
Accordingly, there would be no need for regimes enabling tax efficient intra-group mergers 
and acquisitions as intra-group reorganizations would not trigger an immediate corporate tax 
liability in the first place.  
 
Moreover, the same is true for regimes enabling tax-neutral intra-group asset transfers, such 
as, for example, those currently in place in the United Kingdom and Ireland (‘capital gains tax 
group relief’).
714
 In addition, it would, for instance, render redundant regimes seeking to 
counter the availability under the separate entity approach of so-called ‘repackaged asset 
transfer transactions’. That is, the tax-induced engaging into transactions whereby instead of 
transferring the asset to a third-party buyer – which would trigger a corporate tax liability – the 
assets involved are first transferred tax-free within the firm to a tax consolidated subsidiary, 
i.e., to subsequently dispose of the shares without taxation under the application of an 
economic double tax relief mechanism such as a participation exemption regime. Under the 
advocated system, the disposal of the shares shall imply the disposal of the underlying assets 
triggering the liability for corporate tax purposes.
715
 The subsidiary company involved would 
remain tax transparent until the third-party asset disposal. 
 
Ad. 3. Neutralizing arbitrage involving the financing of the business operations 
undertaken through controlled non-tax consolidated foreign subsidiary companies 
 
The recognition of the group as a single taxable entity would solve the issues which arise 
from the application of a gross-based participation exemption or indirect credit mechanism to 
proceeds from foreign controlled non-consolidated subsidiaries in combination with the 
territorial allocation of costs relating to the financing of the shareholdings in these 
subsidiaries. 
 
Territorial mismatch in taxing business profit and deducting related financing 
expenses 
 
The application of a participation exemption or indirect credit mechanism in an international 
tax system typically has the following intrinsic consequence. On the one hand, an exemption 
or credit is granted at the level of the corporate shareholder with respect to proceeds from 
foreign subsidiaries. As the subsidiary’s business profits are taxed abroad, economic double 
taxation at the level of the shareholder is mitigated on the basis of an economic double tax 
relief mechanism (exemption or indirect credit). On the other hand, the expenses that have 
been incurred relating to the financing of the shareholdings in these subsidiaries are 
nevertheless typically considered to constitute tax deductible items at the level of the 
corporate shareholder. 
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As a consequence, a jurisdictional mismatch occurs between the taxable business profits 
realized – i.e., at the level of the subsidiary in the tax jurisdiction of source – and the tax 
deductible costs incurred with respect to the financing of these foreign source business 
activities – i.e., at the level of the corporate shareholder in the taxing jurisdiction of origin. 
Such a mismatch, for instance, also exists in the European Commission’s CCCTB Proposal. 
The proposal shows evidence of embracing a gross-based exemption regarding shareholding 
proceeds, while allowing the taxpayers involved to deduct related financing expenses from 
the tax base.
716
 
 
Nation states seek to resolve this loophole typically with deduction limitations for interest 
payments on intra-group (or sometimes even third party)
717
 debt financing arrangements. For 
this purpose, one may think of the countermeasures commonly referred to in international tax 
practice as thin capitalization measures. These are, for instance, in place in Denmark, 
France, Spain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
718
 One may also think of ‘earnings 
stripping rules’ as in place in Germany, Italy and the United States.
719
 Notably, a targeted 
interest deduction limitation that specifically seeks to strike down the arbitrage at this point 
can be found in the Dutch international tax regime.
720
 In place as of 2013, the measure 
conceptually lies somewhere in-between a thin capitalization measure and an earnings and 
stripping measure. This is not further discussed. 
 
Mismatch would dissolve under the advocated approach; in jure debt-push down 
 
With the unlimited tax liability for groups in conjunction with a credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income, the financing costs with respect to externally attracted debt 
capital would be allocated for corporate tax purposes to the geographic location where the 
group’s business activities are actually performed. Such an approach would basically entail 
an automatic ‘debt push down’ for corporate tax purposes. As the issue referred to in the 
above paragraphs would not arise under the approach advocated in the first place, it follows 
that there would be no need for interest deduction limitations to resolve it. 
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Corp.’s 30% share in the group’s net interest expense (0.30 * 150 = 45). The deduction limitation at the level of US 
Group Corp. would accordingly equal $55 (100 - 45). If US Group Corp would have received $20 stand-alone interest 
income, ceteris paribus, the tax-deductible amount would equal $65, i.e., the $20 stand-alone interest income added 
with $45 – i.e., US Group Corp.’s 30% share in the group’s net interest expense. The deduction limitation at the level 
of US Group Corp. would accordingly equal $35 (100 - 65). Non-deductible interest would be carried forward 
infinitely. 
720
 Article 13L Dutch CITA. 
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The recognition of the group as a single taxable entity would require that interest paid to third 
parties would be attributed to the geographic location where the group operates its financed 
business activities on the basis of a functional and factual analysis – such is currently already 
the case with permanent establishments. Consequently, such a ‘branching’ of the group 
companies involved, piercing the corporate veils for corporation tax purposes would entail a 
consistent functional allocation of external debt interest expenses to the taxing jurisdiction in 
which the financed business activities are actually performed. 
 
The allocation of third-party financing would accordingly take place irrespective of the legal 
form chosen by the economic operator in arranging its business affairs.
721
 This approach 
would in jure resolve the aforementioned jurisdictional mismatch between the taxable 
business profits realized and the deductible costs incurred with respect to the financing of 
these respective business activities. Local business activities would be taxed at the net 
amount. Double tax relief regarding the proceeds from foreign business activities would be 
granted at the net amount as well. Notably, the effects as regards the financing of third-party 
shareholdings are addressed in Chapter 5 at sections 4.4.3 and 6.4.2. 
 
Thin cap issues would be resolved 
 
It would follow that there would no longer be any tax incentive in place for thinly capitalizing 
group companies through intra-group financing arrangements issued for the purpose of 
reducing the corporate tax base. The tax-treating of the group as a single taxable entity for 
corporate tax purposes would entail that the debt to equity ratio of the group for corporate tax 
purposes would correspond to the commercial debt to equity ratio of this group. Intra-group 
financing arrangements would not be recognized; only third party debt arrangements would. 
Consequently, any need for interest deduction limitations – such as a thin capitalization or an 
earnings stripping rule – would then become redundant.
722
 
 
 No incentive for tax-induced engaging into ‘flow-through’ and treasury activities 
 
Moreover, the advocated approach would bring about an equitable and neutral corporate 
taxation of intermediate shareholders’ activities, as well as ‘flow-through’ and treasury 
activities. The taxable ‘spreads’ with respect to the rendering of administrative ‘shareholders’ 
services, ‘flow-through services’ and ‘group financing services’, that are commonly taken into 
consideration on the basis of a functional and factual analysis and the arm’s length principle 
would remain untouched. That is, as there would be no differential in treatment regarding 
undertaking activities through branches relative to group companies. For example, the 
economic function of treasury activities performed – i.e., apportioning the group’s debt and 
equity capital attracted from third parties to the various business activities of the group – 
would be awarded with an at arm’s length consideration in accordance with currently applied 
transfer pricing concepts and would be taxed accordingly. 
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 See for a comparison Court of Justice, case C-168/01 (Bosal). As from the Court of Justice’s Bosal ruling, it is 
possible in the Netherlands to deduct financing costs relating to foreign business activities from the Dutch corporate 
tax base, yet receiving the proceeds from such foreign operations on a tax-exempt basis under the participation 
exemption. The unlimited corporate tax liability of groups with a tax exemption for foreign business income would 
automatically close the loophole in the Dutch international tax system that emerged subsequent to the Bosal ruling 
(commonly referred to in the Netherlands as the ‘Bosalgat’, in English: ‘Bosal Loophole’). That would render the need 
for the current Article 13L Dutch CITA redundant. For a similar observation see the concluding remarks in Maarten F. 
de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch ‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 
(2013). 
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 It also would not, for instance, be necessary to adopt an interest deduction limitation by reference to the group’s 
worldwide debt to equity ratio, as suggested by Burnett in Chloe Burnett, ‘Intra-Group Debt at the Crossroads: Stand-
Alone versus Worldwide Approach’, 6 World Tax Journal 40 (2014), at 40-76. Notably, conceptually the problem does 
not lie with the debtor (i.e., at the expenditure side), but in the fact that most modern corporate tax systems are not 
adequately equipped to tax the foreign creditor’s income (i.e., at the recipient side) in the source state, see section 
6.3. 
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4.5.2 Weighing the pros and cons: the cons 
4.5.2.1 Tax-transparency of subsidiary companies and hybrid entity mismatch issues 
The adopting of such an approach would entail various cons – or. positively formulated: 
‘challenges’ – as well. As said, the group companies included in the tax consolidation would 
become transparent for corporate tax purposes within the international tax system of the state 
applying this approach. The ultimate parent company would become the taxable entity. In 
cross-border scenarios, the group companies would become branches (permanent 
establishments) of the ultimate parent company (the ‘head office’). 
 
The transparency of these group companies for corporate tax purposes would lead to an 
expansion of hybrid entity issues, that is, in the event that other states would continue taxing 
affiliated corporate entities on an individual basis. This problem may be solved through 
coordination. For instance, one solution may be to have group companies recognized as a 
permanent establishment of their ultimate parent company, or even better, as fiscally 
transparent under the bilateral double tax conventions.
723
 Indeed, that would require a 
negotiation of the double tax convention networks in the international tax regime. 
 
4.5.2.2 Triangular cases and currency exchange rate mutations 
 
Triangular cases involving permanent establishment with source taxed portfolio 
investment income 
 
Moreover, where a consolidated foreign group company derives passive income that arises in 
a third state, which is subject to a source tax in that third state, a triangular case would 
emerge. This problem may be resolved by requiring the state to which the passive income is 
attributable on the basis of a functional and factual analysis to grant double tax relief with 
respect to the foreign source tax levied on the passive income.
724
 This is not further 
discussed. That is, as this study in the end advocates a destination basis profit allocation 
mechanism. That would resolve the triangular case issues conceptually via an alternative 
means. 
 
Currency exchange rate mutations 
 
Furthermore, as the group would be taxed on its worldwide business income earned, currency 
issues would occur with respect to the calculation of the double tax relief. Inclusion of the 
foreign income in the domestic tax base prior to granting double tax relief under the ‘credit for 
domestic tax attributable to the foreign income’ methodology would lead to the recognition of 
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 See for a comparison Brian J. Arnold, ‘Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits under Tax Treaties’, 
57 Bulletin for International Taxation 476 (2003), at 492. Subsidiaries are not regarded as permanent establishments 
of their parent company on the basis of Article 5, paragraph 7, OECD Model Tax Convention. It should be noted that 
e.g. the Dutch Supreme Court nevertheless does not seem to have problems with allowing the cross-border tax 
consolidation under domestic tax legislation to have effect under the Dutch double tax convention network. See 
Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 16 March 1994, No. 27 764, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse 
Belastingrechtspraak 1994/191, Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 29 June 1988, No. 24 738, Beslissingen in 
Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1988/331, and Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 13 November 
1996, No 31 008, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1998/47, and Dutch Supreme 
Court, Hoge Raad, 3 February 2012, No 10/05383, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse 
Belastingrechtspraak 2012/126. See for some analysis Frank P.G. Pötgens et al, ‘Cross-border Fiscal Unities and 
Tax Treaties: Nothing New under the Sun?’, 42 Intertax 92 (2014), at 92-105, and C. van Raad, ‘Internationale 
aspecten van het herziene regime inzake de fiscale eenheid’, 129 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 85 (2000), and for some 
analytical comparison Michael Lang, ‘CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties’, 57 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 51 (2003), at 51-58. 
724
 See for example, Court of Justice, case C-307/97 (Saint Gobain) in which the court adopts a similar approach. On 
triangular cases see e.g. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Over samenloop van verrekening en vrijstelling onder 
belastingverdragen’,136 Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 855 (2007). Notably, under Article 76(2) Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), the credit 
may be shared among the countries involved subsequent to the application of the sharing mechanism referred to in 
Chapter 6 of the CCCTB Proposal. This is not further discussed. 
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as many currency results for corporate tax purposes as the group has business activities in 
taxing jurisdictions – i.e., if all countries involved employed their own currencies.  
 
Save for the exception of scenarios where pragmatic functional currency tax reporting rules 
have been adopted, this may lead to practical difficulties in determining the amount of double 
tax relief to be granted. The calculations in sections 4.4 and 5.3.4 of Chapter 3, however, 
reveal that these challenges would be by no means insurmountable.
725
 Matters accordingly 
seem to be more of a practical nature than of a theoretical nature. Notably, currency 
exchange effects under the final system are addressed in Chapter 6, section 4.5.3. 
 
The exemption of currency exchange rate would introduce distortive properties into 
the system 
 
An alternative to recognizing currency exchange results for corporate tax purposes would be 
to exempt them from the taxable corporate base. Although this would be administratively 
convenient, such an approach would not be conceptually sound.
726
  
 
Currency exchange risks are actual commercial risks. These risks – in the event that they 
have not been hedged – may lead to actual mutations in the group’s equity capital. In my 
view, this economic reality should be acknowledged for corporate tax purposes, irrespective 
of the technical difficulties that may emerge from this when calculating the corporate tax 
liability.
727-728
  
 
Market distortions that emerge as a result of mutual fluctuations in exchange rates should be 
resolved outside the area of corporate taxation. Solutions may, for example, be found in a 
harmonized monetary policy (such as, for example, the monetary union within the European 
Union). This matter is not further discussed as it falls outside this study’s subject of analysis.  
 
4.5.2.3 Profit attribution by reference to the OECD’s two-step analysis – also, see 
Chapter 6 
The allocation of the group’s business profits to taxing jurisdictions would take place on the 
same basis as with respect to the allocation of profits to permanent establishments. The 
allocation of business income would occur on the basis of the OECD’s two-step analysis.  
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 Analytically valid solutions have already been developed for example by the Dutch Supreme Court in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. See Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 4 May 1960, No. 14 218, Beslissingen in 
Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1960/163 and Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 29 April 1959, 
No. 13 892, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1960/164 (Rupiah) confirmed by 
Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 10 March 1993, No. 28 017, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse 
Belastingrechtspraak 1993/209, as well as Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 5 December 2003, No. 37 743, 
Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 2004/139 (Cruzeiro). Furthermore, see Dutch 
Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 31 March 1954, No. 11 518, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse 
Belastingrechtspraak 1954/180. See for some analysis Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical 
issues to eliminate double taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international (2011), at section 2.7. Notably, the Dutch tax legislator has adopted functional currency tax reporting 
rules for administrative convenience reasons (Article 7, fifth indent, Dutch CITA). These are not further discussed. 
The Court of Justice seems to take a similar stand in case C-293/06 (Deutsche Shell). This jurisprudence has 
provided the inspiration for the numerical examples set forth in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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 See for a comparison, Court of Justice, case C-293/06 (Deutsche Shell). 
727
 Hedge accounting could be applied for corporate tax purposes in scenarios where the currency exchange risks 
have been hedged. The aforementioned issues with regard to the corporate tax implications of currency exchange 
results would then not arise as currency risks would not occur to the extent that these are effectively hedged. 
728
 The exempting of currency exchange results realized on shareholding interests under the application of a 
participation exemption regime would be conceptually unsound for comparable reasons. Such an exemption should 
only apply in my view to secure the single taxation of the underlying (business) profits realized by the company in 
which the shareholding interest is held. Namely, with respect to currency exchange results realized on the 
shareholding interest no economic double taxation occurs. Hence, there is no need to apply the exemption for these 
income items. Cf. Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 4 May 1960, No. 14 218, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken 
Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1960/163 and Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 29 April 1959, No. 13 892, 
Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1960/164 (Rupiah). Contra Dutch Supreme Court, 
Hoge Raad, 9 June 1982, No. 21 142, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 1982/230. 
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The significance of legal transactions between affiliated corporate entities would be strongly 
reduced. In the event that groups would be treated as a single taxable entity, legal 
transactions within the group would merely have an indicative value for the purpose of 
allocating business profits, just as is currently the case with respect to reported internal 
dealings between a head office and its permanent establishment. This may be regarded as 
problematic in tax practice.  
 
However, it can be considered true that intra-group legal transactions are not necessary to 
the allocation of business income to taxing jurisdictions under the transfer pricing 
methodology; neither in theory, nor in practice. The possibility to allocate income amongst a 
permanent establishment and its head office – an environment where legal transactions are 
absent – on the basis of the two-step analysis proves this thesis. Under the transfer pricing 
methodology, a factual and functional analysis may suffice to identify the functions performed, 
the assets used and the risks assumed, to which the arm’s length principle is subsequently 
applied. It has already been applied in international tax practice when business income is 
allocated to permanent establishments.
729
 
 
It should however be noted at this point in this study that the analysis will ultimately favor 
ending-up at a profit allocation approach based on the destination principle. The division of 
the tax base is further assessed in Chapter 6.  
 
4.5.2.4 Tax return filing, auditing and mutual administrative assistance 
The unlimited tax liability for corporate groups in conjunction with a credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income would lead to considerable changes in the tax auditing and tax 
return filing practice.  
 
The tax returns would be based on the consolidated commercial annual accounts of the entire 
group rather than the domestic accounts of the part of the group that is subjected to corporate 
tax within a respective tax system. In addition to this, the (computerized) filing systems 
employed by the tax authorities would need to be amended. Significant amounts of (possibly 
to be translated) data should be administered. Taxable amounts would need to be extracted 
from commercial annual accounts that may be based on various accounting practices (e.g. 
US GAAP or IFRS).  
 
Moreover, with respect to determining taxpayers’ corporate tax position, obligations for 
taxpayers to provide for relevant information, legal remedies, international administrative 
assistance and cooperation, as well as mutual agreement and arbitration procedures, may 
become even more important than has been the case until today. The need to apply 
provisions of this nature in the respective states’ international tax systems (i.e., administrative 
provisions in domestic legislation and double tax conventions, as well as the Mutual 
Assistance Directive and Arbitration Convention in an European Union context) would likely 
increase.  
 
This may lead to administrative difficulties. However, these practical challenges would not 
necessarily be insurmountable. As the OECD, for instance, submits regarding the application 
of the profit split method, “it would be reasonable to expect that taxpayers be ready to provide 
tax administrations with the necessary information on the foreign associated enterprise party 
to the transaction, including the financial data necessary to calculate the profit split.”
730
 At the 
end of the day, it will be the required (political) willingness of states to assist each other 
administratively that may prove to be the bottleneck for proper functionality of the approach as 
advocated in this study. However, regarding the weight of the political willingness of nation 
states in reality should also be recognized for what it is – politics rather than academics. 
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 Arguments opposing this position can be considered an implicit plea against the conceptual soundness of the 
transfer pricing methodology – i.e., the tool to allocate business income to taxing jurisdictions employed by states 
today – rather than an argument against the approach as advocated in this chapter. 
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 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, 
Chapter III at par. 3.21. 
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Nevertheless, in the event that the proposed system would lead to practical problems in 
assessing corporate tax – e.g. were practice to show that the relevant information for 
determining the taxpayer’s tax position would not be made available – the solution to that 
problem needs to be sought in improving international administrative proceedings, rather than 
in the rejection of the theoretical analysis.
731
 The emerging global market just calls for 
international administrative assistance. As already mentioned earlier, recent developments in 
the area of ‘country-by-country reporting’ show evidence of a trend towards an international 
consensus on the need for global transparency in tax administrative matters.
732
 
 
4.5.3 Remaining challenges to be resolved 
4.5.3.1 Obstacles imposed abroad still in place 
The approach advocated until this point would not resolve all theoretical problems that have 
been addressed in the introductory chapter. It would, for instance, not provide an answer to 
the obstacles imposed by foreign international tax systems in their international tax 
systems.
733
 That matter, however, proves to be theoretically resolvable as previously 
demonstrated in Chapter 3; that is, if the nation state involved would be politically willing to 
fairly amend its international corporation tax system. 
 
4.5.3.2 Disparities and inadequacies in the tax base definition methodologies still in 
place 
Furthermore, the advocated system would not provide for a solution to the remaining market 
distortions that are caused by the disparities and inadequacies that have not yet been 
assessed until this point of the study. For instance, the approach advocated up until this point 
does not deal with the double taxation and the double non-taxation issues that result as a 
consequence of differentials in income qualification, or the interpretation of facts and 
circumstances for corporate tax purposes.  
 
Fundamentally, the advocated approach would, for instance, not provide for a solution to the 
current (arbitrary) differences in corporate tax treatment between third party debt and equity 
financing arrangements.
734
 Proceeds from third party debt financing arrangements would 
remain to be recognized for corporate tax purposes, while proceeds from third party equity 
arrangements (at least at the level of the paying agent) would not. The tax base definition is 
touched upon in the upcoming Chapter 5. 
 
4.5.3.3 Disparities and inadequacies in the profit division methodologies still in place  
 
The geographic attribution of economic rents remains problematic 
 
Moreover, the system at this point does not provide an answer to the distortions in the 
international tax regime that are caused by the inadequacies in the methodology that is 
generally used by nation states to divide the ‘international tax pie’ – i.e., the issue of taxable 
profit allocation accordingly. Although the subject of geographic tax base division is touched 
upon in Chapter 6, the following remarks are worth noting at this point. 
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 See for a comparison Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing 
Economy’, 38 Intertax 281 (2010), at sections 4.4 and 7.2. 
732
 For some reading and analysis, see OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Memorandum on transfer pricing 
documentation and country-by-country reporting, OECD Publishing, Paris, 3 October 2013, OECD, OECD Committee 
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 See for a comparison Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing 
Economy’, 38 Intertax 281 (2010), at sections 2-9. 
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 See Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and 
Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120. 
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First, it would remain troublesome to properly allocate business profits, for instance the 
multinationals’ firm-specific rents, to taxing jurisdictions as the international allocation of 
income would still take place on the basis of the generally applied but fairly criticized concepts 
of permanent establishment
735
 and the arm’s length principle.
736
  
 
It would remain conceivable, for example, to shift business income to low-tax jurisdictions 
through strategically arranging the transfer prices relating to the intra-group trading of firm 
specific rent-yielding assets, such as intellectual property portfolios that provide unique 
monopoly rights. As there are no outside markets for trading these often valuable intangible 
assets, it is generally impossible to find comparable transactions to determine the transfer 
price for these interaffiliate transactions by reference to the arm’s length principle. This 
provides multinationals with some leeway to reduce their overall tax burden through 
strategically arranging the intra-firm transfer prices.
737
 Furthermore, it would remain 
impossible, for instance, to allocate proceeds from a web store to the origin state under the 
physically oriented permanent establishment threshold. 
 
Troublesome taxation of third party shareholders, creditors, and lessors at source 
 
Second, it would remain troublesome to adequately tax proceeds from inbound investments 
by third party shareholders, creditors, and lessors in the source state.
738
 The OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and Capital, the European Union legislation and the international 
tax systems of various OECD member states typically do not provide suitable instruments in 
this respect to tax proceeds from (portfolio) shareholders’ interests, bonds, leases and license 
agreements, despite the fact that these proceeds may very well have been realized within the 
source state.
739
  
 
It is my impression that the reason for this is that the OECD members are traditionally capital-
exporting countries. As a consequence of this, typically, less emphasis has been put on the 
taxation of proceeds from capital imports in the source country. Consequently, the 
international tax systems of these states are confronted with difficulties in their attempts to tax 
the income realized, for example, by foreign creditors and licensors in today’s globalizing 
economy.  
 
The UN Model Double Taxation Convention provides countries more room to tax proceeds 
from capital imports – e.g. outbound interest and royalty payments. This may be explained by 
the fact that the UN Model, to a greater extent, promotes the interests of the traditionally 
capital-importing countries – i.e., developing countries and countries with transition 
economies. 
 
It is true that various OECD member states have adopted dividend, interest and royalty 
withholding tax legislation in their international tax systems. Yet, it should be noted that, 
particularly within the context of the European Union, the levying of withholding taxes in effect 
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 See for example Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin 
for International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-280, Arthur J. Cockfield, ‘The Law and Economics of Digital Taxation: 
Challenges to Traditional Tax Laws and Principles’, 56 Bulletin for International Taxation 606 (2002), at 606-619, and 
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 See for example Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary Taxation of International Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 201 (2008), at 201-215, and Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st 
Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing 
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55 Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary 
Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 3-17. 
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 See for a comparison Ruud de Mooij, ‘Will corporate income taxation survive?’, 3 De Economist 153 (2005), at 
292 and Avi-Yonah, ibidem. 
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Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based Approach’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 430 (2006), at 430-452. 
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Arguments (Parts I, II & III)’, 8/9 Intertax 216 (1988), at 216-228, 10 Intertax 310 (1988), at 310-320 and 11 Intertax 
393 (1988), at 393-402, and Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘Source of income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the 
Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based Approach’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 430 (2006), at 430-452. 
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is not always possible. The European Union Parent-Subsidiary Directive, for example, does 
not consistently allow for the imposition of a dividend withholding tax on outbound dividends 
to certain foreign minority – i.e., third party – shareholding companies. The same is true 
regarding withholding taxes on outbound interest and royalty payments to foreign third party 
creditors and/or licensors under the European Union Interest and Royalty Directive. 
Furthermore, the possibilities for European Union Member States to levy source taxes at the 
gross amount on outbound dividend, interest and royalty payments are also limited in 
scenarios falling outside the scope of application of these Directives. The Court of Justice 
does not allow European Union Member States to levy final source taxes on the gross 
amount with respect to outbound dividend distributions and interest and royalty payments in 
the event that economically comparable domestic payments – i.e., payments not crossing the 
tax border – are exempt from tax or are taxed at the net amount.
740
  
 
4.5.4 Remaining challenges do not render current analysis invalid  
The recognition of these remaining issues, however, does not make the inferences made thus 
far in the current analysis invalid. The remaining issues identified in the areas of tax base 
definition and tax base allocation fall outside the confines of the present analysis, as this 
chapter has merely dealt with the taxable entity definition.  
 
The identified issues reveal that the work is not done yet. The international tax regime also 
requires an adequate tax base definition and an adequate tax base division key. The 
approach advocated in this chapter therefore provides only part of an answer. The remaining 
pieces in the international tax jigsaw puzzle remain left to be discovered. These will be 
addressed in the upcoming chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.6 Final remarks 
This chapter is devoted to answering the question of who to tax in an alternative international 
corporate tax regime. What may be considered the appropriate taxable entity or ‘tax subject’ 
in a corporate tax 2.0? 
 
An answer lies in tax consolidation; treat the multinational as a single taxable entity for 
corporate tax purposes. To define the group for corporate tax purposes, two criteria should be 
adopted. Tax consolidation should apply with respect to: 
 
a) corporate interests that provide the ultimate parent company a decisive influence over 
the underlying business affairs of its subsidiaries, provided that; 
b) the parent company holds its corporate interest as a capital asset. 
 
Moreover, tax consolidation should be allowed in both domestic and cross-border scenarios. 
The ultimate parent company could be assigned as the (principal) taxpayer for tax 
assessment purposes. 
 
Following the approach established in the previous chapter, the group should be subject to an 
unlimited corporate tax liability in each taxing jurisdiction in which it exceeds a minimum 
threshold of economic activity. In cross-border scenarios, double tax relief should 
subsequently be available by means of the credit for domestic tax that is attributable to 
foreign income as developed in Chapter 3. 
 
The adoption of such an approach would remove all distortions that are currently caused by 
the commonly adopted approach to deal with each group company as a single taxable entity 
(resident or non-resident taxpayer) for corporate tax purposes. The corporate tax treatment of 
corporate groups and single corporate entities would be brought up to the same level in both 
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domestic and cross-border scenarios. It would accordingly cancel out all unilaterally imposed 
distortions in the corporate taxation of multinationals. Corporate tax burden and revenue 
levels would not be influenced by the multinationals’ legal structuring or the question of 
whether business is conducted in a domestic or cross-border context. 
 
The need for ad hoc correction mechanisms would become superfluous. I favor treating the 
group as the taxable entity for corporate tax purposes over the separate entity approach, 
basically because it is principally founded on economic reality. Deal with the group as a single 
entity for tax purposes as it is a single economic entity from a business economics 
perspective. 
 
The approach taken merely requires acceptance that the problems initiated by taking the 
separate entity assumption as a starting point in corporate taxation cannot be resolved within 
the same tax framework that created these problems. Although it should also be said that the 
bottleneck for a proper functioning of such an approach would lie in the required willingness of 
states to tax-coordinate and assist each other administratively. 
 
The approach advocated until this point of the current analysis would not resolve all problems 
in international taxation. It would not remove market distortions that occur due to remaining 
disparities or obstacles imposed abroad. Moreover, it would not provide an answer to the 
distortions caused by the remaining inadequacies in the methodology generally employed by 
states to mutually design the tax base and divide it between the countries in which the 
multinational firm operates its business activities. The first piece of the international tax jigsaw 
puzzle nevertheless seems to have fallen into place. This paves the way for discovering the 
remaining ones in the upcoming Chapters 5 and 6.  
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Chapter 5 Economic rents as taxable base 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter further builds on the observation set forth in Chapter 2 that the notion of fairness 
in the international tax regime ultimately calls for a worldwide coordination of the international 
corporate tax systems of nation states. That is, an approximation of tax systems into an 
adequately operating coherent international tax regime is called for. 
 
After addressing the appropriate taxable entity in the previous chapter, the current chapter is 
devoted to answering the question of how to identify the taxable business proceeds for 
corporation tax purposes in an alternative international tax regime; that is, how to identify the 
tax object.
741
 What may be considered the appropriate taxable base or ‘tax object’ in a 
corporate tax 2.0 other than the nominal return to equity standard that is typically used in 
corporate taxation?  
 
Taxing the multinational’s economic rents… 
 
This analysis is inspired by the ‘Schanz-Haig-Simons’ concept of income,
 
i.e., the ‘capital 
accrual theory’ defining income as the sum of consumption and actual capital accrual.
742
 The 
argument made is that the international tax regime should autonomously identify a taxable 
base for corporate tax purposes by referring to the firm’s economic rents derived, as that 
amount constitutes the remuneration in return for the provision of the production factor of 
enterprise. 
 
The analysis builds on the widely acknowledged notion that multinational firms derive rents. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, by operating their global business activities in a 
financially economic and organizationally integrated manner, multinationals have proven able 
to produce above-normal investment returns, commonly addressed as rents. That is, they 
have been able to derive investment returns exceeding the normal returns on the production 
factors of labor and capital. 
 
The goal of the approach taken is to arrive at a taxing system where basically only the above 
normal returns are taken into account for corporate tax base calculation purposes. Various 
commentators have resorted to advocating the approach of taxing rents instead of profits.
743
 
Such an approach could be achieved technically by means of an allowance for corporate 
equity or via a cash flow tax. 
 
As to be qualitatively demonstrated by means of numerical examples and formulaic analyses, 
the common return to equity standard produces inequities and distortions in the financing 
decisions. That is, as it tax-favors debt over equity financing.
744
 It will also be shown that the 
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 See for some comparison Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and 
the End of the World’, 2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 315. 
742
 See Georg Schanz, ‘Der Einkommensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetze’, 13 Finanzarchiv 1 (1896), at 1-
87, Robert M. Haig, ‘The Concept of Income: economic and legal aspects’, in Robert M. Haig (ed.), The Federal 
Income Tax (1921) and Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938). For extensive analyses on the S-H-S 
concept of income, see Kevin Holmes, The Concept of Income – A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis (2001), at Chapters 1 
and 2, and Victor Thuronyi, ‘The Concept of Income’, 46 Tax Law Review 45 (1990), at 45-105. 
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 See e.g., Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century 
(2008), Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010, Howell H. Zee, 
‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-
448. 
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 See e.g., Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century 
(2008), Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and 
Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120, Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion 
Paper 2010, Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448, as well as Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global 
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, and 
Serena Fatica et al, ‘Taxation Papers; The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: Consequences And Solutions’, European 
Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2012:33. 
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arbitrage becomes exacerbated under the use of the classical system of corporate taxation 
addressed in the previous chapter. 
 
Would enhance fairness… 
 
The argument is made that fairness may be enhanced when nation states decide to make use 
of a tax base foundation concept containing an allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’). The 
idea is to appropriately mitigate the financing discrimination issues that arise under their 
typical nominal return to equity based international tax systems. An ACE-based foundation 
concept to tax business income has the following equitable properties. It produces equal to 
statutory average effective tax rates; that is, as it taxes business cash flows. Furthermore, 
marginal financing decisions are not affected by corporate taxation since the effective 
marginal tax rate under an ACE is nil. The financing distortion issues would accordingly be 
mitigated in an equitable and neutral manner. Furthermore, the distortions that arise under a 
common corporate tax in the presence of differentials in tax depreciation and economic 
depreciation would be mitigated under an ACE as well, because the present values of 
depreciation and ACE allowances are independent of the rate against which assets are 
written-off in tax bookkeeping. The effects of the system are demonstrated via numerical and 
formulaic examples. 
 
With regards to equity investments in minority shareholdings, the argument is made that 
arising economic double taxation issues should be resolved by means of a double tax relief 
mechanism akin to the mechanism advocated in Chapter 3. The economic double tax relief 
mechanism addressed in the current chapter is referred to as the ‘indirect tax exemption’. It 
would basically operate as an indirect tax credit. That is, however, with the exception that the 
credit is calculated by reference to an amount equal to the domestic tax that can be attributed 
to the excess earnings of the respective entity in which the equity investment is held – 
accordingly: indirect tax exemption = (grossed-up net proceeds from a participation / 
worldwide income) * domestic tax on worldwide income. To efficiently arrive at a single 
taxation of the business cash flows involved, the economic double tax relief mechanism would 
be combined with a ‘loss recapture mechanism’ and a ‘profit carry forward mechanism’. The 
neutral operation of such a double tax relief system is demonstrated by means of numerical 
and formulaic examples. 
  
But only as a next step… 
 
However, such an approach would again provide only a next answer to the distortive 
allocation of corporate tax among corporate taxpayers and between states in a global 
marketplace. That is, in addition to the treatment of the multinational group as a single tax unit 
elaborated upon in the previous chapter. The approach advocated in this chapter to tax rents 
would not resolve the distortive allocation of the tax base in the current international tax 
regime. 
 
Indeed, the geographic division of the tax base would remain to take place by reference to the 
common tax jurisdiction concepts, such as the permanent establishment and the place of 
effective management. The allocation of the tax base would remain to revolve around the 
arm’s length standard. The advocated system up until this point would not resolve the 
distortions in the investment location decision that arise under the current international tax 
regime. It would not resolve the tax-induced arbitrage in the establishment of tax jurisdiction. 
It would furthermore remain problematic to adequately allocate the tax base geographically to 
the taxing jurisdictions in which the firm undertakes its economic activities. 
 
Nevertheless, the definition of the tax base by reference to firm rents may be considered to 
provide the second piece of the international tax jigsaw puzzle. Perhaps, the mitigation of the 
financing discrimination renders this piece to have fallen into place as well. This would 
accordingly pave the way for discovering the final piece of the puzzle in the remaining 
Chapter 6, i.e., a proper geographical tax base division key.  
 
5.2 Business income as remuneration for production factor of enterprise 
212
5.2.1 What is business income? The S-H-S concept of income 
To answer the question as to how to define the desired taxable base first requires an answer 
to the underlying question of how to understand the concept of business income conceptually. 
What is business income? 
The underlying theoretical rationale for defining the proper corporate taxable base may be 
provided by the capital accrual theory that is founded on the Schanz-Haig-Simons (‘S-H-S’) 
concept of income.
745
 Under the S-H-S concept of income, income (Y) is defined as the sum
of consumption (C) and actual capital accrual (S), i.e., Y = C + S. At the same time, income 
(Y) can be seen as the sum of remunerations paid by firms to households in return for the 
provision of the production factors of capital (R), labor (W) and enterprise (R*) by these latter 
mentioned households to the first mentioned firms.
746
The remuneration for the provision of the production factors of labor and enterprise, often 
referred to as active sources of income, respectively are classified as wages and business 
income (the latter may also be referred to as business cash flow, excess earnings, economic 
rents, or inframarginal returns). The remunerations for the provision of the production factor of 
capital, both monetary capital and tangible and intangible capital (on the basis of e.g. 
(portfolio) shareholders’ interests, bonds, leases and license agreements), often referred to as 
passive income, are typically classified as portfolio investment returns, or normal returns. In 
this respect one may think of portfolio dividends and interests, as well as leasehold and 
royalty payments. Households, subsequently, employ the aggregate of these remunerations – 
the income derived – for consumption or savings, accordingly constituting the S-H-S concept 
of income as Y = C + S. 
The introduction of an income tax in this basic model reveals that, theoretically, one may 
evenly decide between introducing a levy at the economy’s supply side (production factors) 
and the economy’s demand side (consumption). A tax introduced at the supply side is 
typically referred to in tax law as a direct income tax. A tax introduced at the demand side is 
typically referred to in tax law as an indirect consumption tax. Obviously, a combination of the 
two types of levies is feasible as well, and is currently the reality in most countries.  
In acknowledgement of the reality that all taxes are ultimately borne by individuals, it is fair to 
say that conceptually no real difference exists between an income tax and a consumption 
tax,
747
 with the exception of the tax treatment of savings income, which typically are taxed
under an income tax while being exempt from tax under a consumption tax.
748
 This also
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 See Kevin Holmes, The Concept of Income; A Multidisciplinary analysis (2001), at Chapters 1 and 2, as well as 
Victor Thuronyi, ‘The Concept of Income’, 46 Tax Law Review 45 (1990), at 45-105. To enable taxation, accrued 
income is attributed to taxable periods. 
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 In the event that solely the production factors of capital (R) and labor (W) are distinguished, the remuneration for 
the provision of capital is typically considered to break down into two components, a normal market return rate (R) 
and a super normal market return rate (i.e., (R*); or (R-I) for that matter). The super normal market return rate then 
typically is also referred to as business cash flow, excess earnings or economic rents. See Willem Vermeend et al, 
Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, Investment, Consumption and 
the Environment (2008), at 41-45. In the above normal returns, I recognize the remuneration for the provision of the 
production factor of enterprise. Accordingly, that renders moot the need to distinguish between components R and R* 
as the remuneration for the provision for the production factor of capital. 
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 See also Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, 
Employment, Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 41-45. See for a comparison, Peter Harris, 
‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or Russian Roulette?’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues 
(2012), 271-297, who notes at 278 that: “the legislator cannot effectively prescribe who is to bear the burden of a tax. 
And this is the reason why, in terms of effect, the distinction between a direct tax and an indirect tax is artificial. The 
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748
 See for a comparison Joseph Bankman et al, ‘The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over and Ideal 
Income Tax’, 58 Stanford Law Review 1413 (2006), section I. Bankman et al argue that savings income should not 
be taxed as it tax treats consumption ‘today’ more favorably
 
over consumption ‘tomorrow’ and accordingly distorts 
decisions on when to consume. See on this matter, for instance, Robert E. Hall, ‘The Effects of Tax Reform on Prices 
and Asset Values’, 10 Tax Policy and the Economy 71 (1996), at 71-88. See also Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and 
the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, Investment, Consumption and the 
Environment (2008), at 44. Contra, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Three Goals of Taxation’, 60 Tax Law Review 1 
(2006-2007). Avi-Yonah argues that savings income should be taxed. This issue is not further discussed in this study 
for being considered an analytically separate from the question as to how to tax business income. Michael P. 
Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for Fundamental Reform’, European 
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means, again with the mentioned exception of the taxation of savings, that no conceptual 
difference exists between a consumption tax on the one hand and a wage tax and a business 
income tax (i.e., a business cash flow tax) on the other,
749
 aside from the difference in timing.
The first mentioned levies are imposed ex ante, or at the time the wage income or business 
income has been derived, prior to consumption, while the latter mentioned levy is imposed ex 
post, that is, upon the spending and subsequent consumption of the derived wage or 
business income. 
5.2.2 Taxing the returns to the production factor of enterprise: economic rents 
5.2.2.1 Taxing the business proceeds… 
To the extent that the various production factors are to be taxed in separate tax processes, it 
follows that the quest for a (direct) impost on actual business income should necessarily focus 
on excess earnings or economic rents to be imposed on entrepreneurs. The remuneration for 
the provision of labor – wages – would accordingly be taxed under a wage tax imposed on 
workers. The remuneration for the provision of capital – portfolio investments returns – would 
be taxed under a savings income tax imposed on portfolio investors. The remuneration for the 
provision of enterprise – business cash flow – would be taxed under a business income tax 
imposed on entrepreneurs. 
That is, at least, as long as one assumes that a fair tax should acknowledge economic reality 
and as long as one assumes that fairness calls for non-overlapping taxes, i.e., the imposition 
of various direct taxes regarding the remunerations for the same production factors. 
Moreover, this holds true as long as one does not desire to eradicate all direct taxes in the 
international tax regime replacing them with consumption taxes, as is sometimes advocated 
in the economic literature.
750
Notably, it may be considered arguable that the taxpayer, under an ideal business income 
tax, should be the business enterprise itself, i.e., the commercial or industrial activity of an 
independent nature undertaken for profit rather than the entrepreneur operating it.
 751
 Such an
approach would make such an income tax a full-fledged in rem tax. The tax object – the 
business proceeds or economic rents – and the tax subject – the business enterprise that is 
carried on – would be merged into one another. That is, the ad personam component and the 
in rem component of an income tax would be merged. 
5.2.2.2 … of the firm involved
It may however be doubtful that such an approach would be desirable. This study upholds the 
position that an income tax has and should have both an in rem and an ad personam 
component. The taxable object, i.e., the business proceeds or economic rents, and the 
Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Paper 2006:264, at 18 referring to the 
absence of universal theoretical consensus on the proper tax treatment of taxing capital income. 
749
 See also Sijbren Cnossen, ‘A VAT Primer for Lawyers, Economists, and Accountants’, 124 Tax Notes 687 (17 
August 2009), at 687-698, as well as Charles E. McLure, ‘Economic, Administrative, and Political Factors in Choosing 
a General Consumption Tax’, 46 National Tax Journal 345 (1991), at 345-358. 
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 The question on the desirability of simultaneously taxing ‘income’ and ‘consumption’ is not further discussed. See 
on this matter Joseph Bankman et al, ‘The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over and Ideal Income Tax’, 58 
Stanford Law Review 1413 (2006) and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Three Goals of Taxation’, 60 Tax Law Review 1 
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and Investment’, in Victor Thuronyi et al, Tax Law Design and Drafting (1998), at Chapter 16. Please note that, for 
illustration purposes, established Dutch case law in the field of direct taxation defines a business as a durable 
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taxable entity, i.e., the entrepreneur, should be kept analytically distinguished from one 
another. 
In my view, an income tax should be imposed on a person as it is a person rather than the 
business operation that produces the income and pays the tax impost.
752
 In the end it is the
entrepreneur that produces the income. It is the human capital – the human intellectual 
intervention – that leads to the creation of actual wealth. Value may be added to things only 
through the actions of people, irrespective of whether or not a device (capital) is used.
753
The assets that are employed in the business process merely provide means, i.e., the 
instruments that enhance workforce productivity, whereby workforce productivity can be 
described as the amount of goods and services produced by workers in any given amount of 
time. The business operation provides the means involved, or the instrument operated by the 
entrepreneur to produce economic wealth accrual. Things such as assets and businesses 
themselves do not produce income. Essentially, no money is made when the shop is closed. 
As the business proceeds from operating a business enterprise are derived by the 
entrepreneur, it would subsequently be the entrepreneur that is regarded as the taxpayer for 
business income tax purposes. The taxpayer involved may be an individual or a firm – i.e., a 
(multinational) group of affiliated corporate bodies governed by its common corporate 
management. Accordingly, the business income tax involved would in the end be levied from 
the firm operating the business enterprise as the economic entrepreneur through its corporate 
management. The ultimate parent company could function as the (principle) taxpayer for 
corporate tax assessment purposes. This holds up, in my view, regardless of who ultimately 
bears the corporate tax imposed. The tax incidence, as previously stated, is unknown. 
In summary, as business income may be identified as remuneration for the provision of the 
production factor of enterprise, the focus should lie on taxing those elements that actually 
constitute the remuneration for this production factor: economic rent. The income derived 
from the other production factors would accordingly be taxed under separate taxes, e.g. 
wages under a wage tax and portfolio investment returns under a savings tax. It also follows 
that these items (wages, portfolio returns) would need to be tax-deductible in determining the 
tax base for business income tax purposes. A corporate income tax should not tax wage 
income; it should also not tax savings income. These items should be taxed in the hands of 
the worker and the portfolio investor respectively. 
To identify the most suitable taxable base in this respect, the following sections scrutinize a 
range of alternative tax bases identified in practice and doctrine. It should be noted that the 
stepping stones and inspiration for the analysis have been found in the work of Howell Zee.
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5.3 No tax environment 
5.3.1 Assessing the investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
To illustrate the effects of the current return to equity-based corporate income tax systems 
adopted throughout the world, as well as the effects under a range of alternative tax bases 
recognized in the literature, it may prove worthwhile to illustrate things by means of a stylized 
running numerical example, a base case. I commence with a ‘no tax environment’ as a point 
of reference. 
Let us return to our corporate taxpayer ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ and its dinghy 
business activities from Chapter 3.  
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 See for a comparison the remarks forwarded by Kemmeren that only individuals produce income. See Eric C.C.M. 
Kemmeren, ‘Source of income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based 
Approach’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 430 (2006), at 430-452. 
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 Cf. Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘Source of income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea for an 
Origin-Based Approach’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 430 (2006), at 430-452. 
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 See particularly Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 
De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
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 Let us assume that Johnson decides to invest in a business activity, a direct
investment in a dinghy selling project in period 1. The business activities are
inconsequentially performed, either domestically or abroad, as this chapter seeks to
identify the proper taxable base rather than its geographic location. That topic is dealt
with in isolation in Chapter 6.
 The investment amounts to €10,000 (‘1’). Johnson finances this investment partly with
debt (‘α’) – an interest bearing bank loan – and partly with equity (‘1 – α’), such as
non-repatriated earnings or newly issued equity capital. The bank loan amounts to
€6,000. The interest rate (‘r’) equals 4% (the inflation component has been included).
The issued principal amount needs to be repaid in period 2. Accordingly, the equity
investment equals €4,000. The opportunity cost of capital – i.e., the return on an
alternative investment in a low-risk normal market rate return yielding investment in a
debt-financing instrument – (‘r’) equals 4% as well (again, including the inflation
component and excluding the risk component – see hereunder). Notably, the concept
of ‘opportunity costs of capital’ may be acknowledged upon the recognition that
Johnson could also have invested its equity capital by lending it to a third party at a
4% interest rate rather than investing it in a dinghy sales activity.
 Let us suppose that Johnson’s investment is profitable. Johnson’s activities produce
economic rents. The gross return equals 5% in period 2. Accordingly, ultimo period 2,
the investment yields a gross return of €10,500 (‘1 + ρ’). The amount of interest paid
equals €240.
755
 The opportunity cost of the equity capital is equal to €160.
756
5.3.2 The benchmark: investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling 
Company’ in a no tax environment 
In a no tax environment, i.e., our point of reference to illustrate the effects under the diverging 
tax bases in the following sections, Johnson’s business activities produce the following 
business cash flows (fig. 32): 
Fig. 32. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement  
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment – 10,000
757
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
758
 Aggregate – 10,000
759
+ 10,500
760
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance + 6,000
761
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
762
 Interest Paid – 240
763
 Aggregate + 6,000
764
– 6,240
765
Aggregate ‘R’ and ‘F’ – 4,000
766
+ 4,260
767
The net outbound cash flow in period 1 equals €4,000, an amount equal to the invested equity 
capital. The net inbound cash flow in period 2 equals €4,260. The net return to the invested 
equity capital (‘v’), €260 or 6.5%,
768
 is comprised of two components. The first component
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 0,04 * 6,000 = 240. 
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 0,04 * 4,000 = 160. 
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 – 1. 
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 1 + ρ. 
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 – 1. 
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 1 + ρ. 
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 α. 
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– α. 
763
– α.r. 
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 α. 
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– α.(1 + r). 
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– (1 – α). 
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 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r). 
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 (4,260 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.065. 0.065 * 100% = 6.5%. Accordingly: v = (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) / (1 – α) – 1 = (ρ – r) / (1 – α) 
+ r. 
216
constitutes the economic rent or excess earnings, i.e., Johnson’s remuneration for the 
provision of the production factor of enterprise (business cash flow). This amounts to €100, 
i.e., 2.5% of the invested equity capital.
769
 The second component constitutes the normal
market return to equity (including inflation) or the opportunity costs of capital, i.e., the 
remuneration for the production factor of capital (savings income). The normal market return 
equals €160, i.e., 4% of the invested equity.
770
5.3.3 Leverage explained 
As Johnson derives excess earnings, he will be able to push the return upwards to the 
invested equity capital by financing its investment in the dinghy sales activity with a higher 
percentage of debt capital. This already is apparent as Johnson, in our example, finances the 
investment with 60% debt and, accordingly, yields a return on its equity investment of 6.5%, 
exceeding the return that he would have yielded if the investment would have been fully 
financed with equity capital. In the event that the return yielded amounts to €500, the return 
rate equals 5%.
771
Assuming that our investor Johnson strives for profit optimization, Johnson will rationally 
continue to invest its equity capital in the profitable dinghy sales activities until the marginal 
return equals the opportunity costs of capital of 4%, in our example.
772
 Johnson will rationally
cease its investment in dinghy sales activities only when the return yielded drops below the 
opportunity costs of capital. Viz., in such a case it proves more profitable to just open up a 
savings account. Should Johnson nevertheless irrationally maintain its investment activities in 
such a case, the gross return rate, for instance, equals a mere 3.5% (or €350), such a return 
would comprise of the aforementioned two components as well. On the one hand, Johnson 
derives a normal market return equal to 4% (€160). On the other hand, Johnson derives 
negative excess earnings equal to €50 (or 1.25%) in the negative.
773
 That is, a marginal loss-
rendering investment accordingly. 
In reality, however, the presence of commercial risks involving the investment would affect the 
amount of debt financing relative to the equity financing. The rate of return to equity that the 
shareholders would require would differentiate dependent on the manner in which the 
respective investment has been financed. To the extent that the investment is partly financed 
with debt, the shareholders involved would require a higher return on the equity provided to 
compensate for the increased level of risk that they incur due to the taking-up of debt capital 
by the firm; for instance, as a result of their subordinated position relative to the creditors 
involved and the firm’s lack of obligation to repay the principal amount. The higher the debt-
to-equity ratio, the higher the required return to equity would be (‘(un)levered cost of equity 
capital’). This stems from the notion that the value of a firm in an efficient market is 
determined by reference to its earning power – taking into account the risks incurred from the 
utilization of the firm’s assets in its business processes and the market value of collateral 
provided
774
 – rather than the manner in which the firm’s activities have been financed.
775
 The
normal return to capital (‘r’), in consequence, changes in reality depending on the firm’s 
earning power and its financing structure. The normal return further differs per chosen type(s) 
of financing arrangement(s) in the debt-equity spectrum. Only the return in excess of the 
normal return rate would accordingly constitute the economic rent. 
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 2.5% * 4,000 = 100. 
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 4% * 4,000 = 160. 
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 500 / 10,000 * 100% = 5.00%. 
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 ρ = r. See for some analysis Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and 
Options for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Economic Paper 2006:264, at 1-60. 
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 On debt financing limitations and their effects under cash flow taxes, see Robin Broadway, Neil Bruce and Jack 
Mintz, On the Neutrality of Flow-of-Funds Corporate Taxation, Economica, New Series, Vol. 50. No. 197 (1983), at 
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 See Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment’, 48 The American Economic Review 261 (1958), at 261-297, and Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, 
‘Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction’, 53 The American Economic Review 433 (1963), at 
433-443. 
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The model forwarded in this study, however, excludes risk from the analysis and fixes ‘r’ on 
4%, regarding both the debt and equity provided. It accordingly simplifies reality. This has 
been done for the sake of simplicity. The point is to illustrate the mechanism, not to argue the 
normal return rate to be fixed regardless of financing structures, debt-to-equity ratios, and firm 
earning powers. It should nevertheless be appreciated that any translation from ‘r’ in the 
model into a ‘proper’ interest rate or set of interest rates for tax law design purposes, for 
instance under an ‘allowance for corporate equity’ mechanism (see section 6 of this chapter 
hereunder), would be very difficult if not impossible to achieve. Each amount chosen would 
operate as a proxy and, in consequence, arbitrarily to some extent. 
5.3.4 Operating through interposed subsidiary ‘Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary 
Co.’ 
Johnson could very well have chosen to invest in the dinghy sales indirectly, i.e., through an 
interposed controlled subsidiary. In such a case, Johnson would set up a corporate entity, say 
‘Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’, and would make the amounts to be invested 
available to this subsidiary. The legal title under which these amounts are made available 
may inconsequentially be debt capital, equity capital or a combination thereof. Economically, 
the legal structuring of the investment in the dinghy distribution, i.e., directly or indirectly via a 
controlled subsidiary, is of no relevance. Viz., Johnson ultimately controls things. The return 
on Johnson’s investment, in our example of 6.5%, does not differentiate as a consequence of 
the legal separation of the dinghy selling activities in a controlled subsidiary. 
5.3.5 The alternative business opportunity: (in)direct investment in dinghy 
distribution business of a third-party 
As an alternative to the (in)direct investment in the dinghy selling activities, Johnson could 
have also invested in the equity capital of a third party. With this it is implied that a minority 
shareholder’s interest is taken on in a participation, a corporate body (in)directly operating a 
business activity, for instance a dinghy distribution business. 
Should such a joint venture in a capital asset yield a return of 6.5%, Johnson, now in the 
position as co-owner of the corporate body (i.e., a minority interest) and, with that, indirectly of 
the underlying business activity, would derive a return comprising of the aforementioned two 
components as well. Johnson would again derive a normal market return of 4% and an 
economic rent of 2.5%. 
It should be noted, however, that this time, it is not Johnson operating the underlying dinghy 
selling activities. The entrepreneur or economic operator now is the respective participation in 
which Johnson holds its non-controlling minority shareholding interest, just as Johnson is the 
entrepreneur in the initial example. That is, he operates the dinghy sales activity itself, directly 
or indirectly through a controlling shareholder’s interest in a subsidiary. When it concerns an 
investment in a minority shareholding interest, Johnson is merely one in a range of 
investors/owners, a party participating in a joint venture. This, however, does not entail that 
Johnson’s return to the investment in such a venture, in summary, would alter in comparison 
with the (in)direct investment in the dinghy selling activities. It remains to equal 6.5%, 
comprising two distinct components: the opportunity costs of capital (4%) and the excess 
earnings as derived by the activities performed by the company involved (2.5%). 
5.4 Problematic effects under conventional corporate income tax 
5.4.1 General remarks 
5.4.1.1 Introducing a typical corporate tax into the model 
Now let us introduce a tax (‘t’) into our example. As said, we are in search of a levy which 
merely taxes Johnson’s excess earnings of €100 in an equitable and neutral manner. Today, 
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under a conventional corporate income tax, this is not the case. Consequently, this reality 
triggers all kinds of distortions and various inequities.  
5.4.1.2 Nominal return to equity 
Under their corporate income tax systems, states basically employ the derived nominal return 
to the invested equity capital as the foundation concept for taxable profit calculation purposes 
rather than stand-alone business cash flows. Equity mutations with origins in the shareholding 
relationship, such as outbound dividend distributions and inbound equity contributions, are not 
recognized for taxable income calculation purposes. 
Neither the opportunity costs of capital nor inflation are taken into consideration.
776
Remunerations for the provision of debt capital and (in)tangible capital, nevertheless, are 
treated distinctively for tax purposes. These are taken into account for taxable profit 
calculation purposes. Accordingly, for instance, contrary to dividend payments, interest 
payments as well as leasehold and royalty payments constitute tax-deductible items. Both the 
remuneration for the provision of the production factor of equity capital and the production 
factor of enterprise are taken into account for taxable corporate income tax calculation 
purposes. 
5.4.1.3 Realization basis 
The attribution of proceeds to tax years occurs under (tax) accounting principles, which 
typically to a (very) large extent correspond with, if not operate equal to, common business 
economics and accounting principles (e.g. the reality, matching, realization and prudence 
principles).
777
Under the realization principle, proceeds are typically taxed upon realization rather than, for 
instance, upon payment.
778
 Accordingly, accrued yet unrealized income typically remains
untaxed, while realized income is taxable, hence, tax-favoring the first over the latter.
779
 This
entails tax deferral issues in respect of unrealized net accretions of wealth. Notably, tax 
deferral, i.e., the occurrence and presence of hidden reserves, as well as the spin-off exit 
taxation issues, may for instance be resolved by adopting fair market or ‘mark-to-market’ 
value corporate income tax accounting. Such a modification would enhance the appreciation 
of the S-H-S concept of income.
780
776
 Inflation is currently typically recognized indirectly in taxation, i.e., by annually resetting the tax brackets. This is 
not further discussed. 
777
 As an illustration, reference can be made to the Netherlands, which applies the so-called ‘principle of sound 
business practice’, for this purpose. The principle is laid down in Article 8 of the Dutch CITA in conjunction with Article 
3.25 of the Dutch IITA 2001. For a brief discussion of the concept, see Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – 
Key practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international (2011), at 447-470.  
778
 As the timing of payments generally is irrelevant, the taxable event cannot be delayed by delaying the payments. 
Notably, under the cash flow taxes analyzed
 
in section 7, such a deferral issue would not be present as all cash 
flows, both inward bound and outward bound cash flows trigger tax effects. The first would trigger a tax payable, the 
second a tax refund. Accordingly, it would be of no use to delay payments as that would not only delay the tax liability 
but also the tax refund of the business partner with whom the business transaction has been arranged.  
779
 Accordingly, the theoretical S-H-S concept of income is not implemented to its full extent at this point. For 
example, most states do not tax capital gains on an accrual basis, but postpone corporate taxation up until the 
moment that the capital gain has been realized. See OECD Tax Policy Studies, Fundamental Reform of Corporate 
Income Tax, No. 16, OECD, Paris, 2007. 
780
 Please note that I do not have a conceptual problem with this. See for a comparison Kevin Holmes, The Concept 
of Income; A Multidisciplinary analysis (2001), at 570. Holmes cites Richard Krever, ‘Structural Issues in the Taxation 
of Capital Gains’, 1 Australian Tax Forum 164 (1984), at 171, who argues that there is no persuasive reason for 
favoring the taxpayer who has difficulty finding cash for her taxes because she keeps her income in appreciated 
assets over the taxpayer who has similar problems because she prefers to consume with all her income rather than 
pay taxes. Holmes argues that arising liquidity problems could be overcome, for instance, by allowing taxpayers to 
defer payment of taxes on unrealized
 
net wealth accretions where interest is charged during the deferral period. Such 
a mechanism may already be found in the international tax regime. An example is the Dutch ‘preserved assessment’ 
levied in respect of taxpayers, individuals, having substantial corporate shareholdings in Dutch resident companies, 
upon their emigration to abroad. 
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5.4.1.4 Tax depreciation 
Common business economics and commercial accounting also employs both the return to 
equity and fair market value standards for profit calculation.
781
 To ascertain that income is
taxed when accrued, investments generally are capitalized rather than expensed. 
Alternatively, tax-deductible depreciation terms, write-offs, amortizations and write downs or 
impairments become available (‘d’). Conceptually, tax depreciation seeks to correspond with 
true economic depreciation.
782
However, tax depreciation is often utilized as a fiscal policy instrument as well, and is 
consequently typically subject to country-specific mutually diverging arbitrary rules and 
mechanisms.
783
 This exacerbates tax deferral issues. In addition, it is common that
investments in non-location specific intangible assets are typically tax treated favorably 
relative to location specific tangible assets. 
Tax-deductible losses suffered in a particular tax year generally do not lead to a tax refund, 
but rather may typically be carried back to (a) previous year(s) or carried forward to (a) 
subsequent year(s) at their nominal amounts. The absence of tax refunds ascertains revenue 
so as to avoid exposure to private sector investments risks. 
5.4.2 The effects involving a direct investment 
5.4.2.1 Assessing the investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
Let us return to our taxpayer Johnson and its dinghy business activities. As said, Johnson 
invests in a dinghy selling project. Assume that the corporate income tax rate equals a linear 
25%; progressivity is not considered here merely for the sake of simplicity. Under a 
conventional corporate income tax, the effects are as follows (fig. 33): 
Fig. 33. Johnson’s CIT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s CIT calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,500
784
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Financing Expenses (interest) 0 – 240
785
 Depreciation 0 – 10,000
786
 Aggregate 0 – 10,240
787
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount)  0 + 260
788
Tax*
) 
(25%) 0 + 65
789
781
 Various tax scholars discuss the question of whether and to which extent a convergence of tax accounting 
principles, rules and concepts and commercial accounting principles, rules and concepts is desirable. And the 
derivative question of which of these areas and to what extent they should advance in a certain direction; often 
referred to as ‘(umgekehrte) Massgeblichkeit’). See on this matter, Wolfgang Schön, ‘International Accounting 
Standards – A “Starting Point” for a Common European Tax Base?’, 44 European taxation 426 (2004), at 426-440, 
and Lida Jaatinen, ‘IAS/IFRS: A Starting Point for the CCCTB?’, 40 Intertax 260 (2012, No. 4), at 260-269. Krever 
and Burns set forth that uniformity between tax and financial accounting may seem desirable. See Lee Burns et al, 
‘Taxation of Income from Business and Investment’, in Victor Thuronyi et al, Tax Law Design and Drafting (1998), at 
Chapter 16. These questions are not further discussed in this study. 
782
 Tax depreciation mechanisms typically seek to correspond with the economic lifetime of the respective asset, i.e., 
the period over which an asset is expected to be of economic use. 
783
 For analyses see Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for 
Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264. The authors demonstrate that various OECD Member States subject location specific assets such 
as real estate situated within their territories to relatively high effective taxation rates in comparison to mobile 
production factors – broadening the tax base to that extent to finance statutory tax rate reductions. 
784
 1 + ρ. 
785
– α.r. 
786
 – d. 
787
– α.r – d. 
788
 (500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 260. Accordingly: (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d). 
789
 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 65. Accordingly: t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
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*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable.
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 34): 
Fig. 34. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
790
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
791
 Aggregate – 10,000
792
+ 10,500  
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
793
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
794
 Interest Paid – 240
795
 Aggregate + 6,000
796
– 6,240
797
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
(25%)  0 + 65
798
Aggregate  – 4,000
799
+ 4,195
800
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable.
The net outbound cash flow in period 1 equals €4,000, an amount equal to the equity capital 
Johnson invested. The transactions in period 1 do not constitute a taxable event under a 
conventional corporate income tax. The net inbound cash flow in period 2 nevertheless alters 
in comparison with the no tax environment. Now, the inflow in period 2 equals €4,195. The net 
post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vCIT’) equals €195, a percentage of 4.875.
801
What does this tell us? The numbers tell us three things (see sections 5.4.2.2, 5.4.2.3 and 
5.4.2.4). 
5.4.2.2 Average Effective Tax Rates; the ‘tax-wedge’ 
First, it tells us something about the average effective tax rate (‘AETR’) under a conventional 
corporate income tax.
 
The AETR is calculated by dividing the tax payable (numerator) by the 
pre-tax income (denominator).
802
 The tax payable to be adopted in the numerator equals €65.
With respect to the amount to be adopted in the denominator, the following remarks should be 
made. Johnson’s pre-tax return of €260, as said, comprises of two components. The first 
component amounting to €100 refers to the excess earnings, the remuneration for the 
production factor of enterprise. The second component amounting to €160 refers to the 
normal market return rate (opportunity costs of capital), the remuneration for the equity capital 
provided. Which of these amounts should be taken into consideration?
803
790
 – 1. 
791
 1 + ρ. 
792
 – 1. 
793
 α. 
794
– α. 
795
– α.r. 
796
 α. 
797
– α.(1 + r). 
798
 t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
799
– (1 – α). 
800
 (1 – α) + (1 – t ).(ρ – α.r) – t. (1 – d). 
801
 (4,195 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.04875. Accordingly: vCIT = (1 – α) + (1 – t ).(ρ – α.r) – t. (1 – d) / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t).[(ρ – r) / 
(1 – α) + r] – t.(1 –d) / (1 – α). 
802
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. See also Martin Ruf, ‘The Economic Unit of Effective 
Tax Rates’, 3 World Tax Journal 226 (2011), at 226-246. 
803
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for 
Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, who refer to concerns as to whether it is suitable to find a proper measure of profit to use as the 
denominator.  
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Would the pre-tax nominal return to equity, €260, be adopted as denominator for AETR 
calculation purposes, the outcome would be an AETR equal to 25%.
804
 Viz., the post-tax
nominal return on the invested equity capital equals 75% of the pre-tax nominal return on the 
invested equity capital. The difference between the pre-tax return, 6.5%, and the post-tax 
return, 4.875%, is 1.625%, sometimes referred to as the ‘tax-wedge’, and is equal to the pre-
tax nominal return to equity multiplied by the employed tax rate of, in this case, 25%.
805
Despite the practice that the AETR calculation as performed here is the one as typically 
employed, I nevertheless doubt whether the proper amount as a denominator has been 
adopted. Are we comparing apples and oranges? Perhaps one should just consider business 
cash flows in this respect. I would favor adopting that approach. Namely, if one recognizes 
that savings – the remuneration for the provision of capital – should not be taxed under a 
business income tax as such a tax should merely tax the remuneration for the production 
factor of enterprise; the normal market rate of return should a fortiori also not be taken into 
account for AETR calculation purposes. Provided that one recognizes that the actual 
business cash flow derived from the dinghy selling activities, i.e., the earnings exceeding the 
normal market rate of return which account for a mere €100, the AETR under a conventional 
corporate income tax exceeds its statutory tax rate as it disregards the opportunity costs of 
capital for tax calculation purposes. Under that point of reference, i.e., if the pre-tax excess 
earnings equal to €100 is adopted as the denominator for AETR calculation purposes, the 
AETR calculation in our example produces an AETR equal to 65%.
806
 Accordingly, such an
above statutory AETR under a conventional corporate income tax should be considered unfair 
as it does not reflect economic reality. This holds true also in cases where states tax savings 
under a portfolio investment income tax de facto producing an economic double taxation of 
savings income.
807
This being said, moreover, a conventional corporate income tax only produces an AETR 
equal to 25% (or 65% when employing pre-tax excess earnings as the denominator), in the 
event that the tax depreciation employed for tax calculation purposes corresponds with 
economic depreciation.
808
 Would tax depreciation and economic depreciation mutually
diverge, the wedge between pre-tax and post-tax rates of return would grow bigger or smaller 
dependent on facts and circumstances causing the AETRs to fluctuate accordingly. If tax 
depreciation, for instance, would be limited to 95% relative to the economic depreciation, the 
effective return on Johnson’s dinghy sales activity would reduce. In such a case, the tax 
payable would equal €190,
809
 lowering the nominal return to equity rate to 1.75%.
810
 Should
tax deprecation, for instance under an investment allowance, be 102% relative to the 
economic depreciation, the effective return on Johnson’s dinghy sales activity would increase. 
In such a case, the tax payable would equal €15,
811
 increasing the nominal return to equity
rate to 6.125%.
812
Tax wedge affects investment location decisions 
Consequently, divergences between tax depreciation and economic depreciation affect 
location investment decisions, i.e., the economic operator’s decision as to where to produce. 
This explains the wide range of states adopting a multitude of investment allowances, 
(accelerated) depreciation allowances or (even) tax holidays in their international tax systems. 
In today’s globalizing economy, this particularly holds true in respect of mobile intangible 
assets which, as said, typically are treated favorably for tax purposes relative to less mobile 
tangible assets. The plain and simple reason for states adopting such tax incentives is to 
attract business operations to their jurisdictions, i.e., the carrots regimes referred to in 
804
 65 / 260 * 100% = 25%. 
805
 6.5% – 4.875% = 0.25 * 6.5%. Accordingly: v – vCIT = t.[ v + (1 – d) / (1 – α)]. 
806
 65 / 100 * 100% = 65%. 
807
 The question as to whether savings should be taxed in the first place, as said, is not considered in this study. 
808
 d = 1. 
809
 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 9,500)] = 190. 
810
 (4,070 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.0175. 
811
 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,200)] = 15. 
812
 (4,245 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.06125. 
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Chapter 1.
813
 Notably, the tax responsiveness to investment locations is addressed in Chapter
6.  
The distortive effects caused by the differences created by states between the ‘tax reality’ and 
‘actual (economic) reality’ prove distortive and with that non-equitable. Obviously, provided 
that all other circumstances are equal, a lower AETR in one state relative to the AETR 
imposed by another state will drive an entrepreneur striving for profit optimization to invest in 
the first mentioned state. This holds true as income is attributed to taxing jurisdictions by 
means of origin based profit allocation factors.  
It is no secret that states compete with each other to attract business activities. Relatively 
higher AETRs drive investments abroad. Various studies verify that AETRs affect business 
decisions as to where to produce.
814
 This effect is exacerbated as economic rents produced
by multinational firms become increasingly non-location-specific as a consequence of 
globalization, the internet, and the high mobility of their most valuable resources: the 
multinational firm’s intangibles. Multinationals prove flexible in their decisions as to where to 
produce and, hence, are able to geographically transfer their income producing resources in 
response to tax.
815
 The relative value of location-specific tangible assets in today’s economy,
for instance real estate, is on the decline. And with that, the same is true with regard to 
location-specific rents. 
Logical reasoning entails the recognition of states playing a zero sum game. The attraction of 
business activities to a certain state by means of its tax incentives necessarily triggers mutual 
spill-over effects. The attraction to one state is necessarily at the cost of another. A favorable 
tax climate in one state works to the disadvantage of any other state. It has been verified that 
this triggers tax competition in practice rather than tax cooperation.
816
 That is, the provision of
even more favorable tax treatment by the other state to ‘outsmart’ its competitors results in 
the renowned ‘race to the bottom’ fuelled by ever-increasing globalization.
817
 And this may 
perhaps entail a zero business income tax (revenue) in the end. Notably, as previously stated, 
the attribution of profits to taxing jurisdictions is further assessed as an isolated issue in 
Chapter 6. 
813
 See for some analysis and literature references Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union 
– Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
814
 See for instance Huizinga and Laeven who find evidence in support of profit shifting in Harry Huizinga et al, 
‘International profit shifting within multinationals: a multi-country perspective’, European Commission Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Paper 2006:260. See also Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxes in the 
EU New Member States and the Location of Capital and Profit’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper 2007:0703, Michael P. Devereux, ‘Business taxation in a globalized World’, 24 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 625, (2008), at 625-638, Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘Do countries compete over corporate tax 
rates?’, 92 Journal of Public Economics 1210 (2008), at 1210-1235, and Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘Taxing 
Multinationals’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 2000:7920. 
815
 See Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working 
Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008), at 17-
18. See also Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax
and Public Finance 93 (2011), at section 3.3. 
816
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Business taxation in a globalized World’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 625, 
(2008), at 625-638 and Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘Taxing Multinationals’, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 2000:7920. Worth mentioning also is Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton 
Project Discussion Paper 2010. Auerbach notes the steady decline of US corporate tax revenues as a share of 
national income, as well as the international pressure, also felt in the US, to reduce rates while attracting foreign 
business activities. Further, see Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 
21
st
 Century (2008), at section 4.2. Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and 
Options for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Economic Paper 2006:264, find support for concluding that tax revenues in corporate income weighted by gross 
domestic product remained broadly stable. This is not further discussed. 
817
 See on this matter, e.g., Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options 
for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264. 
223
5.4.2.3 Financing discrimination; distorting financing decisions 
Second, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement above tells us something about 
the effects of financing decisions. These heavily influence the AETR imposed under a 
conventional corporate income tax. Taking the returns on the investment in the dinghy sales 
activity forwarded in the above as a given, the AETR, under a conventional corporate income 
tax, could vary with a factor of 5 dependent on the manner in which Johnson had financed its 
investment.  
As demonstrated, a conventional corporate income tax taxes the nominal return to equity. 
Both the excess earnings (€100) and the opportunity costs of capital (€160) are taken into 
consideration for corporate income tax calculation purposes. These components respectively 
produce €25 and €40, i.e., an aggregate of €65 payable corporate income tax. Inflation is not 
taken into consideration. 
Had Johnson financed the dinghy sales activity entirely with debt,
818
 the conventional
corporate income tax would have produced a different tax liability in comparison with the base 
case scenario. In that event, merely the excess earnings amounting to €100 would have been 
taxed. The tax payable would have accounted for €25 instead of €65.
819
 Accordingly, the tax
burden imposed would have dropped significantly. Had Johnson financed the dinghy sales 
activity entirely with equity,
820
 the conventional corporate income tax would have produced a
different tax liability in comparison with the base case scenario as well. In that event, the 
entire return to equity amounting to €500 would have been taxed. The tax payable would 
have accounted for €125 instead of €65.
821
Accordingly, 100% debt financing of the investment would have entailed a tax payable of €25, 
while 100% equity financing would have entailed a tax payable of €125. The AETR imposed 
varies with a factor of 5 dependent on the question of whether and to what extent Johnson 
financed its activities with debt or equity. No significant economic differences exist between 
debt and equity financing (absent gradual risk differentials), as both in the end merely 
constitute a remuneration for the making available of monetary capital to finance economic 
activity. The distinctive tax treatment, dependent on the chosen financing arrangements, may 
accordingly be referred to as a discriminatory property in conventional corporate income tax 
systems distorting taxpayers’ financing decisions (‘financing discrimination’). 
Under a conventional corporate income tax, taxpayers are encouraged to finance investment 
with as much debt as possible. Seen from that perspective, the corporate income tax system 
basically subsidizes debt financing relative to equity financing. It encourages taxpayers to 
take on debt rather than finance business with equity. As this conflicts with the neutrality 
principle, this financing discrimination provides an inequitable property of a conventional 
corporate income tax system heavily in need of being resolved.  
5.4.2.4 Marginal Effective Tax Rates; distortions at the margin 
Third, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement above tells us something about the 
marginal effective tax rate (‘METR’) under a conventional corporate income tax system. The 
METR is calculated by measuring the tax burden on an additional unit of pre-tax income.
822
The non-neutralities induced by the distinctive tax treatment of debt and equity financing 
appear even more starkly when the corporate income tax’s METR is looked into. Suppose 
that Johnson’s investment in the dinghy selling activities would have yielded a return equal to 
the opportunity costs of capital of, in our example, 4%, i.e., €400.
823
 The marginal return on
the investment equals its costs. In the case that the remaining facts and circumstances are 
818
 α = 1. 
819
 0.25 * (500 – 400) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 25. 
820
 1 – α = 1; α = 0. 
821
 0.25 * 500 + (10,000 – 10,000) = 125. 
822
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. 
823
 ρ = r. 
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equal to those in the base case scenario, i.e., Johnson employed €4,000 equity and €6,000 
debt to finance its investment, the tax payable on the normal market return rate – the 
opportunity costs of capital – would equal €40.
824
 Accordingly, despite the fact that Johnson’s
marginal return equals nil, he would be liable to pay tax. Had Johnson financed the dinghy 
sales activity entirely with debt, the tax payable at the margin would equal nil.
825
 100% equity
financing would have produced a tax payable of €100.
826
 Hence, the corporate income tax
payable at the margin ranges between nil and €100 dependent on Johnson’s financing 
decision. 
METRs fluctuate significantly, dependent on whether Johnson financed its marginal 
investment with debt or equity. Only in the event that Johnson had financed its investment 
with 100% debt, the METR would equal nil. In each scenario where equity financing plays a 
role, the METR equals an infinite amount (‘∞’). This is caused by the fact that under a 
conventional corporate income tax system, the opportunity costs of capital are not taken into 
consideration when calculating the tax payable. This discriminatory tax treatment encourages 
taxpayers to finance their investments, especially those at the margin, with debt. 
The financing discrimination features may even drive taxpayers to choose to finance with debt 
where they, for one reason or another, would have chosen equity financing in a no tax 
environment. In my view, this is undesirable. Financing discrimination issues in corporate 
taxation under conventional corporate income tax system again are seriously in need of being 
resolved. Some even argue that, since the corporate income tax encourages excessive 
corporate borrowings, the corporate income tax has contributed to the recent financial and 
economic crises.
827
5.4.3 The effects that arise when it involves an (in)direct investment through an 
interposed controlled subsidiary  
5.4.3.1 Assessing the investment returns through interposed subsidiary ‘Johnson’s 
Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’ 
In addition, as previously stated, Johnson could very well have chosen to invest in the dinghy 
sales activity indirectly, i.e., through an interposed controlled subsidiary, referred to as 
‘Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’ 
Economically, things would not substantially alter. The investment and its return in our 
example would remain identical (1sub = 1; ρsub = ρ). In this respect, the legal structuring of the 
investment in the dinghy business, i.e., directly or indirectly via a controlled subsidiary, is of 
no significance as Johnson controls the undertaking. This, however, is untrue when it 
concerns the tax effects under a conventional corporate income tax. While ignoring economic 
reality, states typically maintain the approach of taxing corporate entities on an individual 
basis, even if these entities belong to a (multinational) firm or group. This ‘separate entity 
approach’ or ‘separate accounting’, has already been thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4. 
Legal reality is respected for corporate income tax calculation purposes even when it does not 
correspond with actual (economic) reality. 
5.4.3.2 The effects of the deviation between the ‘corporate income tax reality’ and the 
‘actual reality’ are significant 
Intra-firm financing not governed by market forces yet affect tax levels 
824
 0.25 * [(400 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 40. 
825
 0.25 * [(400 – 400) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 0. Cf. Charles E. Mclure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax : Lambs 
in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et al, The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 336, following Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, ‘Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital’, 2 Journal of Public Economics 1 (1973), at 1-
34.  
826
 0.25 * [400 + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 100. 
827
 See, for instance, Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. 
225
The effects of the deviation between the ‘corporate income tax reality’ and the ‘actual reality’ 
are significant. Upon its decision to invest in a dinghy sales activity indirectly, Johnson may 
randomly decide to make the funds extracted from the capital markets (€4,000 equity capital, 
€6,000 debt capital) available to its subsidiary in terms of legal titles. Johnson could, for 
instance, make the funds available to its subsidiary under the exact same legal terms and 
titles as it has extracted them from the capital market (αsub = α; 1 – αsub = 1 – α; rsub = r). This, 
however, is not a necessity.  
As Johnson controls its subsidiary, Johnson has total autonomy in its decisions in this 
respect. Johnson could make the funds available under each arbitrary legal title or term it 
finds appropriate (αsub ≠ α; 1 – αsub ≠ 1 – α; rsub ≠ r). Viz., the relationship between Johnson 
and its subsidiary is not governed by market forces where the commercial interests of 
independent contracting partners are necessarily opposing. Yet, this economically arbitrary 
legal reality created between Johnson and ‘Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’ is, in 
principle, respected for corporate income tax calculation purposes. Moreover, the tax regimes 
applied to Johnson and its subsidiary are not necessarily identical (tsub ≠ t; dsub ≠ d). 
Obviously, in a globalizing economy, this dichotomy provides various tax planning 
opportunities. 
As conventional corporate income tax systems typically recognize corporate entities as 
separate taxpayers, even when they are part of the same multinational firm, effects now are 
recognized at two levels. First, they are recognized at the level of Johnson’s Dinghy Sales 
Subsidiary Co. in regards to the returns on the investment in the dinghy selling activities. 
Second, they are recognized at the level of Johnson upon the repatriation of the post-tax 
earnings. 
To explore the effects of this in terms of actual tax burdens, let us first assume that Johnson 
makes the funds available to its subsidiary under the exact same legal terms and titles as it 
has extracted them from the capital markets. Moreover, let us assume that the post-tax 
returns, as derived by Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co., immediately are repatriated to 
Johnson, e.g. by means of a dividend distribution (or alternatively assume mark-to-market 
value corporate income tax accounting will apply). 
Under a conventional corporate income tax, the tax calculations at the level of Johnson’s 
Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co. are identical to those as set forth in the previous section 5.4.2. 
These are as follows (the repetition of the table is for the sake of convenience– fig. 35): 
Fig. 35. Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’s CIT Calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Dinghy Sales 
Subsidiary Co’s CIT Calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,500 
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Financing Expenses (interest) 0 – 240 
 Depreciation 0 – 10,000 
 Aggregate 0 – 10,240 
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) 0 + 260 
Tax*
) (25%) 0 + 65 
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable.
The repatriation of the post-tax earnings constitutes a taxable event at the level of Johnson. If 
dividend taxation is assumed to be absent – i.e., dividend taxation is non-existent, a dividend 
tax exemption applies, or the dividend tax is fully creditable against corporate income tax – 
the effects are as follows (fig. 36): 
Fig. 36. Johnson’s CIT Calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s CIT Calculation 
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Earnings 
 Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,435
828
 Aggregate 0 + 10,435 
Costs 
 Financing Expenses (interest) 0 – 240
829
 Depreciation 0 – 10,000
830
 Aggregate 0 – 10,240
831
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) 0 + 195
832
Tax*
) 
(25%) 0 + 48,75
833
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows. Notably, the intra-
firm cash flows, i.e., those between Johnson and Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co., are 
ignored for their lack of economic substance (fig. 37):
834
Fig. 37. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment – 10,000
835
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
836
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500 
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
837
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
838
 Interest Paid – 240
839
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
840
Tax Levy 
Tax Johnson’s Dinghy Sales 
Subsidiary Co*
) 
 0 + 65
841
Tax Johnson*
)
  0  + 48.75
842
Aggregate  0  + 113.75
843
Aggregate  – 4,000
844
+ 4,146.25
845
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. 
828
 10,500 – 65 = 10,435. Accordingly: 1 + ρ + tsub.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – dsub)].  
829
– α.r. 
830
 – d. For simplicity reasons, it is assumed that d = dsub. 
831
– α.r – d. 
832
 (500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000) – 65 = 195. Accordingly: (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + t.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – dsub)]. 
833
 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000) – 65] = 48.75. Accordingly: t.{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + tsub.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – 
dsub)]}. 
834
 This supplementary assumption seems justified as intra-group transactions and their equivalent intra-group cash 
flows necessarily lack economic substance. See for a comparison, commercial accounting standards, who call for 
commercial consolidation of the group companies’ stand-alone records. See, for instance, IAS 27. 
835
 – 1. 
836
 1 + ρ. 
837
 α. 
838
– α. 
839
– α.r. 
840
– α.(1 + r). 
841
 t.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – dsub)]. 
842
 t.{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + t.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – dsub)]}. 
843
 65 + 48.75 = 113.75. Accordingly: tsub.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – dsub)] + t.{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + tsub.[(ρ – αsub.rsub) + (1 – 
dsub)]}. Under the assumptions tsub = t; αsub = α; 1 – αsub = 1 – α; r sub = r; dsub = d this formula may alternatively be 
referred to as: [1 – (1 – t)
2
].[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. The mathematical involution with the characteristic 2 illustrates the tax 
cascading effects. Under the same assumptions, the aggregate tax impost upon the inter-positioning of an x-amount 
corporate entities may be calculated by reducing the return on the investment with a figure equal to the taxable 
corporate income tax base multiplied with a factor (1 – t)
x
, whereby x represents the number of interposed corporate 
entities. Accordingly: [(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)] – {[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)].(1 – t)
x
}. The mathematical involution with characteristic 
x illustrates the tax cascading effects under the separate entity approach. 
844
– (1 – α). 
845
Under the assumptions tsub = t; αsub = α; 1 – αsub = 1 – α; r sub = r; dsub = d, accordingly: (1 – α) + (1 – t)
2
.(ρ – α.r) – [1 
– (1 – t)
2
].(1 – d). The gross investment return, while recognizing the aggregate tax impost upon the inter-positioning 
of an x-amount corporate entities may be calculated by multiplying the taxable corporate income tax base with a 
factor (1 – t)
x
, whereby x represents the number of interposed corporate entities. Accordingly: (1 – α) + (1 – t)
x
.(ρ – 
α.r) – [1 – (1 – t)
x
].(1 – d). 
227
Introducing separate accounting; additional effects 
What are the additional effects under the separate entity approach? In comparison with those 
in the case of a direct investment, two additional effects arise in the case of an indirect 
investment through a subsidiary. 
Tax cascading / multiple taxation 
First, in addition to the already acknowledged effect that the tax recognizes the nominal return 
to equity for tax calculation purposes rather than the mere excess earnings, the separate 
entity approach causes tax cascading or economic multiple taxation when a multitude of 
corporate entities are being employed. The tables clearly demonstrate that the return to equity 
amounting to €260 is subject to tax cascading. Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co. is 
liable to pay €65 tax. Upon the post-tax profit repatriation, Johnson is subsequently liable to 
pay €48.75 tax. The aggregate amount of tax due is €113.75. The net outbound 
(economically substantive) cash flow in period 1 equals €4,000, an amount equal to the 
invested equity capital. Again, the transactions in period 1 are not considered to constitute a 
taxable event under a conventional corporate income tax. The net inbound cash flow in period 
2 nevertheless alters in comparison with the direct investment under a conventional corporate 
income tax. Now, the inflow in period 2 equals €4,146.25. The net return to the invested 
equity capital (‘vCIT
2
’) equals €146.25, a percentage of 3.656 (instead of 4.875 in the case of a
direct investment in the dinghy sales activity).
846
 Under a 25% tax rate, each additional
interposed subsidiary would cause the post-tax return rate to drop with a factor of 0.75.
847
This significant decrease in post-tax investment returns, as caused by an increase of the 
AETR upon the inter-positioning of corporate entities, obviously distorts costs and prices. It 
also interferes with decisions, for instance on the choice of legal form. This is both inequitable 
and non-neutral and, therefore, unfair (see also Chapters 2 and 4). 
The occurrence of economic double taxation or tax cascading as caused by the adoption of 
the separate entity approach is a well-known property of the conventional corporate income 
tax. Tax legislators in various states recognize these distorting effects. It inspired many to try 
to remedy them through the adoption of, often technically complex, double tax relief 
measures. Examples of these are the participation exemption or indirect (imputation) credit 
regimes. These regimes are regularly adopted in conjunction with the application of a 0% 
dividend tax rate or dividend tax exemption with respect to intra-group dividend distributions. 
Participation exemption regimes exclude the proceeds from equity interests from the taxable 
base at the level of the shareholder, who in this case is Johnson. Indirect credit regimes 
provide for a mechanism enabling taxpayers – shareholders – to credit the underlying 
corporate income tax that is levied at the level of the corporate bodies in which they hold their 
shareholding interests against the corporate income tax that is levied on the (grossed-up) 
proceeds from these equity investments. The European Union Parent Subsidiary Directive, 
requiring the Member States to adopt either an exemption mechanism or an indirect credit 
mechanism with respect to inter-company dividend distributions – accompanied with a 
dividend withholding tax exemption – can be mentioned in this respect as well. The operation 
of these regimes is discussed in section 5.4.4. 
Recognition of intra-group transactions / arbitrary profit shifting 
Second, under the separate entity approach, as said, intra-group transactions are recognized 
for corporate income tax calculation purposes. Johnson may randomly decide to make the 
funds extracted from the capital markets available to its subsidiary in terms of legal titles. As 
846
 (4,146.25 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.03656. Under the assumptions tsub = t; αsub = α; 1 – αsub = 1 – α; r sub = r; dsub = d, 
accordingly: vCIT
2 
= (1 – α) + (1 – t)
2
. (ρ – α.r) – [1 – (1 – t)
2
] . (1 – d) / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t)
2
. [(ρ – r) / (1 – α) + r] – [1 – 
(1 – t)
2
].(1 – d) / (1 – α). 
847
For instance, the post-tax return rate on the investment upon the inter-positioning of 3 corporate entities, ‘vCIT
3
’,
would equal 3.656% * 0.75 = 2.74%. Under the forwarded assumptions (i.e., αsub = α; 1 – αsub = 1 – α; r sub = r; dsub = 
d), the post-tax return rate upon the inter-positioning of an x-amount corporate entities may be calculated by referring 
to the formula: vCIT
x 
= (1 – α) + (1 – t)
x
.(ρ – α.r) – [1 – (1 – t)
x
].(1 – d) / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t)
x
.[(ρ – r) / (1 – α) + r] – [1 – (1 
– t)
x
].(1 – d) / (1 – α). 
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these legal titles are recognized for corporate income tax calculation purposes, this reality, 
i.e., in conjunction with the aforementioned financing discrimination feature in the
conventional corporate income tax, enables Johnson to de facto arbitrarily transfer its taxable 
base between itself and its subsidiary. Viz., Johnson does not necessarily need to make the 
funds available to its subsidiary under the exact same legal terms and titles as he obtained 
them from the capital market (αsub = α; 1 – αsub = 1 – α; rsub = r). 
Basically, two scenarios, or a combination thereof, become available. Johnson could decide 
to finance its subsidiary completely with equity (scenario 1) or completely with debt (scenario 
2). 
Scenario 1. Johnson finances its subsidiary completely with equity (αsub = 0; 1 – αsub = 
1). In terms of effective tax burdens imposed, this scenario would turn out less 
favorably in comparison with the effects under a direct investment in the dinghy 
distribution business. The tax payable at the level of Johnson’s Dinghy Sales 
Subsidiary Co would equal €125.
848
 Upon the repatriation of the post-tax earnings,
which in this scenario equals €375,
849
 Johnson would be liable to pay an additional
tax at an amount of €33.75.
850
 An aggregate tax liability of €158.75 and an AETR of
61.1%
851
 (or 158.75% to the extent excess earnings are employed as the
denominator).
852
 The net post-tax nominal return to equity would equal €101.25, a
percentage of 2.53 (instead of the aforementioned 4.875% in the case where 
Johnson invests in the dinghy selling activities directly).
853
Scenario 2. Johnson finances its subsidiary completely with debt (αsub = 1; 1 – αsub = 
0). If Johnson makes the funds withdrawn from the capital market available to its 
subsidiary under an interest bearing loan agreement, for instance a loan carrying 
interest at a rate of 5% (rsub ≠ r), the tax burden imposed would decrease 
substantially. Due to the recognition of, in principle, a tax-deductible interest expense 
of €500 (0.05 * 10,000) at the level of Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co., its tax 
payable would equal nil.
854
 Johnson however would be liable to pay tax on the
interest receipts. The taxable base would equal €260
855
 on which €65 tax becomes
due.
856
 That is, an aggregate tax of €65 and an AETR of 25%
857
 (or 65% to the extent
that excess earnings are employed as the denominator).
 858
 The net post-tax rate of
nominal return to equity would equal €195, a percentage of 4.875, which is equal to 
the investment return in the case that Johnson would invest in the dinghy selling 
activities directly.
859
This example makes apparent once again that conventional corporate income taxation 
provides an incentive to finance subsidiaries with as much of intra-group debt as possible 
against interest rates that are as high as possible. The phenomenon is typically referred to as 
‘thin capitalization’. This incentive to finance subsidiaries with debt occurs in addition to the 
debt financing incentives mentioned in the above. 
So, conventional corporate income tax systems provide for an additional incentive to finance 
operational subsidiaries with debt to transfer taxable profits within the group to, in this case, 
the shareholder. Is this problematic, for instance in terms of tax revenues to be collected? 
Apart from the initial financing discrimination issues already explored earlier, the answer is in 
the negative, provided that all investment and business activities occur within the same taxing 
848
 0.25 * 500 + (10,000 – 10,000) = 125. 
849
 500 – 125 = 375. 
850
 0.25 * (375 – 240) = 33.75.  
851
 158.75 / 260 * 100% = 61.1%. 
852
 158.75 / 100 * 100% = 158.75 %. 
853
 (4,101.25 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.02531. 
854
 0.25 * (500 – 500) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 0. 
855
 500 – 240 = 260. 
856
 0.25 * 260 = 65. 
857
 65 / 260 * 100% = 25%. 
858
 65 / 100 * 100% = 65%. 
859
 (4,195 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.04875. 
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jurisdiction (tsub = t). In such a case, all that happens is that the tax now is collected from 
another group company rather than from the respective operational subsidiary. 
Taking things cross-border; the arbitrage risks revealed 
The answer to this question, however, is in the affirmative in the case where the investment 
and business activities do not occur within the same taxing jurisdiction but in a cross-border 
context (tsub ≠ t’). In such a case, the financing discrimination issues are starkly exacerbated 
as a consequence of the employed separate entity approach. Please allow me to elaborate 
on the matter hereunder.  
In a cross-border scenario, the transfer of taxable profits from, in this case, the subsidiary to 
its shareholder simultaneously entails a transfer of its taxable base – and tax revenue 
accordingly – from one tax jurisdiction to another. If the group entity / creditor operates in a 
taxing jurisdiction other than the state in which the group entity / debtor operates, the latter 
sees its tax revenues decrease due to the tax deductible intra-group interest expense. If the 
creditor operates from a relatively lower tax (t’ < tsub) or even non-tax jurisdiction (t’ = o) 
jurisdiction, the overall effective tax burden may decrease significantly as a consequence of 
the tax deductible interest expense in one jurisdiction not being compensated with a taxable 
interest receipt in the other. Were Johnson, for instance, to reside for tax purposes in a tax 
jurisdiction exempting the respective interest receipts, the overall tax burden imposed on 
Johnson and its subsidiary for the investment’s return would be nil. Notably, that would be in 
addition to the recognized inter-jurisdictional tax revenue transfer. 
Such a loophole may, for instance, be caused by beneficial tax regimes, e.g. group financing 
regimes, in place in the state in which the creditor undertakes its (intra-)group financing 
activities. This is not the only situation, however. Similar effects may occur when the 
respective taxing systems mutually diverge (disparities). Examples are mutual differences in 
the qualification and/or interpretation of facts and circumstances for corporate tax purposes: 
one state considers an income item, for example, to be a taxable/deductible interest expense, 
the other state considers it to be a non-deductible/exempt dividend distribution (α ≠ α’; 1 – α ≠ 
1 – α’).
860
 Such disparities cause the well-known hybrid income mismatch issues. Other
examples are mutual differences in the classification of legal entities for corporate tax 
purposes: the respective states concerned link up with different legal entities to identify the 
respective taxable entities (sub ≠ sub’). Such disparities cause the well-known hybrid entity 
mismatch issues. 
It is no secret that these elements and features of conventional corporate income tax systems 
are employed in practice for one’s individual benefit, i.e., both by well-advised multinational 
groups of companies as well as nation states, the latter, for example, by means of beneficial 
tax regimes introduced to attract economic activities. Notably, taxable profit transferring 
possibilities are not limited to intra-group financing arrangements. Theoretically, this is 
possible by means of any intra-group transaction; it is just easiest to achieve it by means of 
intra-group financing arrangements. All that is required is a loan agreement; basically, a pen, 
a piece of paper, and a (tax) lawyer. Of particular relevance in this respect, in my view, is the 
recognition that the possibilities to transfer the corporate income tax base across the globe 
accordingly are principally infinite.  
States obviously consider the outbound shift of taxable corporate profits, typically referred to 
as tax base erosion, problematic. This is particularly problematic to the extent that it concerns 
their domestic taxable base. Foreign tax base erosion is sometimes considered less relevant. 
As a consequence, a variety of counter measures can be found in the states’ international tax 
860
 See on this matter, OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, 
OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013, OECD, OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements 
(Recommendations for domestic laws), 19 March 2014 – 2 May 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 19 March 2014, 
OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the effects of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements (Treaty Issues), 19 March 2014 – 2 May 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2014, and OECD, 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Neutralising the effects of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014. 
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systems to tackle such profit shifting possibilities. Common, nevertheless, are intra-group 
interest deduction limitation regimes in all kinds of variations, as well as limitations in the 
application of double tax relief mechanisms. The measures taken in response to a particular 
newly developed tax base erosion scheme often has the characteristics of an ad hoc 
correction mechanism. A range of those have already been touched upon in the previous 
Chapter 4. In response to such a correction mechanism, multinational firms, or at least their 
advisers, develop other variations to erode the corporate income tax base triggering, yet 
again, the adoption of ad hoc correction mechanisms, this time technically somewhat more 
complex.  
The image of a merry-go-round of repeating tax erosion schemes and subsequent correction 
measures comes to mind. However, as the underlying features in corporate taxation remain 
untouched, i.e., the nominal return to equity tax base combined with the separate entity 
approach, the consequence of states’ responses is a staggering and ever expanding body of 
tax legislation. That is, a body of legislation, which becomes increasingly more technical and 
complex upon each bill that passes parliament. The result is a continuous generation of non-
solutions and perhaps even chaos in the end. 
Moreover, states commonly adopt regulations in their tax systems requiring affiliated 
corporate entities / taxpayers to establish their intra-firm legal arrangements as though they 
are unrelated (separate accounting under the arm’s length principle). In our scenario 2, i.e., 
the case in which Johnson grants a loan carrying interest at a 5% rate, application of the 
arm’s length principle would entail that the interest would be capped at 4% for corporate 
income tax calculation purposes – note that for the sake of convenience, it is assumed that 
the 100% debt financing would be acknowledged for corporate income tax calculation 
purposes under the separate accounting / arm’s length pricing model. Viz., in the base case, 
a 4% interest is considered the normal market rate of return. As a consequence of this, the 
taxable corporate income at the level of Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co. would equal 
€100 (instead of nil).
861
 The tax liability would amount to €25,
862
 leaving €75 post-tax
earnings. The repatriation of the €75 post-tax earnings would entail a taxable event at the 
level of Johnson, which is typically eligible for economic double tax relief. Together with the 
interest receipt of (now) €400 and the tax-deductible interest expense of €160, Johnson’s 
taxable income would equal €235.
863
 This triggers a tax liability amounting to €58.75.
864
Consequently, economic double taxation with respect to the underlying subsidiary’s income of 
€100 emerges – i.e., €25 tax at the level of the subsidiary and upon repatriation, and €18.75 
tax at the level of Johnson. As this proves distortive, as previously stated, a subsequent 
double tax relief mechanism typically becomes available.  
One may ask why. To be honest, I do not know. It seems that tax legislators fail to recognize 
the underlying causes of these problems in the system. In a globalizing economy, problems 
already arising due to the finance discrimination worsen dramatically under the separate 
entity approach. These problems cannot be resolved by means of ad hoc correction 
mechanisms, such as (intra-group) interest deduction limitations or the re-qualification for tax 
calculation purposes of (intra-group) debt into (intra-group) equity (e.g., regarding 
subordinated profit participating loans issued under terms exceeding, say, 20 years) or vice 
versa (e.g., regarding redeemable preference shares).
865
 This issue has been touched upon
for illustration purposes in Chapter 4 as well. As argued, the first step in resolving the matter 
lies in the abolishment of the separate entity approach. 
861
 500 – 400 = 100. 
862
 0.25 * 100 = 25. 
863
 75 (dividends received) + 400 (interest received) – 240 (interests paid) = 235. 
864
 0.25 * 235 = 58.75. 
865
 For an overview of the qualification of profit participating loans in international taxation, particularly the US, 
Germany and Denmark, reference is made to Jakob Bundgaard et al, ‘Profit-Participating Loans in International Tax 
Law’, 38 Intertax 643 (2010), at 643 – 662. 
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5.4.3.3 Tax consolidation remedies 
As set forth in Chapter 4, a group of affiliated corporate entities, in our example Johnson and 
Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co., should be treated as a single taxpayer as they 
constitute a single economic entity. This can be achieved by means of tax consolidation, i.e., 
consolidation in a manner technically akin to typical commercial profit accounting 
consolidation. All intra-group transactions would be eliminated for corporate income tax 
calculation purposes. The effect of adopting such an approach is that the tax cascading effect 
does not occur. The post-tax nominal return to equity would not alter upon the inter-
positioning of corporate entities. The return would remain exactly the same as the return in 
the case where Johnson invests in the dinghy distribution business directly. The post-tax 
return rate would equal 4.875% regardless of the manner in which the undertaken investment 
activities are legally structured.  
Economic double tax relief mechanisms would become redundant as the issue, economic 
double taxation, would not arise in the first place. The same holds true in respect of the intra-
group interest deduction limitations. As the separate entity approach would be let go, intra-
group transactions would not be recognized for corporate income tax calculation purposes. 
Consequently, such transactions would no longer, a priori, pose tax base erosion hazards.  
Notably, moreover, as set forth in Chapter 3, double tax relief with respect to cross-border 
business operations may be granted in a neutral and equitable manner under the Dutch-style 
juridical double tax relief mechanism elaborated upon in the above: the credit for domestic tax 
attributable to foreign income method. Notably, issues regarding the way in which the 
geographical attribution of tax base across taxing jurisdictions should occur are dealt with in 
isolation in Chapter 6. 
In summary, tax consolidation would entail that we are back to the effects under a 
conventional corporate income tax in case of a direct investment, i.e., the point at which we 
started in section 5.4.2. The additional issues created under the recognition for corporate 
income tax purposes of the separate entity approach regarding indirect investments in 
controlled subsidiaries have been resolved conceptually. 
5.4.4 The effects involving an indirect investment in a non-controlled participation 
5.4.4.1 General remarks 
This brings us to the effects in the case of an investment in the equity capital of a third party, 
i.e., the investment in a non-controlled participation. This issue has not yet been dealt with in
this study. Where the additional problems triggered by the separate entity approach could be 
resolved relatively easily by means of tax consolidation, i.e., to the extent that it concerns a 
group of affiliated entities, the opposite is true where it concerns investments in the equity 
capital of a third party.  
As said, as an alternative to the (in)direct investment in the dinghy sales activity, Johnson 
alternatively could have invested in the equity capital of a third party, i.e., a minority 
shareholder’s interest in a participation, i.e., a corporate body operating a business activity, 
for instance a dinghy distribution business.  
‘Just’ tax cascading issues 
The distortions that emerge in the case of an indirect investment in a non-controlled 
participation seem limited to the economic double taxation of the underlying business income. 
Profit shifting threats as recognized in the previous section 5.4.3 do not seem to arise, or at 
least, arise to a far lesser extent. This can be explained by pointing at the different 
circumstances in these cases. The shareholder does not have a controlling interest in its 
participation. Our shareholder Johnson now has to deal with its joint venture partners, other 
shareholders, i.e., third parties. The shareholding does not provide a decisive influence to 
steer the underlying business activities. Johnson plainly lacks the economic power. 
Consequently, contrary to the intra-group scenarios forwarded in section 5.4.3, economically, 
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the shareholder and the participation are separate economic entities. It may be acknowledged 
that the arbitrage in intra-group transactions does not emerge, at least not significantly, in 
respect of transactions between shareholder and participation; particularly if the profit 
allocation operates neutrally (see Chapter 6). 
As the shareholding does not provide the holder with sufficient economic power to steer the 
underlying business affairs in such cases, it may be considered fair to say that, at least to 
some extent, the economic entities involved are mutually sufficiently independent. 
Commercial interests do not necessarily overlap. This mutually independent third party 
relationship between shareholder and participation, to a larger extent, guarantees that the 
undertaken legal transactions are directed by market forces, which may be appreciated for 
corporate income tax calculation purposes. 
Notably, this does not mean that the core financing discrimination issues as set forth in the 
above section 5.4.2 do not arise. This issue also emerges as regards to financing 
arrangements between shareholder and participation. Incentives to finance activities with debt 
remain in place. The separate entity approach, however, does not exacerbate them. The 
question as to how to resolve the underlying financing discrimination issue should therefore 
be seen in isolation as having little to do with distortions that emerge due to the adoption of 
the separate entity approach. The financing discrimination issue is dealt with in isolation in the 
subsequent sections. 
Let us return to the question as to how to resolve the tax cascading effects, i.e., economic 
double taxation regarding investments in non-controlled participations. In the event Johnson 
decides to invest in a minority shareholding, the economic double taxation effects are 
essentially comparable to those as set forth in the previous section 5.4.3 as regards to the 
indirect investment in an underlying business activity through a subsidiary. This holds true 
regardless of the fact that the investment and its return do not necessarily need to be the 
same (1sub ≠ 1’; ρsub ≠ ρ’) since shareholder and participation constitute separate economic 
entities.  
As regards Johnson’s indirect investment in a minority shareholding, economic double 
taxation arises with respect to the underlying participation’s business income to the extent 
that it can be attributed to the relative volume of Johnson’s shareholders’ interest. In other 
words, economic double taxation arises to the extent that Johnson’s participation issued 
equity capital to Johnson (‘pro rata parte effect’). Hence, the double taxation varies directly 
proportional to the volume of the shareholders’ interest.
 866
 The distortive economic double
taxation comprises of two components: the tax levied at the level of the participation, 
‘component I’,
867
 and the tax levied at the level of the shareholder, ‘component II’.
 868
5.4.4.2 Mitigating tax cascading: participation exemption and indirect credit regimes 
operate inequitably 
With the absence of a decisive influence, the tax consolidation of non-controlled participations 
does not seem appropriate. Let us therefore look at the economic double tax relief 
mechanisms currently found in the international tax regime, i.e., the aggregate of states’ 
international tax systems. The international tax regime basically provides for two 
mechanisms, both adopted to achieve single taxation:  
866
 The double taxation comprises of two components. That is, the tax levied at the level of the participation, 
proportional to the shareholder’s shareholding interest, ‘component I’, and the tax levied at the level of the 
shareholder, ‘component II’. If ‘P’ represents the scope of the shareholders interest, whereby 0 < P ≤ 1, the formula 
referred to in footnote 843 alters as follows. Component I corresponds with the formula component P.tsub.[(ρsub – 
αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]. Component II corresponds with the formula component t.{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – 
αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}. The aggregate (‘∑’) of components I and II, P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)] + t.{(ρ – α.r) 
+ (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}, accordingly, reflects the tax cascading effects in the event of an 
investment in a non-controlled participation. Note that the underlined component – α.r reflects the need to address 
the potential risk of creating a ‘Bosal Loophole’, referred to in the following paragraphs. 
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 As said, element I corresponds with the formula component P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]. 
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 As said, element II corresponds with the formula component t.{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – 
dsub)]}. 
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A. a base exemption mechanism, typically referred to as the participation exemption, 
and; 
B. an indirect credit mechanism, sometimes referred to as ‘imputation credit’ or 
‘participation credit’. 
Ad A. The application of a base exemption for economic double tax relief purposes entails 
that the investment in the respective participation is disregarded for corporate tax calculation 
purposes. The proceeds from such an equity interest are excluded from the taxable base at 
the level of the shareholder.
869
 Consequently, taxation to that extent only occurs at the level of
the respective participation.  
Two types of problems may be associated with a participation exemption mechanism, i.e., 
problems in its design as well as conceptual flaws in the mechanism’s operation.  
Flaws in design 
First, participation exemption regimes may not be designed consistently. Typically, states 
exempt the gross proceeds from a participation such as dividends and capital gains from the 
taxable base. They often fail, however, to exempt economically related expenses, such as 
financing expenses, from that taxable base in conjunction accordingly.
870
 The consequence of
such an inconsistency is an occurring mismatch between exempt profits and tax-deductible 
expenses, thereby exempting the gross-proceeds rather than the net proceeds from the 
taxable base.
871
The issue has sometimes been referred to in tax practice as the ‘Bosal Loophole’ 
paraphrasing the Court of Justice’s ruling in the renowned Bosal case.
872
 The issue has also
briefly been touched upon for illustration purposes in Chapter 4, section 4.5.1.3; Ad. 3. Worth 
mentioning at this point is the following: While the issue as referred to in Chapter 4 concerns 
a mismatch between exempt underlying business gross-profits derived by group companies 
and tax-deductible expenses occurred upon the financing of the underlying business activities 
(‘look-through-variation’), the matter regarding participations concerns a mismatch between 
exempt proceeds from participations at the shareholder’s level on the one hand and tax-
deductible expenses economically related to the financing of the equity investments on the 
shareholder’s level on the other hand (‘non-look-through-variation’). Nevertheless, beside the 
(non-)look-through-variation, substantially, there is no conceptual difference between the 
mismatches themselves. Both concern a divergence between an exempt ‘plus’ and a tax-
deductible ‘minus’.  
Also noteworthy, for instance, the European Commission’s proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) shows evidence of embracing a gross-based 
869
 This should occur by crossing out element II from the formula, i.e., the component (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub 
– αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]. 
870
 The flaw arises when the component ρ is crossed out from the formula, while the component – α.r is kept in. 
Accordingly, an imbalance arises between exempt proceeds ‘ρ’ and tax-deductible expenses ‘– α.r’. The imbalance or 
mismatch is referred to as the ‘Bosal Loophole’. The component ‘– α.r’ illustrates the effect. 
871
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax 
policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), 
 at 714: “the issue here is that the basic structure of the international tax system for multinational companies is close 
to a source-based tax for equity-financed investment, but a corporate-residence based tax for debt-financed 
investment. It is hard to think of a sensible economic rationale for this practice, especially when the finance provided 
is internal to the multinational company. (…) if the basic aim of the tax system is to tax profit arising in the UK, then, 
in principle, relief should only be given for interest payments made by the parent to the extent that the underlying 
borrowing was used to finance activities which took place in the UK. Conversely, if interest relief is not granted for 
payments for borrowing funds used to finance foreign activity, then there is no clear rationale for taxing interest 
received from foreign affiliates. Exempting foreign source interest receipts from taxation would be a radical departure 
from the international norm, but one which is implied by the principle that only economic activity taking place in the 
jurisdiction should be taxed.” 
872
 See Court of Justice, case C-168/01 (Bosal). In this case, the court ruled that a former tax provision in the 
Netherlands’ international tax system that subjected a deduction of interest expenses related to the financing of a 
participation to the requirement that the participation derives Dutch-source taxable profits is incompatible with 
European Union law. 
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exemption regarding shareholding proceeds, while allowing the taxpayers involved to deduct 
related financing expenses from the tax base. Briefly put, as it neglects to exempt the net 
proceeds, i.e., to also exempt the related financing expenses involved from the tax base, the 
CCCTB also produces a ‘Bosal Loophole’.
873
This issue of a technical nature may be resolved with relative ease by adopting an exemption 
mechanism which exempts the net proceeds from the tax base, a net-participation exemption 
mechanism, accordingly exempting the related interest expenses as well.
874
 A functional and
factual analysis may be performed to identify the relevant earnings and expenses.
875
Conceptual flaws 
Second, the adoption of a base exemption mechanism, and with that also the application of a 
participation exemption regime, triggers a conceptual problem. As the proceeds are exempt 
from the taxable base, losses suffered from an investment in a minority shareholding are also 
exempt, i.e., non-tax-deductible, despite the reality that such losses suffered are commercially 
real.  
As a compensatory measure, some states, such as the Netherlands, allow taxpayers –
shareholders – to deduct final losses realized at the level of the shareholding company upon 
the liquidation of its (foreign) participation under the ‘liquidation-losses-set-off-regime’.
876
 The
deductible liquidation loss is generally calculated as the difference between the participation’s 
acquisition price and the sum of the liquidation proceeds.  
Despite such a tax-deduction, this tax treatment triggers a liquidity disadvantage as a tax-
deduction merely becomes available ex post, i.e., upon the winding up of the investment 
rather than at the time when the business losses have actually been suffered. Such a liquidity 
disadvantage distorts the choice of legal form as, in the case of business losses suffered, the 
tax treatment of a direct investment in a business activity, allowing for the set-off of losses 
when these actually occur, proves relatively more equitable. Real losses from equity 
investments should be deductible plainly when suffered.  
Some states appreciated this in the past. An example is Spain, whose international tax 
regime used to allow for tax-deductible impairments of equity interests in (foreign) loss-
making group companies; the deduction, however, was repealed from the system as of 1 
January 2013.
877
Distorting outbound investment under import neutrality promoting base exemption 
873
 See Article 11(c) and (d) in conjunction with Article 14 (1)(g) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). Notably, European Commission, 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working group (CCCTB WG) Working Paper No. 57, CCCTB: possible 
elements of a technical outline, Taxud E1, CCCTB/WP\057\doc\en, Brussels, 26 July 2007, at 9 (footnote 13) 
considers financing expenses not to qualify as “costs incurred for the purpose of deriving income which is exempt 
pursuant to Article 11…” See also Pasquale Pistone, ‘Outbound Investments and Interest Deduction: an Era of Fat 
Cap in European International Tax Law?’, in Michael Lang et al, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (2008), 
at 860-862. Pistone recognizes the effect as well but does not seem to mind conceptually. Notably, the Presidency of 
the Council has suggested to introduce an earnings and stripping provision to counter CCCTB base erosion in this 
area; see the suggested Article 14a as found in the comments of the Presidency of the Council on the CCCTB 
proporsal (doc. 8387/12 FISC 49) published by the Council of the European Union, 16 April 2012, no. 
2011/0058(CNS). This is not further discussed. 
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 See for a similar argument, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New Dutch ‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of 
the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. See also Charles E. Mclure, Jr., ‘State Taxation of 
Foreign-Source Dividends: Starting from First Principles’, 30 Tax Notes 975 (10 March 1986), at 975-989, observing 
that expenses incurred to finance tax exempt income should not be tax deductible. At 975: “Foreign-source dividends 
should not be subject to state corporate income taxes and (…) interest expense deemed to be incurred by the parent 
(or domestic subsidiaries) to finance investment in foreign subsidiaries should not be deductible in calculating the 
apportionable income of the water’s edge group subject to state taxation.” 
875
 This may be achieved by also crossing out the component ‘– α.r’ from the taxable base. See the formula in 
footnote 869. 
876
 Article 13d Dutch CITA. 
877
 See Law 16/2013 of 29 October 2013, Establishing Certain Measures on Environmental Taxation and Taking 
other Tax and Financial Measures (Ley 16/2013, de 29 de octubre, por la que se establecen determinadas medidas 
en materia de fiscalidad medioambiental y se adoptan otras medidas tributarias y financieras). 
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In cross-border scenarios, i.e., in cases of equity investments in non-controlled participations 
operating business activities across the border, a participation exemption regime operates in 
a manner akin to the import neutrality promoting base exemption mechanism for juridical 
double tax relief purposes. That type of juridical double tax relief mechanism has been 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
A base exemption mechanism for economic double tax relief purposes operates conceptually 
similar to a base exemption mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes. It should be 
noted that juridical double taxation, economically, is also a form economic double taxation. In 
consequence, the conceptual problems relating to an import neutrality promoting juridical 
double tax relief mechanism necessarily equivalently occur under an import neutrality 
promoting economic double tax relief mechanism, such as the participation exemption.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, under a territorial taxing system based on import neutrality – 
where income realized within the source state is taxed and foreign source income is not taken 
into consideration – the tax burden differs depending on whether the economic operator 
realizes its business income solely within the respective taxing state or across various states. 
For instance, losses suffered from economic operations indirectly carried on abroad are not 
tax-deductible under base exemption mechanisms, entailing an inequitable distorting increase 
in AETRs.  
Hence, the conceptual basis for territorial tax systems is inequitable and inefficient as these 
systems – indeed neutral regarding the imports of production factors – unilaterally distort 
outbound movements of production factors from the source state to abroad (dislocations). 
This holds equally true in respect of both juridical and economical double tax relief 
mechanisms promoting the same underlying import neutrality concept. Viz., both deny a tax-
deduction for foreign source losses that have actually been suffered. Import neutrality 
promoting double tax relief systems distort outward bound movements of production factors. 
And so does a participation exemption. 
Ad B. The application of an indirect credit mechanism for economic double tax relief purposes 
at the level of the shareholder entails relief in two steps: 
1. First, the pre-underlying-tax return on the shareholder’s investment in the
shareholders’ interest – i.e., the proceeds from the respective participation without the
underlying tax as imposed at the level of the participation being taken into
consideration – is included in the shareholder’s taxable base.
878
 In practice, this
amount typically is calculated by ‘grossing-up’ the post-underlying-tax return on the
shareholder’s equity investment, that is by multiplying the post-tax proceeds from the
respective participation by a factor of ‘1/(1– t)’.
879
 The tax impost is calculated
accordingly;
2. Subsequently, second, the underlying tax that is levied at the level of the participation
is credited against the tax levied at the shareholder’s level, being the amount of tax
calculated by making reference to the grossed-up proceeds from the respective
participation.
880
 Accordingly, the taxpayer receives a credit for underlying tax.
Also in respect of indirect credit mechanisms, two types of problems may be recognized, i.e., 
problems in their design as well as conceptual flaws.  
Flaws in design 
878
 (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d). 
879
 1/(1 – t).{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}. 
880
 t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)] – P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]. 
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First, indirect credit regimes may not be designed consistently (for the ‘second’ see the 
header Conceptual flaws hereunder).
881
 This is the case when the double tax relief
mechanism provides relief in respect of the gross proceeds from a participation, such as 
dividends and capital gains. In such a case, a mismatch occurs if economically related 
expenses like financing expenses are disregarded for double tax relief purposes and remain 
tax deductible.
882
 That is a mismatch between a creditable ‘plus’ and a tax-deductible ‘minus’.
This issue has already been touched upon and referred to as the ‘Bosal Loophole’. This issue 
conceptually occurs under each gross-based double tax relief mechanism. It can be resolved 
with relative ease by adopting a net-basis credit mechanism, which grants a credit for 
underlying tax economically attributable to the net proceeds from a participation.
883
 Such
responses may be found in states’ international tax systems under tax credit limitations. An 
example is the indirect credit mechanism employed in the Netherlands regarding so-called 
‘non-qualifying portfolio participations’ under the ‘participation credit regime’. Under the so-
called ‘second limitation’, the indirect credit granted is limited to the domestic corporate 
income tax as levied on the grossed-up proceeds from ‘non-qualifying-portfolio-participations’ 
after the deduction of attributable expenses.
884
 Also the CCCTB proposal makes use of a
switch-over to credit mechanism.
885
 Economically related expenses are identified subsequent
to a functional and factual analysis. 
Another problematic element in the design of an indirect credit mechanism is that an indirect 
credit mechanism requires the taxpayer to have some knowledge on the tax position of the 
corporation in which it holds its minority shareholders’ interest. Namely, the basic assumption 
of the indirect credit mechanism is that the underlying tax imposed at the level of the 
participation is credited against the tax levied at the shareholders’ level.  
This triggers problems with regards to non-controlling interests, which will consistently be the 
case as, in my view, controlling interests should be tax consolidated. The shareholder needs 
to obtain information on another person’s tax affairs, which is not readily available to him. In 
addition, as the shareholder does not have a controlling interest in the respective corporate 
body, the shareholder a priori lacks the power to force that body to make the necessary 
information available. 
The awkward approach of the Court of Justice in Haribo: ‘resort to market forces to 
resolve tax-induced distortion’ 
Nevertheless, states typically grant the double tax relief subject to the meeting of 
documentation requirements, such as the requirement to supply a precise indication of the 
underlying tax levied.
886
 In cases where the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union
applies, in the Haribo case for example, the Court of Justice gracelessly held that such an 
administrative burden imposed in respect of minority interests in foreign corporations does not 
infringe upon the EU’s fundamental freedoms.
887
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 (Dividend) imputation credit regimes can, e.g., be found in New Zealand and the United States. For some reading 
and analysis of indirect credit mechanisms, see International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international 
(2011). 
882
 The flaw emerges when the component ρ is crossed out, while the component – α.r is kept in. Merely the 
component ρ is taken into consideration for double tax relief purposes. Again, the consequence would be an 
imbalance arising between proceeds ‘ρ’ eligible for relief and tax-deductible expenses ‘– α.r’, i.e., the ‘Bosal 
Loophole’. 
883
 This may be achieved by taking into account the component ‘– α.r’ in determining the amount of double tax relief 
granted.  
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 See Article 13aa Dutch CITA in conjunction with Article 23c Dutch CITA. For a brief discussion on the operation of 
this mechanism in the Dutch international tax system reference see Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – 
Key practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international (2011), at 447-470. 
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 Article 73 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 
121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
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 An example may be found in the current economic double tax relief measures found in the Austrian international 
tax system. For an overview of legislation concerning documentation requirements in this respect see Court of 
Justice, joined cases C-437/08 and C-436/08 (Haribo & Salinen). 
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 See Court of Justice, joined cases C-437/08 C-436/08 (Haribo & Salinen) and the Opinion of Advocate General 
Kokott delivered on 11 November 2010. 
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The case at hand concerned the application of the Austrian indirect tax credit mechanism. 
Amongst others, its application was subject to the requirement that the respective taxpayer 
submits relevant information to the tax authorities regarding the underlying corporation’s tax 
affairs. In the Haribo case, the respective taxpayer, a minority shareholder, was unable to 
meet this requirement as he did not dispose of a controlling shareholding interest. 
Consequently, the relief mechanism did not apply, subjecting the taxpayer to tax cascading. 
Following A-G Kokott’s arguments, the Court of Justice observed that the capital markets 
would recover such an issue as it is in the interest of both parties to make minority 
shareholder investments as attractive as possible. This would include the provision of relevant 
information by corporations on their tax positions to minority shareholders, which, notably, in 
the real world does not occur. Information on companies’ actual tax positions typically is not 
publicly available. According to both A-G Kokott and the Court of Justice, an inadequate flow 
of information to the investor is not a problem for which a Member State should have to 
answer. Hence, according to the Court of Justice, Member States are justified in imposing 
such an administrative burden. 
To be honest, I have some difficulties in appreciating this approach of the Court of Justice. 
Oddly, Kokott and the Court of Justice justify the tax distortion by arguing that its distortive 
effects will be resolved by the market. In my view, they turn the world upside down by doing 
that. The internal market is built to attain collective well-being. With regards to direct taxation, 
this calls for equal and neutral tax treatment within the internal market. The mentioned ‘lack-
of-information-problem’ has been caused by the state that designed the double tax relief 
mechanism at hand. The problem has not been caused by the taxpayer necessarily coping 
with the impossible to meet administrative requirements. Nevertheless, the taxpayer has been 
made the party that is subject to administrative requirements, which it is unable to meet. This 
has the consequence of it being subject to a distortive double taxation upon the failure of 
meeting these requirements.  
The taxpayer pays the price for a flawed double tax relief mechanism. And the A-G’s and 
court’s response is: ‘Deal with it, the capital market will recover this’. The inadequacy, 
however, in my opinion is just the symptom of the problem. That is, the distortive tax 
treatment that has been created by the Member State concerned. The A-G and the Court of 
Justice nevertheless resort to the market flexibilities to justify a flaw in the design of a Member 
State’s tax system; despite that, the notion of the internal market calls for states to impose 
non-distortive tax systems.
888
 I respectfully disagree. Tax distortions cannot be considered
just in my view by simply referring to the possibility of them being recovered by the market. 
Conceptual flaws 
Distorting inbound investment under export neutrality promoting credit mechanism 
Second, the adoption of an indirect tax credit mechanism for economic double tax relief 
purposes triggers conceptual issues when it concerns cases of foreign source equity 
investments in non-controlled participations. In such cross-border scenarios, an indirect tax 
credit mechanism operates in a manner akin to the export neutrality promoting a direct credit 
mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes. That juridical double tax relief mechanism 
has been discussed in Chapter 3.  
An indirect credit mechanism for economic double tax relief purposes operates conceptually 
similar to a direct credit mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes. It should be noted 
that, as said, juridical double taxation is also economic double taxation. In consequence, the 
conceptual problems relating to an export neutrality promoting juridical double tax relief 
mechanism necessarily also occur under an export neutrality promoting economic double tax 
relief mechanism, such as the indirect credit. 
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 See for a comparison Daniel S. Smit, ‘The Haribo and Österreichische Salinen Cases: To What Extent Is the ECJ 
Willing To Remove International Double Taxation Caused by Member States’, 51 European Taxation 275 (2011), at 
275-284. 
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As demonstrated in Chapter 3, international tax systems based on export neutrality – where 
worldwide income is taxed and a credit for foreign tax is granted – distort the competitive 
position of foreign economic operators in the source state. It, for instance, ‘tops-up’ the tax 
burden to residence state levels putting the non-resident taxpayer in a disadvantageous 
position in comparison with its local competitors, who are subject to diverging source state tax 
burdens. This was precisely the reason why the Subpart F rules in the US, at the time of their 
design in the 1960s, were not extended to apply to actively held controlled foreign companies; 
it would have put US business at a less advantageous competitive position relative to its local 
competitors. 
Therefore, the analytical basis for these systems is inequitable and inefficient as these 
systems – which are indeed neutral regarding the exports of production factors – unilaterally 
distort inbound capital movements in the source state. This holds equally true in respect of 
both juridical and economical double tax relief mechanisms promoting the same underlying 
export neutrality concept. All export neutrality promoting double tax relief mechanisms distort 
inbound movements of production factors. An indirect tax credit mechanism also does this. 
5.4.4.3 An equitable alternative to mitigate tax cascading: the ‘indirect tax exemption’ 
Juridical double tax relief: the ‘credit of domestic tax attributable to foreign income’ 
As both double tax relief mechanisms reveal their flaws, it may be worth exploring an 
alternative. In Chapter 3, the import neutrality promoting base exemption mechanism and the 
export neutrality promoting credit mechanism have been integrated into each other, thereby 
producing a juridical tax relief mechanism in respect of proceeds from cross-border direct 
investments. I referred to this as the ‘credit for the domestic tax that is attributable to the 
foreign income items’, using a double tax relief methodology extracted from current Dutch 
international tax law as an analogy. As demonstrated this mechanism simultaneously 
promotes both the import and export of production factors. 
As the ‘credit for the domestic tax that is attributable to the foreign income items’ discussed in 
Chapter 3 enhances fairness by promoting both inbound and outbound movements of 
production factors, perhaps an economic double tax relief mechanism operating in a similar 
manner may enhance fairness as well.  
Economic double tax relief: something similar – the ‘indirect tax exemption’ 
The question arises as to what such an economic double tax relief mechanism would look 
like. For this purpose, the required economic double tax relief method may be achieved by 
again combining the export neutrality promoting indirect credit mechanism and import 
neutrality promoting participation (i.e., base) exemption mechanism methods.  
This would thereby produce an economic double tax relief mechanism that could be referred 
to as the ‘indirect tax exemption’. The application of the ‘indirect tax exemption’ for economic 
double tax relief purposes at the level of the shareholder in respect of proceeds from minority 
shareholders’ interests would provide relief in two consecutive steps:  
1. First, the pre-underlying-tax return on the shareholder’s investment in the
shareholder’s interest – i.e., the proceeds from the respective participation without the
underlying tax as imposed at the level of the participation being taken into
consideration – is included in the shareholder’s taxable base.
889
 In practice, this
amount typically could be calculated by ‘grossing-up’ the post-underlying-tax return
on the shareholder’s equity investment, that is by multiplying the post-tax proceeds
from the respective participation by a factor of ‘1/(1– t)’.
890
 The tax impost is
889
 (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d). 
890
 1/(1 – t).{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – αsub.rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}. 
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calculated accordingly. Basically, the first step would be identical to the first step as 
applied under the indirect tax credit mechanism; 
2. Subsequently, second, a credit becomes available. The credit equals the tax imposed
at the level of the shareholder that is economically attributable to the net proceeds
from the participation.
891
 Accordingly, contrary to the indirect tax credit mechanism,
the amount of credit available does not correspond to the tax actually imposed at the
level at which the respective underlying corporation is disregarded. Instead, the credit
granted is calculated autonomously. More specifically, the credit equals the amount of
tax economically attributable to the proceeds of the respective entity in which the
equity investment is held. Economically related expenses are identified subsequent to
a functional and factual analysis. Hence, the creditable amount is calculated in a
manner akin to the calculation of the indirect tax credit under the application of the tax
credit limitation I referred to in the above as the ‘second limitation’.
The relief would be calculated in a manner akin to the fraction as forwarded in Chapter 3 
for juridical double tax relief purposes. It would apply according to the following fraction: 
(Grossed-up net proceeds from a participation / Worldwide Income) * Domestic Tax on 
Worldwide Income 
The grossed-up net proceeds from the participation are included in the taxable base with 
respect to which the tax impost is calculated accordingly (Step 1: ‘In’). Subsequently, the tax 
that is economically attributable to these proceeds becomes available to be credited against 
the tax as calculated under the first step (Step 2: ‘Out’). 
One may ask what the use of such an approach would be. Why consider it? It may be worth 
exploring though, as this economic double tax relief mechanism would provide an equitable 
and tax neutral solution for the tax cascading issues as caused under the application of the 
separate entity approach in the international tax regime. Moreover, it would promote neutrality 
regarding both inward bound and outward bound movements of production factors. 
Illustrating the effects: back to Johnson 
Let us illustrate things by returning to our running example of taxpayer Johnson and its 
indirect investment in the equity capital of a third party, i.e., the investment in a non-controlled 
participation. In addition, let us refer to that third party as ‘Johnson’s Participation in 
Distribution Co.’  
Under a conventional corporate income tax, the corporate income tax calculations at the level 
of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’ are identical to those at the level of ‘Johnson’s 
Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’ as set forth in section 5.4.3 (which notably is a repetition of the 
calculations set forth in section 5.4.2). Under the assumption that the post-tax returns as 
derived by ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’ immediately are repatriated to Johnson 
and the effects recognized at the level of Johnson are as follows (fig. 38):
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Fig. 38. Johnson’s CIT Calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s CIT Calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,435
893
Gross-up*
)
 0 – 65
894
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500
895
Costs 
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 t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)] – t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
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 Notably, dividend taxation again is assumed to be non-existent, a dividend tax exemption is considered to apply, 
or it is assumed that the dividend tax is fully creditable against corporate income tax. 
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 10,500 – 65 = 10,435. Accordingly: 1 + ρ + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)].  
894
 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 65. Accordingly: – P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)]. 
895
 1 + ρ. Alternatively, 1/(1 – t).{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)]}. 
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 Financing Expenses (interest) 0 – 240
896
 Depreciation 0 – 10,000
897
 Aggregate 0 – 10,240
898
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) 0 + 260
899
Tax*
) 
(25%) 0 + 65
900
‘Indirect Tax Exemption’*
)
 0 – 65
901
Aggregate / Tax Payable 0  0 
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax creditable. 
Alternatively, the corporate income tax payable can be calculated in the following steps: 
1. The tax calculated on the grossed-up net proceeds from the participation, which
equals €260 (i.e., €195
902
 + €65
903
), amounts to €65;
904
2. The double tax relief available amounts to €65;
905
3. The tax payable, due to the absence of other sources of income, amounts to €0.
As a table (from left to right – fig. 39): 
Fig. 39 Tax Positions of Johnson and ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co’ (pro rata parte) 
Gross 
Earnings 
Gross-up Tax base Tax*
)
 Relief*
)
 Tax payable 
Johnson + 195 + 65 + 260 + 65 – 65 0 
Johnson’s Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
+ 260 n/a + 260 + 65 n/a + 65 
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax creditable. 
Accordingly, Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 40): 
Fig. 40. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment – 10,000
906
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,435
907
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,435 
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
908
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
909
 Interest Paid – 240
910
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
911
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
Johnson (25%) 0  0
912
896
– α.r. 
897
 – d. For simplicity reasons, it is assumed that d = dpart. 
898
– α.r – d. 
899
 (500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000) – (65 + 65) = 260. Accordingly: (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part 
– dpart)] – P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)] = (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d). For technical reasons, alternatively, one may 
decide on adopting: 1/(1 – t).{(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d) + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)]}. 
900
 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000) – (65 + 65)] = 65. Accordingly: t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
901
– 0.25 * [(500 – 240) + (10,000 – 10,000) – 65 + 65] = –65. Accordingly: –t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
902
 435 – 240 = 195. 
903
 0.25/0.75 * 195 = 65.  
904
 0.25 * 260 = 65. 
905
 260 / 260 * 65 = 65. 
906
 – 1. 
907
 10,500 – 65 = 10,435. Accordingly: 1 + ρ + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)].  
908
 α. 
909
– α. 
910
– α.r. 
911
– α.(1 + r). 
912
 t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)] – t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
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Aggregate  – 4,000
913
+ 4,195
914
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable
The net outbound cash flow in period 1 equals €4,000, an amount equal to the invested equity 
capital. The transactions in period 1 do not constitute a taxable event under a conventional 
corporate income tax. The net inbound cash flow in period 2 nevertheless alters in 
comparison to a no tax environment. Now, the inflow in period 2 equals €4,195. The net 
return to the invested equity capital (‘vC
DTR
’) equals €195, a percentage of 4.875.
915
 What
does this number tell us? 
Back to where we left off… 
It seems that we are back to where we started in section 5.4.2, i.e., the section forwarding the 
effects under a typical corporate income tax in the case of a direct investment.  
 The additional issues created under the recognition for tax purposes of the separate
entity approach in conventional corporate income taxation in respect of indirect
investments in non-controlled participations, i.e., the economic multiple taxation issue,
has been resolved conceptually in an equitable and tax neutral manner.
 Furthermore, the problematic elements in the typical economic double tax relief
mechanisms, the participation (base) exemption and indirect credit mechanism, do
not occur under the ‘indirect tax exemption mechanism’. It provides for a net double
tax relief mechanism and it promotes neutrality regarding both inbound and outbound
movements of production factors.
 Moreover, the ‘impossible-to-meet-administrative-requirements’ under the indirect tax
credit are absent as the relief is calculated autonomously, i.e., regardless of the
underlying tax payable. In addition, the indirect tax exemption would operate
autonomously, and with that would be non-distortive, also in conjunction with the
‘credit for the domestic tax that is attributable to the foreign income items’, i.e., the
juridical double tax relief mechanism that is extensively discussed in Chapter 3.
Please let me elaborate on this. 
No ‘Bosal Loophole’ 
First, the issue referred to in the above as the ‘Bosal Loophole’ does not arise. The indirect 
tax exemption mechanism provides for relief on a net-basis. Accordingly, no mismatch occurs 
between exempted profits and tax-deductible expenses. The design flaws recognized under 
some of the participation (base) exemption and indirect credit mechanisms in place in the 
international tax regime remain absent. 
Neutrality towards inbound and outbound investment 
Second, the indirect tax exemption mechanism resolves the conceptual problems – the 
‘topping-up-effect’ – that appear under the export neutrality promoting indirect credit 
mechanisms as currently are in place worldwide. As relief is granted autonomously, while 
disregarding the underlying (foreign) taxes levied, the ‘indirect tax exemption mechanism’ 
operates in a unilaterally tax neutral fashion. 
As it operates in a manner akin to the ‘credit for the domestic tax that is attributable to the 
foreign income items’, the indirect tax exemption mechanism enhances import neutrality in 
cross-border scenarios. Tax burdens imposed are identical irrespective of the taxpayer’s 
913
– (1 – α). 
914
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)]). 
915
(4,195 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.04875. Accordingly: vCIT
DTR
 = (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)]) / (1 – 
α) – 1 = (ρ – r + P.tpart.[(ρpart – αpart.rpart) + (1part – dpart)]) / (1 – α) + r. 
242
place of residence. Accordingly, it refrains from distorting inbound investments as is the case 
under export neutrality promoting credit mechanisms. 
Moreover, contrary to the existing indirect credit mechanism, the indirect tax exemption 
mechanism does not require taxpayers claiming relief to have knowledge on the tax position 
of the corporation if the minority interest is held. Relief is granted on an autonomous basis, 
plainly by referring to the tax attributable to the net income derived from the taxpayer’s 
investment.  
Allowing for cross-border loss offset 
Third and finally, the indirect tax exemption mechanism resolves the conceptual problems 
triggered by the import neutrality promoting base exemption mechanism, as it, contrary to a 
base exemption, allows for a deduction or set-off of losses when suffered. As the mechanism 
enables cross-border loss set-off as well, it enhances export neutrality in cross-border 
scenarios. Tax burdens imposed are identical irrespective of the question of whether 
taxpayer’s operate their economic activities in a domestic or cross-border context. 
Accordingly, it refrains from distorting outbound investments as is the case under import 
neutrality promoting base exemption mechanisms. 
5.4.4.4 Loss recapture and profit carry-forward mechanisms required 
Adding two features two the system: a ‘recapture of losses feature’ and a ‘carry-
forward of profits feature’ 
To ascertain single taxation under a conventional corporate income tax, two features should 
be added. Analogue or equivalent to the ‘credit for the domestic tax that is attributable to the 
foreign income items mechanism’, the indirect tax exemption calls for a ‘recapture of losses 
feature’ and a ‘carry-forward of profits feature’. 
This requires some further elaboration. Up until this point, the numerical examples forwarded 
in this study consider scenarios where the investment return is derived in a single taxable 
period, i.e., period 2. Under a conventional corporate income tax, this does not necessarily 
need to be the case. Where the return has been derived across multiple taxable periods, 
taxable profits are attributed to these taxable periods under (tax) accounting principles that, 
as said, typically align with common business economics and commercial accounting 
principles (e.g. the reality, matching, realization and prudence principles). This triggers the 
question as to how to deal with this under the application of the advocated indirect tax 
exemption mechanism. For instance, in the event that a taxable proceed in the negative (a tax 
loss to be vertically compensated) has been derived in one taxable period, while a taxable 
proceed in the positive has been derived in the other. 
Illustrating the effects: back to Johnson 
A ‘recapture of losses feature’ and a ‘carry-forward of profits feature’ would support the 
attribution process equitably and neutrally. The effects, as always, can be illustrated best by 
means of numerical examples.  
Let us assume that the imposition of corporate income tax now occurs in two taxable periods, 
‘Taxable Period 1’ and ‘Taxable Period 2’. Accordingly, ‘Period 2’ referred to in the above 
tables is divided into two distinctive taxable periods. Moreover, let us assume that Johnson, in 
addition to the proceeds derived from its investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution 
Co.’, which for the sake of convenience is now relabeled as ‘source a)’, derives income from a 
direct investment, for convenience labeled as ‘source b)’. In addition let us consider the 
following three alternative scenarios: 
1. The yields derived from both sources, i.e., ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution
Co.’, ‘source a)’ and the additional direct investment, ‘source b)’, account for a
positive amount in both taxable periods;
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2. The yield from ‘source a)’, accounts for a negative amount in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and
for a positive amount in ‘Taxable Period 2’; the yield from the additional ‘source b)’,
account for a positive amount in both taxable periods; to ensure single taxation, a
recapture mechanism is required.
3. The yield from ‘source a)’ accounts for a positive amount in both taxable periods; the
yields from the additional ‘source b)’ account for a negative amount in ‘Taxable
Period 1’ and for a positive amount in ‘Taxable Period 2’; to ensure single taxation, a
carry-forward mechanism is required.
Ad 1. The yields derived from both sources account for positive amounts in both taxable 
periods. Assume that the net return on the investment in source a), ‘Johnson’s Participation in 
Distribution Co.’, remains unchanged and equals €195. And assume that the net return on the 
investment in the additional direct investment, source b), equals €500. The returns are 
attributed to the taxable periods in the following manner. The taxable proceeds in respect of 
source a) tax account for €75 in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and €120 in ‘Taxable Period 2’. The 
underlying taxable profits of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, i.e., to the extent that 
they are pro rata parte attributed to Johnson equity investment respectively, hereinafter 
labeled as ‘source a)*’, respectively equal €100 and €160. The taxable proceeds in respect of 
source b) equally account for €250 in both taxable periods. The tax rate remains equal to a 
linear 25%. Forwarded as a schedule (fig. 41): 
Fig. 41. Given attribution taxable proceeds to taxable periods 1 and 2 
Sources of 
income 
Yields Taxable 
Period 1 
Yields Taxable 
Period 2 
∑  
Johnson source a) 75 120 195 (double tax 
relief) 
source b) 250 250 500 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
source a)* 100 160 260 
Under these circumstances, the tax effects under the application of the indirect tax exemption 
would operate accordingly (figs. 42, 43 and 44): 
Fig. 42. Taxable Period 1; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
∑ Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief /2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 75 - 250 25 350 87.50 25 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 100 - - 100 25 - 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 75 = 25; 
/2: (75 + 25) / 350 * 87.50 = 25; 
/3: 87.50 – 25 = 62.50. 
Fig. 43. Taxable Period 2; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
∑ Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief /2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 120 - 250 40 410 102.50 40 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 160 - - 160 40 - 40 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 120 = 40; 
/2: (120 + 40) / 410 * 102.50 = 40; 
/3: 102.50 – 40 = 62.50. 
Fig. 44. Taxable Periods 1 & 2; Overall Tax Positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 1 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 2 
 ∑ Tax Payable  
Johnson  
source a), post-double 
tax relief 
0 0 0 
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Johnson  
source b) 
62.50 62.50 125 
Johnson’s Participation  
source a)* 
25 40 65 
The tables illustrate that Johnson, in effect, would only be liable to pay tax on the €500 return 
on its direct investment, source b). Johnson would be liable to pay an amount of tax equal to 
€62.50 in Taxable Period 1 and €62.50 in Taxable Period 2. That is an aggregate tax payable 
of €125. That amount equals an overall nominal tax payable imposed at a 25% rate. The 
(grossed-up) return on Johnson’s investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, 
‘source a)’, of €260 does not trigger a tax liability at the level of Johnson. This would be fair as 
Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’ already would be liable to pay tax on the 
underlying proceeds, i.e., source a)*. These equal €260, leaving a tax payable at the level of 
the participation of €65, specifically €25 in Taxable Period 1 and €40 in Taxable Period 2. 
Economic single taxation efficiently achieved 
Accordingly, economic single taxation on the underlying proceeds of €260, source a)*, would 
be achieved. In terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the attribution of the proceeds to 
taxable periods does not entail any differences in tax treatment under the application of the 
indirect tax exemption mechanism (leaving the time value of money out of consideration – the 
operation of the system is assessed under a conventional corporate tax). That is, in 
comparison with the scenario set forth in section 5.4.2 (The effects involving a direct 
investment). Accordingly, the distortions recognized under a conventional corporate income 
tax are not exacerbated any more. The nominal amount of corporate income tax payable 
remains unchanged. The preliminary conclusion that we are back to where we left off in 
section 5.4.2 remains unchanged as well. Accordingly, the indirect tax exemption mechanism, 
to this extent, operates equitably. 
Ad 2. The yields from ‘source a)’, account for a negative amount in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and for 
a positive amount in ‘Taxable Period 2’, while the yields from ‘source b)’ account for positive 
amounts in both taxable periods. Assume that the net return to the investment in source a), 
‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, remains unchanged and equals €195. And 
assume that the net return on the investment in the additional direct investment, source b), 
equals €500. However, the returns are attributed to the taxable periods differently compared 
to the scenario Ad 1. The taxable proceeds in respect of source a) account for €75 in the 
negative in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and €270 in the positive in ‘Taxable Period 2’. The underlying 
taxable profits of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, i.e., to the extent that they are 
pro rata parte attributed to Johnson equity investment respectively, ‘source a)*’, respectively 
equals €100 in the negative (loss to be compensated vertically) and €360. The taxable yields 
in respect of source b) remain unchanged and account equally for €250 in both taxable 
periods. Forwarded as a schedule (fig. 45): 
Fig. 45. Given attribution taxable proceeds to taxable periods 1 and 2 
Sources of 
income 
Yields Taxable 
Period 1 
Yields Taxable 
Period 2 
∑  
Johnson source a) <75> 270 195 (double tax 
relief) 
source b) 250 250 500 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
source a)* <100> 360 260 
To secure single taxation, now a loss-recapture mechanism, equivalent to the recapture 
mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes as set forth in Chapter 3, is required. Such 
a recapture would need to operate accordingly (figs. 46, 47 and 48):  
Fig. 46. Taxable Period 1; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax relief 
Recapture 
/*  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
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/2 
Johnson <75> - 250 <25> - 150 37.50 <100> 0 37.50 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- <100> - - <100> 0 0 - - 0 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * <75> = <25>; 
/2: n/a; 0 
/3: 0,25 * 150 = 37.50. 
/*: Administrative notice: double tax relief recapture next year 
Fig. 47. Taxable Period 2; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double tax 
relief 
Recapture 
*)  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 270 - 250 90 - 610 152.50 100 65 87.50 62.50 
Johnson’s 
participation 
- 360 - - 100 260 65 - - 65 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 270 = 90; 
/2: (270 + 90 – 100/*) / 610 * 152.50 = 65; 
/3: 152.50 – 65 = 87.50 
/*: recapture reduces numerator double tax relief fraction 
Fig. 48. Taxable periods 1 & 2; overall tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 1 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 2 
 ∑ Tax Payable  
Johnson  
source a), post-double 
tax relief 
0 0 0 
Johnson  
source b) 
37.50 87.50 125 
Johnson’s Participation  
source a)* 
0 65 65 
The tables illustrate that Johnson, in effect, would be liable to pay tax on the €500 return on 
its direct investment, source b). Johnson would be liable to pay an amount of tax equal to 
€37.50 in Taxable Period 1 and €87.50 in Taxable Period 2. That is an aggregate tax payable 
of €125. That amount equals an overall nominal tax payable imposed at a 25% rate. The 
(grossed-up) return on Johnson’s investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, 
‘source a)’, of €260 does not trigger a tax liability at the level of Johnson. This is fair as 
Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, already would be liable to pay tax on the 
underlying proceeds, i.e., source a)*. These equal €260 triggering a tax payable at the level of 
the participation of €65, specifically €0 in Taxable Period 1 due to the tax loss suffered and 
€65 in Taxable Period 2. 
Economic single taxation efficiently achieved 
Accordingly, due to the recapture mechanism, economic single taxation of the underlying 
proceeds of €260, source a)*, would be achieved. The loss suffered is recognized for tax 
calculation purposes in Taxable Period 1.  
This is fair. The loss has been suffered at that time. No liquidity disadvantage arises if put in 
comparison with a typical participation (base) exemption mechanism. The liquidity 
disadvantages, imposed under a conventional corporate income tax system which e.g. does 
not provide for a refund upon a loss suffered, are not exacerbated. The Taxable Period 1 loss 
is recaptured in Taxable Period 2 for economic double tax calculation purposes to ensure that 
the loss is not taken into account twice (which would entail economic non-taxation).  
Technically, the recapture in Taxable Period 2 takes place by reducing the numerator in the 
double tax relief mechanism’s fraction with an amount equal to the loss suffered in Taxable 
246
Period 1. Conceptually, the recapture operates in a manner akin to the recapture in the 
juridical double tax relief mechanism advocated in Chapter 3, section 4.2.2.
 916
In summary, in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the attribution of the proceeds to 
taxable periods does not entail any differences in tax treatment (leaving the time value of 
money out of consideration) under the application of the indirect tax exemption mechanism. 
That is, in comparison with the scenario set forth in section 5.4.2 of the current chapter (The 
effects involving a direct investment). Accordingly, the distortions recognized under a 
conventional corporate income tax system are not exacerbated. The nominal amount of tax 
payable remains unchanged. The preliminary conclusion that we are back to where we left off 
in section 5.4.2 remains unchanged. Accordingly, the indirect tax exemption mechanism, also 
to this extent, operates equitably. 
Ad 3. The yields from ‘source a)’ account for positive amounts in both taxable periods. The 
yields from the additional ‘source b)’ account for a negative amount in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and 
for a positive amount in ‘Taxable Period 2’. Assume that the net return to the investment in 
source a), ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, remains unchanged and again equals 
€195. And assume that the net return to the investment in the additional direct investment, 
source b), equals €500. However, again the returns are attributed to the taxable periods 
differently. Assume that, like the scenario ad. 1, the taxable proceeds in respect of source a) 
remain unchanged and this time account for €75 in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and €120 in ‘Taxable 
Period 2’. The underlying taxable profits of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, i.e., to 
the extent that they are pro rata parte attributed to Johnson equity investment, ‘source a)*’, 
respectively equal €100 and €160. This time, the taxable proceeds in respect of source b) 
alter. The proceeds from source b) tax account for €150 in the negative in ‘Taxable Period 1’ 
(loss to be compensated vertically) and €650 in the positive in ‘Taxable Period 2’. Forwarded 
as a schedule (fig. 49): 
Fig. 49. Given attribution taxable proceeds to taxable periods 1 and 2 
Sources of 
income 
Yields Taxable 
Period 1 
Yields Taxable 
Period 2 
∑  
Johnson source a) 75 120 195 (double tax 
relief) 
source b) <150> 650 500 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
source a)* 100 160 260 
To secure single taxation, now a profit carry-forward mechanism, equivalent to the carry-
forward mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes as set forth in Chapter 3, is 
required. Such a carry-forward would need to operate accordingly (figs. 50, 51 and 52):  
Fig. 50. Taxable Period 1; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax 
relief 
carry 
forward 
/*  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 75 - <150> 25 <50> 0 0 100 0 0 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 100 - - - 100 25 - - 25 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 75 = 25; 
/2: n/a; 0 
/3: n/a; 0 / 0,25 * 100 = 25 (Johnson’s participation); 
/*: Administrative notice: double tax relief carry forward to next year 
916
 A liquidation losses set-off regime allowing the corporate taxpayer involved to tax-deduct final losses realized 
upon the liquidation of a (foreign) corporate body in which the taxpayer holds a shareholding interest, such as the one 
adopted by the Netherlands (laid down in Article 13d Dutch CITA, would become redundant. The same holds true for 
a type of ‘add-back-regulation’, such as the one adopted by the Netherlands (laid down in Article 13aa-6 Dutch CITA. 
Such an amendment would enhance fairness relative to these measures as they entail liquidity disadvantages for 
merely enabling the setting-off of a tax loss at a moment later in time than actually suffered. 
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Fig. 51. Taxable Period 2; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax 
relief 
Carry 
forward 
*)  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 120 - 650 40 <50> 760 190 <100> 65 125 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 160 - - - 160 40 - - 40 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 120 = 40; 
/2: (120 + 40 + 100/*) / 760 * 190 = 65; 
/3: 190 – 65 = 125 
/*:carry forward increases numerator double tax relief fraction 
Fig. 52 Taxable Periods 1 & 2; overall tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 1 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 2 
 ∑ Tax Payable  
Johnson  
source a), post-double 
tax relief 
0 0 0 
Johnson  
source b) 
0 125 125 
Johnson’s Participation  
source a)* 
25 40 65 
The tables illustrate that Johnson, in effect, would be liable to pay tax on the €500 return on 
its direct investment, source b). Johnson would be liable to pay an amount of tax equal to €0 
in Taxable Period 1 due to the taxable loss suffered and €125 in Taxable Period 2. That is an 
aggregate tax payable of €125. That amount equals an overall nominal tax payable imposed 
at a 25% rate. The (grossed-up) return on Johnson’s investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in 
Distribution Co.’, ‘source a)’, of €260 does not trigger a tax liability at the level of Johnson. 
This is fair as Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, already would be liable to pay tax 
on the underlying proceeds, i.e., source a)*. These equal €260 triggering a tax payable at the 
level of the participation of €65, specifically €25 in Taxable Period 1 and €40 in Taxable 
Period 2. 
Economic single taxation efficiently achieved 
Accordingly, due to the profit carry-forward mechanism, economic single taxation of the 
underlying proceeds of €260, source a)*, would be achieved. The loss suffered from source b) 
is recognized for tax calculation purposes in Taxable Period 1 and set-off against the taxable 
income from source a), leaving a nil amount of tax payable. However, as a conventional 
corporate income tax does not provide for a tax refund, a latent double tax relief entitlement 
with respect to the proceeds from source a) in Taxable Period 1 arises. To ensure that this 
relief entitlement is appreciated, the application of the carry-forward mechanism entails that 
the source a) profit realized in Taxable Period 1 does not diminish for economic double tax 
relief purposes but, instead, is taken into account as a profit eligible for relief in Taxable 
Period 2. Consequently, relief becomes available in Taxable Period 2, guaranteeing economic 
single taxation.  
Technically, the carry-forward in Taxable Period 2 takes place by increasing the numerator in 
the double tax relief mechanism’s fraction with an amount equal to the carried forward 
proceeds from source a) to the extent that no relief is granted in Taxable Period 1. 
Conceptually, the carry-forward operates in a manner akin to the carry-forward feature in the 
juridical double tax relief mechanism advocated in Chapter 3, section 4.2.3.
917
 Accordingly, no
liquidity disadvantages arise in addition to any liquidity disadvantages already imposed under 
a conventional corporate income tax.  
917
 A tax credit carry forward mechanism, such as the one adopted by the Netherlands (laid down in Article 23c-7 
Dutch CITA), would become redundant.  
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In summary, in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the attribution of the proceeds to 
taxable periods does not entail any differences in tax treatment (leaving the time value of 
money out of consideration) under the application of the indirect tax exemption mechanism. 
That is, if it is in comparison with the scenario set forth in section 5.4.2 (The effects involving 
a direct investment). Accordingly, the distortions recognized under a conventional corporate 
income tax would not be exacerbated. The nominal amount of tax payable remains 
unchanged. The preliminary conclusion that we are back to where we left off in section 5.4.2 
remains unchanged. Accordingly, the indirect tax exemption mechanism, also to this extent, 
operates equitably. 
5.4.4.5 Yet, core issues remain in place, so we need something else… 
However, regardless of the fairness enhancing properties of the advocated double tax relief 
mechanisms for both juridical and economic double tax elimination purposes, the underlying 
problematic features of the conventional corporate income tax system as identified in sections 
5.4.1 and 5.4.2 remain in place. As said, it particularly concerns: 
1. The ‘tax-wedge’ between pre-tax and post-tax rate of returns;
2. The ‘financing discrimination’, and;
3. The distortions at the margin.
At the end of the day, we have merely resolved the problems recognized in section 5.4.3, 
which arise on top of the problems recognized already in section 5.4.2. Accordingly, we are 
still dealing with the derived nominal return to the invested equity capital as the foundation 
concept for taxable profit calculation purposes.  
To resolve the distortive features of the conventional corporate income tax, rigorous 
alternatives need to be scrutinized. This simply holds true if one acknowledges that an issue 
cannot be resolved within a framework identical to the one that created it. We need another 
foundation concept for taxable profit calculation purposes. This requires one to set 
conventional ‘tax-thinking’ aside and commence exploring alternatives. 
5.5 Problematic effects under Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
5.5.1 General remarks 
5.5.1.1 A CBIT taxes EBIT 
Let us commence with the so-called ‘Comprehensive Business Income Tax’ (‘CBIT’).
918
 The
CBIT basically operates as a conventional corporate income tax with one vast difference: A 
CBIT excludes from the taxable base all proceeds from financing arrangements. Accordingly, 
outbound interest payments, for instance, are non-tax-deductible irrespective of whether 
debtor and creditor are affiliated. Interest receipts are exempt from tax (or eligible to be 
credited). Consequently, the tax base is basically calculated by making reference to an 
investor’s operational income or so-called ‘earnings before interest and tax’ (‘EBIT’). A CBIT 
taxes EBIT. 
5.5.1.2 Creating tax-parity in financing by denying deduction for debt financing 
Due to the non-provision of a tax deduction regarding interest payments, the financing 
discrimination issue, i.e., the difference in tax treatment between debt and equity financing, as 
918
 The CBIT has been proposed in the early 1990s by the US Department of the Treasury. See U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once, Washington, 
DC (1992). For an analysis of the CBIT, see Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in 
the EU’, 18 International Tax and Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120, as well as Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The 
Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Paper 2006:264. 
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recognized under a conventional corporate income tax, is sought to be resolved by granting 
debt financing the exact same tax treatment as equity financing. Viz., both interest payments 
and dividend payments qualify as non-deductible items for tax calculation purposes. Both the 
remuneration for the provision of capital and enterprise are taken into consideration for tax 
calculation purposes. This typical feature accordingly renders the CBIT a significantly broader 
taxable base in comparison with a conventional corporate income tax (as the latter recognizes 
debt financing for tax calculation purposes). 
To my knowledge, currently there is not a single state that has adopted a CBIT in its 
international direct tax system. That is, at least not to its full extent. Various states’ 
international tax systems have features that, to some extent, embrace the CBIT’s approach of 
not granting a deduction for interest payments. Typical examples are the various ad hoc 
interest deduction limitations that can be found in the international tax regime. Worth 
mentioning here is Hungary, which, at an earlier time, applied a 50% base exemption for 
intra-group interest payments (i.e., non-deduction of interest payment, non-taxation of interest 
receipt).
919
 Another example is the Netherlands, which also at an earlier time had
contemplated the introduction of a ‘mandatory group interest box’ de facto allowing for an 
80% base exemption for proceeds from intra-group debt arrangements.
920
 Interest deduction
limitations, such as thin capitalization measures – i.e., a mechanism disabling the tax-
deduction of interest payments to the extent of what is considered excessive debt financing 
under a statutory debt to equity ratio or arm’s length standard – can for instance be found in 
Denmark, France, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the UK.
921
 Finally, earnings-
stripping rules denying a deduction of interest payments exceeding a certain level relative to 
the respective taxpayer’s EBIT and irrespective of the debtor’s and creditor’s affiliation may 
be mentioned in this respect as an example of a tax measure currently in place that 
conceptually comes nearest to a full-fledged CBIT.
922
 Earnings and stripping regimes are for
instance in place in Denmark, Germany, Italy and the United States. 
5.5.2 The effects involving a direct investment 
5.5.2.1 Assessing the investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
The operation of a CBIT can be illustrated best by means of a numerical example. Let us 
return to our taxpayer Johnson and its dinghy business activities. As said, Johnson invests in 
a dinghy sales activity. The tax rate equals a linear 25% (again, progressivity is not 
considered for mere simplicity reasons). Under a CBIT, the effects are as follows (fig. 53): 
Fig. 53. Johnson’s CBIT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s CBIT calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,500
923
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Depreciation 0 – 10,000
924
919
 This regime has been repealed as of January 1, 2010. For some details see Roland Felkai, ‘Hungary, 2010 Tax 
Changes’, 49 European Taxation 611 (2009), at 611-613. 
920
 The mandatory Dutch group interest box regime was proposed in the letter of the Dutch State Secretary for 
Finance to Parliament of 15 June 2009, DB/2009/227U and subsequently withdrawn in the Letter of the Dutch State 
Secretary for Finance to Parliament of 5 December 2009, DB2009/674M. The regime would have been laid down in 
Article 12c Dutch CITA. 
921
 The regimes can be found respectively in §11 Danish CTA, Article 212 French CGI, Article 20 Spanish CITA’), 
Division 820 (Thin capitalization rules) Australian IITA 1997, subpart FE (Interest apportionment on thin capitalisation) 
New Zealand ITA, Article 66-5 Japanese Special Taxation Measures Law (‘Japanese SMTL’) and Schedule 28AA UK 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (as added to ICTA by the Finance Act 1998). In addition, UK legislation 
governing the arm’s length provision of cross border finance between affiliates is at Section 209(2)(da) ICTA 1988 
and Schedule 28AA ICTA 1988. 
922
 Respectively to be found in §11C Danish CTA, §4h of the German Einkommensteuergesetz (‘German Income Tax 
Code’ or ‘EStG’), articles 167 and 168 of the Italian Tax Code and §163(j) (Limitation on deduction for interest on 
certain indebtedness) US IRC. 
923
 1 + ρ. 
924
 – d. 
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 Aggregate 0 – 10,000 
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount)  0 + 500
925
Tax*
) 
(25%) 0 + 125
926
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 54): 
Fig. 54. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
927
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
928
 Aggregate – 10,000
929
+ 10,500
930
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
931
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
932
 Interest Paid – 240
933
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
934
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
(25%)  0 + 125
935
Aggregate  – 4,000
936
+ 4,135
937
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable.
The net outbound cash flow in period 1 again equals €4,000, an amount equal to the invested 
equity capital. The transactions in period 1 are not considered to constitute a taxable event 
under a CBIT. The CBIT shares this feature with the conventional corporate income tax. The 
net inbound cash flow in period 2 nevertheless alters. This holds true both in comparison with 
a no tax environment and the scenario under a conventional corporate income tax. This time, 
the inflow in period 2 equals €4,135. The net post-tax return to the invested equity capital 
(‘vCBIT’) equals €135, a percentage of 3.375.
938
 What does this tell us? The numbers tell us
three things (see sections 5.5.2.2, 5.5.2.3, and 5.5.2.4). 
5.5.2.2 Average Effective Tax Rates; the ‘tax-wedge’ 
First, it tells us something about the average effective tax rate (‘AETR’) under a CBIT. A CBIT 
taxes operational profit, EBIT. It not only taxes the nominal return to equity, i.e., the excess 
earnings (€100) and the opportunity costs of equity capital (€160), it also taxes the costs of 
debt capital (€240). These three components taken together respectively produce the €25, 
€40 and €60, i.e., an aggregate of €125 tax payable. Inflation is disregarded for CBIT 
calculation purposes. CBIT taxes nominal returns. 
Let us calculate AETRs. As mentioned, AETRs are calculated by dividing the tax payable 
(numerator) by the pre-tax income (denominator).
939
 The tax payable to be adopted in the
925
 500 + (10,000 – 10,000) = 500. Accordingly: ρ + (1-d). 
926
 0.25 * 500 + (10,000 – 10,000) = 125. Accordingly: t.[ρ + (1 – d)]. 
927
 – 1. 
928
 1 + ρ. 
929
 – 1. 
930
 1 + ρ. 
931
 α. 
932
– α. 
933
– α.r. 
934
– α.(1 + r). 
935
 t.[ρ + (1 – d)]. 
936
– (1 – α). 
937
 (1 – α) – (α.r) + (1 – t).ρ – t.(1 – d). 
938
 (4,135 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.03375. Accordingly: vCBIT = (1 – α) – (α.r) + (1 – t).ρ – t. (1 – d) / (1 – α) – 1 = [(ρ – r) – t.ρ] / 
(1 – α) – t. (1 – d) / (1 – α) + r. 
939
 See for a comparison Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on 
Growth, Employment, Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. 
251
numerator equals €125. With respect to the amount to be adopted in the denominator, the 
remarks referred to in the above should be repeated. Johnson’s pre-tax return of €260, as 
said, comprises of two components. The first component amounting to €100 refers to the 
excess earnings, the remuneration for the production factor of enterprise. The second 
component amounting to €160 refers to the normal market return rate (opportunity costs of 
capital), or the remuneration for the equity capital provided. Again, the question arises as to 
which of these amounts should be taken into consideration?
940
If the pre-tax nominal return to equity, €260, is adopted as denominator for AETR calculation 
purposes, the outcome would be an AETR exceeding 48%.
941
 Accordingly, under a CBIT, the
AETR significantly exceeds the statutory tax rate of 25%. This effect can be appreciated 
should one recognize that financing costs are actual costs. That is, at least to the extent it 
does not concern intra-group debt financing arrangements which are typically recognized for 
tax calculation purposes under the separate entity approach. Third parties, such as banks, 
actually collect interests due (or sell the collateral if the debtor defaults on its payments). The 
post-tax nominal return on the invested equity capital, 3.375%, equals 51.9% of the pre-tax 
nominal return on the invested equity capital, 6.5%.
942
 The difference between the pre-tax
return, 6.5% and the post-tax return, 3.375%, being 3.125%, sometimes referred to as the 
‘tax-wedge’, equals the employed tax rate of 25% multiplied by Johnson’s operational return 
on its investment.
943
 The difference between the amount of tax payable under the CBIT
referred to in this section, i.e., €125, and the amount of tax payable under the conventional 
corporate income tax, i.e., €65, can be understood as being the effect of broadening the 
taxable base by denying the tax-deduction of the interest payment of €240. This interest 
deduction limitation accounts for the increase in tax payable with €60 (i.e., from an amount of 
tax payable of €65 until €125).
944
If one were to acknowledge that the pre-tax business cash flow should be taken into 
consideration as denominator for AETR calculation purposes, i.e., the earnings exceeding the 
normal market rate of return, which in this case account for a mere €100, then the AETR 
would be relatively higher. Under that point of reference, the AETR calculation produces an 
AETR equal to 125%.
945
 Johnson’s excess earnings of €100 would be completely taxed away.
Johnson pays more tax than he actually earns. Accordingly, the above statutory AETR under 
a CBIT should be considered unfair provided that one recognizes that savings, or the 
remuneration for the provision of capital, should not be taxed under a business income tax as 
such a tax should merely tax the remuneration for the production factor of enterprise. That is, 
just as the above statutory rate under a conventional corporate income tax should be 
considered unfair for this reason. This plainly holds up since one does not get what one sees, 
i.e., an effective tax imposed at a rate equal to the statutory tax rate. This a fortiori holds true
in cases where states tax savings under a portfolio investment income tax de facto producing 
an economic double taxation of savings income.
946
Tax wedge affects investment location decisions 
This being said, moreover, analogue to a conventional corporate income tax, a CBIT only 
produces AETRs of 48% (or 125% when employing pre-tax excess earnings as the 
denominator), in the event that the depreciation and the like employed for tax calculation 
purposes corresponds with the economic depreciation of Johnson’s investment.
947
 As with
conventional corporate income taxes, under CBITs the wedge between pre-tax and post-tax 
940
 Again, see for a comparison Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and 
Options for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Economic Paper 2006:264, who refer to concerns as to whether it is suitable to find a proper measure of profit to use 
as the denominator. 
941
 125 / 260 * 100% = 48.1%. 
942
 1 – 125 / 260 * 100% = 51.9%. Alternatively: 0.03375 / 0.065 = 0.519. 
943
 6.5% – 3.375% = 0.25 * 500/4,000. Accordingly: v – vCBIT = t.{[ρ + (1 – d)] / (1 – α)]. 
944
 125 – 65 = 60 = 0.25 * 240. Accordingly: vCBIT – vC = t.r.α. 
945
 125 / 100 * 100% = 125%. 
946
 The question of whether savings should be taxed in the first place, as said, is not considered in this study. Please 
note that the proposal of the US Department of the Treasury recognized the capital tax element in the CBIT. The 
proposal is accompanied by an abolition of personal taxes on capital. 
947
 d = 1. 
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rate of returns would grow bigger or smaller would tax depreciation and economic 
depreciation mutually diverge. Dependent on facts and circumstances the AETR would 
fluctuate accordingly. Divergences between tax depreciation and economic depreciation 
consequently would affect location investment decisions in a manner akin to the investment 
decision distortions as already recognized in the above section 5.4.2.2 in respect of 
conventional corporate income tax systems. That would feed the ‘race to the bottom’ referred 
to in that above section. 
5.5.2.3 Financing Discrimination Issues Mitigated 
Second, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement above tells us something about 
the effects of financing decisions. It shows that there is a bright side to the CBIT.  
The adoption of a CBIT would resolve the financing discrimination issues that arise under a 
conventional corporate income tax system as explained earlier. The CBIT is neutral as 
regards the decision of how to finance a particular investment. Namely, both interest 
payments, which in this case equal €240, as well as the opportunity costs of capital, which in 
this case equal €160, constitute non-deductible items. Accordingly, the costs of financing, 
regardless of whether debt or equity financing has been employed, do not affect the taxable 
base and, therefore, due to the nature of CBIT, cannot influence the financing decisions 
accordingly. Hence, a CBIT is neutral towards financing decisions. Johnson would be subject 
to a tax liability equal to €125 regardless of whether the investment in the dinghy selling 
activities is financed with debt, equity, or a combination thereof.  
Contrary to a conventional corporate income tax, a CBIT renders the financing decision 
immaterial for tax calculation purposes. Had Johnson financed the dinghy sales activity 
entirely with debt,
948
 the CBIT would have produced a tax liability of €125 as well (instead of a
taxable amount of €25 which would be the case under a conventional corporate income tax).
949
 The tax payable under a CBIT would also have accounted for €125 had Johnson financed 
its investment entirely with equity.
950-951
 Accordingly, the CBIT would not subsidize debt
financing relative to equity financing as is the case under conventional corporate income tax 
systems today (please note that Johnson, under a conventional corporate income tax, would 
be liable to pay €125 tax had he financed the dinghy sales activity entirely with equity). The 
adoption of CBIT would entail that the current tax incentives toward excessive debt financing 
would disappear. 
The introduction of a CBIT would accordingly render superfluous all interest deduction 
limitations that can be currently found throughout virtually all states’ international tax systems 
with the stroke of a pen. In addition, the same holds true in respect of the ongoing quest to 
draw the dividing line between debt and equity financing for conventional corporate income 
tax calculation purposes. If no distinctions are made, there is no need to draw dividing lines. 
To that extent, the CBIT would make life quite easy. 
5.5.2.4 Marginal Effective Tax Rates; the Price: Distortions at the Margin 
The life easing financing neutrality feature of a CBIT, however, comes with a price. As 
mentioned, the CBIT’s broad taxable base triggers above statutory AETRs. This inequitable 
feature of the CBIT’s non-recognition that the costs of capital economically are actual costs 
incurred could of course be mitigated by reducing statutory rates. 
Such an equity enhancing tax rate reduction, however, would not help things when looking at 
fairness in terms of marginal effective tax rate (‘METR’) calculations and investment decisions 
at the margin. If seen from that perspective, the CBIT proves inequitable and distortive as the 
948
 α = 1. 
949
 0,25 * (500) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 125. 
950
 1 – α = 1 (α = 0). 
951
 0.25 * (500) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 125. 
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adoption of a CBIT would prove distortive at the margin. Frankly put, CBITs distort marginal 
investment decisions. Please let me elaborate on this. 
The CBIT taxes excess earnings as well as the costs of debt capital and the opportunity costs 
of equity capital. Due to the non-deductibility of the costs of debt and equity capital for tax 
calculation purposes, the actual level of capital costs is higher in comparison with a no tax 
environment – and the environment under a corporate income tax which allows for the tax-
deduction of interest payments.
 952
So that is the third thing the numbers, forwarded in the cash flow statement under a CBIT set 
forth in the above, tell us. They tell us something about METRs. As said, these are calculated 
by measuring the tax burden with respect to an additional unit of pre-tax income.
953
Let us calculate METRs to illustrate things. Under the CBIT, in our example, a marginal item 
of income would be taxed at an excessively high rate.
954
 While the pre-tax return on
Johnson’s investment in our example exceeds the normal market return rate of 4% with 250 
base points, the pre-tax return rate equals 6.5%, the post-tax return rate drops 62.5 base 
points under the normal market rate return or opportunity costs of capital, i.e., to 3.375%. 
Accordingly, Johnson’s profitable investment turns out to render a loss.
955
The CBIT starkly pushes on the costs of capital at the margin, consequently reducing the 
inflow of capital. Moreover, tax rate reductions do not resolve this effect of pre-tax profitable 
returns and post-tax loss rendering returns. The CBIT’s increasingly excessive tax rate 
towards the margin renders profitable investments loss-making at the margin, having the 
effect of making marginal investment decision substantially less attractive relative to a no tax 
environment. This holds true, irrespective of the employed tax rates. Had Johnson’s 
investment, for instance, yielded a pre-tax return of 4.01%, a business cash flow in our 
example of €1, a CBIT imposed at rate of, for example, 5% would produce a tax liability equal 
to €20.05.
956
 A tax rate equal to a staggering 2,005%! A pre-tax return of 4.0%, i.e., the
marginal investment producing a marginal income equal to nil, would entail a tax liability of 
€20. That would produce an infinite METR (‘∞’). 
5.5.3 We need something else… 
These pretty straightforward examples illustrate the severe distortions at the margins that 
CBITs cause and with that reveals the unfair features of the CBIT. The CBIT would resolve 
the financing discrimination issues that appear in conventional corporate income taxation. 
However, the price to be paid, i.e., the excessive AETR and METR effects, in my view, would 
be too high. Solutions for the problems that occur under the conventional corporate income 
tax base should be sought elsewhere. 
Notably, as the CBIT proves unfair already when it concerns direct investments, there is no 
need to further explore its potential effects in cases of indirect investments through 
subsidiaries or investments in minority shareholders’ interests. Let us proceed and consider 
some alternative tax bases.  
Worth noting finally is that it has been argued in the literature that legislative steps towards 
the introduction of CBIT-like properties into the international tax system would entail the 
952
 See Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and 
Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120 who forward similar remarks. 
953
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. 
954
 This effect may be recognized in the formula component [(ρ – r) – t.ρ] / (1 – α) forwarded in footnote reference 
938. 
955
 Also De Mooij and Devereux recognize this unfair property of the CBIT. See Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied 
analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120. The 
authors consequently argue an introduction of a CBIT feature within an European Union-wide business income tax to 
be less efficient relative to an ACE. 
956
 0.05 * 401 = 20.05. 
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introduction of a harmful tax measure.
957
 For instance, the ‘mandatory group interest box
regime’, once proposed by the Netherlands’ government providing for an 80% exemption of 
intra-group interest payments, had been withdrawn amongst others for fears of being labeled 
as ‘harmful tax competition’. It was thought that the introduction of such a regime would 
trigger foreign retaliatory legislative responses, e.g., the application of anti-abuse measures 
like interest deduction limitations.
958
 The conceptually murky label ‘harmful tax competition’
has been used in the literature basically by referring to the regime’s differential approach 
towards debt financing relative to the approach adopted under a conventional corporate 
income tax. In my view such reasoning is analytically invalid, as it would render all 
divergences from the conventional corporate income tax to constitute ‘harmful tax 
competition’: It differs and, therefore, is wrong.  
5.6 Towards fairness: the allowance for corporate equity 
5.6.1 General remarks 
5.6.1.1 An ACE taxes rents 
Let us proceed with the so-called ‘allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’).
959
 The ACE
basically operates in a manner similar to a conventional corporate income tax with one vast 
difference: a tax-deduction for the opportunity costs of equity capital. Accordingly, both the 
remunerations for the provision of debt capital (interest payments) and equity capital (i.e., the 
opportunity costs of capital) are tax-deductible for tax calculation purposes. This basically 
entails that normal market rate returns on equity investments are not taxed. 
The financing discrimination issue under a conventional corporate income tax is sought to be 
mitigated by granting equity financing the exact same tax treatment as debt financing. The 
mechanism used is the making available of a tax deduction for equity financing arrangements. 
That is, in addition to the recognition of tax-deductible interest payments for tax calculation 
purposes. 
5.6.1.2 Creating tax-parity in financing by granting deduction for equity financing 
Accordingly, the ACE operates exactly opposite of the CBIT. As both the remunerations for 
the provision of debt capital and equity capital are tax-deductible, merely the remunerations 
for the provision of the production factor of enterprise are taken into consideration for tax 
calculation purposes. This typical feature of the ACE accordingly has the effect of the tax to 
adopt a significantly narrower taxable base in comparison with both the conventional 
corporate income tax (which recognizes debt financing, yet disregards equity financing for tax 
calculation purposes) and CBIT (which recognizes neither debt financing nor equity financing 
arrangements for tax calculation purposes). The tax base under an ACE is basically 
calculated by merely making reference to the investor’s excess earnings (business cash flow) 
or economic rent. 
There are some real world examples of countries adopting approaches akin to ACEs. 
Currently, Belgium applies a variant of the mechanism under the so-called ‘notional interest 
957
 See, for instance, Rita Szudoczky et al, ‘Revisiting the Dutch Interest Box under the EU State Aid Rules and the 
Code of Conduct: When a ‘Disparity’ Is Selective and Harmful’, 38 Intertax 260 (2010), at 260-280.  
958
 See the letters of the State Secretary for Finance of December 5, 2009, No. DB2009/674 M and April 14, 2011, 
No. AFP/2011/248U. 
959
 The proposals for an ACE originated in the early 1990s. See the proposal of the Capital Taxes Committee of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Equity for Companies: A Corporate Tax for the 1990s, London (1991). See also Michael 
P. Devereux et al, ‘A general neutral profits tax’, 12 Fiscal Studies 1 (1991), at 12-15. The ACE has been based on 
an earlier proposal for a ‘capital cost deduction’ forwarded by Robin Broadway et al, ‘A general proposition on the 
design of a neutral business tax’, 24 Journal of Public Economics 231 (1984), at 231-239. For an analysis, reference 
is made to Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and 
Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120. See for some further discussion  
Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 
07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008). 
255
deduction regime’.
960
 The ‘notional interest deduction’ provides for a yearly ‘fictitious’ tax
deduction basically equal to the respective taxpayer’s equity capital multiplied with the 
published interest rate on long-term (10-year) Belgian government bonds. In the Netherlands, 
the so-called ‘Study Group Tax System’, a Dutch government-appointed advisory committee, 
recognizes the ACE to constitute a founding feature of an envisaged Dutch profit tax system 
of the future.
961
 Moreover, some real world experience with ACE-style tax reforms has been
gained in Austria, Croatia, Brazil and Italy.
962
5.6.2 The effects involving a direct investment 
5.6.2.1 Assessing the investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
The operation of an ACE can be illustrated best by means of a numerical example. Let us 
return to our taxpayer Johnson and its dinghy business activities. As said, Johnson invests in 
a dinghy sales activity directly. The tax rate again equals a linear 25%. Under an ACE, the 
effects are as follows (fig. 55): 
Fig. 55. Johnson’s ACE calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s ACE calculation 
Earnings 
Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,500
963
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500 
Costs 
Financing Expenses (interest) 0 – 240
964
Opportunity costs of capital 0 – 160
965
Depreciation 0 – 10,000
966
Aggregate 0 – 10,400
967
Tax Levy 
Aggregate (Taxable Amount) 0 + 100
968
Tax*
 
(25%) 0 + 25
969
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable.
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 56): 
Fig. 56. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow 
Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment – 10,000
970
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
971
960
 The relevant provisions of the legislation in force in Belgium are contained in Articles 205bis through 205novies of 
the Income Tax Act (“Wetboek van de inkomstenbelastingen 92”). 
961
 The Study Group Tax System forwarded its conclusions in its report entitled ‘Continuïteit en vernieuwing. Een visie 
op het belastingstelsel’ (Studiecommissie Belastingstelsel). See the letter of the State Secretary of Finance to the 
Dutch Lower House of Parliament to the Dutch Lower House of Parliament of April 7, 2011 (“Brief van de Minister van 
Financiën aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal van 7 april 2010, Kamerstukken II, 
vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 32140, nr. 4”), at 1. The report has been attached to this letter. 
962
 See for some discussion Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options 
for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, and Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
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 1 + ρ. 
964
– α.r. 
965
– (1 – α).r. 
966
 – d. 
967
– r – d. 
968
 (500 – 240 – 160) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 100. Accordingly: (ρ – r) + (1 – d). 
969
 0.25 * [(500 – 240 – 160) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 25. Accordingly: t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)]. 
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 – 1. 
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 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500 
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance + 6,000
972
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
973
 Interest Paid – 240
974
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
975
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
(25%)  0 + 25
976
Aggregate – 4,000
977
+ 4,235
978
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable.
The net outward bound cash flow in period 1 equals €4,000, an amount equal to the invested 
equity capital. The transactions in period 1 again do not constitute a taxable event under an 
ACE. The ACE shares this feature with both the conventional corporate income tax and the 
CBIT. The net inbound cash flow in period 2 nevertheless alters. This holds true in 
comparison with a no tax environment, the scenario under a conventional corporate income 
tax and the scenario under the CBIT. This time, the inflow in period 2 equals €4,235. The net 
post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vACE’) equals €235, a percentage of 5.875.
979
What does this tell us? Again, the numbers tell us three things (see sections 5.6.2.2, 5.6.2.3, 
and 5.6.2.4). 
5.6.2.2 Equal to Statutory Average Effective Tax Rates 
First, it tells us something about the AETR under an ACE. The ACE does not tax the entire 
nominal return to equity. Rather, it merely taxes excess earnings, the investor’s economic 
rent.
 980
 Both the costs of debt capital (€240) as well as the opportunity costs of equity capital
(€160) constitute tax-deductible items. Consequently, it only taxes the excess earnings of, in 
this case, €100. Accordingly, the application of an ACE produces a tax payable of €25. The 
difference between the amount of tax payable under the ACE referred to in this section, i.e., 
€25, and the amounts of tax payable under the CBIT (€125) and the conventional corporate 
income tax (€65), can be understood as being the effect of narrowing the taxable base by 
granting tax deductions for both debt capital (€240) and equity capital (€160) remunerations. 
The deduction for the equity component accounts for the decrease in taxes payable relative to 
a conventional corporate income tax system of €40 (i.e., from an amount of tax payable of 
€65 until €25).
 981
 In addition, as the costs of capital include the inflation component, an ACE
produces a substantive foundation concept for taxable profit calculation purposes. This is 
contrary to both a conventional corporate income tax system and the CBIT. Both tax nominal 
investment returns. 
In my view, these features of an ACE are pivotal in distinguishing it from conventional 
corporate income tax systems and the CBIT as the ACE provides the first tax base foundation 
concept forwarded in this chapter that seeks to tax the actual income derived in return for the 
provision of the production factor of enterprise. Accordingly, it is the first tax base foundation 
concept seeking to fully appreciate the underlying S-H-S concept of income to the extent it 
971
 1 + ρ. 
972
 α. 
973
– α. 
974
– α.r. 
975
– α.(1 + r). 
976
 t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)]. 
977
– (1 – α). 
978
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r) – t.(1 – d). 
979
 (4,235 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.05875. Accordingly: vACE = [(1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r) – t.(1 – d)] / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t).(ρ – 
r) / (1 – α) – t.(1 – d) l/ (1 – α) + r. It is noted that the formula corresponds with its equivalent under the modified R-
CFT set forth in section 7.2.3 with the exception of the tax depreciation component, as vmodR-CFT = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – 
α) + r. The same holds true under the modified R+F-CFT set forth in section 7.3.3 with the same exception, as 
vmodR+F-CFT = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) + r. Moreover, reinforcing the R+F-CFT with tax depreciation in a manner as set 
forth in section 7.3.4., renders it identical to the ACE, as vmodR+F-CFTdepreciation = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) – t.(1 – d) / (1 – α) 
+ r. 
980
 This effect may be recognized in the formula component (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) forwarded in the previous footnote 
reference 979. 
981
 65 – 25 = 40 = 0.25 * 160. Accordingly: vC – vACE = t.r.(1 – α). 
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concerns income derived from carrying on business activities (opposite to labor income and 
savings income). 
Now let us calculate AETRs. Again, AETRs are calculated by dividing the tax payable 
(numerator) by the pre-tax income (denominator).
982
 The tax payable to be adopted in the
numerator equals €25. With respect to the amount to be adopted in the denominator, the 
remarks referred to in the above should be repeated. Johnson’s pre-tax return of €260, as 
said, comprises of two components. The first component amounting to €100 refers to the 
excess earnings, the remuneration for the production factor of enterprise. The second 
component amounting to €160 refers to the normal market return rate on the investment (i.e., 
the opportunity costs of capital), the remuneration for the equity capital provided. Again, the 
question arises as to which of these amounts should be taken into consideration?
983
Would the pre-tax nominal return to equity, €260, be adopted as the denominator for AETR 
calculation purposes, the outcome would be an AETR roughly equal to 10%.
984
 Viz., the post-
tax nominal return on the invested equity capital, 5.875%, roughly equals 90% of the pre-tax 
nominal return on the invested equity capital, 6.5%.
985
 That could trigger one to jump to the
conclusion that ACEs produce below statutory AETRs. Or are we once again comparing 
apples to oranges? 
If one were to acknowledge that the pre-tax business cash flow, i.e., the earnings exceeding 
the normal market rate of return, which in this case account for €100, should be taken into 
consideration as denominator for AETR calculation purposes, the AETR would increase in 
comparison with the 10% AETR calculation set forth in the above paragraph. This effect can 
be appreciated should one recognize that financing costs, including the opportunity costs of 
equity capital, are actual costs. Taking that starting point for AETR calculation purposes, the 
AETR on Johnson’s business cash flow equals 25%.
986
 The difference between the pre-tax
return, 6.5% and the post-tax return, 5.875%, being 0.625%, equals the employed tax rate of 
25% multiplied with Johnson’s economic rent derived from its investment in the dinghy 
distribution business.
987
 Put forward otherwise, Johnson’s pre-tax return exceeds the normal
market return rate of 4% with 250 base points with a return of 6.5%. Johnson’s post-tax return 
equals 5.875%. That amount exceeds the normal market return rate of 4% with 187.5 base 
points. The difference between pre-tax and post-tax return rates equals 62.5 base points, and 
accordingly produces an AETR of 25%.
988
Consequently, under proper AETR calculations, the ACE produces equal to statutory AETRs 
of, in this case, 25%. Johnson pays the same amount of tax he actually earns. Accordingly, 
provided that one recognizes that savings, or the remuneration for the provision of capital, 
should not be taxed under a business income tax as such a tax should merely tax the 
remuneration for the production factor of enterprise, the equal to statutory AETR under an 
ACE should enhance fairness relative to conventional corporate income tax and the CBIT. 
The fairness of the situation is plain to see, since one gets what one sees, i.e., an effective 
tax imposed at a rate equal to the statutory tax rate. Again, this a fortiori holds true in cases 
where states tax savings under a portfolio investment income tax de facto producing an 
economic double taxation of savings income.
989
Investment location decisions in the presence of AETR differentials 
982
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. 
983
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for 
Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, who refer to concerns as to whether it is suitable to find a proper measure of profit to uses as the 
denominator. 
984
 25 / 260 * 100% = 10%. 
985
 1 – 25 / 260 * 100% = 90%. Alternatively, 0.05875 / 0.065 = 0.90. 
986
 25 / 100 * 100% = 25%. 
987
 0.065 – 0.05875 = 0.25 * 100/4,000. Accordingly: v – vACE = t.(ρ – r).(1 – d) / (1 – α).  
988
 62.5 / 250 * 100% = 25%. 
989
 The question of whether savings should be taxed in the first place is not considered in this study. 
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This being said, moreover, analogue to both a conventional corporate income tax and the 
CBIT, the ACE only produces AETRs of 25% in the event that the depreciation employed for 
tax calculation purposes corresponds with the economic depreciation of Johnson’s 
investment.
990
 As with conventional corporate income tax systems and CBITs in this respect,
a wedge between pre-tax and post-tax rates of return would emerge, growing bigger or 
smaller to the extent that tax depreciation and economic depreciation mutually diverge, for 
instance due to the adoption of tax incentives such as depreciation allowances and tax 
holidays. Dependent on facts and circumstances, the AETR would fluctuate accordingly. 
Divergences between tax depreciation and economic depreciation, consequently, would seem 
to affect location investment decisions in a manner akin to the investment decision distortions 
as already recognized in the above in respect of conventional corporate income tax systems. 
Accordingly, states would seem to be in need to adopt tax depreciation mechanisms that (aim 
to) correspond with economic depreciation to mitigate these effects. 
However, this being said, the effects could be considered less significant in present value 
terms.
991
 At least, to the extent it concerns mutual differences between tax depreciation and
economic depreciation in terms of the pace in which depreciation is recognized (i.e., temporal 
differences). That is because the accelerated tax depreciation relative to the economic 
depreciation would reduce not only the tax bookkeeping value of the respective asset, but 
also the taxpayer’s equity in respect of which the ACE is calculated against in later years. 
Accordingly, accelerated tax depreciation reduces the ACE granted in later years. This offsets 
the tax benefits from the accelerated tax depreciation, which entails the present values of 
depreciation and ACE allowances to be independent of the rate against which assets are 
written-off in tax bookkeeping. 
This holds true, in addition to the reality that income currently is attributed to taxing 
jurisdictions by means of origin based profit allocation factors. The mere adoption of an ACE 
feature would not change investment location distortions.
992
 Consequently, mutual
divergences between AETRs under ACE based corporate tax systems could not put an end 
to the ‘race to the bottom’ referred to in the above. Accordingly, the ACE would not resolve 
things in the geographical tax base allocation area. The attribution of profits to taxing 
jurisdictions is recognized and further discussed as an isolated issue in Chapter 6. 
5.6.2.3 Financing Discrimination Issues Mitigated 
Second, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement above tells us something about 
the effects of financing decisions.  
The adoption of an ACE would mitigate the financing discrimination issues that arise under a 
conventional corporate income tax as explained earlier. The ACE operates neutral to a great 
extent as regards the decision of how to finance a particular investment. Namely, both interest 
payments, which in this case equal €240, and the opportunity costs of capital, which in this 
case equal €160, constitute tax-deductible items. As is also the case with the CBIT, the ACE 
resolves the financing discrimination issue. Yet it reaches this outcome by exact opposite 
means. Contrary to the CBIT mechanism, the costs of financing, regardless of whether debt 
or equity financing has been employed, affect the taxable base and, therefore, by the nature 
of the ACE, cannot influence the financing decisions accordingly. Had Johnson financed the 
dinghy sales activity entirely with equity,
993
 the tax payable under an ACE would have
990
 d = 1. 
991
 See Robin Broadway et al, ‘A general proposition on the design of a neutral business tax’, 24 Journal of Public 
Economics 231 (1984), at 231-239. See also Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International 
Trends and Options for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs Economic Paper 2006:264, as well as Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT 
reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and Public Finance 93 (2011), at 96, as well as Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘A 
General neutral profit tax’, 12 Fiscal Studies 1 (1991), at 9. 
992
 See also Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century 
(2008), at 48. 
993
 1 – α = 1 (α = 0). 
259
accounted for €25
994
 (instead of a taxable amount of €125 which would be the case under a
conventional corporate income tax).
995
 Had the dinghy sales activity entirely been financed
with debt,
996
 the ACE would also have produced a tax liability of €25.
997
 Johnson would be
subject to a tax liability equal to €25 regardless of whether the investment in the dinghy selling 
activities is financed with debt, equity or a combination thereof. Hence, the ACE renders the 
financing decision immaterial for tax calculation purposes making this decision tax neutral in 
this respect. It would not subsidize debt financing relative to equity financing as is the case 
under conventional corporate income tax systems today. The adoption of an ACE would 
therefore entail that the current tax incentives for excessive debt financing would disappear, 
or at least be robustly mitigated. The introduction of an ACE, accordingly, would render 
superfluous with the stroke of a pen all interest deduction limitations that can be currently 
found throughout the international tax regime. Thin capitalization issues would be rendered 
moot. 
It should be mentioned, however, that the tax-deduction for the opportunity costs of capital to 
be laid down in the tax legislation would equal a (perhaps annually set) fixed amount, e.g., the 
return on a long-term government bond with a mark-up for economic risk incurred. To the 
extent that this fixed amount does not correspond with actual normal return rates – a 
necessary effect of the adoption of a fixed tax-deduction – differences between debt and 
equity financing in terms of tax burdens imposed would remain to occur. As mentioned in the 
above section 5.3.4, it would be quite difficult to decide on a ‘proper’ interest rate for ACE 
purposes. Each amount chosen would constitute a proxy and would be arbitrary to some 
extent. However, if compared with current conventional corporate income taxation and its 
scope of subsidizing debt financing relative to equity financing, these differences in tax 
treatment between debt and equity financing under an ACE would be substantially mitigated. 
This particularly holds true to the extent that the tax-deduction is closely monitored and 
occasionally set-off against market return rates on low-risk debt financing arrangements to 
guarantee that potential arbitrage opportunities would remain inconsequential. Notably, 
solutions for these remaining divergences between debt and equity financing may 
alternatively be sought in granting a deduction for both equity and debt financing 
arrangements, as a proxy, i.e., regardless of actual interest payments agreed upon. Such a 
mechanism is typically referred to as a ‘capital cost deduction’ or ‘allowance for corporate 
capital’ (‘ACC’).
998
 The ACC would operate conceptually similar to an ACE. It would bring the
exact same tax treatment of debt and equity financing, but by means of a tax-deductible 
amount corresponding with the normal market return rate on the respective firm’s entire 
capital, i.e., the firm’s equity capital and debt capital combined. The ACC is not further 
discussed. 
It is true that, under an ACE, one would still be required to draw the administrative dividing 
line between debt and equity financing for tax calculation purposes. However, due to the 
considerable mitigation of the financing discrimination issue, the incentive involving the 
drawing of such a line in terms of tax burden consequences and opposite tax revenue 
consequences would be strongly reduced.  
It may for instance suffice to draw the line by reviewing the question of whether the funds are 
made available under the (legal) obligation to materially repay the principal amount within a 
period of say 20 years.
999
 An affirmative answer could entail the qualification of the financing
994
 0.25 * (500 – 400) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 25. 
995
 0.25 * (500) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 125. 
996
 α = 1. 
997
 0.25 * (500 – 400) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 25. 
998
 Reference can be made to Robin Broadway et al, ‘A general proposition on the design of a neutral business tax’, 
24 Journal of Public Economics 231 (1984), at 231-239, suggesting a ‘capital cost deduction’. See also, for instance, 
Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 International Tax and Public 
Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120, who refer to the suggestions of Broadway and Bruce to introduce an allowance for 
corporate capital. 
999
 For instance, in the Netherlands the dividing line in taxation to distinguish debt from equity is the material 
obligation to repay the principle amount within a period not exceeding 50 years. A subordinated profit participating 
loan issued under a term exceeding 50 years is considered an equity contribution for corporate income tax purposes. 
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arrangement as debt entailing tax deductible interest payments; a negative answer would 
then entail the qualification of the financing arrangement as equity to trigger the fixed tax-
deduction to account for the opportunity costs of capital. Contract law typically employs 
similar distinctions. Such a clear-cut dividing line could prove sufficient since the incentives to 
qualify respective financing arrangements as debt or equity would be strongly reduced. The 
gain or loss in terms of tax costs seems limited. So why seek the borderline and create legal 
uncertainty? If the need to distinguish is inconsequential, the same may hold true regarding 
the accuracy of the lines drawn. The ACE would make life easier. 
5.6.2.4 Marginal Effective Tax Rates are nil 
And things would get better. Contrary to the CBIT, the life easing financing neutrality feature 
of an ACE does not come with a price. At least that is, not in addition to the administrative 
requirements for tax calculation purposes to define the opportunity costs of equity capital, the 
fixed tax-deductible amount, and the drawing of the dividing line between debt and equity 
(e.g. by means of looking into the requirement to repay the principal amount). 
So that would be the third matter the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement under an 
ACE tell us. In addition to the ACEs feature that AETRs correspond with statutory tax rates, 
METRs are nil.
1000
 This is opposite to the CBIT where METRs, as explained in the above, are
sky-rocketing. Frankly put, ACEs do not distort marginal investment decisions as one would 
not pay tax at the margin. Accordingly, an ACE would not prove inequitable and distortive at 
the margin. Please let me elaborate on this. 
As mentioned, the ACE does not tax the entire nominal return to equity. Rather, it merely 
taxes excess earnings, or the investor’s economic rent. Due to the deductibility of both the 
costs of debt and equity capital for tax calculation purposes, the actual level of capital costs is 
equal to the costs of capital in a no tax environment (and lower in comparison with the 
environments under a CBIT or the conventional corporate income tax). Let us calculate 
METRs to illustrate things. Under the ACE, in our example, the METR equals 0%. Had 
Johnson’s investment, for instance, yielded a pre-tax return of 4.01%, a business cash flow in 
our example of €1, an ACE imposed at a 25% rate would produce a tax liability equal to 
€0.25.
1001
 A pre-tax return of 4.0%, i.e., the marginal investment producing a marginal income
equal to nil, would entail a tax liability of €0 also.
1002
 That would produce the 0% METR.
1003
5.6.2.5 Arguments for Further Exploration… 
These straightforward examples illustrate the fairness enhancing effects that ACEs produce: 
equal to statutory AETRs, financing neutrality and nil METRs. This provides some arguments 
for further exploration of the ACE as a foundation concept for taxable profit calculation 
purposes.  
Before leaping towards the effects under indirect investments, some remarks should be 
forwarded first. In comparison with conventional corporate income taxation and the 
application of the CBIT, tax revenues under an ACE could be considered quite moderate. In 
our example, under the ACE Johnson would be liable to pay €25 tax while the conventional 
corporate income tax would produce a tax liability of €65. That is, at least to the extent that 
Johnson would fail to recognize the debt financing incentive under conventional corporate 
income taxation and would not finance its investment in the dinghy selling activities entirely 
with debt. That would produce a €25 corporate income tax liability.  
See Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business 
income’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2011) 447, at section 2.1.3. 
1000
 See for a comparison Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 18 
International Tax and Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120 who forward similar remarks. 
1001
 1.00 * 0.25 = 0.25. 
1002
 0.00 * 0.25 = 0.00. 
1003
 See also Bond and Devereux who demonstrate the ACE’s neutrality at the margin in Stephen R. Bond et al, 
‘Generalised R-based and S-based taxes under uncertainty’, 87 Journal of Public Economics 1291 (2003), at 1291 – 
1311.  
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In addition, the CBIT would produce tax payable of €125 rendering the pre-tax profitable 
investment as a loss at the margin post-tax. The reduced revenue effects caused by the 
narrow taxable base (at least, that is relative to the conventional corporate income tax) are 
sometimes recognized as a disadvantage of the ACE.  
The policy requirements of maintaining tax revenues would accordingly seem to render tax 
rate increases necessary. That is the argument at least. It is sometimes said in practice that 
this would make the respective taxing jurisdiction less attractive for foreign investments, if 
multinationals base their location decisions on statutory tax rates.
1004
 I doubt whether that
would really be the case. First, I feel it hard to believe that directors of multinational firms 
would fail to recognize that high tax rates with narrow tax bases could produce lower AETRS 
than low tax rates with broad tax bases (or vice versa). I would tend to argue that CFOs are 
very well acquainted with the concept that taxation is more than just a tax rate. This may 
particularly be considered true since international tax practice reveals the presence of 
technically complex legal structures, such as intra-group hybrid financing structures, which 
multinational firms implement for tax optimization reasons. Second, it is no secret that, under 
conventional corporate income taxation, AETRS and statutory tax rates mutually diverge to a 
great extent. This is sometimes referred to as base erosion. It is sometimes heard in tax 
practice as a rule of thumb that perhaps up to 60% of a multinational firm’s profits may 
effectively escape corporate taxation if business is structured legally in a tax-optimized 
manner.
1005
 A tax gap of such an extent would render the statutory 25% tax rates to
effectively tax at a 10% rate. That percentage comes close to the (though analytically flawed) 
rough 10% AETR calculation under an ACE as set forth in the above; see section 5.6.2.2. If 
seen from that perspective, AETRs under an ACE may not necessarily entail significant 
declines in revenue collection.
1006
Worth noting finally is that, in the past, some have considered that the taking of steps by 
countries toward an ACE to produce harmful tax competition. For instance, the Belgian 
‘notional interest deduction’ referred to in the above has once, i.e., at least implicitly, been 
labeled as ‘harmful tax competition’ by the Netherlands government in 2007.
1007
 In my view,
this is quite odd as the ACE is the first to provide a fair foundation concept of taxable income, 
since it actually seeks to tax economic rents and mitigate the financing discrimination issue.  
Again, the label ‘harmful tax competition’ seems to have been placed, basically by referring to 
the regime’s different approach relative to the conventional corporate income tax. In my view 
such reasoning is analytically invalid as it would render all divergences from the conventional 
corporate income tax to constitute ‘harmful tax competition’: It differs and, therefore, it is 
wrong. Moreover, the so-called ‘Study Group Tax System’, a Dutch government-appointed 
advisory committee, recognizes that the ACE constitutes a founding feature of an envisaged 
Dutch profit tax system of the future.
1008
 The ‘harmful tax competition’ label, posted by the
1004
 Empirical research, which, notably, I did not came across in my research, could verify such a hypothesis. See for 
a comparison, Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for 
Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264. The authors set forth that it might be expected that multinationals, in addition to reviewing statutory 
tax rates, base their decisions on the allowances and deductions available in a jurisdiction. 
1005
 That is, although ‘it is difficult to reach solid conclusions about how much base erosion and profit shifting actually 
occurs’ in practice. See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at 
Chapter 2, also for overviews of corporate tax receipts data. 
1006
 Unfortunately, there seem to be no clear-cut empirical studies available verifying economic implications of ACE-
style reforms. See for a comparison Ruud A. de Mooij et al, ‘An applied analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms in the EU’, 
18 International Tax and Public Finance 93 (2011), at 93-120. 
1007
 Reference can be made to Dutch Parliamentary history. See, for instance, Parliamentary papers of the Dutch 
Lower House of Parliament (Kamerstukken II, 2006-2007, 30572, nr. 13 ‘Wetgevingsoverleg’ 18 September 2006), at 
43, where the Netherlands government referred to Belgium, for illustration purposes, as low-taxing jurisdiction for the 
purpose of applying the ‘subject-to-tax-test’. The low tax impost in Belgium is explained as a consequence of the 
notional interest deduction limitation in place in Belgium. This may trigger the application of the ‘switch-over’ to the 
indirect credit mechanism in the Netherlands regarding so-called ‘low-taxed portfolio participations’. 
1008
 The Study Group Tax System (“Studiecommissie Belastingstelsel”) forwarded its conclusions in its report entitled 
‘Continuïteit en vernieuwing. Een visie op het belastingstelsel’. See the letter of the State Secretary for Finance to the 
Dutch Lower House of Parliament to the Dutch Lower House of Parliament of April 7, 2011 (“Brief van de Minister van 
Financiën aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal van 7 april 2010, Kamerstukken II, 
vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 32140, nr. 4”) at 1. The report has been attached to this letter. 
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Netherlands government, may be considered particularly awkward as the Dutch government 
embraced the Study Group Tax System’s conclusions conceptually in 2011.
1009
All in all, various arguments seem available to support a further exploration of the ACE in the 
international tax regime. Let us proceed and further explore the ACE’s merits. 
5.6.3 The effects that arise when it involves an (in)direct investment through an 
interposed controlled subsidiary 
5.6.3.1 Assessing the investment returns through interposed subsidiary ‘Johnson’s 
Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’ 
As mentioned earlier, Johnson could very well have chosen to invest in the dinghy sales 
activity indirectly, i.e., through an interposed controlled subsidiary. Earlier, I referred to the 
subsidiary as ‘Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co.’ Economically such a difference in the 
legal organization chosen re the investment undertaken would not substantially alter things. 
If the application of the separate entity approach would be maintained under an ACE, tax 
cascading, i.e., economic multiple taxation would be the consequence. Moreover, the 
recognition of intra-group transactions between affiliated entities would still provide an 
incentive for the arbitrary (inter-jurisdictional) shifting of profits between affiliated corporate 
bodies within the same group. The introduction of an ACE would not alter this. It would not 
change the recognition for tax calculation purposes of intra-group transactions which, by 
principle, are not governed by actual market forces. Irrespective of whether an ACE applies, 
tax base erosion issues would remain in existence. 
5.6.3.2 Tax consolidation remedies 
Tax base erosion by means of employing intra-group transactions has already been referred 
to in section 5.4.3 in the above. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 4, these effects could be 
mitigated by treating a group of affiliated corporate entities, in our example Johnson and 
Johnson’s Dinghy Sales Subsidiary Co., as a single taxpayer for tax calculation purposes. 
This can be achieved as said through tax consolidation. Also, under the application of an 
ACE, the effect of adopting such an approach is that the tax cascading effect under the 
separate entity approach would disappear. The post-tax return to equity would not alter as a 
consequence of the inter-positioning of corporate entities. It would be exactly the same as in 
the case where Johnson invests in the dinghy distribution business directly.  
The post-tax return rate would equal 5.875% regardless of whether the investment activities 
are undertaken (in)directly. Economic double tax relief mechanisms would become redundant 
as the issue of economic double taxation would not arise. In addition, the same would be true 
in respect of measures seeking to tackle arbitrary profit shifting by means of intra-group 
financing transactions. As the separate entity approach would be let go, intra-group 
transactions would not be recognized for corporate tax calculation purposes. Consequently, 
such transactions would no longer a priori pose tax base erosion hazards. Notably, moreover, 
as argued in Chapter 3, double tax relief with respect to cross-border business operations 
may be granted in a neutral and equitable manner under the Dutch-style juridical double tax 
relief mechanism: the credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income method.
1010
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 See the letter of the State Secretary for Finance to the Dutch Lower House of Parliament of April 14, 2011 (“Brief 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën van 14 april 2011”), No. AFP/2011/248U, particularly the appendix, the ‘Tax Agenda’ 
(“Fiscale agenda; Naar een eenvoudiger, meer solide en fraudebestendig belastingstelsel”). 
1010
 The ACE would be assigned geographically in proportion to the geographic attribution of the firm’s equity capital. 
Contra, Court of Justice, case C-350/11 (Argenta Spaarbank). Regrettably, the Court requires a pro rata allocation of 
the ‘notional interest deduction’ under the Belgium tax system at hand in the case concerned to infringe primary EU 
law. The Court accordingly does not seem to appreciate the underlying economic rationale of the allowance for 
corporate equity to provide for a tax-deduction in appreciation of the opportunity costs of equity capital (it seems that 
the Court considered the notional interest deduction to constitute some kind of a tax subsidy). If it did, the Court 
would accordingly have ruled it to be consistent to attribute the notional interest deduction geographically in 
263
Notably, the issue of how the geographical attribution of tax base across taxing jurisdictions 
should occur, as said, is dealt with in isolation in Chapter 6. 
5.6.4 The effects involving an indirect investment in a non-controlled participation 
5.6.4.1 General remarks 
This brings us to the effects in the case of an investment in the equity capital of a third party, 
i.e., the investment in a non-controlled participation. As said, where the additional problems
triggered under the separate entity approach could be resolved relatively easily through tax 
consolidation where it concerns a group of affiliated entities, the opposite is true where it 
concerns investments in the equity capital of a third party. In respect of minority shareholding 
interests, tax consolidation would not be appropriate. 
In the above section 5.4.4 of this chapter, the adoption of an indirect tax credit mechanism 
has been advocated to mitigate the tax cascading effects in an equitable and tax-neutral 
manner. The question now arises regarding how things would turn out in conjunction with an 
ACE mechanism. 
Let us return to Johnson’s investment activities. In the event that Johnson decides to invest in 
a minority shareholding, the economic double taxation effects are essentially similar to those 
as set forth in the previous sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. Absent an economic double tax relief 
mechanism, economic double taxation arises with respect to the underlying participation’s 
business income to the extent that it can be attributed to the relative volume of Johnson’s 
shareholders’ interest. Tax cascading effects, in other words, arise to the extent that 
Johnson’s participation issued equity capital to Johnson (‘pro rata parte effect’). Hence, the 
double taxation varies directly proportional to the volume of the shareholders’ interest.
 1011
 The
distortive economic double taxation again comprises two components: the tax levied at the 
level of the participation, ‘component I’,
1012
 and the tax levied at the level of the shareholder,
‘component II’.
1013
5.6.4.2 Mitigating tax cascading: the indirect tax exemption under an ACE 
As argued, the typical economic double tax relief mechanisms, the participation exemption 
mechanism and the indirect tax credit mechanism prove to operate in an unfair fashion. Both 
reveal flaws in their design and conceptual operation. The indirect tax exemption has been 
advocated as an equitable and neutral alternative. Let us look into things. Also under an ACE, 
the indirect tax exemption would provide relief in two consecutive steps: 
1. First, the pre-underlying-tax excess earnings on the shareholder’s investment in the
shareholders’ interest – i.e., the economic rents from the respective participation
without the underlying tax as imposed at the level of the participation being taken into
consideration – is included in the shareholder’s taxable base.
1014
 This amount could
be calculated by ‘grossing-up’ the post-underlying-tax return on the shareholder’s
proportion to the geographic allocation of the corporate taxpayer’s equity capital; that is, as the Belgian system did. 
Instead, the Court required Belgium to allow its resident taxpayers to take the deduction into account fully, i.e., even if 
their worldwide taxable base had been derived from Belgian sources only partially. Regrettably, the approach taken 
by the Court of Justice in Argenta is analytically inconsistent, and hence deeply flawed. 
1011
 Again, the double taxation comprises of two components. That is, the tax levied at the level of the participation, 
proportional to the shareholder’s shareholding interest, ‘component I’, and the tax levied at the level of the 
shareholder, ‘component II’. If ‘P’ represents the scope of the shareholders interest, whereby 0 < P ≤ 1, the formula 
referred to in footnote 843, this time, alters as follows. Component I corresponds with the formula component 
P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]. Component II corresponds with the formula component t.{(ρ – r) + (1 – d) + 
P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}. The aggregate (‘∑’) of components I and II, P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)] + t.{(ρ – 
r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}, accordingly, reflects the tax cascading effects in the event of an 
investment in a non-controlled participation. 
1012
 As said, element I corresponds with the formula component P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]. 
1013
 As said, element II corresponds with the formula component t.{(ρ – r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}. 
1014
 (ρ – α.r) + (1 – d). 
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equity investment by multiplying the post-tax proceeds from the respective 
participation with a factor of ‘1/(1– t)’.
1015
 The tax impost is calculated accordingly;
2. Subsequently, second, a credit would become available. The credit equals the tax
imposed at the level of the shareholder that is economically attributable to the net
excess earnings from the participation.
1016
Accordingly, the credit granted is calculated
autonomously. More specifically, the credit equals the amount of tax economically
attributable to the excess earnings from the respective equity investment.
Economically related expenses are identified subsequent to a functional and factual
analysis.
The relief would be calculated in a manner akin to the fraction as forwarded in the above 
section 5.4.4.3, which for its turn has been derived analogue to the juridical double tax relief 
mechanism advocated in Chapter 3. Accordingly, the relief would be calculated according to 
the following fraction: 
(Grossed-up net economic rents from a participation / Worldwide economic rents) * Domestic 
tax on worldwide economic rents 
The grossed-up net economic rents from the participation are included in the taxable base 
with respect to which the tax impost is calculated accordingly (Step 1: ‘In’). Subsequently, the 
tax that is economically attributable to these rents is available to be credited against the tax 
as calculated under the first step (Step 2: ‘Out’). 
Also under an ACE, the indirect tax exemption would achieve economic single taxation 
equitably and tax neutrally. This may be illustrated by means of numerical examples. Johnson 
invests in ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’ Under an ACE, the tax calculations at 
the level of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’ are identical to those at the level of 
Johnson in the case of a direct investment as set forth in section 5.6.2. Under the assumption 
that the post-tax returns as derived by ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’ are 
immediately repatriated to Johnson, the effects recognized at the level of Johnson are as 
follows (fig. 57):
1017
Fig. 57. Johnson’s ACE Calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s ACE Calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Earnings (‘EBITDA’) 0 + 10,475
1018
Gross-up*
)
 0 – 25
1019
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500
1020
Costs 
 Financing Expenses (interest) 0 – 240
1021
 Opportunity costs of capital 0 – 160
1022
 Depreciation 0 – 10,000
1023
 Aggregate 0 – 10,240
1024
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) 0 + 100
1025
1015
 1/(1 – t).{(ρ – r) + (1 – d) + P.tsub.[(ρsub – rsub) + (1sub – dsub)]}. 
1016
 t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)] – t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)].  
1017
 Notably, dividend taxation again is assumed to be non-existent, a dividend tax exemption is considered to apply, 
or it is assumed that the dividend tax is fully creditable against corporate income tax. 
1018
 10,500 – 25 = 10,475. Accordingly: 1 + ρ + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)].  
1019
– 0.25 * [(500 – 400) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 25. Accordingly: – P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)]. 
1020
 1 + ρ. Alternatively, 1/(1 – t).{(ρ – r) + (1 – d) + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)]}. 
1021
– α.r. 
1022
– (1 – α).r. 
1023
 – d. For simplicity reasons, it is assumed that d = dpart. 
1024
– r – d. 
1025
 (500 – 240 – 160) + (10,000 – 10,000) = 100. Accordingly: (ρ – r) + (1 – d) + P.tpart.[(ρpart –rpart) + (1part – dpart)] – 
P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)] = (ρ – r) + (1 – d). For technical reasons, alternatively, one may decide on adopting: 
1/(1 – t).{(ρ – r) + (1 – d) + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)]}. 
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Tax*
) 
(25%) 0 + 25
1026
‘Indirect Tax Exemption’*
)
 0 – 25
1027
 Aggregate / Tax Payable 0  0 
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax creditable. 
Alternatively, the tax payable can be calculated in the followings steps: 
1. The tax calculated on the grossed-up net rents from the participation, which equals
€100 (i.e., €75
1028
 + €25
1029
) amounts to €25;
1030
2. The double tax relief available amounts to €25;
1031
3. The tax payable, due to the absence of other sources of income, amounts €0.
As a table (left to right – fig. 58): 
Fig. 58. Tax Positions of Johnson and ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co’ (pro rata parte) 
Economic 
rents 
Gross-up Tax base Tax*
)
 Relief*
)
 Tax payable 
Johnson + 75 + 25 + 100 + 25 – 25 0 
Johnson’s Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
+ 100 n/a + 100 + 25 n/a + 25 
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax creditable. 
Accordingly, Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 59): 
Fig. 59. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment – 10,000
1032
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,475
1033
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,475 
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1034
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1035
 Interest Paid – 240
1036
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
1037
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
Johnson (25%)  0  0
1038
Aggregate  – 4,000
1039
+ 4,235
1040
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable
The net outward bound cash flow in period 1 equals €4,000, an amount equal to the invested 
equity capital. The transactions in period 1 again do not constitute a taxable event under an 
ACE. As said, the ACE shares this feature with both the conventional corporate income tax 
and the CBIT. The net inbound cash flow in period 2 under an ACE with an indirect tax 
1026
 0,25 * [(500 – 400) + (10.000 – 10.000) – (25 + 25)] = 25. Accordingly: t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)]. 
1027
– 0,25 * [(500 – 400) + (10.000 – 10.000) – 25 + 25] = –25. Accordingly: –t.[(ρ – α.r) + (1 – d)]. 
1028
 475 – 400 = 75. 
1029
 0.25/0.75 * 75 = 25.  
1030
 0.25 * 100 = 25. 
1031
 100 / 100 * 25 = 25. 
1032
 – 1. 
1033
 10,500 – 25 = 10,475. Accordingly: 1 + ρ + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)].  
1034
 α. 
1035
– α. 
1036
– α.r. 
1037
– α.(1 + r). 
1038
 t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)] – t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)]. 
1039
– (1 – α). 
1040
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)]). 
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exemption equals €4,235. The net post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vACE
DTR
’)
equals €235, a percentage of 5.875.
 1041
 What does this tell us?
We are back to where we started in section 5.6.2 of this chapter, i.e., the section forwarding 
the effects under an ACE in the event of a direct investment. The tax cascading effects that 
occur under the separate entity approach have been resolved equitably.  
5.6.4.3 Loss recapture and profit carry-forward mechanisms required 
Adding two features two the system: a ‘recapture of losses feature’ and a ‘carry-
forward of profits feature’ 
This being said, however, to ascertain single taxation under an ACE in subsequent taxable 
periods, once again two additional properties need to be added. Similar to the indirect tax 
exemption mechanism under the conventional corporate income tax as forwarded in the 
above, the double tax relief mechanism needs to be attributed with a ‘loss-recapture 
mechanism’ and a ‘profit-carry forward mechanism’.  
Illustrating the effects: back to Johnson 
The effects of adopting such additional features would be as follows. Let us assume that the 
imposition of corporate tax under an ACE mechanism occurs in two taxable periods, ‘Taxable 
Period 1’ and ‘Taxable Period 2’. Accordingly, ‘Period 2’ referred to in the above tables is 
divided into two taxable periods. Moreover, let us assume that Johnson, in addition to the 
rents derived from its investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, for the sake 
of convenience now relabeled as ‘source a)’, derives income from a direct investment, for the 
sake of convenience labeled as ‘source b)’. In addition, let us consider the following three 
alternative scenarios: 
1. The rents derived from both sources, i.e., ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’,
‘source a)’ and the additional direct investment, ‘source b)’, account for positive
amounts in both taxable periods;
2. The rents from ‘source a)’, account for negative amounts in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and
positive amounts in ‘Taxable Period 2’; the rents from the additional ‘source b)’,
account for positive amounts in both taxable periods; to ensure single taxation, a
recapture mechanism is required.
3. The rents from ‘source a)’ account for positive amounts in both taxable periods; the
rents from the additional ‘source b)’ account for negative amounts in ‘Taxable Period
1’ and positive amounts in ‘Taxable Period 2’; to ensure single taxation, a carry-
forward mechanism is required.
Ad 1. The rents derived from both sources account for positive amounts in both taxable 
periods. Assume that the economic rents derived from the investment in source a), ‘Johnson’s 
Participation in Distribution Co.’, remain unchanged and equal €75. And assume that the 
economic rents derived from the investment in the additional direct investment, source b), 
equal €500. The returns are attributed to the taxable periods in the following manner. The 
taxable proceeds in respect of source a) account for €30 in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and €45 in 
‘Taxable Period 2’. The underlying taxable rents of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution 
Co.’, i.e., to the extent that they are pro rata parte attributed to Johnson equity investment 
respectively, hereinafter labeled as ‘source a)*’, respectively equal €40 and €60. The taxable 
proceeds in respect of source b) equally tax account for €250 in both taxable periods. The tax 
rate remains to equal a linear 25%. Forwarded as a schedule (figs. 60, 61, 62, and 63): 
Fig. 60. Given attribution taxable proceeds to taxable periods 1 and 2 
Sources of Proceeds Proceeds ∑  
1041
(4,235 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.05875. Accordingly: vACE
DTR
 = (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)]) / (1 – α) 
– 1 = (ρ – r + P.tpart.[(ρpart – rpart) + (1part – dpart)]) / (1 – α) + r. 
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income Taxable Period 1 Taxable Period 2 
Johnson source a) 30 45 75 (double tax 
relief) 
source b) 250 250 500 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
source a)* 40 60 100 
Under these circumstances, the tax effects would be accordingly (fig. 62): 
Fig. 61. Taxable Period 1; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
∑ Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief /2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 30 - 250 10 290 72.50 10 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 40 - - 40 10 - 10 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 30 = 10; 
/2: (30 + 10) / 290 * 72.50 = 10; 
/3: 72.50 – 10 = 62.50. 
Fig. 62. Taxable Period 2; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
∑ Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief /2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 45 - 250 15 310 77.50 15 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 60 - - 60 15 - 15 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 45 = 15; 
/2: (45 + 15) / 310 * 77.50 = 15; 
/3: 77.50 – 15 = 62.50. 
Fig. 63. Taxable Periods 1 & 2; Overall Tax Positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 1 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 2 
 ∑ Tax Payable  
Johnson  
source a), post-double 
tax relief 
0 0 0 
Johnson  
source b) 
62.50 62.50 125 
Johnson’s Participation  
source a)* 
10 15 25 
The tables illustrate that Johnson, in effect, would be liable to pay tax on the €500 rents on its 
direct investment, source b). Johnson would be liable to pay an amount of tax equal to €62.50 
in Taxable Period 1 and €62.50 in Taxable Period 2. That is an aggregate tax payable of 
€125. That amount equals an overall amount of tax payable which effectively equals a rate of 
25%. The (grossed-up) rents on Johnson’s investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in 
Distribution Co.’, ‘source a)’, of €100 do not trigger a tax liability at the level of Johnson. This 
would be fair as Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, already would be liable to pay tax 
on the underlying rents, i.e., source a)*. These equal €100 triggering a tax payable at the level 
of the participation of €25, specifically €10 in Taxable Period 1 and €15 in Taxable Period 2. 
Economic single taxation efficiently achieved 
Accordingly, economic single taxation on the underlying rents of €100, source a)*, would be 
achieved. In terms of amounts of tax payable, the attribution of the proceeds to taxable 
periods does not entail any differences in tax treatment under the application of the indirect 
tax exemption mechanism. That is, in comparison with the scenario set forth in section 6.2 
(effects direct investment under an ACE). Accordingly, the recognized remaining distortions, 
i.e., regarding investment location decisions, are not exacerbated. The amounts of tax
payable remain unchanged. The preliminary conclusion that we are back to where we started 
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in section 6.2 remains unchanged. Accordingly, the indirect tax exemption mechanism 
operates equitably to this extent. 
Ad 2. The rents from ‘source a)’, account for negative amounts in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and 
positive amounts in ‘Taxable Period 2’, while the rents from ‘source b)’ account for positive 
amounts in both taxable periods. Assume that the economic rents derived from the 
investment in source a), ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, remain unchanged and 
equal €75. And assume that the net economic rents derived from the investment in the 
additional direct investment, source b), equal €500. However, these rents are attributed to the 
taxable periods differently. The taxable proceeds in respect of source a) account for €30 in 
the negative in ‘Taxable Period 1’ and €105 in the positive in ‘Taxable Period 2’. The 
underlying taxable rents of ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, i.e., to the extent that 
they are pro rata parte attributed to Johnson equity investment, ‘source a)*’, respectively 
equal €40 in the negative (loss to be compensated vertically) and €140.
1042
 The taxable
proceeds in respect of source b) remain unchanged and equally tax account for €250 in both 
taxable periods. Forwarded as a schedule (fig. 64): 
Fig. 64. Given attribution taxable proceeds to taxable periods 1 and 2 
Sources of 
income 
Yields Taxable 
Period 1 
Yields Taxable 
Period 2 
∑  
Johnson source a) <30> 105 75 (double tax 
relief) 
source b) 250 250 500 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
source a)* <40> 140 100 
To secure single taxation, a loss-recapture mechanism equivalent to the recapture 
mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes, as set forth in Chapter 3, is now required. 
Such a recapture would need to operate accordingly (figs. 65, 66 and 67):  
Fig. 65. Taxable Period 1; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax relief 
Recapture 
/*  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson <30> - 250 <10> - 210 52.50 <40> 0 52.50 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- <40> - - <40> 0 0 - - 0 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * <30> = <10>; 
/2: n/a; 0 
/3: 0,25 * 210 = 52.50. 
/*: Administrative notice: double tax relief recapture next year 
Fig. 66. Taxable Period 2; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s Participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax relief 
Recapture 
*)  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 105 - 250 35 - 390 97.50 40 25 72.50 62.50 
Johnson’s 
participation 
- 140 - - 40 100 25 - - 25 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 105 = 35; 
/2: (105 + 35 – 40/*) / 390 * 97.50.50 = 25; 
/3: 97.50 – 25 = 72.50; 
/*: recapture reduces numerator double tax relief fraction 
1042
 See, notably, Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for 
Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, at 47. The authors argue that the loss carry-forward should carry interest. This matter is not dealt 
with in the numerical examples for simplicity reasons. 
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Fig.67. Taxable periods 1 & 2; overall tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 1 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 2 
 ∑ Tax Payable  
Johnson  
source a), post-double 
tax relief 
0 0 0 
Johnson  
source b) 
52.50 72.50 125 
Johnson’s Participation  
source a)* 
0 25 25 
The tables illustrate that Johnson, in effect, would be liable to pay tax on the €500 rents on its 
direct investment, source b). Johnson would be liable to pay an amount of tax equal to €52.50 
in Taxable Period 1 and €72.50 in Taxable Period 2. That is an aggregate tax payable of 
€125. That equals an overall amount of tax payable at a rate of 25%. The (grossed-up) rents 
on Johnson’s investment in ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, ‘source a)’, of €100 
do not trigger a tax liability at the level of Johnson. This is fair as Johnson’s Participation in 
Distribution Co.’, already would be liable to pay tax on the underlying rents, i.e., source a)*. 
These equal €1,000, leaving a tax payable at the level of the participation of €25, specifically 
€0 in Taxable Period 1 due to the tax loss suffered, and €25 in Taxable Period 2. 
Economic single taxation efficiently achieved 
Accordingly, due to the recapture mechanism, economic single taxation of the underlying 
economic rents of €100, source a)*, would be achieved. The loss suffered is recognized for 
tax calculation purposes in Taxable Period 1.  
This is fair. The loss has been suffered at that time. No liquidity disadvantage arises if put in 
comparison with a typical participation (base) exemption mechanism. The Taxable Period 1 
loss is recaptured in Taxable period 2 for economic double tax relief calculation purposes to 
ensure that the loss is not taken into account twice (which would entail economic non-
taxation).  
Technically, the recapture in Taxable Period 2 takes place by reducing the numerator in the 
double tax relief mechanism’s fraction with an amount equal to the loss suffered in Taxable 
Period 1. Conceptually, the recapture would operate in a manner akin to the recapture in the 
juridical double tax relief mechanism advocated in Chapter 3, section 4.2.2.
 1043
In summary, in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the attribution of the proceeds to 
taxable periods does not entail any differences in tax treatment under the application of the 
indirect tax exemption mechanism. That is, in comparison with the scenario set forth in 
section 5.6.2 in terms of amounts of taxes payable (effects direct investment under an ACE). 
Accordingly, the remaining recognized distortions, i.e., regarding investment location 
decisions, are not exacerbated. The preliminary conclusion that we are back to where we 
started in section 5.6.2 remains unchanged. Accordingly, the indirect tax exemption 
mechanism, also to this extent, operates equitably. 
Ad 3. The rents from ‘source a)’ account for amounts in the positive in both taxable periods; 
the rents from the additional ‘source b)’ tax account for amounts in the negative in ‘Taxable 
Period 1’ and for amounts in the positive in ‘Taxable Period 2’. Assume that the economic 
rents derived from the investment in source a), ‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co’, 
remain unchanged and again equal €75. And assume that the economic rents derived from 
the investment in the additional direct investment, source b), equal €500. However, again the 
1043
 A liquidation losses set-off regime allowing the corporate taxpayer involved to tax-deduct final losses realized 
upon the liquidation of a (foreign) corporate body in which the taxpayer holds a shareholding interest, such as the one 
adopted by the Netherlands (laid down in Article 13d Dutch CITA, would become redundant. The same holds true for 
a type of ‘add-back-regulation’ such as the one adopted by the Netherlands (laid down in Article 13aa-6 Dutch CITA. 
Such an amendment would enhance fairness relative to these measures as they entail liquidity disadvantages for 
merely enabling the setting-off of a tax loss at a moment later in time than actually suffered. 
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returns are attributed to the taxable periods differently. Assume that, like the scenario ad. 1, 
the taxable rents in respect of source a) remain unchanged this time and account for €30 in 
‘Taxable Period 1’ and €45 in ‘Taxable Period 2’. The underlying taxable rents of ‘Johnson’s 
Participation in Distribution Co.’, i.e., to the extent that they are pro rata parte attributed to 
Johnson equity investment, ‘source a)*’, respectively equal €40 and €60. This time, the 
taxable proceeds in respect of source b) alter. The rents from source b) tax account for €150 
in the negative in ‘Taxable Period 1’ (loss to be compensated vertically) and €650 in the 
positive in ‘Taxable Period 2’. Forwarded as a schedule (fig. 68): 
Fig. 68. Given attribution taxable proceeds to taxable periods 1 and 2 
Sources of 
income 
Yields Taxable 
Period 1 
Yields Taxable 
Period 2 
∑  
Johnson source a) 30 45 75 (double tax 
relief) 
source b) <150> 650 500 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
(pro rata parte) 
source a)* 40 60 100 
To secure single taxation, now a profit carry-forward mechanism, equivalent to the carry-
forward mechanism for juridical double tax relief purposes as set forth in Chapter 3, is 
required. Such a carry-forward would need to operate accordingly (figs. 69, 70, and 71):  
Fig. 69. Taxable Period 1; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax 
relief 
carry 
forward 
/*  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 30 - <150> 10 <110> 0 0 40 0 0 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 40 - - - 40 10 - - 10 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 30 = 10; 
/2: n/a; 0 
/3: n/a; 0 / 0,25 * 40 = 10 (Johnson’s participation); 
/*: Administrative notice: double tax relief carry forward to next year 
Fig. 70. Taxable Period 2; tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
a) a)* b) Gross-
up /1 
Loss 
Carry 
forward 
∑ 
Tax 
base 
Tax 
levy 
Double 
tax 
relief 
Carry 
forward 
*)  
Econ. 
double 
tax 
relief 
/2 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Tax 
Payable 
/3 
Johnson 45 - 650 15 <110> 600 150 <40> 25 125 62.50 
Johnson’s 
Participation 
- 60 - - - 60 15 - - 15 25 
/1: 0.25 / 0.75 * 45 = 15; 
/2: (45 + 15 + 40/*) / 600 * 150 = 25; 
/3: 150 – 25 = 125; 
/*: carry forward increases numerator double tax relief fraction 
Fig. 71. Taxable Periods 1 & 2; overall tax positions Johnson & Johnson’s participation 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 1 
Tax Payable 
Taxable Period 2 
 ∑ Tax Payable  
Johnson  
source a), post-double 
tax relief 
0 0 0 
Johnson  
source b) 
0 125 125 
Johnson’s Participation  
source a)* 
10 15 25 
The tables illustrate that Johnson, in effect, would be liable to pay tax on the €500 rents 
derived from its direct investment, source b). Johnson would be liable to pay an amount of tax 
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equal to €0 in Taxable Period 1 due to the taxable loss suffered and €125 in Taxable Period 
2. That is an aggregate tax payable of €125. That equals an overall tax payable effectively
imposed at a 25% rate. The (grossed-up) rents derived from Johnson’s investment in 
‘Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co.’, ‘source a)’, of €100 do not initiate a tax liability at 
the level of Johnson. This is fair as Johnson’s Participation in Distribution Co’, already would 
be liable to pay tax on the underlying economic rents, i.e., source a)*. These equal €100 
triggering a tax payable at the level of the participation of €25, specifically €10 in Taxable 
Period 1 and €15 in Taxable Period 2. 
Economic single taxation efficiently achieved 
Accordingly, due to the profit carry-forward mechanism, economic single taxation of the 
underlying rents of €100, source a)* would be achieved. The loss suffered from source b) is 
recognized for tax calculation purposes in Taxable Period 1 and set-off against the taxable 
income from source a) leaving a nil amount of tax payable. However, as the ACE would not 
provide for a tax refund, a latent double tax relief entitlement with respect to the proceeds 
from source a) in Taxable period 1 arises. To ensure that this relief entitlement is appreciated, 
the application of the carry-forward mechanism entails that the source a) rents realized in 
Taxable Period 1 do not diminish for economic double tax relief purposes but instead are 
taken into account as rents eligible for relief in Taxable Period 2. 
Consequently, relief comes available in Taxable Period 2 guaranteeing economic single 
taxation. Technically, the carry-forward in Taxable Period 2 takes place by increasing the 
numerator in the double tax relief mechanism’s fraction with an amount equal to the carried 
forward rents from source a) to the extent that no relief is granted in Taxable Period 1. 
Conceptually, the carry-forward operates in a manner akin to the carry-forward feature in the 
juridical double tax relief mechanism advocated in Chapter 3, section 4.2.3.
1044
In summary, in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the attribution of the rents to taxable 
periods does not entail any differences in tax treatment under the application of the indirect 
tax exemption mechanism. That is, in comparison with the scenario set forth in section 5.6.2 
in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable (effects direct investment under an ACE). 
Accordingly, the remaining distortions in the investment location decisions are not 
exacerbated. The preliminary conclusion that we are back to where we started in section 6.2 
remains unchanged. Accordingly, the indirect tax exemption mechanism, also to this extent, 
would operate equitably. 
5.7 Effects under Cash Flow Taxes 
5.7.1 General 
5.7.1.1 Inbound and outbound cash flows are taxable events 
Despite the ACE’s fairness enhancing characteristics of imposing equal to statutory AETRs, 
de facto resolving the financing discrimination issue while producing nil METRs, economists 
have explored other alternative tax bases as well.
1045
 For this purpose, reference is made to
the so-called cash flow taxes (‘CFTs’). To my knowledge tax lawyers are relatively unfamiliar 
with the properties of CFTs. Let us therefore follow the economists’ footprints and look into 
these alternative taxes’ merits also. 
Cash flow taxes, CFTs, basically are tax imposts which consider all corporate cash flows as 
taxable events for tax calculation purposes, rather than the returns on corporate 
1044
 A tax credit carry forward mechanism, such as the one adopted by the Netherlands (laid down in Article 23c-7 
Dutch CITA, would become redundant.  
1045
 Cash Flow Taxes have been advocated already in the 1970s. See the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Their findings 
are sometimes referred to as the ‘Meade Committee Study’. See The Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and 
Reform of Direct Taxation (1978).  
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investments.
1046
 Both inbound payments and outbound payments constitute a taxable event.
CFTs share this property with European Union value added taxation. That is, with the 
(administrative) exception that European Union value added taxation recognizes the 
submission of an invoice as the taxable event rather than the actual payment in return for 
goods provided and services rendered.  
5.7.1.2 Cash flow taxes in three variations 
On the drawing board cash flow taxes are typically recognized to exist in three variations: 
1. The ‘Real Transactions Based Cash Flow Tax’ (‘R-CFT’), which recognizes as a
taxable event all cash flows related to goods provided and services rendered, with the
exception of cash flows related to financial transactions, i.e., debt financing
arrangements;
1047
2. The ‘Real and Financial Transactions Based Cash Flow Tax’ (‘R+F-CFT’), which
recognizes as a taxable event all cash flows related to goods provided and services
rendered, i.e., including cash flows related to financial (i.e., debt financing)
transactions;
3. The ‘Share Based Cash Flow Tax’ (‘S-CFT’), which recognizes as a taxable event all
cash flows related to share transactions, i.e., equity financing arrangements.
 1048
Common to all CFTs is the property that outbound cash flows trigger tax refunds, while 
inbound cash flows trigger liabilities to pay tax. Note that, in addition, cash raised from new 
equity issues would be excluded from the receipts.
1049
 CFTs share this property with
European Union value added taxation, which also allows for tax refunds.  
Moreover, worth noting is that, actually, there are no real conceptual differences to be 
recognized between an R+F-CFT and the S-CFT.
1050
 This may be appreciated if one
1046
 Contrary to the earlier discussed alternatives (i.e., the corporate income tax, CBIT, ACE), the timing of payments 
constitutes the taxable moment rather than the moment of realization. However, deferral issues would not occur as all 
cash flows, both inward bound and outward bound cash flows trigger tax consequences. The first mentioned would 
trigger a tax payable, the second mentioned a tax refund. Accordingly, it would for instance be of no use to delay 
payments as that would not only delay the tax liability but also the tax refund at the level of the business partner with 
whom the business transaction has been arranged. Similar effects may be recognized under European Union value 
added taxation where tax deferral issues generally are absent as well. 
1047
 The proposals of Hall and Rabushka for a ‘flat tax’ recognize the R-CFT as the most suited candidate for a 
business income tax. See Robert E. Hall et al, The Flat Tax 2nd edition (1995). Also Bradford favors an R-CFT, 
which in a cross-border context should apply on a destination basis (as is also currently the case under European 
Union value added tax). Bradford’s ideas on an ‘X-tax’ can, amongst others, be found in David F. Bradford, ‘Blueprint 
for International Tax Reform’, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1449 (2000-2001), at 1449-1463, David F. 
Bradford, ‘Transition to and Tax Rate Flexibility in a Cash-Flow Type Tax’, 12 Tax Policy and the Economy 151, at 
151–172, David F. Bradford, ‘Addressing the Transfer-Pricing Problem in an Origin-Basis X Tax’, 10 International Tax 
and Public Finance 591 (2003), at 591-610, David F. Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy (2004). Bradford’s 
X-Tax has, for instance, been discussed by Weisbach, David A. Weisbach, ‘Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot?’, 56 
SMU Law Review 201 (2003), at 201–238 and Cnossen, Sijbren Cnossen, ‘Evaluating the National Retail Sales Tax 
from a VAT Perspective’, in George R. Zudrow et al, United States Tax Reform in the 21
st
 Century (2002) 215, at 
215-244. 
1048
 In addition, various VAT-style business income taxes have been advocated. All conceptually relate to the CFTs 
discussed in this study. See, for instance, the ‘Business Value Tax’ (‘BVT’) proposed by Bird and Mintz. See also 
Richard M. Bird et al, ‘Tax Assignment in Canada: A Modest Proposal’, in Harvey Lazar et al, The State of Federation 
1999/2000 (2001) 262, at 262-292. Another example is the ‘subtraction-method VAT’ (‘S-VAT’), which was part of the 
‘Unlimited Savings Allowance Tax’ (‘USA Tax’), advocated, e.g., by Seidman, in Laurence S. Seidman, The USA Tax: 
A progressive Consumption Tax (1997). These taxes are not further discussed. For a discussion of the USA Tax see 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘From Income To Consumption Tax: International Implications’, 33 San Diego Law Review 
1329 (1996), at 1329 – 1354. Moreover, the so-called Norwegian-style Dual Income Tax (‘DIT’) is left untouched also. 
See on the DIT, Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for 
Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, at 51-54. 
1049
 See Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working 
Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008), at 9. 
1050
 See for instance Stephen R. Bond et al, ‘Generalised R-based and S-based taxes under uncertainty’, 87 Journal 
of Public Economics 1291 (2003), at 1291 – 1311, who demonstrate the equivalence of the S-CFT and R+F-CFT. 
See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. An exception worth mentioning is that an S-CFT produces zero taxes on 
retentions. This could render the S-CFT vulnerable to tax avoidance strategies. See Geerten M. Michielse, ‘EU 
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recognizes that the net inflow of real transactions and financial transactions, by accounting 
identification, necessarily needs to equal to the net outflow of share transactions (i.e., R + F = 
S). Accordingly, it is fair to say that there are two rather than three conceptually distinct CFT 
variations, i.e., the R-CFT on the one hand and the R+F-CFT / S-CFT on the other. To my 
knowledge, CFTs particularly exist on the drawing board. There is little to no real life 
experience with them.
1051
5.7.2 Effects under Real Transactions Based Cash Flow Tax 
5.7.2.1 General remarks 
Let us commence with the ‘Real Transactions Based Cash Flow Tax’.
1052
 As said, the R-CFT
recognizes as a taxable event all cash flows related to goods provided and services rendered, 
with the exception of cash flows related to financial transactions. Real transactions, for 
instance, comprise of sales (inflows), wages and (fixed) asset acquisitions (outflows). 
Financial transactions for instance comprise of borrowings (inflows), principal amount 
repayments and interest expenses (outflows). The outward bound cash flows related to real 
transactions trigger tax refunds. The inward bound cash flows related to real transactions 
trigger liabilities to pay tax.  
Accordingly, the R-CFT’s taxable base is conceptually similar to European Union value added 
taxation, which typically exempts financial transactions from the imposition of value added tax 
as well. At least, this holds true with the exception that R-CFT recognizes wage payments for 
tax calculation purposes while European Union value added taxation does not. Worth noting 
is that simultaneously, the R-CFT share the administrative need in European Union value 
added taxation to distinguish between real and financial transactions. That is, an 
administrative requirement is not necessarily easy to establish (triggering complexities, for 
instance, in cases of financial lease arrangements). Moreover, financial institutions would be 
exempt from tax under an R-CFT. That would trigger the need to adopt a specific income tax 
for financial institutions.
 1053
 These issues are absent under the R+F-CFT discussed
hereunder.
1054
In terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the R-CFT corresponds with the CBIT, which 
exempts (proceeds from) debt financing from the taxable base. Accordingly, the taxable base 
under an R-CFT in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable is broader than under, for 
instance, the conventional corporate income tax.  
However, in terms of effective tax burdens imposed, there is a vast difference to be 
recognized between the R-CFT on the one hand and the ACE, CBIT and conventional 
corporate income tax on the other, as the first mentioned entails a tax refund to the taxpayer 
upon the outbound payment, i.e., the investment in period 1 and a tax payable upon the 
investment’s return in period 2, while the latter do not enable tax refunds at the time of the 
investment in period 1 and merely recognizes a taxable event at the time the respective 
investment yields a taxable return in period 2. Accordingly, contrary to the ACE, CBIT and 
Harmonization – an Obstacle for new initiatives in drafting corporate income tax systems’, National Tax Association, 
95
th
 Annual Conference on Taxation (2003): 236-240. 
1051
 See Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for Fundamental 
Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic Paper 2006:264, 
at 1-60. Notably, Estonia makes use of a tax upon profit distributions that is akin to a S-CFT. Further, the Caribbean 
part of the country of The Netherlands within the Kingdom of The Netherlands, i.e., the islands of Bonaire, Saint 
Eustace and Saba utilize a similar profit distribution tax as well. 
1052
 For some further discussion, see Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 
21
st
 Century (2008). 
1053
 This is not further discussed.  
1054
 This has lead for instance Mclure and Zodrow to argue not to distinguish between real and financial transactions 
and to include both in the taxable base. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., et al, ‘A Hybrid Approach to the Direct Taxation 
of Consumption’, in Michael J. Boskin, Frontiers of Tax Reform (1996) 70. See also Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern 
Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. Auerbach favors a destination based R+F-CFT also. 
As both real and financial transactions are taken into account it may be applied to both financial and non-financial 
institutions. 
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conventional corporate income tax, interest yielding funds become available upon the 
investment. However, if that property would be cancelled out, the R-CFT would turn out to 
operate conceptually in a manner surprisingly akin to an ACE. Let us proceed with the 
analysis. 
5.7.2.2 The effects involving a direct investment 
Assessing the investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
Let us return to our taxpayer Johnson and its dinghy business activities to illustrate the effects 
of an R-CFT. As said, Johnson directly invests in a dinghy sales activity. Let us suppose that 
the tax rate equals a linear 25% (again, progressivity is not considered merely for the sake of 
simplicity). Under an R-CFT, the effects are as follows (fig. 72): 
Fig. 72. Johnson’s R-CFT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s R-CFT calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Return on Investment  0 + 10,500
1055
 Aggregate  0 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Investment  – 10,000
1056
 0 
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500 
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) – 10,000 + 10,500 
Tax*
) 
(25%) – 2,500
1057
+ 2,625
1058
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 73): 
Fig. 73. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
1059
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1060
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500  
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1061
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1062
 Interest Paid – 240
1063
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
1064
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
(25%) – 2,500
1065
+ 2,625
1066
Aggregate  – 1,500
1067
+ 1,635
1068
1055
 1 + ρ. 
1056
– 1 
1057
 0,25 * 10,000. Accordingly: – t. 
1058
 0.25 * 10,500. Accordingly: t.(1 + ρ). 
1059
 – 1. 
1060
 1 + ρ. 
1061
 α. 
1062
– α. 
1063
– α.r. 
1064
– α.(1 + r). 
1065
 – t. 
1066
 t.( 1 + ρ). 
1067
– (1 – α – t). See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow 
Tax’, 155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1068
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(1 + ρ). See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a 
Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
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*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
The net outbound cash flow in period 1 alters in comparison with the no-tax environment and 
in comparison with the aforementioned tax systems (conventional corporate income tax, CBIT 
and ACE). The investment transaction in period 1 constitutes a taxable event triggering a tax 
refund. Consequently, the outbound cash flow in period 1 equals €1,500 rather than €4,000. 
The net inbound cash flow in period 2 also alters. This time, the inflow in period 2 equals 
€1,635. The post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vR-CFT’) equals €135, a percentage 
of 9.00.
1069
 These numbers again tell us three things (see sections 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, and
5.7.2.5). 
5.7.2.3 Average Effective Tax Rates are nil; Property comes with a Price 
What would be the AETR? 
First, it tells us something about the AETR under an R-CFT. The application of an R-CFT 
produces a tax payable of €125. However, the question arises as to the extent that Johnson 
effectively bears the tax. Please let me elaborate on this. 
A closer look reveals that one may ask whether the R-CFT actually requires Johnson to bear 
a tax impost. It rather seems that the fisc (tax authorities) engages in a private investment as 
a silent partner in Johnson’s distribution activities yielding a return of €125 (i.e., 2,625 – 
2,500).
1070
 The amount of €125 tax payable effectively breaks down in two components: a
component corresponding to the financing costs relating to the fisc’s capital investment (€100 
financing costs) and a component corresponding with an amount payable relating to the fisc’s 
excess earnings (€25). How should we qualify these amounts? As a de facto profit tax 
burden? Or as the fisc’s share of the excess earnings produced relating to their investment as 
a silent partner in Johnson’s business? In period 1, Johnson’s investment entails a refund 
from the tax authorities at an amount of €2,500.  
This can be interpreted as a private investment undertaken by the government. Viz., the fisc 
makes these funds available to Johnson, without having any a priori certainty of yielding a 
return. Taking the debt issuance into account as well, Johnson’s actual equity investment 
accordingly accounts for a mere €1,500 rather than the nominal amount of €4,000 which we 
have seen earlier. That amount of €1,500 would equal the amount of Johnson’s actual equity 
at risk. From the perspective of the fisc, its investment of €2,500 turns out to produce a return 
of €125, a return rate of 5%.
1071
 This holds true, despite the fact that the investment produces
a return at a 6.5% rate absent a tax impost. Apparently, the silent partner settles for 5%. A 
deposit on a savings account at the normal market rate of 4% would yield the €2,500 
investment to return €100. Hence, an amount of €100 corresponds with the normal market 
rate return on the fisc’s capital investment. From Johnson’s perspective, this amount of €100 
equals the costs of capital made available by its silent partner, the tax authorities. 
Consequently, the excess of €25 (i.e., 125 – 100) can be understood as the fisc’s ‘excess 
earnings’ (i.e., a 1% excess return
1072
) on its €2,500 investment in Johnson’s business.
Perhaps, that latter amount, i.e., from Johnson’s perspective, may be understood to equal the 
tax burden imposed on the economic rents of, in this case, €100 on the investment in the 
dinghy distribution business. That amount of €100 economic rents can be understood as 
follows. The investment of €10,000 in the dinghy selling activities produces a gross return of 
€500. The interests paid on the bank loan of €6,000 equal €240, the costs of capital relating 
1069
 (1.635 / 1.500) – 1 = 0,09. Accordingly: vR-CFT = (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(1 + ρ) / (1 – α – t) – 1 = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α 
– t) + r. See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 
De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1070
 See also Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. Auerbach 
recognizes this effect under its destination based R+F-CFT proposal, yet does not seem to have a problem with this. 
1071
 (2,625 / 2,500) – 1 = 0.05. 
1072
 25 / 2,500 * 100 = 1%. 
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to the fisc’s investment of €2,500 equal €100, the opportunity costs of capital relating to 
Johnson’s equity investment of €1,500 equal €60.
1073
 Consequently, the aggregate amount of
€100 (i.e., 500 – 240 – 100 – 60 = 100) equals the excess earnings triggering the amount of 
what may de facto be understood as a tax burden of €25.
1074
However, alternatively, the amount of €25 tax payable to the tax authorities (in excess of the 
€100) may also be considered to equal the fisc’s share of excess earnings as silent partner in 
Johnson’s dinghy distribution business. If one were to consider this latter amount of €25 to 
constitute the fisc’s/silent partner’s share of excess earnings, this qualification would render 
the R-CFT not to be borne by Johnson at all. Namely, Johnson’s pre-tax excess earnings 
would then equal its post-tax excess earnings. In such a case, the amount of Johnson’s pre-
tax economic rents would be calculated as €75. That amount can be understood as follows. 
The investment of €10,000 in the dinghy selling activities produces a gross return of €500. 
The interests paid on the bank loan of €6,000 equal €240. The costs of capital relating to the 
fisc’s investment of €2,500 equal €100. The opportunity costs of capital relating to Johnson’s 
equity investment of €1,500 equal €60. In addition, the fisc’s excess earnings relating to its 
capital investment as a silent partner equals €25. Consequently, the aggregate amount of €75 
(i.e., 500 – 240 – 100 – 60 – 25 = 75) would constitute Johnson’s pre-tax excess earnings 
taking the silent partner’s share into account. The pre-tax excess earnings would then equal 
Johnson’s post-tax excess earnings of €75 (i.e., 500 – 240 – 100 – 60 – 25 = 75). That would 
accordingly render the R-CFT not to be borne by Johnson! In my view, this would be the 
proper observation.  
Notably, the expensing feature is what distinguishes the R-CFT from, for instance, the CBIT, 
which in this case would produce an overall amount of €125 tax payable as borne by 
Johnson. Contrary to the R-CFT, that amount would not break down into components since 
the CBIT lacks the expensing feature. Under a CBIT (or conventional corporate income tax 
and ACE for that matter) government would not operate as a silent partner. It would merely sit 
back and wait until Johnson yields a return to subsequently tax it. The question may even 
arise as to which extent an R-CFT actually still may be considered to constitute a tax. This 
question is left unanswered in this thesis. 
Let us proceed to calculate AETRs. As said, AETRs are calculated by dividing the tax payable 
(numerator) by the pre-tax income (denominator).
1075
 The question now arises of which
numbers need to be put into the fraction.
1076
 As we have seen in the above paragraph, in
respect of the amount to be adopted in the numerator a decision out of three options needs to 
be made. The available numbers are €125, €25 and nil. Things depend on whether and to 
which extent the tax authorities’ position, as silent partner in Johnson’s investment in the 
dinghy distribution business, should be recognized for AETR calculation purposes. With 
respect to the amount to be adopted in the denominator, various figures are potentially 
available as well.  
In this respect the remarks referred to in the above should be both repeated and 
supplemented. As discussed, in a no-tax environment, the net return on the investment in the 
dinghy distribution business equals €260. Taking the application of the R-CFT into account, 
this amount comprises of two components, both of which subsequently can be subdivided into 
two subcomponents (entailing an aggregate of four subcomponents). The first component 
amounts to €160. It refers to the 4% normal market return rate on the €4,000 equity 
investment. Contrary to previously discussed alternative tax bases, this amount of €160 may 
be considered to subsequently break down into two subcomponents. The first equals an 
amount of €100 corresponding to the fisc’s normal market rate return on its €2,500 investment 
as silent partner. The second subcomponent equals an amount of €60 corresponding to 
1073
 0.04 * 1,500 = 60. 
1074
 0.25 * 100 = 25. 
1075
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. 
1076
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options 
for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, who refer to concerns as to whether it is suitable to find a proper measure of profit to uses as the 
denominator. 
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Johnson’s normal market rate return on its €1,500 equity investment, i.e., the opportunity 
costs of capital. The second component amounts to €100. It refers to the remuneration for the 
production factor of enterprise, the excess earnings that is. Contrary to earlier discussed 
alternative tax bases, this amount of €100 may be considered to subsequently break up into 
two components as well. Viz., an amount of €25 corresponding to the fisc’s share of the 
excess earnings in return to its €2,500 investment as silent partner (i.e., the 1% return in 
excess of the 4% normal market rate return) and the remaining amount of €75 corresponding 
to Johnson’s share of the excess earnings in return to its equity investment of €1,500 (i.e., the 
5% return in excess of the 4% normal market rate return
1077
). As said, the question arises as
to which of these numbers should be taken into consideration? What are the numbers to 
pick? 
The numbers to pick, in my view, are nil (numerator) and €75 (denominator). This produces a 
nil AETR.
1078
 Why is that? The amount of nil in the numerator can be appreciated where it is
recognized that the fisc actually invests as a silent partner in Johnson’s business. This effect 
has been caused by the R-CFT’s expensing feature. The amount of €75 in the denominator 
can be appreciated where one recognizes that pre-tax business cash flow, i.e., the earnings 
exceeding the normal market rate of return, should be taken into consideration as a 
denominator for AETR calculation purposes. That is because all financing costs are actual 
costs, the opportunity costs of capital included. The fact that the pre-tax business cash flow 
accounts for €75 rather than €100 – which is the case under the tax bases already discussed 
in the above – can be appreciated should one recognize the fisc’s performance as silent 
partner. The R-CFT’s expensing feature causes the fisc to operate as a silent partner in the 
dinghy distribution business, yielding both a normal market rate return (€40) as well as excess 
earnings (€25). This observation renders Johnson’s pre-tax excess earnings to equal its post-
tax excess earnings, i.e., €75. Moreover, as the fisc settles for a 5% return rate, the R-CFT 
enables Johnson to derive a net return on its equity investment equal to 9%.  
‘Tax depreciation should correspond with economic depreciation issues’ do not 
emerge 
This being said, moreover, contrary to some of its counterparts discussed in the above, i.e., 
the conventional corporate income tax and the CBIT, no ‘tax depreciation should correspond 
with economic depreciation issues’ emerge.
1079
 Due to the expensing feature the R-CFT
shares with European Union value added taxation, i.e., Johnson’s investment triggers a tax 
refund in period 1, tax depreciation is non-existent and hence, by its nature, cannot trigger 
this issue as present under the earlier discussed alternatives.  
Notably, this does not necessarily entail that R-CFTs would resolve issues on the question as 
to where, i.e., in which state, the tax should be paid. Investment location distortions may still 
occur as a result of mutual tax rate divergences to the extent that the taxable base, as is 
currently the case in international taxation, is attributed to taxing jurisdictions by means of 
origin based profit allocation factors. The adoption of an ‘origin based’ R-CFT would not 
change this. The effects in terms of investment location decisions are difficult to predict, 
though. Relatively higher rates employed would entail relatively higher tax refunds. The 
opposite would hold under relatively lower rates. It is uncertain what the outcome would be. In 
addition, it is also uncertain whether the R-CFT to that extent would be able to put an end to 
the current ‘race to the bottom’ referred to in the above.  
Nevertheless, this being said, the introduction of a tax rate increase in our example of 
Johnson investing in a dinghy distribution business – let us for instance increase the rate from 
25% to, say, 30% – would entail the post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vR-CFT’) to 
drop to €110 (instead of €135).
1080
 Yet, that would effectively entail a post-tax return rate of
1077
 75 / 1,500 * 100 = 5%. 
1078
 0 / 75 = 0. 
1079
 See, for comparison, Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. 
Auerbach argues to introduce the expensing feature under its destination based S-CFT proposal as it produces nil 
AETRs.  
1080
 1,110 – 1,000 = 110. 
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11.00% (instead of 9.00%).
1081
 Remarkably, a closer look reveals that a tax rate increase
would actually drive post-tax earnings upwards. That might trigger a ‘race to the top’ to the 
extent that the R-CFT would be adopted to apply on an origin basis. As said, the attribution of 
taxable base to taxing jurisdictions is further discussed in isolation in Chapter 6. 
Absence of tax depreciation issues comes with a price; society engages in taking on 
private investment risks 
However, the absence of issues involving tax depreciation under an R-CFT comes with a 
price. Such a price is absent under the alternative tax bases discussed in the above 
(corporate income tax, CBIT, ACE).  
As said, the expensing feature under an R-CFT entails that society, as represented by the 
government, would engage in private investment undertakings as a silent partner in all private 
investments undertaken by taxpayers. In our example, the government’s stake in Johnson’s 
investment equals €2,500. Thereby, Johnson’s private investor’s risks are partly transferred to 
society.  
Accordingly, under an R-CFT, government revenue would be exposed to the exact same 
investment risks as those faced by private investors.
1082
 That would accordingly render the
provision of public goods, as financed by tax revenues, to be subject to these risks as well. 
This role of government as a silent partner may be considered an inherent limitation of the R-
CFT, as many would agree that the financing of public goods should not be put at private 
investors’ risks. Governments should impose tax, rather than act as silent partners in 
business ventures. Perhaps this explains why R-CFTs have never left the drawing board. 
Note that the ACE lacks this feature as recognized under an R-CFT. Under an ACE, 
government would not be subject to these private investor’s risks. Government would just sit 
back and tax economic rents. 
Hence, it is fair to say that something needs to be done about the expensing feature in an R-
CFT. However, before getting to potential solutions for this issue, some additional remarks 
should be made. 
5.7.2.4 Financing Discrimination Issues prove not to be Resolved 
Debt financing still tax-subsidized relative to equity financing 
Second, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement above tells us something about 
the effects of financing decisions under an R-CFT. The cash flow calculations demonstrate 
that Johnson’s post-tax return rate under an R-CFT (‘vR-CFT’ = 9.00%) exceeds the return rate 
in a no tax environment (v = 6.5%) with 250 base points. Why is that?  
Things can be explained by referring to the R-CFT’s property that it subsidizes debt financing 
relative to equity financing in cases where investments yield economic rents.
1083
 Had Johnson
financed the dinghy sales activity entirely with equity,
1084
 the R-CFT would have produced the
same nominal overall amount of €125 tax payable, i.e., the aggregate of the tax refund of 
€2,500 in period 1 and the tax payable of €2,625 in period 2. The fisc settles consistently for a 
5% return on its investment as silent partner, regardless of the manner in which the 
investment has been financed. Johnson’s return to the invested equity of €7,500, in that case, 
would equal €375, i.e., a return to equity rate of 5%.
1085
 That would match the return to equity
1081
 (1,110 / 1,000) – 1 = 0.11. Notably, a tax rate of 35% would entail a post-tax return rate of 17.00%: (585 / 500) – 1 
= 0.1700. 
1082
 See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1083
 Zee demonstrates this effect by means of the following formula: vR-CFT – v = t . α . (ρ – r) / [(1 – α – t) . (1 – α)] > 0 
as ρ > r. See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 
De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1084
 1 – α = 1 (α = 0). 
1085
 7,875 / 7,500 – 1 = 0.05. 
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rate in a no tax environment (provided that Johnson had financed its investment entirely with 
equity).
1086
Accordingly, as Johnson derives excess earnings from its dinghy selling activities, the 
adoption of an R-CFT would enable him to push on the return to the invested equity capital by 
financing its investment in the dinghy sales activity with a higher percentage of debt capital. 
The return to equity rate would increase even at a higher pace than the increase in return to 
equity rates would have been in a no tax environment. This increased leverage effect is 
caused by the fact that the denial of interest deductibility under an R-CFT does not fully offset 
the benefit of the expensing feature where the respective investment yields a return 
exceeding the costs of debt financing (‘ρ > r’).  
Hence, the R-CFT proves to subsidize debt financing relative to equity financing. It would 
encourage taxpayers to finance their investments with as much debt as possible. The R-CFT 
shares this undesirable leverage property with the conventional corporate income tax 
discussed above. In my view, as this entails non-neutrality in financing decisions, this 
financing discrimination provides an inequitable feature of an R-CFT, which is in need of a 
resolution. It appears that again something needs to be done about the expensing feature. 
But before getting to potential solutions, some further remarks on the R-CFT’s properties 
should be made. 
5.7.2.5 Marginal Effective Tax Rates are nil 
Third, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement under an R-CFT tell us that the R-
CFT would produce nil METRs. The R-CFT does not distort marginal investment decisions. 
The R-CFT shares this property with the ACE.  
Accordingly, an R-CFT would operate equitably and neutrally at the margin. An R-CFT taxes 
excess earnings, Johnson’s economic rent. Let us calculate METRs to illustrate things. Had 
Johnson’s investment, for instance, yielded a pre-tax return of 4.01%, a business cash flow in 
our example of €1, the R-CFT imposed at a 25% rate would produce a tax on that business 
cash flow equal to €0.25.
1087
 A pre-tax return of 4.0%, i.e., the marginal investment producing
a marginal income equal to nil, would effectively entail a marginal tax liability of €0 also.
1088
That would produce the 0% METR.
1089
5.7.2.6 Fixing the ‘government’s silent partnership’ and ‘financing discrimination’ 
properties 
Comparing R-CFT with ACE 
Let us now compare the R-CFT with an ACE. First, the R-CFT trumps the ACE in the first 
round as the R-CFT lacks the ‘tax depreciation should equal economic depreciation’ issue. 
That is, although the issue under an ACE would be relatively moderate to the extent that 
matters are seen in present value terms; see section 56.2.2. However, second, the R-CFT’s 
property comes with a price to be paid: government takes upon the role as a silent partner in 
all private investments, thereby exposing public revenue to private investor’s risks. This 
basically ties the score, perhaps even renders the ACE to already win on points. Moreover, 
third, contrary to the ACE, the R-CFT does not resolve the financing discrimination issue as it 
proves to subsidize debt financing relative to equity financing. As the ACE lacks the latter two 
1086
 10,500 / 10,000 – 1 = 0.05. 
1087
 1.00 * 0.25 = 0.25. As said, the amount of additional €100 tax payable effectively equals the fisc’s normal return 
rate to its capital investment as a silent partner in Johnson’s venture (i.e., 0.04 * 2,500 = 100).  
1088
 0.00 * 0.25 = 0.00. Johnson’s return to the invested equity capital of €60 in this example, equals the normal 
market return rate on the invested equity (i.e., 0.04 * 1,500 = 60). 
1089
 See also Bond and Devereux who demonstrate the R-CFT’s neutrality at the margin in Stephen R. Bond et al, 
‘Generalised R-based and S-based taxes under uncertainty’, 87 Journal of Public Economics 1291 (2003), at 1291 – 
1311.  
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problematic features that the adoption of an R-CFT would entail, the ACE, in my view, beats 
the R-CFT in the second and third round. 
Modifying R-CFT; introducing ‘tax credit carry forward at a normal market return rate’ 
The question arises as to whether it is possible to fix the R-CFT’s two drawbacks. Zee 
demonstrates that it is.
1090
 He shows that both the ‘silent partnership’ and ‘debt subsidizing’
properties of the R-CFT can be mitigated by transforming the expensing feature into a ‘tax 
credit carry forward at the normal market return rate’.  
Let us return to Johnson’s investment in the dinghy selling activities to look into the effects of 
such a modification. These would be as follows (fig. 74):  
Fig. 74. Johnson’s ‘Modified’ R-CFT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s ‘Modified’ R-CFT 
calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Return on Investment 0 + 10,500
1091
 Aggregate 0 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Investment  – 10,000
1092
 0 
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500 
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) – 10,000 + 10,500 
Tax*
) 
(25%) – 2,500
1093
+ 2,625
1094
Tax credit (at rate r)*
)
 + 2,500
1095
– 2,600
1096
 Tax payable   0
1097
+ 25
1098
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax creditable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 75): 
Fig. 75. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
1099
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1100
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500  
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1101
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1102
 Interest Paid – 240
1103
 Aggregate – 6,240
1104
Tax Levy 
1090
 See Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1091
 1 + ρ. 
1092
– 1 
1093
 0.25 * 10,000. Accordingly: – t. 
1094
 0.25 * 10,500. Accordingly: t.( 1 + ρ). 
1095
 + t. 
1096
 0.25 * 10,000 * 1.04 = 2,600. Accordingly: – t . (1 + r). 
1097
– t + t. 
1098
 0.25 * 100 = 25. Accordingly: t . (ρ – r). 
1099
 – 1. 
1100
 1 + ρ. 
1101
 α. 
1102
– α. 
1103
– α.r. 
1104
– α.(1 + r). 
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Tax*
)
 (25%)  0
1105
+ 25
1106
Aggregate  – 4,000
1107
+ 4,235
1108
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Under such a modification, the net outbound cash flow in period 1 would be restored to 
€4,000, an amount equal to the invested equity capital. The modification would effectively 
bring the tax in line, at this point, with the conventional corporate income tax, the CBIT and 
the ACE discussed in the above. The net inbound cash flow in period 2 would alter. The 
inflow in period 2 would now equal €4,235. Accordingly, that would entail the exact same 
amount as the period 2 inflow under an ACE. The net post-tax return to the invested equity 
capital (‘vmodR-CFT’) equals €235, a percentage of 5.875.
1109
 What does this tell us?
That is, transforming R-CFT into an ACE 
Basically, what we have just witnessed is the transformation of the R-CFT into an ACE. That 
is, with the exception of the tax depreciation feature.
1110
 As of the modification, the R-CFT
shares the properties of an ACE in producing equal to statutory AETRs, nil METRs and the 
property of operating neutrally towards the financing decision. 
First, as regards AETRs, the modified R-CFT would produce equal to statutory AETRs of, in 
this case, 25%. Johnson would pay the same amount of tax he actually earns. Please let me 
demonstrate this. The canceling out of the expensing feature by transforming it into an 
interest carrying tax credit carry forward under the modified R-CFT, and with that, mitigating 
the role of government as silent partner, entails that the numerator and denominator in the 
fraction alter in comparison with the R-CFT. In our example, the numerator would change into 
€25 (instead of nil). That amount can be appreciated should one recognize that the tax 
authorities would return to sitting back and waiting until Johnson yields a return to 
subsequently be taxed (rather than to operate as a silent partner). The denominator would 
change into €100. 
Government mitigates its role as silent partner under the modification 
That amount (instead of €75) can be appreciated should one recognize that again, 
government basically ceases its role as silent partner. Silent partners’ shares in the excess 
earnings may no longer be recognized. 
The fisc returns to actually taxing Johnson’s excess earnings rather than participating in the 
investment project. Taking these starting points for AETR calculation purposes, the AETR on 
Johnson’s business cash flow under the modified R-CFT would equal 25%.
1111
 The difference
between the pre-tax return, 6.5% and the post-tax return, 5.875%, being 0.625%, equals the 
employed tax rate of 25% multiplied with Johnson’s economic rent derived from its investment 
in the dinghy distribution business.
1112
 Put forward otherwise, Johnson’s pre-tax return
exceeds the normal market return rate of 4% with 250 base points, so the return is 6.5%. 
Johnson’s post-tax return equals 5.875%. That amount exceeds the normal market return rate 
1105
– t + t. 
1106
 0,25 * 100 = 25. Accordingly: t . (ρ – r). 
1107
– (1 – α). See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’,
155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1108
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r). 
1109
 (4.235 / 4.000) – 1 = 0,05875. Accordingly: vmodR-CFT = [(1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r)] / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 
– α) + r. See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 
De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. Note that the formula corresponds with its equivalent under an ACE with the 
exception of the tax depreciation component, as vACE = [(1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r) – t.(1 – d)] / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t).(ρ 
– r) / (1 – α) – t.(1 – d) / (1 – α) + r. 
1110
 In addition, the tax would remain to tax cash flows, while the ACE would tax realized income or accrued income 
(i.e., regarding the latter if fair market value tax accounting would be adopted). 
1111
 25 / 100 * 100% = 25%. 
1112
 0.065 – 0.05875 = 0.25 * 100 / 4,000 Accordingly: v – vmodR-CFT = t . (ρ – r) / (1 – α). Note that the formula 
corresponds with its equivalent under an ACE with the exception of the tax depreciation component as v – vACE = t.(ρ 
– r) . (1 – d) / (1 – α). 
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of 4% with 187.5 base points. The difference between pre-tax and post-tax return rates 
equals 62.5 base points, and accordingly, an AETR of 25%.
1113
Accordingly, provided that one recognizes that savings, the remuneration for the provision of 
capital, should not be taxed under a business income tax, as such a tax should merely tax the 
remuneration for the production factor of enterprise, the equal to statutory AETR under a 
modified R-CFT should be considered to enhance fairness relative to conventional corporate 
income tax and the CBIT. The modified R-CFT would share this property with the ACE. It 
takes some calculations, but in the end one gets what one sees, i.e., an effective tax imposed 
at a rate equal to the statutory tax rate. Again, this a fortiori holds true in cases where states 
tax savings under a portfolio investment income tax de facto producing an economic double 
taxation of savings income. 
1114
Nil METR; no financing discrimination issues 
Second, as regards METRs, the marginal investment would produce a nil tax liability under an 
accordingly modified R-CFT. A pre-tax return of 4.0%, i.e., the marginal investment producing 
a marginal income equal to nil, would effectively entail a marginal tax liability of €0 also.
1115
Third, as regards the risen financing discrimination issues under an R-CFT, Johnson would, 
upon the modification, be subject to a tax liability equal to €25 relating to its excess earnings, 
regardless of whether the investment in the dinghy selling activities is financed with debt, 
equity or a combination thereof. Accordingly, leverage effects would not alter relative to the 
no-tax environment.
1116
Moreover, as a consequence of the tax credit carry forward property that replaced the 
expensing feature, government would cease to participate in Johnson’s dinghy selling venture 
as a silent partner. Accordingly, government revenue would not be exposed to private 
investors’ risks. Please note that the replacement of the expensing feature for a tax carry 
forward at the nominal amount would transform the R-CFT into a CBIT. 
One drawback would remain 
With Zee, however, one remaining drawback may be recognized. As said, the expensing 
feature in an R-CFT entails government revenue to be exposed to private investor’s risks. 
This risk cannot be fully resolved by crediting forward the total net tax credits at the normal 
market return rate. In reality entrepreneurs typically undertake multiple and concurrent 
investments. Some of those will be successful, others will not. As the entrepreneur’s overall 
profitability will be the combined outcome of both successful and unsuccessful investment 
projects, so will government revenue. Accordingly, society would still pay for unsuccessful 
business projects. That is, to the extent that the taxable rents derived from the successful 
investments decrease as they are set-off against the losses derived from the unsuccessful 
ones. To that extent, the principle of income accrual under the S-H-S concept of income 
would not be fully appreciated. 
As is to be seen in the following subsections, this remaining issue may be resolved by 
reinforcing tax depreciation. Accordingly, in the end, things would boil down to a trade-off 
between the acceptance of government being subject to private investors’ risks, i.e., at least 
to some extent, and the (administrative) question of how to keep tax depreciation and 
economic depreciation in line. But first, let us take a closer look at the other cash flow tax, the 
‘Real and Financial Transactions Based’ or ‘Share Based’ cash flow tax. Notably, as 
1113
 62.5 / 250 * 100% = 25%. 
1114
 The question of whether savings should be taxed in the first place, as said, is not considered in this study. 
1115
 0.00 * 0.25 = 0.00.  
1116
 Indeed, as Johnson derives excess earnings from its dinghy distribution activities, the adoption of an modified R-
CFT would enable him to push on the return to the invested equity capital by financing its investment in the dinghy 
distribution activity with a higher percentage of debt capital. However, contrary to the R-CFT, the return to equity 
rates would move at the same pace in comparison with the increase in return to equity rates in a no tax environment. 
Accordingly, to that extent, the tax operates neutral relative to the no tax environment. 
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previously stated, issues involving the attribution of the taxable base to taxing jurisdictions are 
discussed as an isolated matter in Chapter 6. 
5.7.3 Effects under ‘Real and Financial Transactions Based’ or ‘Share Based’ Cash 
Flow Tax 
5.7.3.1 General remarks 
Economists also resort to R+F-CFTs and S-CFTs 
As mentioned, the R-CFT is not the only cash flow tax that is advocated by economists. Let 
us recommence with the ‘Real and Financial Transactions Based Cash Flow Tax’ (‘R+F-CFT’) 
or ‘Share Based Cash Flow Tax’ (‘S-CFT’).
1117
 The R+F-CFT recognizes as a taxable event
all cash flows related to goods provided and services rendered, i.e., including cash flows 
related to financial (i.e., debt financing) transactions. The S-CFT recognizes as a taxable 
event all cash flows related to share transactions, i.e., equity financing arrangements.  
As mentioned in section 5.7.1, there are no real conceptual differences to be recognized 
between an R+F-CFT and the S-CFT as the net inflow of real transactions and financial 
transactions, by accounting identity, necessarily equals the net outflow of share transactions 
(i.e., R + F = S). 
The following exclusively refers to the term ‘R+F’. It may nevertheless be appreciated that the 
term may be interchanged with ‘S’. Similar to the R-CFT, the application of the R+F-CFT 
triggers tax refunds upon outward bound cash flows. The inward bound cash flows trigger 
liabilities to pay tax. However, contrary to the R-CFT and, notably, the European Union value 
added taxation as well, the R+F-CFT does not exclude financial transactions from the taxable 
base. There is no need, other than perhaps administratively, to distinguish between real 
transactions and financial transactions as, for instance, is the case under an R-CFT and 
European Union value added taxation. Moreover, the R+F-CFT includes wages in the taxable 
base, while European Union value added taxation does not. 
Nominal tax payable; R+F-CFT corresponds with conventional CIT, but… 
In terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the R+F-CFT corresponds with the conventional 
corporate income tax, which taxes the nominal return to equity and allows for a deduction of 
wages and interest payments. Accordingly, in terms of nominal amounts of tax payable, the 
R+F-CFT is broader than, for instance, under the ACE. 
However, in terms of effective tax burdens imposed, there is a vast difference to be 
recognized between the R+F-CFT on the one hand and the conventional corporate income 
tax and ACE on the other, as the first mentioned entails a tax refund to the taxpayer upon the 
outbound payment, i.e., the investment in period 1 and a tax payable upon the investment’s 
return in period 2, while the conventional corporate income tax and ACE do not allow for tax 
refunds at the time of undertaking the investment in period 1. The latter tax systems merely 
recognize a taxable event at the time the respective investment yields a taxable return in 
period 2. Accordingly, contrary to the conventional corporate income tax and ACE, interest 
yielding funds become available upon the investment under the R+F-CFT. However, if that 
property would be cancelled out, the R+F-CFT would turn out to operate conceptually in a 
manner surprisingly akin to an ACE. Let us proceed with the analysis. 
5.7.3.2 The effects involving a direct investment 
1117
 For some further discussion, see Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 
21
st
 Century (2008). 
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Assessing the investment returns of ‘Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company’ 
Let us return to our taxpayer Johnson and its dinghy business activities. As previously stated, 
Johnson directly invests in a dinghy sales activity. Let us suppose that the tax rate equals a 
linear 25%. Under an R+F-CFT, the effects are as follows (fig. 76): 
Fig. 76. Johnson’s R+F-CFT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s R+F-CFT calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1118
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1119
 Aggregate + 6,000 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Investment  – 10,000
1120
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1121
 Interest Paid – 240
1122
 Aggregate – 10,000 – 6,240
1123
Tax Levy 
 Aggregate (Taxable Amount) – 4,000
1124
+ 4,260
1125
Tax*
)
 (25%) – 1,000
1126
+ 1,065
1127
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 77): 
Fig. 77. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
1128
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1129
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500  
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1130
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1131
 Interest Paid – 240
1132
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
1133
Tax Levy 
Tax*
) 
(25%) – 1,000
1134
+ 1,065
1135
Aggregate  – 3,000
1136
+ 3,195
1137
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
1118
 1 + ρ. 
1119
 α. 
1120
– 1 
1121
– α. 
1122
– α.r. 
1123
– α.(1 + r). 
1124
 (1 – α). 
1125
 ( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r). 
1126
 0.25 * 4,000 = 1,000. Accordingly: – t.(1 – α). 
1127
 0.25 * 4,260 = 1,065. Accordingly: t.[( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r)]. 
1128
 – 1. 
1129
 1 + ρ. 
1130
 α. 
1131
– α. 
1132
– α.r. 
1133
– α.(1 + r). 
1134
– t.(1 – α). 
1135
 t.[( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r)]. 
1136
– (1 – t).(1 – α). See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-
Flow Tax’, 155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1137
 (1 – t).[( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r)]. See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid 
Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
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The net outward bound cash flow in period 1 alters in comparison with the no-tax environment 
and in comparison with the aforementioned taxes (conventional corporate income tax, CBIT, 
ACE and R-CFT). The investment transaction in period 1 constitutes a taxable event 
triggering a tax refund. Consequently, the outward bound cash flow in period equals €3,000 
rather than €4,000. The net inward bound cash flow in period 2 also alters. This time, the 
inflow in period 2 equals 3,195. The post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vR+F-CFT’) 
equals €195, a percentage of 0.065.
1138
 These numbers again tell us three things (see
sections 5.7.3.3, 5.7.3.4, and 5.7.3.5). 
5.7.3.3 Average Effective Tax Rates are nil; Property comes with a Price 
What would be the AETR? 
First, it tells us something about the AETR under an R+F-CFT. The application of an R+F-
CFT produces a tax payable of €65. However, similar to the R-CFT the question arises to 
which extent Johnson effectively bears the tax.  
A closer look at the R+F-CFT reveals that one may ask again whether the R+F-CFT actually 
results into Johnson bearing a tax impost. It rather seems that the R+F-CFT shares the R-
CFT’s property of triggering the tax authorities to engage in a private investment as a silent 
partner in Johnson’s distribution activities yielding a return of €65 (i.e., 1,065 – 1,000).
1139
 The
amount of €65 tax payable effectively breaks down in two components again: a component 
corresponding to the financing costs relating to the fisc’s capital investment (€40 financing 
costs) and a component corresponding with an amount payable relating to the fisc’s excess 
earnings (€25). In period 1, Johnson’s investment entails a refund from the tax authorities at 
an amount of €1,000. 
This can be interpreted as a private investment undertaken by the government. Namely, the 
fisc makes these funds available to Johnson. Taking the debt issuance into account as well, 
Johnson’s actual equity investment accordingly accounts for a mere €3,000 rather than the 
nominal amount of €4,000 which we saw earlier. That amount of €3,000 would equal the 
amount of Johnson’s actual equity at risk. From the fisc’s perspective, its investment of 
€1,000 turns out to produce a return of €65, a return rate of 6.5%.
1140
 That number equals the
return on the investment absent a tax impost. This time, the silent partner’s share in the 
excess earnings equals Johnson’s. As a comparison, the fisc would have settled for a 5% 
return under the R-CFT. A deposit on a savings account at the normal market rate of 4% 
would yield the €1,000 investment to return €40. Hence, an amount of €40 corresponds with 
the normal market rate return on the fisc’s capital investment. From Johnson’s perspective, 
this amount of €40 equals the costs of capital made available by its silent partner, the tax 
authorities.  
Consequently, the excess of €25 (i.e., 65 – 40) can be understood as the fisc’s ‘excess 
earnings’ (i.e., a 2.5% excess return
1141
) on its €1,000 investment in Johnson’s business.
Perhaps, that latter amount, i.e., from Johnson’s perspective, may be understood to equal the 
tax burden imposed on the economic rents of, in this case, €100 on the investment in the 
dinghy distribution business. That amount of €100 economic rents can be understood as 
follows. The investment of €10,000 in the dinghy selling activities produces a gross return of 
€500. The interest paid on the bank loan of €6,000 equals €240. The cost of capital relating to 
the fisc’s investment of €1,000 equals €40. The opportunity cost of capital relating to 
Johnson’s equity investment of €3,000 equals 120.
1142
 Consequently, the aggregate amount
1138
 (3,195 / 3,000) – 1 = 0.065. Accordingly: vR+F-CFT = (1 – t).[( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) / (1 – t).(1 – α) – 1 = (ρ – r) / (1 – α) + 
r. Note that vR+F-CFT = v, as v = (ρ – r) / (1 – α) + r. Accordingly: v – vR+F-CFT = 0. 
1139
 See also Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. Auerbach 
recognizes this effect under its destination based CFT proposal, yet does not seem to have a problem with this. 
1140
 (1,065 / 1,000) – 1 = 0.065. 
1141
 25 / 1,000 * 100 = 2.50%. 
1142
 0.04 * 3,000 = 120. 
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of €100 (i.e., 500 – 240 – 40 – 120 = 100) equals the excess earnings triggering the amount 
of what may de facto be understood as a tax burden of €25.
1143
However, alternatively, the amount of €25 tax payable to the tax authorities (in excess of the 
€40) may also be considered to equal the fisc’s share of excess earnings as silent partner in 
Johnson’s dinghy distribution business. If one considers this latter amount of €25 to constitute 
the fisc’s/silent partner’s share of excess earnings, this qualification would render the R+F-
CFT not to be borne by Johnson at all. Namely, Johnson’s pre-tax excess earnings would 
then equal its post-tax excess earnings. In such a case, the amount of Johnson’s pre-tax 
economic rents would be calculated as €75. That amount can be understood as follows. The 
investment of €10,000 in the dinghy selling activities produces a gross return of €500. The 
interest paid on the bank loan of €6,000 equals €240. The cost of capital relating to the fisc’s 
investment of €1,000 equals €40. The opportunity cost of capital relating to Johnson’s equity 
investment of €3,000 equals €120.  
In addition, the fisc’s excess earnings relating to its capital investment as a silent partner, 
equals €25. Consequently, the aggregate amount of €75 (i.e., 500 – 240 – 40 – 120 – 25 = 
75) would constitute Johnson’s pre-tax excess earnings, taking the silent partner’s share into
account. The pre-tax excess earnings would be equal to Johnson’s post-tax excess earnings 
of €75 (i.e., 500 – 240 – 100 – 60 – 25 = 75). That would accordingly render the R+F-CFT not 
to be borne by Johnson at all. In my view, this would be the proper finding.  
Notably, the expensing feature is what the R+F-CFT distinguishes from, for instance, the 
conventional corporate income tax, which in this case would produce an overall amount of 
€65 tax payable as borne by Johnson. Contrary to the R+F-CFT, that amount would not break 
down into components since the conventional corporate income tax lacks the expensing 
feature. Under a conventional corporate income tax (or CBIT and ACE for that matter) 
government would not operate as a silent partner. It would merely sit back and wait until 
Johnson yields a return to subsequently tax it. Again, the question may arise as to which 
extent an R+F-CFT actually still is a tax. 
Let us proceed calculating AETRs. As said, AETRs are calculated by dividing the tax payable 
(numerator) by the pre-tax income (denominator).
1144
 The question again arises as to which
numbers need to be put into the fraction.
1145
 As we have seen in the above paragraph, in
respect of the amount to be adopted in the numerator, a decision out of three available 
options needs to be made. The available numbers are €65, €25 and nil. Things depend on 
whether and to which extent the tax authorities’ position as silent partner in Johnson’s 
investment in the dinghy distribution business should be recognized for AETR calculation 
purposes. With respect to the amount to be adopted in the denominator, various figures are 
potentially available as well. 
In this respect, the remarks referred to in the above should be both repeated and 
supplemented. As discussed, in a no-tax environment, the net return on the investment in the 
dinghy distribution business equals €260. Taking the application of the R+F-CFT into account, 
this amount comprises of two components, both of which subsequently can be subdivided into 
two subcomponents (entailing an aggregate of four subcomponents). The first component 
amounts to €160. It refers to the 4% normal market return rate on the €6,000 equity 
investment. Contrary to alternative tax bases discussed earlier, this amount of €160 may 
subsequently be broken up into two subcomponents. The first equals an amount of €40 
corresponding to the fisc’s normal market rate return on its €1,000 investment as a silent 
partner. The second subcomponent equals an amount of €120 corresponding to Johnson’s 
normal market rate return on its €3,000 equity investment (i.e., the opportunity costs of 
capital). The second component amounts to €100. It refers to the excess earnings, the 
1143
 0.25 * 100 = 25. 
1144
 See Willem Vermeend et al, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, Employment, 
Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. 
1145
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options 
for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, who refer to concerns as to whether it is suitable to find a proper measure of profit to uses as the 
denominator. 
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remuneration for the production factor of enterprise. Contrary to alternative tax bases 
discussed earlier, this amount of €100 may subsequently be broken up into two components 
as well. Viz., an amount of €25 corresponding to the fisc’s share of the excess earnings in 
return on its €1,000 investment as silent partner (i.e., the 2.5% return in excess of the 4% 
normal market rate return) and the remaining amount of €75 corresponding to Johnson’s 
share of the excess earnings in return on its equity investment of €3,000 (i.e., the 2.5% return 
in excess of the 4% normal market rate return
1146
). As said, again, the question arises as to
which of these numbers should be taken into consideration? Which numbers should be 
picked? 
Similar to the R-CFT, the numbers to pick, in my view, are nil (numerator) and €75 
(denominator). This produces a nil AETR.
1147
 Why is that? The amount of nil in the numerator
can be appreciated should one recognize that the fisc actually invests as a silent partner in 
Johnson’s business. This effect has been caused by the R+F-CFT’s expensing feature it 
shares with the R-CFT. The amount of €75 in the denominator can be appreciated if one 
recognizes that pre-tax business cash flow, i.e., the earnings exceeding the normal market 
rate of return, should be taken into consideration as denominator for AETR calculation 
purposes. All financing costs, including the opportunity costs of capital, are actual costs. The 
fact that the pre-tax business cash flow accounts for €75 rather than €100 (which is the case 
under the tax bases discussed in the above with the exception of the R-CFT) can be 
appreciated if one recognizes the fisc’s performance as silent partner. The R+F-CFT’s 
expensing feature triggers the fisc to operate as a silent partner in the dinghy distribution 
business yielding both a normal market rate return (€40) as well as excess earnings (€25). 
This observation renders Johnson’s pre-tax excess earnings equal its post-tax excess 
earnings, i.e., €75. Moreover, as the fisc does not settle for a return rate that differs from 
Johnson’s, the R+F-CFT enables Johnson to derive a net return on its equity investment 
equal to the return in a no tax environment, i.e., 6.5%. That would be contrary to the R-CFT, 
as that tax would enable Johnson to derive a 9% return. 
 ‘Tax depreciation should correspond with economic depreciation issues’ do not 
emerge 
This being said, moreover, contrary to some of its counterpart taxation methods discussed in 
the above, i.e., the conventional corporate income tax, and the CBIT (and similar to the R-
CFT) no ‘tax depreciation should correspond with economic depreciation issues’ emerge. Due 
to the expensing feature, the R+F-CFT has in common with the R-CFT and European Union 
value added taxation the following: i.e., Johnson’s investment triggers a tax refund in period 1, 
tax depreciation is non-existent and, hence, by its nature, cannot trigger this issue as 
presented under the earlier discussed alternatives.  
Notably, similar to the remarks made in respect of the R-CFT, this does not necessarily entail 
that R+F-CFTs would resolve issues on the question of where, i.e., in which state, the tax 
should be paid. Investment location distortions may still occur as a result of mutual tax rate 
divergences to the extent that the taxable base, as is currently the case in international 
taxation, is attributed to taxing jurisdictions by means of origin based profit allocation factors. 
The adoption of an ‘origin based’ R+F-CFT would not change this. The effects are difficult to 
predict. Relatively higher rates employed would entail relatively higher tax refunds. The 
opposite would be true under relatively lower rates. I am not sure what the outcome would be. 
In addition, I am also not sure whether the R+F-CFT, to this extent, would be able to put the 
current ‘race to the bottom’ problem referred to previously to an end. This being said, 
interestingly, contrary to the R-CFT, the introduction of a tax rate increase in our example – 
let us for instance again increase the rate from 25% to, say, 30% – would not entail a 
mutation in post-tax investment returns (‘vR+F-CFT’). Indeed, the post-tax return to the invested 
equity capital would drop to €182 (instead of €195).
1148
 Yet, that would effectively entail a
1146
 75 / 3,000 * 100 = 2.50%. 
1147
 0 / 75 = 0. 
1148
 2,982 – 2,800 = 182. 
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post-tax return rate of 6.5%, i.e., a return equal to the return under a 25% tax rate.
1149
Contrary to the R-CFT, a tax rate increase would not drive post-tax earnings upwards. The 
potential of ‘racing to the top’, as tentatively recognized under an origin-based R-CFT, 
accordingly, would be absent under an origin-based R+F-CFT. As said, the attribution of a 
taxable base to taxing jurisdictions is further discussed as an isolated issue in Chapter 6. 
Absence of tax depreciation issues comes with a price; society engages in taking on 
private investment risks 
Nevertheless, the absence of issues involving tax depreciation under an R-CFT again comes 
with a price similar to that under an R-CFT. That price paid is absent under the alternative tax 
bases discussed in the above (corporate income tax, CBIT, ACE).  
As said, the expensing feature under an R+F-CFT entails that society, as represented by the 
government, would engage in private investment undertakings as a silent partner in all private 
investments undertaken by taxpayers. In our example, the government’s stake in Johnson’s 
investment equals €1,000. Thereby, Johnson’s private investor’s risks are partly transferred to 
society.  
Accordingly, under an R+F-CFT, government revenue would be exposed to the exact same 
investment risks as those faced by private investors.
1150
 Despite the fact that the amount of
community funds at risk is lower in comparison with the R-CFT, under which, government 
would invest €2,500, the provision of public goods, as financed by tax revenues, would be 
subject to these risks as well. This role of government as a silent partner may be considered 
an inherent limitation of the R+F-CFT, as many perhaps would agree that the financing of 
public goods should not be subject to private investors’ risks. The R+F-CFT shares this 
property with the R-CFT (yet the absolute scope of funds at risk would be less). Many would 
perhaps agree that governments should impose tax rather than act as silent partners in 
business ventures. Note that the ACE lacks this feature. Under an ACE, government would 
not be subject to these private investor’s risks as recognized under an R-CFT. 
Hence, again something needs to be done about the expensing feature. However, before 
getting to potential solutions for the issues triggered by the expensing feature of an R-CFT, 
some additional remarks should be made regarding the R+F-CFT’s properties. 
5.7.3.4 Financing Discrimination Issues Mitigated 
Second, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement above tell us something about the 
effects of financing decisions under an R+F-CFT. The cash flow calculations demonstrate that 
Johnson’s post-tax return rate under an R+F-CFT (‘vR+F-CFT’ = 6.5%) equals the return rate in 
a no tax environment (v = 6.5%). What does this tell us? 
This can be explained by recognizing that, contrary to the R-CFT, the R+F-CFT does not 
subsidize debt financing relative to equity financing in cases where investments yield 
economic rents. The R+F-CFT does not affect the return rate whatsoever. Regardless of 
Johnson’s financing decision, the return rate under an R+F-CFT would equal the return rate in 
a no tax environment. Had Johnson financed the dinghy sales activity entirely with equity,
1151
the R+F-CFT would have produced a nominal overall amount of €125 tax payable, i.e., the 
aggregate of a tax refund equal to €2,500 in period 1 and a tax payable equal to €2,625 in 
period 2. The fisc settles consistently for a return on its investment as silent partner equal to 
Johnson’s. Viz., Johnson’s return to the invested equity of, this time, €7,500, would equal 
€375 (i.e., 7,875 – 7,500), a return to equity rate of 5%.
1152
 That would match the return to
equity rate in a no tax environment (provided that Johnson had financed its investment 
1149
 (2,982 / 2,800) – 1 = 0.065. Notably, a tax rate of 35% would entail a post-tax return rate of 6.5% as well: (2,769 / 
2,600) – 1 = 0.065. 
1150
 See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1151
 1 – α = 1 (α = 0). 
1152
 7,875 / 7,500 – 1 = 0.05. 
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entirely with equity).
1153
 Accordingly, as Johnson derives excess earnings from its dinghy
selling activities, the adoption of an R+F-CFT, contrary to the R-CFT, would not enable him to 
push on the return to the invested equity capital by financing its investment in the dinghy 
sales activity with a higher percentage of debt capital. The return to equity rate would 
increase at the exact same pace as the increase in return to equity rates would have been in 
a no tax environment.
1154
 The leverage effects are identical. This is caused by the fact that the
R+F-CFT does not distinguish between real and financial transaction. Accordingly, the R+F-
CFT proves not to subsidize debt financing relative to equity financing in a similar manner as 
the R-CFT does. Hence, it would not encourage taxpayers to finance their investments with 
as much debt as possible. The R+F-CFT operates neutrally towards the financing decision. 
Accordingly, the R+F-CFT shares this property with the ACE as discussed in section 5.6. In 
my view, as this entails neutrality towards financing decisions, this financing neutrality 
provides an equitable feature of an R+F-CFT, which it shares with the ACE. 
5.7.3.5 Marginal Effective Tax Rates are nil 
Third, the numbers forwarded in the cash flow statement under an R+F-CFT tell us that the 
R+F-CFT would produce nil METRs. The R+F-CFT does not distort marginal investment 
decisions. It shares this property with both the R-CFT and the ACE. Accordingly, an R+F-CFT 
would operate equitably and neutrally at the margin. An R-CFT merely taxes excess earnings, 
or Johnson’s economic rent, as an example. Let us calculate METRs to illustrate things. Had 
Johnson’s investment, for instance, yielded a pre-tax return of 4.01%, a business cash flow in 
our example of €1, the R-CFT imposed at a 25% rate would produce a tax on that business 
cash flow equal to €0.25.
1155
 A pre-tax return of 4.0%, i.e., the marginal investment producing
a marginal income equal to nil, would effectively entail a marginal tax liability of €0 also.
1156
That would produce the 0% METR.
1157
5.7.3.6 Fixing the ‘government’s silent partnership’ feature 
Let us compare the R+F-CFT with an ACE. First, the R+F-CFT seems to trump the ACE in 
the first round as the R+F-CFT lacks the ‘tax depreciation should equal economic 
depreciation’ issue. That is, although the issue under an ACE would be relatively moderate to 
the extent that matters are seen in present value terms; see section 5.6.2.2. However, 
second, the R-CFT’s property comes with a price to be paid: government takes upon the role 
as a silent partner in all private investments thereby exposing public revenue to private 
investor’s risks. This basically ties the score. Moreover, the score remains tied as the R+F-
CFT, contrary to the R-CFT, shares the ACE’s property of resolving the financing 
discrimination issue.  
Modifying R+F-CFT; introducing ‘tax credit carry forward at normal market return rate’ 
The question again arises as to whether it is possible to fix the R+F-CFT drawback. Zee 
demonstrates that it is.
1158
 He shows that the ‘silent partnership’ property of the R+F-CFT can
1153
 10,500 / 10,000 – 1 = 0.05. 
1154
 Indeed, as Johnson derives excess earnings from its dinghy distribution activities, the adoption of a modified 
R+F-CFT would enable him to push on the return to the invested equity capital by financing its investment in the 
dinghy distribution activity with a higher percentage of debt capital. However, contrary the return to equity rates would 
move at the same pace in comparison with the increase in return to equity rates in a no tax environment. Accordingly, 
to that extent, the tax operates neutral relative to the no tax environment. 
1155
 1.00 * 0.25 = 0.25. As said, the amount of additional €40 tax payable effectively equals the fisc’s normal return 
rate to its capital investment as a silent partner in Johnson’s venture (0.04 * 1,000 = 40).  
1156
 0.00 * 0.25 = 0.00. Johnson’s return to the invested equity capital of €120, in this example, equals the normal 
market return rate on the invested equity (i.e., 0.04 * 3,000 = 120). 
1157
 See also Bond and Devereux who demonstrate the R+F-CFT’s (and equivalently the S-CFT’s) neutrality at the 
margin in Stephen R. Bond et al, ‘Generalised R-based and S-based taxes under uncertainty’, 87 Journal of Public 
Economics 1291 (2003), at 1291 – 1311. The authors also discuss the effects of debtor defaults under the various 
CFTs. This is not further discussed. 
1158
 See Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
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be mitigated by transforming the expensing feature into a ‘tax credit carry forward at the 
normal market return rate’.  
Let us return to Johnson’s investment in the dinghy selling activities to illustrate the effects of 
such a modification. These would be as follows (fig. 78):  
Fig. 78. Johnson’s Modified’ R+F-CFT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Modified’ R+F-CFT 
calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1159
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1160
 Aggregate + 6,000 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Investment  – 10,000
1161
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1162
 Interest Paid – 240
1163
 Aggregate – 10,000 – 6,240
1164
Tax Levy 
Aggregate (Taxable Amount) – 4,000
1165
+ 4,260
1166
Tax*
)
 (25%) – 1,000
1167
+ 1,065
1168
Tax credit (at rate r)*
)
 + 1,000
1169
– 1,040
1170
 Tax payable   0
1171
+ 25
1172
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 79): 
Fig. 79. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
1173
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1174
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500  
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1175
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1176
 Interest Paid – 240
1177
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
1178
Tax Levy 
Tax*
)
 (25%)  0
1179
+ 25
1180
1159
 1 + ρ. 
1160
 α. 
1161
– 1 
1162
– α. 
1163
– α.r. 
1164
– α.(1 + r). 
1165
 (1 – α). 
1166
 ( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r). 
1167
 0.25 * 4,000 = 1,000. Accordingly: – t.(1 – α). 
1168
 0.25 * 4,260 = 1,065. Accordingly: t.[( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r)]. 
1169
 + t.(1 – α). 
1170
 0.25 * 4,000 * 1.04 = 1,040. Accordingly: – t . (1 + r). 
1171
– t.(1 – α) + t.(1 – α). 
1172
 0.25 * 100 = 25. Accordingly: t . (ρ – r). 
1173
 – 1. 
1174
 1 + ρ. 
1175
 α. 
1176
– α. 
1177
– α.r. 
1178
– α.(1 + r). 
1179
– t.(1 – α) + t.(1 – α). 
1180
 0.25 * 100 = 25. Accordingly: t . (ρ – r). 
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Aggregate  – 4,000
1181
+ 4,235
1182
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Under such a modification, the net outward bound cash flow in period 1 would be restored to 
€4,000, an amount equal to the invested equity capital. The modification would effectively 
bring the tax in line, at this point, with the conventional corporate income tax, the CBIT and 
the ACE discussed in the above. The net inward bound cash flow in period 2 would alter. The 
inflow in period 2 would now equal €4,235. Accordingly, that would entail the exact same 
amount as the period 2 inflow under an ACE. The net post-tax return to the invested equity 
capital (‘vmodR+F-CFT’) equals €235, a percentage of 5.875.
1183
 What does this tell us?
That is, transforming R+F-CFT into an ACE 
Indeed, what we have just witnessed, basically, is the transformation of the R+F-CFT into an 
ACE. That is, with the exception of the tax depreciation feature.
1184
 Similar to the modified R-
CFT, as of the modification, the R+F-CFT shares the properties of an ACE of producing equal 
to statutory AETRs, nil METRs and the feature of operating neutrally towards the financing 
decision. 
First, as regards AETRs, the modified R+F-CFT would produce AETRs that are equal to the 
statutory tax rate of, in this case, 25%. Johnson would pay the same amount of tax he 
actually earns. Please let me demonstrate this. The canceling out of the expensing feature 
under the modified R+F-CFT, and with that, the role of government as silent partner, entails 
that the numerator and denominator in the fraction alter in comparison with the R+F-CFT. In 
our example, the numerator would change into €25 (instead of nil). 
Government mitigates its role as silent partner under the modification 
That amount can be appreciated should one recognize that the tax authorities would return to 
sitting back and waiting until Johnson yields a return to subsequently tax (rather than 
operating as a silent partner). The denominator would change into €100 (instead of €75). That 
amount can be appreciated should one recognize that, again, government ceases its role as 
silent partner. Silent partners’ shares in the excess earnings may no longer be recognized. 
The fisc returns to actually taxing Johnson’s excess earnings rather than participating in the 
investment project. Taking these starting points for AETR calculation purposes, the AETR on 
Johnson’s business cash flow under the modified R+F-CFT would equal 25%.
1185
 The
difference between the pre-tax return of 6.5% and the post-tax return of 5.875% is 0.625%, 
and equals the employed tax rate of 25% multiplied by Johnson’s economic rent derived from 
its investment in the dinghy distribution business.
1186
 Put forward otherwise, Johnson’s pre-tax
return of 6.5% exceeds the normal market return rate of 4% with 250 base points. Johnson’s 
post-tax return equals 5.875%. That amount exceeds the normal market return rate of 4% 
with 187.5 base points. The difference between Johnson’s pre-tax and post-tax return rates 
equals 62.5 base points, and accordingly, an AETR of 25%.
1187
1181
– (1 – α). See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’,
155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. 
1182
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r). 
1183
 (4,235 / 4,000) – 1 = 0.05875. Accordingly: vmodR+F-CFT = [(1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r)] / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / 
(1 – α) + r. See also Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 
155 De Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448. Note that the formula corresponds with the modified R-CFT as vmodR-CFT = 
(1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) + r. as well. Moreover, vmodR+F-CFT matches its equivalent under an ACE with the exception of the 
tax depreciation component, as vACE = [(1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r) – t.(1 – d)] / (1 – α) – 1 = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) – 
t.(1 – d) / (1 – α) + r. 
1184
 In addition, the tax would remain to tax cash flows, while the ACE would tax realized income or accrued income 
(i.e., regarding the latter if fair market value tax accounting would be adopted). 
1185
 25 / 100 * 100% = 25%. 
1186
 0.065 – 0.05875 = 0.25 * 100 / 4,000. Accordingly: v – vmodR-CFT = t . (ρ – r) / (1 – α). Note that the formula 
corresponds with its equivalent under an ACE with the exception of the tax depreciation component as v – vACE = t.(ρ 
– r) . (1 – d) / (1 – α). 
1187
 62.5 / 250 * 100% = 25%. 
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Accordingly, provided that one recognizes that savings, or the remuneration for the provision 
of capital, should not be taxed under a business income tax, as such a tax should merely tax 
the remuneration for the production factor of enterprise, the equal to statutory AETR under a 
modified R-CFT should be considered to enhance fairness relative to conventional corporate 
income tax and the CBIT. The modified R-CFT would share this property with the ACE. In the 
end one gets what one sees, i.e., an effective tax imposed at a rate equal to the statutory tax 
rate. Again, this a fortiori holds true in cases where states tax savings under a portfolio 
investment income tax de facto producing an economic double taxation of savings income. 
1188
Nil METR, and no financing discrimination issues 
Second, as regards METRs, the marginal investment would produce a nil tax liability under an 
accordingly modified R-CFT. A pre-tax return of 4.0%, i.e., the marginal investment producing 
a marginal income equal to nil, would effectively entail a marginal tax liability of €0 also.
1189
Third, no financing discrimination issues would arise. Johnson would be subject to a tax 
liability equal to €25 relating to its excess earnings regardless of whether the investment in 
the dinghy selling activities is financed with debt, equity or a combination thereof. Accordingly, 
leverage effects would not alter relative to the no-tax environment.  
Moreover, as a consequence of the tax credit carry forward property that replaced the 
expensing feature, government would not participate in Johnson’s venture as a silent partner. 
Accordingly, in that respect, government revenue would not be exposed to private investors’ 
risks. Please note that the replacement of the expensing feature for a tax carry forward at the 
nominal amount would transform the R+F-CFT into a conventional corporate income tax. 
Again, one drawback would remain 
With Zee, however, again one remaining drawback may be recognized. As said, the 
expensing feature in an R+F-CFT entails government revenue to be exposed to private 
investor’s risks. Again, this risk cannot be fully resolved by crediting forward the total net tax 
credits at the normal market return rate. As previously stated, in reality entrepreneurs typically 
undertake multiple and concurrent investments. Some of those will be successful, others will 
not. As the entrepreneur’s overall profitability will be the combined outcome of both successful 
and unsuccessful investment projects, so will government revenue. Accordingly, society 
would still pay for unsuccessful business projects, at least to some extent. That is, to the 
extent that the taxable rents derived from the successful investments decrease as they are 
set-off against the losses derived from the unsuccessful ones. To that extent again the 
principle of income accrual under the S-H-S concept of income would not be fully appreciated. 
5.7.3.7 Reinforcing tax depreciation? 
This remaining issue may be resolved by reinforcing tax depreciation, i.e., in a manner 
common to typical tax depreciation under conventional corporate income tax, CBIT and ACE 
taxation systems.
1190
 This could be done by altering the tax credit carry forward calculations
1188
 The question of whether savings should be taxed in the first place is not considered in this study. 
1189
 0.00 * 0.25 = 0.00. 
1190
 Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De Economist 
417 (2007), at 417-448, suggests doing so by replacing the expensing feature with tax depreciation of fixed assets. 
Moreover, he argues to subsequently allow for a carry forward of the undepreciated value of fixed assets at the 
opportunity cost of equity capital. For this purpose, Zee argues to extract the investment (1) from the tax calculation 
in period 1 and to grant a tax deduction in period 2 (1 + r). The latter component would represent the depreciation 
allowance with interest. Zee for simplicity reasons assumes the depreciation allowance to correspond with true 
economic depreciation (1 = d). Indeed, that would not resolve the ‘tax depreciation should equal economic 
depreciation’ issue recognized in the above. In addition, if I understand correctly, Zee, accordingly, basically argues 
to transform the modified R+F-CFT into a ‘F-CFT’, i.e., a cash flow tax on financial transactions. Viz., Zee recognizes 
a taxable event in period 1, i.e., in respect of the inflow of funds upon the debt issuance (t. α), triggering an amount of 
tax payable. Zee further argues that taxpayers could neutralize this by engaging into an appropriate series of financial 
transactions subsequently triggering a tax payable as well. I have some difficulties understanding this. I do not 
understand why the undertaking of a debt financed investment activity should trigger a tax payable. Moreover, I do 
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under the modified R+F-CFT by replacing the investment component (‘1’) for a depreciation 
component (‘d’). That would entail the carry forward of the undepreciated value of fixed assets 
at the opportunity cost of equity capital. 
Let us return to Johnson’s investment in the dinghy selling activities to illustrate the effects of 
such a modification. These would be as follows (fig. 80):  
Fig. 80. Johnson’s Modified’ R+F-CFT calculation 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Modified’ R+F-CFT 
calculation 
Earnings 
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1191
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1192
 Aggregate + 6,000 + 10,500 
Costs 
 Investment  – 10,000
1193
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1194
 Interest Paid – 240
1195
 Aggregate – 10,000 – 6,240
1196
Tax Levy 
Aggregate (Taxable Amount) – 4,000
1197
+ 4,260
1198
Tax*
)
 (25%) – 1,000
1199
+ 1,065
1200
Tax credit (at rate r)*
)
 + 1,000
1201
– 1,040
1202
 Tax payable   0
1203
+ 25
1204
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Johnson’s business activities produce the following business cash flows (fig. 81): 
Fig. 81. Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Period 1 Period 2 
Johnson’s Cash Flow Statement 
Real Transactions (‘R’) 
 Investment  – 10,000
1205
 Gross Return on Investment + 10,500
1206
 Aggregate – 10,000 + 10,500  
Financial Transactions (‘F’) 
 Debt Issuance  + 6,000
1207
 Repayment Principal Amount – 6,000
1208
 Interest Paid – 240
1209
 Aggregate + 6,000 – 6,240
1210
not understand why taxpayers subsequently should borrow funds to finance that tax payable. I have the impression 
that the ‘depreciation’ for ‘investment’ replacement should be introduced at another place in the scheme. I would 
suggest choosing a different path by calculating the tax credit alternatively, i.e., by means of replacing the 
‘investment’ (‘1’) for ‘depreciation’ (‘d’). 
1191
 1 + ρ. 
1192
 α. 
1193
– 1 
1194
– α. 
1195
– α.r. 
1196
– α.(1 + r). 
1197
 (1 – α). 
1198
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r). 
1199
 0.25 * 4,000 = 1,000. Accordingly: – t.(1 – α). 
1200
 0.25 * 4,260 = 1,065. Accordingly: t.[( 1 – α) + (ρ – α.r)]. 
1201
 + t.(d – α). 
1202
 0.25 * 4,000 * 1.04 = 1,040. Accordingly: – t . (d + r). 
1203
– t.(1 – α) + t.(d – α) as d = 1.
1204
 0.25 * [(500 – 400) + (10,000 – 10,000)] = 25. Accordingly: t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)]. 
1205
 – 1. 
1206
 1 + ρ. 
1207
 α. 
1208
– α. 
1209
– α.r. 
1210
– α.(1 + r). 
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Tax Levy 
Tax*
)
 (25%)  0
1211
+ 25
1212
Aggregate  – 4,000
1213
+ 4,235
1214
*
)
 A tax preceded by a ‘+’ sign represents an amount of tax payable. A tax preceded by a ‘–’ sign
represents an amount of tax refundable. 
Under such a modification, the net outward bound cash flow in period 1 would remain to be 
restored to €4,000, an amount equal to the invested equity capital. The net inward bound 
cash flow in period 2 would not alter.
1215
 The inflow in period 2 would again equal €4,235. The
net post-tax return to the invested equity capital (‘vmodR+F-CFTdepreciation’) equals €235, a 
percentage of 5.875.
1216
 What does this tell us?
Modifications drive towards advocating ACE; moving in a circle 
Interestingly, the modifications drove us towards substantially advocating the ACE. We have 
moved in a circle. The re-introduction of tax depreciation and the interest carrying tax credit 
carry forward features that have rendered the R+F-CFT identical to the ACE.  
With the depreciation feature, the transformation of the tax into the ACE is complete. Notably, 
to prevent tax cascading, intra-group transactions regarding controlled subsidiaries should not 
be recognized. In addition, an indirect tax exemption should be adopted with respect to non-
controlling equity interests in participations. As the R+F-CFT has been rendered identical to 
the ACE, it suffices to plainly refer to the in –depth discussions forwarded in sections 5.6.3 
and 5.6.4 of this chapter. 
In summary, the silent partnership feature under CFTs may be resolved by replacing the 
expensing feature with an interest bearing tax credit carry forward and the reinforcement of 
tax depreciation. The issue of tax refunds would be moot. However, the reinforcement of tax 
depreciation entails the reintroduction of the ‘tax depreciation should correspond with 
economic depreciation’ issue; i.e., at least to some extent – see hereunder. 
Accordingly, at the end of the day, things would boil down to a trade-off between the 
acceptance of government being subject to private investors’ risks, i.e., at least to some 
extent, and the (administrative) question as to how to keep tax depreciation and economic 
depreciation on par.  
Favoring the ACE in the end 
I would favor the latter, i.e., the ACE. That is also since the depreciation issues may be 
considered significantly mitigated under the adoption of an ACE if the matter is seen in the 
effects in terms of net present value – i.e., relative to the conventional corporate income tax. 
As discussed in the above, an accelerated tax depreciation relative to the economic 
depreciation would reduce not only the tax bookkeeping value of the respective asset but also 
the taxpayer’s equity capital in respect of which the ACE is calculated against in later years. 
Accelerated tax depreciation reduces the ACE granted in later years (and vice versa). This 
offsets the tax benefits from the accelerated tax depreciation. It entails that the present values 
of depreciation and ACE allowances are independent of the rate against which assets are 
written-off in the tax bookkeeping. Furthermore, the principle of income accrual under the S-
H-S concept of income would be fully appreciated. And finally, the introduction of an ACE 
would pose less transitional issues relative to the introduction of a modified R+F-CFT with a 
1211
– t.(1 – α) + t.(1 – α). 
1212
 0.25 * 100 = 25. Accordingly: t.[(ρ – r) + (1 – d)]. 
1213
– (1 – α). 
1214
 (1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r) – t.(1 – d). Note that the formula component, now, is identical to its equivalent under 
the ACE.  
1215
 That is, provided that d = 1. 
1216
 (4,235 / 4,000) – 1 = 0,05875. Accordingly: vmodR+F-CFTdepreciation = [(1 – α) + (ρ – α.r) – t.(ρ – r) – t.(1 – d)] / (1 – α) – 
1 = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) – t.(1 – d) / (1 – α) + r. Note that the formula, now, is identical to its equivalent under the 
ACE, as vACE = (1 – t).(ρ – r) / (1 – α) – t.(1 – d) / (1 – α) + r. Hence, reinforcing the R+F-CFT with tax depreciation 
accordingly renders the tax identical to the ACE. 
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tax depreciation feature.
1217
 The approach would therefore also be administratively
convenient.  
5.8 Final remarks 
This chapter is devoted to answering the question of how to identify the taxable business 
proceeds for corporation tax purposes in an alternative international tax regime. What may be 
considered the appropriate taxable base or ‘tax object’ in a corporate tax 2.0? 
An answer lies in the allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’). The argument is made that 
fairness requires nation states to tax economic rents. This may be achieved by reference to a 
tax base foundation concept containing an ACE, i.e., to appropriately address the financing 
discrimination issues that arise under the application of a typical nominal return to equity 
based tax system. Appreciating that it would be quite difficult to decide on the ‘proper’ equity 
allowance, one could base the tax-deduction for equity capital provided on the return on a 
long-term government bond, perhaps with a risk mark-up, as a proxy. 
An ACE based foundation concept to tax business income produces c.q. promotes: 
 equal to statutory average effective tax rates, as it taxes business cash flows;
 nil effective marginal tax rates, accordingly leaving marginal financing decisions
unaffected;
 tax neutrality in the presence of timing differentials between depreciation for tax
bookkeeping purposes and economic depreciation, as the present values of
depreciation and ACE allowances are independent of the rate against which assets
are written-off in the tax bookkeeping.
The tax cascading effects regarding equity investments in minority shareholdings could be 
resolved via the ‘indirect tax exemption’. This economic double tax relief mechanism would 
operate similarly to an indirect tax credit. That is, however, with the exception that the credit 
available with regards to the grossed-up equity proceeds is calculated at an amount equal to 
the domestic tax that can be attributed to the excess earnings of the respective entity in which 
the equity investment is held. To efficiently arrive at a single taxation of the business cash 
flows involved, the economic double tax relief mechanism would need to be combined with a 
‘loss recapture mechanism’ and a ‘profit carry forward mechanism’. 
The approach advocated until this point of the current analysis would however still not resolve 
all problems in international taxation. It would, for instance, not remove the market distortions 
that occur due to remaining disparities or obstacles imposed abroad. Moreover, it would not 
provide an answer to the investment location distortions that are caused by the inadequacies 
in the methodologies that are generally employed in the international tax regime to 
geographically divide the corporate tax base among the countries in which the multinational 
firm operates its business activities. Indeed, the first piece of the international tax jigsaw 
puzzle, taxing the firm as a single unit (Chapter 4) as well as the second piece, taxing rents 
instead of nominal equity return (Chapter 5) nevertheless seem to have fallen into place. This 
paves the way for discovering the remaining piece in the upcoming Chapter 6. 
1217
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux et al, ‘The Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options 
for Fundamental Reform’, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Economic 
Paper 2006:264, at 58. 
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Chapter 6 In search of an allocation mechanism 
6.1 Introduction
1218
The previous chapter concludes with the observation that the approach advocated up to this 
point would not resolve the investment location distortions that arise under the international 
tax regime.
1219
 This study has not yet assessed the inadequacies in the methodologies that
are generally employed by nation states to geographically divide the corporate tax base 
among the countries in which a multinational firm operates its business activities.  
Indeed, when a firm operates its business activities in a cross-border environment, a 
methodology is required to allocate its rents to taxing jurisdictions. Please imagine, for this 
purpose, the ‘global entrepreneur’. The global entrepreneur produces its goods and services 
in a multitude of taxing jurisdictions. It performs its R&D, marketing, sales, manufacturing, 
packaging, testing, distribution, treasury and management functions across the globe. It 
subsequently sells its produced goods and services within the same multitude of taxing 
jurisdictions. 
Every tax jurisdiction in which the respective firm is active may want its share in the firm’s 
earning power. In the previous chapters, after submitting a normative framework (Chapter 2), 
it has been sought to develop an equitable and neutral approach towards granting double tax 
relief (Chapter 3), to describe the taxable entity (Chapter 4), and to provide some suggestions 
for a taxable base (Chapter 5). 
In this chapter, the objective is to develop a mechanism on the basis of which the 
multinational’s rents may neutrally be attributed to taxing jurisdictions while applying the 
double tax relief mechanisms advocated in the previous chapters. The current chapter is 
devoted to developing a proper allocation key. How should the firm’s taxable base be 
allocated geographically? Which portion of the multinational’s consolidated worldwide 
investment returns should be geographically attributed to each of the nation states that claim 
entitlement to subject part of these to tax? The approach taken further builds on the notion of 
fairness that the international tax regime ultimately calls for a worldwide coordination of the 
international tax systems of nation states. This is indeed a daunting task. Yet, it seems 
necessary in a globalizing economy. 
Taxing the multinational’s rents at destination… 
The analysis in this chapter is inspired by the theory of the firm and the notion addressed in 
Chapter 2 that the firm’s business proceeds should be taxed once as close as possible to its 
geographic source. This implies engaging in a quest for the available approaches to pinpoint 
the geographic locations where the firm adds economic value. But what is the best way to 
determine the geographic source of the economic rents derived by the global firm? 
The observation is made that income lacks geographic attributes. Income simply has no 
location. Income production as the result of the interplay of firm inputs and firm outputs are as 
global as the multinational itself. Perhaps this renders it somewhat pointless to look for the 
true source of income.  
This, however, does not mean that there is nothing that can be said on the matter. Assessing 
the spectrum of possible angles ranging from the firms’ input locations at their origin to the 
firms’ output locations at their destination, the argument is made that if one only needs to 
agree on the allocation key, perhaps the most sensible thing to do in this respect is to aim at 
taking away the arbitrage opportunities as much as possible.  
1218
 Occasional paragraphs in this chapter have been drawn from Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the 
European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1219
 These arise in the presence of tax rate differentials. Under harmonized tax rates, one may also proceed to 
distribute tax revenues, ‘revenue sharing’; see section 6.4.6. 
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That would lead to an attribution of tax base by reference to elements that seem rational to 
use but are not within the firm’s control. Or, i.e., at least these elements should fall outside 
firm influence as much as possible. In such a case, the tax allocation would operate 
invariantly with respect to the location of resources. 
Income is appreciated as the result of the interplays of both supply and demand, whereby the 
supply side of income production is under the control of the firm involved while the demand 
side is not – i.e., at least to a limited extent. The argument is accordingly made that it would 
be sensible to attribute tax base by adhering to the demand side of income production. That 
would produce a destination based tax base attribution approach where the tax base is 
assigned to the market jurisdiction, rather than the production jurisdiction as currently is the 
case in international taxation; a destination based sales only allocation accordingly. Notably, 
the assignment of rents to the destination state would not transform the corporate tax into a 
value added tax. Allocation revolves around the geographic assignment of tax base; it does 
not deal with its design. 
As a connecting factor to establish tax jurisdiction, or identifying nexus, it is advocated to 
replace the current permanent establishment, place of incorporation and place of effective 
management tests for a turnover threshold test. Such a tax jurisdiction test would operate 
similar to the distance sales rules in European Union value added tax. Furthermore, it is 
argued that profit allocation by reference to separate accounting and arm’s length pricing 
should be abolished. The tax base allocation standards advocated in this chapter would 
assign the tax base exclusively to the customer location. The tax base allocation mechanism 
would operate conceptually equivalent to a sales factor key that is common in formulary 
apportionment systems. The place of supply rules in European value added taxation are 
assessed to optimize the advocated allocation standards. 
Would enhance fairness 
It is argued that a destination-based tax base attribution approach would enhance fairness. 
That is as it would promote a global efficient and non-discriminatory allocation of firm inputs. 
The allocation of firm rents to the market jurisdiction would significantly mitigate the incentives 
to shift taxable profit by shifting corporate investment across tax borders, which exist under 
the current origin oriented international tax regime. 
The ideal would be to adopt a destination-based tax base attribution approach on a 
coordinated basis, e.g., on a global scale under the umbrella of the UN, G20/OECD, or 
regionally, at the levels of the North American Free Trade Association and the European 
Union. But also if it would be impossible to attain international consensus at this point, there 
would still be an incentive for individual states to move towards assigning the tax base to the 
market state. That is because such a move would very likely boost domestic competitiveness, 
which would attract foreign direct investment and employment, and drive economic growth as 
a consequence. If one country were to decide to move to implementing a destination-based 
corporate tax system – particularly if the country involved would be a major producer – 
chances are that others would follow suit as it would be in their self-interest. As to be shown, 
there is a built-in incentive for this. The adoption of a destination-based tax base attribution by 
that first nation state may initiate a knock-on effect where the end-result could very well be a 
worldwide adoption by nation states of destination based corporation tax systems. 
As regards the revenue effects, a transformation from an origin-based to a destination-based 
system may entail a redistribution of tax revenues across countries. The effects would be 
hard if not impossible to predict. The distributional effects would depend on various future 
behavioral effects, both from the perspectives of the multinationals and the taxing jurisdictions 
involved. What can be said though is that the question of which countries would gain and 
which countries would lose seems to depend on the domestic corporate sales to corporate 
income ratios, ceteris paribus. 
6.2 ‘Income lacks geographical attributes’ 
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6.2.1 Identification of ‘true geographical source of income’ seems required, but 
theoretical rationale is non-existent 
To establish some form of profit attribution methodology, it seems to make sense to first try to 
establish an answer to the underlying question of how to, theoretically, identify the ‘true 
geographical source of income’. Is there some kind of theoretical rationale available to 
geographically situate income which may be utilized as a base upon which some kind of profit 
attribution methodology could be created for tax purposes? The answer to this question, 
unfortunately, appears to be in the negative. I have searched and tried, and, indeed, some 
others have as well,
1220
 but my quest to identify ‘the true source of income’ brought me to the
conclusion that the geographical location of income is impossible to identify. Income seems to 
lack geographical attributes. That renders the quest for a conceptual benchmark rather 
pointless. It follows that the same necessarily holds true for pursuing the desire to develop an 
economically correct profit division method. 
To my knowledge, international tax theory does not provide a paradigmatic economic 
foundation concept on the location of income.
1221
 Available theory is of little assistance in this
respect.  
For instance, first, the theory of the firm is of limited help. As addressed in Chapter 4, the 
theory of the firm submits that, substantially, a multinational firm constitutes a single economic 
unit seeking to obtain economic rents on a global scale. Indeed, the theoretical rationale of 
the firm as a single economic unit may be of some assistance in defining the multinational 
group as a taxable entity for corporate tax purposes. Yet, it provides no help in discovering 
the geographical whereabouts of that multinational’s profits.  
Further, second, the income concept itself is of little help to localize its ‘true’ source as well. 
As addressed in Chapter 5, the S-H-S concept of income defines income as the sum of 
consumption and net change in savings over some period.
1222
 The concept merely refers to
some quantitative amount, a number. Its geographical location is not a property of the S-H-S 
income concept itself. Indeed, the concept of income perhaps provides a sound conceptual 
foundation for determining the amount of taxable income. Yet, as it does not refer to its 
location, it does not provide a stepping stone for establishing a key to geographically locate it 
either.
1223
 Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is nothing that can be said on the
matter. 
1220
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation 
and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review 
Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 
2006:9, Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for 
Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in 
Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 228-246, National Tax Association, Report of Committee on the 
Apportionment between States of Taxes on Mercantile and Manufacturing Business, Proceedings of the National Tax 
Association 1922, 198-212, as well as Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company 
Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public 
Finance 199 (2004), at 199-220. 
1221
 Idem, and cf. Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 712-713, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the 
Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, 58 Tax Notes 1511 (15 March 1993). This article has 
been republished in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, 
135 Tax Notes 1229 (4 June 2012), at 1229-1234. In this Article, Avi-Yonah advocates a single sales factor in 
splitting residual profit. 
1222
 Simultaneously, income can be seen as the remuneration for the provision of the production factors of labor
, 
capital and enterprise. Economic rents may then be considered to constitute the remuneration for the provision of the 
last mentioned production factor, enterprise. It has also been set forth in Chapter 5 that, under the S-H-S concept of 
income, conceptually there is not much difference between a direct income tax and an indirect consumption tax, i.e., 
except for the savings component. 
1223
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 260. McIntyre submits that each taxing jurisdiction 
necessarily needs to accept some geographical limitations on its reach though, even if those limitations are alien to 
its definition of taxable income. In current international taxation, McIntyre argues, that: “those limitations are 
contained in the rules defining residence jurisdiction and source jurisdiction. The proponents of combined reporting 
disagree with the proponents of an arm’s length / source-rule system on how those rules should be specified, 
whether or not they agree on how income should be defined.” 
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6.2.2 From net value added at origin to net value added at destination 
6.2.2.1 Supply side of income (firm inputs) and demand side of income (firm outputs) 
In Chapter 2, I advocated the position that fairness, specifically as regards the ability to pay 
principle and the benefits principle, calls for income to be taxed in the nation state where the 
economic rents have been derived. This position reflects the notion that tax jurisdictions may 
tax persons on the value that they have added within these jurisdictions’ geographical 
territories.
1224
 Seen from that perspective, as said, it would make sense to seek to identify the
geographical location of that value added, its ‘true source’, for tax allocation purposes.
1225
Accordingly, income may then be ‘sourced’ by reference to the location where the economic 
rents have been derived, assuming that it is attainable to find that place. If the sourcing of 
income accordingly requires the identification of the whereabouts of net value added, then the 
question arises as to where that is. 
To discover the location of rents, one may commence with observing the supply side and 
demand side of income, respectively referring to firm inputs (production factors) and firm 
outputs (marketplace).
1226
 Then, a spectrum of possibilities having two outer ends becomes
available. The one end of the spectrum, making reference to firm inputs, reflects the origin of 
income. The outset of the other, by reference to firm outputs, reflects its destination.
1227
Essentially, both sides merit some consideration in establishing the geographical location of 
the respective income item.
1228
 This makes the task of designing proper source rules quite a
complex affair.
1229
6.2.2.2 Supply side of income: taxing at origin 
At the one end of the spectrum, taking the supply side of income into consideration, reference 
is made to the location of production. The supply approach directs the income items to the 
1224
 See for a comparison Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. 
McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 230. 
See, e.g., also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 27, referring to Musgrave: 
“Musgrave defines source entitlement as “the notion that jurisdictions are entitled to tax the value added within their 
borders including that by non-resident factors, that is to share in the income accruing to non-resident factors and 
earned by them within the geographical area”.” 
1225
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 34, who states that: “It seems reasonable 
that if the apportioning mechanism is to attribute income taxing rights fairly across tax jurisdictions it does so by 
allocating income according to the place where income has been generated, if that place can be determined”. 
1226
 The pragmatic question of identifying the economic connections between economic activities and the territories of 
a taxing state, i.e., the establishing of nexus, is prior the question of situs and domicile. These taxing ‘principles’ 
merely are guidelines helping assigning and assessing tax jurisdiction. See Richard M. Bird et al, ‘Source vs. 
residence-based taxation in the European Union: the wrong question?’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital 
Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 78, at 78-109. 
1227
 See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 234. 
1228
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 260 submitting that: “an item of income arising from 
cross-border activities does not have a true source, if “true” source means one unambiguous geographical location.” 
1229
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 260: “Designing good source rules is difficult because 
of the many relationships, some complex, that may exist between an item of income and particular geographical 
areas. Many of these relationships arguably merit consideration in determining the source of the income item. Yet 
they cannot all be taken into account, for they sometimes conflict. For example, it is at least plausible that the source 
of income is the place where the revenue generated by the profit-seeking activities is obtained. So defined, the 
source of income is likely to be in the tax jurisdiction where goods or services are marketed. It is also plausible, 
however, to view the source of income as the place where the goods or services originated. That concept of source 
would lead to the assignment of income to the production state or states. Even if the second concept of source were 
accepted as the “true” source of income, the conceptual problems would continue. An origin test for source is 
inherently vague in many cases because the place of origin will differ depending on how far back in the chain of 
causality one decides to go. For example, services may be said to have their origin in the place they are performed, 
or in the place where the performer resides, or the place where the performer mastered the skills that allowed for the 
performance.” 
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location of the utilized production factors, essentially reflecting a concept of net value added 
at origin (‘origin principle’).
1230
 Accordingly, the supply approach addresses the notion that
income is located geographically where the production factors, which generate that income, 
are situated. Here, income represents the product, in their mutual operation, of the employed 
production factors, addressing the location of firm inputs, i.e., the place where the goods 
supplied and the services rendered originated. The identification, localization and evaluation 
of these factors, particularly the production factor of enterprise, would provide the stepping 
stones for discovering the income’s geographical source. The discovery of the geographical 
source of the income through this means, subsequently, would identify the nation state 
entitled to subject the income items to tax. Viz., the localization of income within a particular 
state’s geographical borders would make that state entitled to tax it. That state would be 
identified as the origin state. 
The supply approach towards geographical profit attribution is generally utilized in the current 
international tax regime.
1231
 Direct income taxes generally refer to the supply side of income.
Essentially, international taxation seeks to allocate taxing rights to the origin jurisdiction. 
Substantially, it addresses the location where the firm employs its production factors for profit. 
The ‘remote seller’ or, perhaps, the ‘new economy’ ‘e-tailer’,
1232
 for instance, is not taxed in
the countries where it markets its goods. It is sought to be taxed in the production state. The 
location of the market is neglected for taxable profit attribution purposes. This may further be 
illustrated by reference to the taxation of exports of goods and services. In international 
taxation, these are recognized as a taxable event for corporate tax purposes. Imports of 
goods and services are typically left untaxed.
1233
 This holds for exports of goods and services
that are both external and internal to the firm; the latter consequently requires the fair value 
pricing for tax purposes of internal dealings and transactions. 
Conceptually, the adoption of the supply approach requires an evaluation of the firm’s rents – 
a fair value measurement of inputs – at their origin. Reference solely to costs incurred (labor 
costs, costs of assets used) for this purpose seems insufficient, since costs only do not 
explain profits.
1234
 Substantially, the search aims at locating the employed income producing
production factors (‘nexus’) and evaluating their relative contributions to the business income 
generation (‘allocation’). Where does the global entrepreneur produce its profits? To discover 
the origin of income, for nexus establishment purposes, reference is essentially made to a 
‘functional and factual analysis’, analyzing the functions performed (labor), the assets used 
1230
 In this respect, I consider the concept of net value added interchangeable with economic rent, or infra-marginal 
return. Accordingly, the term as used here is narrower than value added as, e.g., adopted in European Union value 
added taxation. As regards its geographical assignment, the reference to ‘at origin’ basically entails the attribution of 
these rents to the input location of the production factor of enterprise. The using of a value added key at origin to 
geographically divide corporate profit has been suggested by Sven-Olof Lodin et al, Home State Taxation - Tax 
Treaty Aspects (2001), at 47-50. Also the European Commission assessed the possibility of attributing profit 
geographically by reference to a value added key at origin under a European Union wide corporate tax system. See 
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation in the Internal 
Market, Brussels, 23 October 2001, SEC(2001) 1681, at 414. For an extensive discussion, see Ana Agúndez-Garcia, 
‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional 
Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation 
& Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 69-85. For analysis and critique, see Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The 
European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the 
US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 199-220. 
1231
 Cf. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 29, and Michael P. Devereux, 
‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 712. Devereux questions the validity in economic terms of why the location of 
consumption should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of establishing source. See for a comparison, 
further, Joan M. Weiner, ‘Taxation Papers; Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: 
Insights from the United States and Canada’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Working paper 2005:8, at 17, making reference to Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate 
Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary 
Combination (1984) 228, at 228-246, explaining that separate accounting assigns income to the production location. 
1232
 An e-tailer is an enterprise that conducts its business online. 
1233
 Although it should be said that a tax rebasing on fair value upon imports of assets has not always been made 
available by states, e.g., Belgium. 
1234
 See James R. Hines Jr., ‘Income misattribution under formula apportionment’, 54 European Economic Review 
108 (2010, No. 1), at 108-120, as well as OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Chapter VI at par. 6.27: “there is no necessary link between costs and value.” 
Income is the resultant of firm inputs and firm outputs. 
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(capital) and risks assumed.
1235
 For allocation purposes, third-party transactions are typically
evaluated by reference to the agreed selling prices. The fair values of intra-firm modes of 
transfers, in the end, are measured by reference to often sophisticated discounted cash flow 
evaluations.
1236
6.2.2.3 Demand side of income: taxing at destination 
At the other outer end of the spectrum, taking the demand side of income into consideration, 
reference is made to the location of the market. The demand approach directs the income 
items to the marketplace, essentially reflecting a concept of net value added at destination 
(‘destination principle’).
1237
 Accordingly, the demand approach addresses the notion that
demand creates value,
1238
 i.e., a customer’s willingness to buy product, or put somewhat
more eloquently, the presence of the firm in the hearts and minds of its customers. 
Accordingly, income is assigned geographically to the location where the goods and services 
produced are sold. Here income addresses the location of firm outputs, the marketplace 
where the revenues generated by the firm’s commercial activities are obtained. In that 
alternative approach, the identification, localization and evaluation of the marketplace would 
provide the stepping stones for discovering the income’s geographical source. The discovery 
of the geographical source of the income through this alternative means, subsequently, would 
identify which jurisdiction is entitled to subject the income items to tax. The presence of a 
market within a particular state’s geographical borders would make that state entitled to tax. 
That state would be identified as the destination state.  
The demand approach towards geographic profit attribution is to some extent utilized, for 
instance, in destination based sales-only formulary apportionment systems. Today, these are 
increasingly used by various US states to geographically apportion state income tax.
1239
 Also
1235
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 22 
July 2010, OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 22 July 2010 and 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) in conjunction with 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii). 
1236
 The OECD sets forth that “[v]aluation techniques can be useful tools,” i.e., when separate accounting and the 
arm’s length arm’s standard may rationally be considered to be of little assistance; see OECD, Revised discussion 
draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013, at par. 163. See for a comparison 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 
Chapter VI. For some illustrations on the guidance on intangible asset valuation, see OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Annex to Chapter VI: 
“Examples to Illustrate the Guidance on intangible Property and Highly Uncertain Valuation”. See also OECD, OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 September 2014, at 78 et seq. 
1237
 In this respect, as said, I consider the concept of net value added interchangeable with economic rent, or infra-
marginal return. As regards its geographical assignment, the reference to ‘at destination’ basically entails the 
attribution of these rents to the location of firm outputs, i.e., the firm’s marketplace. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation 
Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate 
Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs 
Union Working Paper 2006:9, discusses the concept of value added at destination as a profit division key at 69-85. 
See also Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 216-217. 
1238
 See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 234. 
1239
 See Carol Douglas, ‘More Single-Sales-Factor States’, 37 State Tax Notes 259 (25 July 2005), at 259-260, and 
Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 95. For an overview of the formulae 
adopted by the US States as of January 1, 2013, see David Spencer, ‘Unitary taxation with combined reporting: The 
TP solution?’, International Tax Review, 25 April 2013, at 2-5. See further Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; 
The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income 
Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Working Paper 2006:9, at 58: “[I]f the demand approach is preferred, the sales by destination [emphasis in the 
original, MdW] factor should be given more weight.” See also William F. Fox et al, ‘How Should a Subnational 
Corporate Income Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured?’, 53 National Tax Journal 139 (2005), at 139-159, 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 539, 
advocating a demand approach, as well as Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. 
International Taxation’, 58 Tax Notes 1511 (15 March 1993), and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate 
Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion 
Paper 2007:08. Destination basis taxes for companies have also been suggested by Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing 
Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the 
Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008). See also Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern 
Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting 
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indirect taxes, such as European Union value added taxation,
1240
 or the US sales and use
taxes,
1241
 typically allocate the tax entitlement to the jurisdiction where the products are
utilized or consumed.
1242
 Destination-based (income) taxes, as said, substantially address the
location where the entrepreneur obtains the revenues out of its profit-seeking activities. The 
‘remote seller’ and the ‘e-tailer’, for instance, would be taxed solely in the countries where 
they market their goods.
1243
 The location of production would be neglected for tax base
allocation purposes.
1244
 This may be further illustrated by reference to the tax-treatment of
exports of goods and services. Under destination-based taxes, these are typically not 
recognized as taxable events and are accordingly left untaxed. Imports of goods and services 
typically are taxable. This generally holds true for imports of goods and services that are 
external to the firm. In European Union value added taxation, generally the same is true for 
inbound intra-firm supplies of goods.
1245
Conceptually, the adoption of the demand approach requires an evaluation of the firm’s rents 
at destination, a fair value measurement of firm specific outputs, i.e., the net value added at 
destination. Reference to gross receipts (revenues c.q. turnover) for this purpose seems 
insufficient, since gross receipts only do not explain profits.
1246
 Substantially, the search aims
at locating the marketplace (‘nexus’) and evaluating its relative contribution to the business 
income generation (‘allocation’). Where does the global entrepreneur yield its rents? To 
discover the destination of income, for nexus establishment purposes, reference is essentially 
made to the location of the customer, which, for instance, is essentially the case under sales-
only formulary apportionment mechanisms, European Union value added taxation, or the 
destination basis cash flow tax – i.e., the latter as advocated by various US and UK 
by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 
249, opposes profit attribution by reference to the demand side only. 
1240
 See Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. European 
Union value added taxation (‘EU-VAT’) seeks to locate the tax at the place of final consumption. As the true place of 
consumption is very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to identify, EU-VAT applies place of supply rules (Council 
Directive 2006/112/EC; Title V; Place of taxable transactions) as a surrogate means to identifying the location where 
income is consumed and the country entitled to tax accordingly. For discussion and analysis, see European 
Commission Green Paper: On the future of VAT: Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, 
COM(2010) 695 (2010), and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the future of VAT: Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT 
system tailored to the single market, COM(2011) 851 final, Brussels, 6 December 2011.  
1241
 On the US sales and use tax system, see Neal A. Koskella, ‘The Enigma of Sales Taxation Through the Use of 
State or Federal “Amazon” Laws: Are We Getting Anywhere?’, 49 Idaho Law Review 121 (2012), at 124 et seq. 
1242
 See for some analysis on identifying the location of profit Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct 
investment: economic principles and tax policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 
712. See for a comparison, further, Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in 
Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 
228, referring to a supply-demand approach. 
1243
 A similar approach holds under the application of the distance seller rules in European Union value added 
taxation, see Articles 33 and 34 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of 
value added tax. 
1244
 This holds although, in practice, many allocation keys are made use of which actually assign tax base to the 
origin state, rather than the destination state. See section 4.4.2.3. 
1245
 Conceptually, intra-firm transactions should not constitute a taxable event – also in a cross-border environment. 
This should hold regardless of the legal organization of the firm. This notion has not been fully incorporated in 
European Union value added taxation (‘EU-VAT’). The concept of tax grouping is common in EU-VAT (VAT 
Grouping). European Union Member States may allow affiliated persons to form a VAT Group, thereby creating a 
single taxable entity disregarding intra-firm transactions for VAT purposes. See Article 11 Council Directive 
2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added. However, unfortunately, due to the 
territorial restrictions provided for – only persons established in the Member State are eligible to be part of a VAT 
Group – intra-firm cross-border modes of transfers are generally considered a taxable event. This holds for both the 
intra-firm transactions undertaken by affiliated legal entities (intra-firm, inter-entity) and the supplies of goods between 
head offices and permanent establishments (intra-firm intra-entity). Intra-entity supplies of goods are taxable under 
Article 17 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. The 
exception to this rule is the cross-border intra-entity provision of services. These are not taxable for VAT purposes, 
due to the lacking of a legal basis in the VAT directive. See Court of Justice, Case C-210/04 (FCE Bank). An 
exception however applies with regard to services provided by a “main establishment of a company in a third country 
(…) to a branch of that company in a Member State and where the branch belongs to a group of persons whom it is 
possible to regard as a single taxable person for value added tax purposes in that Member State.” In such a case, the 
Court has ruled that the group in that Member State involved, “as the purchaser of those services, becomes liable for 
the value added tax payable.” See Court of Justice, Case C-7/13 (Scandia). 
1246
 See James R. Hines Jr., ‘Income misattribution under formula apportionment’, 54 European Economic Review 
108 (2010, No. 1), at 108-120. Income is the resultant of firm outputs and firm inputs. 
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scholars.
1247
 For allocation purposes, the transactions concerned are typically evaluated by
reference to agreed selling prices.
 
Please note that the demand view on the generation of 
income is opposite of the supply view as adopted in international taxation, which assigns 
taxing entitlements solely to the jurisdiction of origin.
1248
 As a consequence, the demand view
on profit attribution is alien to the current international tax regime.
1249
6.2.2.4 Income as a result of interplay supply and demand 
Recognition of the outer ends of supply and demand, income, rents or net value added, 
should indeed be considered the result of the interplay of both firm inputs and firm outputs. 
Goods and services do not only need to be produced, they should be sold as well. 
Conversely, in order to be able to sell goods and services, they need to be produced first. 
Income generation requires both the production (supply) and marketing (demand) 
components. No money is made when one of these is absent. If seen from that perspective, 
both the place of production and the place of the market constitute sources of income.
1250
This supply-demand view of income acknowledges that value is created through the interplay 
of both supply and demand.
1251
 It accordingly directs the income items to the geographic
locations of both production and the marketplace. It seeks to assign income geographically by 
addressing both its origin – the supply-side of income making reference to firm inputs – and 
its destination – the demand-side of income making reference to firm outputs. This view 
basically requires the identification, localization and evaluation of both production factors and 
the marketplace. These would, subsequently, provide the stepping stones for discovering the 
income’s geographical source.
1252
Such a supply-demand approach towards geographic profit attribution can be recognized, for 
instance, in the traditional formulary apportionment systems as adopted by various US states 
1247
 See Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working 
Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008), and 
Alan J. Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010. Moreover, the current 
place of supply rules in European Union value added taxation generally seek to attribute tax base to the destination 
jurisdiction, referring for place of taxation purposes to the location of the customer. See Title V Council Directive 
2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.  
1248
 See also Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from 
the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 50. 
1249
 Cf. at International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 9. A notable exception to the rule is the location where the income 
‘arises’. In international taxation, dividends, interest, and royalties, as well as in certain cases fees for (technical) 
services rendered seem to ‘arise’ for tax base allocation purposes at the location of the customer and thereby the 
destination jurisdiction. That is, as it designates the tax base to the place of the customer’s residence or the place 
where it carries on a business through a permanent establishment. Accordingly, these attributional rules in 
international tax echo those in EU-VAT. 
1250
 Cf. Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 712., Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; 
The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income 
Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Working Paper 2006:9, at 52, and Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for 
Income Taxes as the International Norm’, 45 National Tax Journal 145 (1992), at 146-147. Cf. further, Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 540 and 549. See 
for a comparison Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income From International Use and Dispositions of Intellectual 
Property’, 36 Tax Law Review 233 (1980-1981), who argues at 277-278 that the principle geographic source of 
proceeds from intellectual property commercialization is the property’s location of use. Lokken proceeds and argues 
at 277 and 297 that the property is used at both the location of production (‘origin’) and consumption (‘destination’). 
1251
 See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 234. Musgrave argues 
that the pursuit of a supply-demand approach is a way to attain inter-nation equity. 
1252
 See for a comparison Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), who advocates a 
supply-demand approach for intra-European Union profit allocation at 172: “It is also my personal view that in a close-
knit economic environment such as the European Internal Market, market jurisdictions should be attributed a certain 
share of corporate profits, because it is exactly the combination of potent markets and diversified and highly 
competitive industrialized regions that helps increase overall welfare in Europe. Moreover, in times when e-
commerce enables producers to draw on customer bases in Member States without being physically there, market 
jurisdictions are in danger of losing those amounts of corporate profits that were attributed to the physical presence in 
the form of a subsidiary or a permanent establishment that was formerly necessary for undertaking those marketing 
activities (The last consideration additionally represents an argument for applying a factor presence test as the nexus 
standard).” 
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to apportion state income tax.
1253
 Also, the Canadian formulary allocation system to attribute
corporate profits to the provinces and territories shows evidence of acknowledging the supply-
demand view of income.
1254
 These formulary systems have been utilized within these
countries for the purposes of dividing the income tax base to subnational levels of 
government. Within the context of the European Union, a proposal from the European 
Commission is pending for a European Union-wide corporate tax system at the heart of which 
formulary apportionment is envisaged as the proper means to divide a European Union wide 
corporate tax base.
1255
 Under traditional formulary apportionment mechanisms, the tax base
is apportioned to both production and market states by means of a predetermined fixed 
formula reflecting both supply-side factors (payroll, assets) and demand-side factors (sales at 
destination).  
Formulary systems typically seek to divide tax entitlements between both the origin and the 
destination states by attributing parts of the profit to both the jurisdictions of production and 
utility. The allocation keys adopted for this purpose aim at approximating the geographic 
location of income by reference to some apportionment factors. Typically, these factors are 
payroll and assets at origin to reflect the supply side of income, and sales at destination to 
reflect the demand-side of income.
1256
 Advocates of formulary apportionment are under no
illusion that formulary apportionment mechanisms do not capture the income’s true 
source.
1257
 Worth noting also is that the origin and destination factors adopted in traditional
formulary apportionment echo tax allocation approaches in both origin-oriented international 
taxation and destination-oriented consumption taxation. This is further discussed at a later 
time, in section 4.4.2.2 of this chapter. 
6.2.2.5 Taxing income at destination: strange? 
It is noted that the geographical attribution of taxable income to the market jurisdiction may 
seem somewhat awkward at first. Indeed, international taxation with its practice of separate 
1253
 The traditional ‘Massachusetts formula’ equally-weights the factors of tangible assets and rental expense, sales 
and other receipts, and payroll. See Article IV.9 Multistate Tax Compact. The Massachusetts formula is currently 
being debated within the Multistate Tax Commission. Following developments in the US states practices, it has been 
suggested to increase the weight on the sales factor. That is to arrive at a double-weighted revenue factor (1/4 
payroll, 1/4 capital, 1/2 sales). That would put the supply and demand factors on a par. See Multistate Tax 
Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, at 10-14, and Multistate 
Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV Recommended Amendments As approved for Public Hearing, 
December 6, 2012. 
1254
 In Canada, the allocation of corporate profits to the provinces and territories takes place by reference to a two-
factor formula (payroll and gross revenue). The weight put on each factor is one-half. No capital factor is used. See 
Sec. 402(3) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1255
 See Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 
121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). The European Commission has suggested a formula echoing the traditional 
‘Massachusetts formula’, see Article 86(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). European Parliament proposed to increase the weight on 
inputs (labor
:
 45%, assets: 45%) and reduce the weight on outputs (sales: 10%), see European Parliament legislative 
resolution of 19 April 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)), Amendments 16 and 31; changes proposed to 
recital 21 and 86. Parliament argues that this would be more in line with the attribution in international taxation of 
taxing entitlements to the country of source. The Commission cannot accept the amendment, Commission 
Communication on the action taken on opinions and resolutions adopted by Parliament at the April 2012 part-
session, (SP(2012)388), 30 May 2012, considering an equally-weighted three factor formula the most appropriate 
solution. Notably, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection proposed to take out the sales 
factor altogether for the factor being perceived manipulable. See Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the proposal for a Council 
directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 
2011/0058(CNS)), 25 January 2012. 
1256
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 260. McIntyre advocates an equal weighting of 
destination and origin factors at 249. See further Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in 
the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 17, Weiner refers to Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax 
Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination 
(1984) 228, at 228-246, who argues that profits need to be divided in a manner reflecting both the supply side and 
the demand side of income. 
1257
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 260. 
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accounting and arm’s length pricing geographically only attributes income to the jurisdiction of 
production.
1258
 Yet the attribution of income solely to the supply side of income analytically is
no more defensible than the attribution of income solely to the demand side.
1259
 US and
Canadian formulary systems have little problems with allocating tax bases to the jurisdiction 
of destination. Worth mentioning is the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s observation in 
Geoffrey that “the real source of Geoffrey’s [i.e., the corporate taxpayer in this case] income is 
(…)South Carolina’s (…) customers.”
1260
 Also the CCCTB proposal should be noted at this
point, since it seeks to establish the same with its destination-based sales factor. “[D]emand 
is an income generating factor.”
1261
 This illustrates the apparent views of tax law interpreters
and designers in these countries that market states are also entitled to a piece of the pie.
1262
An increasing number of US states even assign taxable state income solely to the destination 
state on the basis of sales-only formulae to attract investment.
1263
Indeed, the question of ‘what to tax’ (income production – Y, or income consumption – C) 
analytically differs from the question of ‘where to tax’ (origin or destination). The taxation of 
income and consumption is not inextricably linked with the taxation at origin and destination 
respectively. Just as it is analytically conceivable to design an origin-based consumption tax, 
it is equally conceivable to establish a destination-based income tax.
1264
 If demand creates
value, and therefore also constitutes a location of source,
1265
 why should we not explore
destination-based corporate taxes? Major consumer markets are rarely tax havens.
1266
Although taking mutually diverging points of departure, these profit allocation systems share a 
similar objective: answering the question of where income has been derived geographically. 
The difference lies in the opposing origin and destination oriented approaches used to arrive 
at that location. The supply–side oriented international tax regime assesses the geographical 
location of income by reference to the location of production. The demand-side oriented and 
supply-demand-side oriented formulary systems include assessments of the sources of 
income by reference to the location of the marketplace. Consequently, though, as the points 
of departure mutually differ, the geographical profit attribution necessarily varies as well. 
1258
 To introduce a destination based tax base attribution component into the international tax regime, the permanent 
establishment threshold, for instance, would need to be amended in such a manner that taxing entitlements would 
also arise when sales are made within that jurisdiction. See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State 
Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary 
Combination (1984) 228, at 228-246. See e.g., also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market 
(2009), at 28. Indeed, particularly in areas where the traditional permanent establishment concept fails, e.g., in 
respect of e-commerce, scholars have advocated such an approach. See Walter Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 425 (1996-1997), at 497-499, and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 510. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-
2000), referring to Hellerstein, at 1671. Both authors suggest in this respect to attribute taxing rights to taxing 
jurisdictions by reference to a quantitative concept designed as a sales at destination threshold test. To establish 
nexus for proceeds from electronic commerce, they suggest a de minimis amount of gross income earned within the 
taxing jurisdiction. To establish the place of taxation, both commentators refer to the billing address of the customer. 
1259
 See Benjamin F. Miller, ‘Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California Practice’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination(1984) 132, at 135. 
1260
 See Supreme Court of South Carolina, Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E. 2d 13 (1993). 
1261
 See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 12 (par. 46). 
1262
 Cf. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 272. 
1263
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 249, and Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European 
Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 
11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 208. 
1264
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), 
at 539. Destination basis corporation taxes have been suggested by various scholars. See for instance, Alan J. 
Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 07/05, 
Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008). See also Alan J. 
Auerbach, ‘A Modern Corporate Tax’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2010, and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, 
‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton 
Project Discussion Paper 2007:08. 
1265
 Contra, Christoph Spengel et al, ‘The Impact of ICT on Profit Allocation within Multinational Groups: Arm's Length 
Pricing or Formula Apportionment?’, ZEW Discussion Paper 2003:53, at 6, who question whether demand constitutes 
a source of income, and subsequently whether income should be attributed to the market jurisdiction. 
1266
 The substantial costs involved of operating consumer markets require substantive revenues to finance them. Cf. 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 539. 
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6.2.3 Nothing sensible to say on geographical location of income, but agreement 
necessary 
6.2.3.1 Locating income; no conceptual benchmark available for rule-making 
The identification of the different approaches, however, has not yet answered the question as 
to which of these approaches – origin, destination or a combination thereof – should be 
preferred over the other. To answer that question it needs to be assailable to discover the true 
source of income normatively directing that preference.  
Only if there is some fundamental underlying rationale or normative benchmark available to 
base upon such a preference, one may be able to theoretically favor one approach over the 
other. And, indeed, if such a benchmark proves to be non-existent, there is not much more to 
say, normatively that is, on these diverging supply-side and demand-side approaches towards 
geographically locating income than that they mutually differ. As a consequence, the same 
necessarily holds true for the different mechanisms conceivable on the basis thereof to 
distribute corporate profits across countries. If any notion on the true geographical location of 
income is absent, while various profit attribution mechanisms are simultaneously conceivable, 
it necessarily cannot be decided which one is ‘better’ than the other. So, normatively, 
comparing supply-side transfer pricing approaches for this purpose to, for instance, supply-
demand-side or even demand-side formulary approaches as the case may be, seems 
somewhat senseless. Transfer pricing is not better than formulary apportionment or vice 
versa, i.e., in the case where an underlying benchmark rationale for the purpose of 
conceptually locating income geographically cannot be identified.
1267
It may be acknowledged that neither firm inputs nor firm outputs are solely responsible for 
wealth creation. Economic rents, as said, are the result of the interplay of firm inputs and 
outputs. Yet, by viewing economic rents in such a way, the single conclusion available is that 
profit is a number rather than a geographic location. In addition, if value has its inextricable 
roots in both supply side and demand side factors, what is the use of trying to separate them 
for geographical profit attribution purposes? Quite little it seems.
1268
 Moreover, in today’s
1267
 See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 29, who submits that this 
understanding makes it possible to value the various, often opposite, views on profit attribution mechanisms as what 
they truly are: “the result of choosing different premises at the outset without explicitly identifying diverging starting 
points.” Advocates of transfer pricing sometimes argue that formulary approaches are a worse alternative to transfer 
pricing, as predetermined formulae do not capture the income’s true geographical source. See, for a comparison, 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, 
Chapter I, at par. 1.16-1.18. It needs to be said, however, that if income lacks geographical attributes, the same 
equally holds for transfer pricing. Note Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in 
Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 253: “The apparent 
logic of the critics of formulary apportionment is that the designers of a formulary apportionment system must have 
assumed that income is always earned proportional to the apportionment factors because that result is the 
anticipated one under formulary apportionment. By that faulty logic, the designers of an arm’s-length/separate-
accounting system can be accused of assuming that MNEs earn much of their income in tax havens.” Stefan Mayer, 
Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 29, proceeds to submitting that the matter boils down to 
the acknowledging that formulary approaches and profit attribution methodologies in international taxation (separate 
accounting and arm’s length pricing) do not aim at achieving the same ideals, as the former rests on supply-demand 
views on income, while the latter rests on supply views of income. Mayer further refers to Peggy B. Musgrave, 
‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income 
Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 237-240, explicitly stating that formulary approaches 
including a sales factor accordingly is not suitable to replicate the profit allocation results under current international 
tax standards. 
1268
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 32, who argue that any attempts to 
separate supply and demand factors for this purpose is as futile as trying to determine which blade of scissors does 
the cutting. The metaphor used e seems to allude to a quote by Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics: An 
Introductory Volume 8
th
 edition (1938), at 348 (Book V, Chapter III, § 7): “We might as reasonably dispute whether it 
is the upper or the under blade of a pair of scissors that cuts a piece of paper, as whether value is governed by utility 
or cost of production”, thereby, accordingly making reference respectively to the interplay of demand and supply 
towards value creation. Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. 
McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 234, 
makes use of this metaphor also: “The first is a supply approach which says that income has its source where the 
factor services which generate that income operate, a concept of value added at origin. The second is a supply-
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integrated global marketplace dominated by multinationals, firms derive their rents globally 
rather than locally. The economic reality of multinationals, global entrepreneurs, to whom the 
tax attribution methodology is intended to be applied is that their interdependent and 
integrated business operations are conducted in a variety of taxing jurisdictions. All of these 
operations combined fundamentally contribute to the multinational’s profit-making.
1269
 Firm
rents, indeed, typically are firm specific rather than location specific.
1270
 Both firm inputs and
firm outputs are global, as is the multinational itself. 
As this holds true, economics does not offer any rationale for preferring origin over 
destination. Many argue that this, indeed, is the case.
1271
 As said, the business profits and
rents generated by a multinational are the outcome of an entangled and integrated complex of 
cross-border internalized and interdependent business processes, which cannot be 
unbundled, segregated and individually appraised in any meaningful way. The economic 
activities of the various operations undertaken within the group by the various group 
companies contribute to the multinational profit making “in an essential but indeterminate 
manner”.
1272
 This makes it conceptually and therefore also pragmatically impossible to
establish the contributions of individual business operations, or those of individual 
multinational group members.
1273
This necessarily entails that if these factors cannot be segregated meaningfully, they a fortiori 
also cannot be subsequently located and quantified geographically in any meaningful way.
1274
If the contributions to profits cannot be isolated per business unit or multinational group entity, 
they cannot, seen in isolation, be geographically attributed either. In that event, the conclusion 
is that business income lacks geographical attributes.
1275
 “[I]t is generally logically impossible
demand approach which holds that market value is created through the interplay of supply and demand, by both 
blades of the Marshallian Scissors.” Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 27-28, 
refers to this also. 
1269
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The 
Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 104. 
1270
 See also Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century 
(2008). 
1271
 See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to the 
European Union’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union, Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 46, at 59: “There does not appear to be any objective, single answer to the question of how company 
profits should be divided in a multijurisdictional setting.” Both Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group 
Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & 
Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 17, and Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market 
(2009), at 27-28, refer to Musgrave. Mayer on Musgrave: “She puts forward that there are two basic understandings 
of source [i.e., the supply side and supply-demand side understanding of source, MdW] that would meet this 
definition, and that economics does not offer a rationale for preferring either one over the other.”  
1272
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The 
Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 104. 
1273
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 7 and 34. 
1274
 See Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, who submitted at 234 that: 
“…there is no fundamental economic rationale for preferring from the outset one of those concepts [i.e., the supply 
approach and supply-demand approach, MdW] over the other.” Musgrave preferred the supply-demand approach, 
as, e.g., adopted in traditional US state income tax apportionment formulas (e.g., the equally weighted three factor 
Massachusetts formula) utilizing both supply side (capital and labor) and demand side (sales at destination) formulae 
to geographically attribute corporate profits to US states. Worth noting is that also the CCCTB working group sees 
room for the inclusion of a sales at destination key to attribute corporate profits interjurisdictionally. See e.g. Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 56, Report and overview of the 
main issues that emerged during the discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007, 
Taxud E1 OP, CCCTB\WP\056\doc\en, Brussels, 20 August 2007, at 9 (par. 31), Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing 
mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 12 et seq (paras. 43 et 
seq.). However, as Musgrave mentions, none of the available approaches, from their outsets, can cogently rule out 
any of the others. See also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 172. 
1275
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 253. See Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income 
Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 104. 
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to tax accurately the corporate profits originating in any particular state of a multistate 
firm.”
1276
And, accordingly, in the end, neither origin approaches, nor destination approaches, nor any 
of their combinations provide any guidance in the design of a theoretically sound cross-border 
profit attribution key. Indeed, then, the quest for the 'true' geographical source of income for 
taxable profit allocation purposes, by segregating and allocating the contributions to corporate 
profits of the various business operations dispersed across a multitude of taxing jurisdictions, 
perhaps results into a “pointless task of localizing the non-localizable”.
1277
This being said necessarily also entails that whichever kind of profit attribution methodology a 
country utilizes, i.e., whether it uses source rules for this purposes or apportionment formulae, 
it is employing some proxy to assign a location to taxable income items. As income lacks 
geographical attributes, there is no single methodology that may fairly claim to localize the 
‘true’ geographical source of income. Viz., income has no single source and the true source of 
income does not seem to exist. This would also mean that the rules and methods adopted in 
taxation to assign taxable income geographically are “legal rules, not economic rules”.
1278
As income has no true geographic source, transfer pricing and formulary apportionment may 
both be considered to operate arbitrarily.
1279
 In the end, both use some proxy to attribute profit
geographically. Neither discover the income’s ‘true’ source.
1280
 Indeed, income has no
location; this holds true regarding any procedure to geographically divide multinational 
profits.
1281
6.2.3.2 “Slicing the shadow”: agreement seems required, but on what? 
So, if income cannot be truly located, if economics does not provide a benchmark here, and if 
the currently employed rules lack theoretical support as a result of this, how do we decide on 
a profit attribution methodology for tax purposes? What should the proxy look like? How 
should we ‘slice a shadow’?
1282
 In the end, as there is not much to say about the ‘right’ profit
allocation system utilized, things boil down to a matter of judgment.
1283
 This, however, does
not mean that nothing can be said on the matter. 
1276
 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et 
al (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 343. 
1277
 See Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 
1986), at 670. See also Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income From International Use and Dispositions of 
Intellectual Property’, 36 Tax Law Review 233 (1980-1981), who argues at 244 that there is no objective method for 
dividing a gain on sale of intellectual property between the production and selling functions. 
1278
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 262. McIntyre further argues at 267 that, because of 
this: “the rules used for assigning income to a particular geographical place (…) should be judged not by some 
absolute standard or by some principles of economics but by the contribution they make to the goals of the tax 
system of which they are a part”. Worth noting Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB 
WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, 
Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 9 (par. 20): “The brief description of the three factors has shown that – in reality – 
there are not ‘ideal’ solutions and the choice concerning the definition, valuation and location of the factors and the 
inclusion (and their weighting) in the formula requires a great deal of work.” 
1279
 Cf. Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et al 
(eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 343. 
1280
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 262. 
1281
 Cf. Richard M. Bird et al, ‘Source vs. residence-based taxation in the European Union: the wrong question?’, in 
Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 78, at 
91. 
1282
 The reference to ‘slicing the Shadow’ at this place and in the header alludes freely to a remark of Justice Brennan 
of the US Supreme Court in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 US 159, at 192; 103 S. Ct. 2933, at 2954 
(1983), submitting that allocation "bears some resemblance . . . to slicing a shadow"). See also Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, 58 Tax Notes 1511 (15 March 
1993), and Steve Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – On Balance Better’, 28 Law and Policy in 
International Business 1133 (1996-1997), at 1133. 
1283
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 33; at 46: “The choice of factors and their 
weighting cannot really be founded on principled scientific methodology, but they should ultimately reflect the political 
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In Chapter 2, it has been argued that business proceeds should be taxed only once. To tackle 
disparities or ‘mismatches’, this calls for a harmonized approach to taxable income 
allocation.
1284
 Viz., differentials in tax base allocation entail double (non-)taxation issues
triggering overtaxation and undertaxation, as well as arbitrage opportunities. Further, I 
submitted that the international tax regime should operate as neutrally as possible as regards 
to the distribution of production factors, i.e., tax neutrality towards investment location 
decisions. In addition, the profit attribution regime should not be easily manipulated and, 
accordingly, should provide for steady tax revenues to finance public expenditure, also with 
respect to multinational income. However, since there is no such thing as a theoretically 
correct distribution of profits key, there is not much principled to say about the way income 
should geographically be divided to countries.
1285
And if one only needs to agree on the allocation key, perhaps, the most sensible thing to do in 
this respect is to aim at taking away arbitrage opportunities by attributing tax bases by 
reference to elements that seem rational to use but are not within the firm’s control. Or, at 
least these elements should fall outside firm influence as much as possible.
1286
 Accordingly, in
such a case that the tax allocation would operate invariantly with respect to the allocation of 
resources.
1287
 This may be considered a rational approach, especially, since globalization and
internationalization, the emergence of intangibles and e-commerce, has not made it easier to 
identify the income’s geographical source under the current supply-side international tax 
regime.
1288
 The increasing mobility of production factors, particularly intangible and monetary
capital, renders effective taxation by nation states an increasingly complex affair. This reality 
puts pressure on nation states seeking tax revenues to finance their public expenditures. 
preferences as to the purpose of corporate taxation (whether it should remunerate producing or marketing states).” 
See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 30: “Relative factor weights would then 
be left to be decided as a part of the agreed fundamental entitlement rationale, which is not determined by economic 
considerations. (…) [I]f the supply-demand approach is pursued, the inclusion and relative weighting of 
apportionment factors is completely undetermined by economic criteria” . See also Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for 
Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in 
Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, describing things at 237 as “a matter of consensual judgment”, as well 
as National Tax Association, Report of Committee on the Apportionment between States of Taxes on Mercantile and 
Manufacturing Business, Proceedings of the National Tax Association 1922, 198-212, at 202, stating that “there is no 
one right rule for apportionments” and that “All methods of apportionment … are arbitrary-the cutting of the Gordian 
knot…”. Note Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the 
EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), 199-220, 
who concur with these NTA considerations at 210. 
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 E.g. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 
121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). See also European Commission, Staff working paper, The internal market: factual 
examples of double non-taxation cases, Consultation document, Brussels, TAXUD D1 D(2012), as well as 
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation in the Internal 
Market, Brussels, 23 October 2001, SEC(2001) 1681. The OECD advocates taking a harmonized approach as well, 
see e.g. OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, and OECD, 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements; Tax policy and compliance issues, OECD, Paris, 2012 where a coordinated 
approach is advocated to tackle mismatches. See for a comparison National Tax Association, Report of Committee 
on the Apportionment between States of Taxes on Mercantile and Manufacturing Business, Proceedings of the 
National Tax Association, Washington, D.C., 1922, 198-212, at 202: “[T]he only right rule … is a rule on which the 
several states can and will get together as a matter of comity”, and Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The 
Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: 
A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working 
Paper 2006:9, at 46: “The only correct rule might simply be the one on which Member States can agree.” 
1285
 Notably, if income allocation is a judgment call, one may also plea to uphold SA/ALS. Why get rid of an allocation 
mechanism that has been in place for over a century for something else? Something which has been untried in 
practice at the international level and is necessarily unable to geographically locate true profit as well? See for a 
comparison, Jeffrey Owens, ‘Income Allocation in the 21
st
 Century: the End of Transfer Pricing?’ Should the Arm’s 
Length Principle Retire?’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 99 (2005), at 99. Owens argues that we should be 
very cautious about replacing a well-established institutional face with an untried visage. Rather, Owens argues, our 
efforts should continue to focus on making the existing systems work more effectively. 
1286
 Cf. Charles E. McLure, Jr, ‘Comments on Musgrave’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation 
Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 264, at 251. 
1287
 Cf. Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et al 
(eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 345. 
1288
 See e.g., International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 48-50, and OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at 35-36. 
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Obviously, this is a serious matter.
1289
 It should not be forgotten that it is the tax revenues
through which states finance their public goods. If states encounter structural and perhaps 
even insurmountable difficulties in raising revenue in the long run, it will be equally impossible 
to uphold the welfare state.
1290
The international tax regime, as said, seeks to allocate corporate profit to the country of 
origin. However, it increasingly faces difficulties in this respect. Empirical evidence suggests 
that in the presence of tax rate differentials, the supply-side international tax systems of 
countries produce incentives for the shifting of corporate profits, both paper profits and real 
profits, to low taxing jurisdictions.
1291
 That is, the tax responsiveness of real activity is less
apparent, though.
1292
 Perhaps the reason for this, besides the difficulties in obtaining relevant
data on the subject,
1293
 is that the incidence of corporate tax cannot be identified. As it is
unknown who ultimately bears the tax (the worker, the supplier, the customer, the consumer, 
or the owner), it is very hard to assess the responses of tax rate differentials on the 
(re)location of firm inputs and outputs. For some economic analysis, see section 4.5.1 of this 
chapter. 
In the upcoming section, the current regime is further assessed to identify the reasons why 
the arbitrage arises. Why does the current separate accounting / transfer pricing system fail? 
Is it worthwhile to explore the spectrum somewhat further and look into some of the more 
destination based alternatives available to geographically attribute corporate rents? 
6.3 Tax pie sharing under the supply side profit attribution system in International 
taxation: why it fails 
6.3.1 Current international tax system aims at locating and evaluating firm inputs, 
but falls short 
Today’s international tax regime system seeks to identify the true source of income.
1294
 Its
purpose is to allocate taxing entitlements to the country of origin by locating and evaluating 
business income by reference to firm inputs. That is, it essentially seeks to localize and 
evaluate the production factors employed. Where does the global entrepreneur produce its 
rents? For this purpose, the international tax regime has established a taxable presence 
concept (‘nexus’) and a methodology to subsequently evaluate that taxable presence 
1289
 Cf. Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 698. 
1290
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 
Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1573-1676. See for a comparison, International Monetary Fund, IMF 
Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014. 
1291
 See International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 12-13, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and 
the OECD Guidelines A Proposal for Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 6, and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et 
al, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International Tax Policies by Utilizing the 
Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World Tax Journal 371 (2011), at 393, as well as 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary 
Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 9. For some empirical support for arguing the 
responsiveness of real economic activity to tax rate differences the authors refer to Ruud de Mooij et al, ‘Taxation 
and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of Empirical Research’, 10 International Tax and Public Finance 673 
(2003), at 673-693, as well as Ruud de Mooij, ‘Will corporate income taxation survive?’, 3 De Economist 153 (2005), 
at 277-301, See further Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU 
Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, 
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 7 and OECD, 
Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapter 2; also for literature 
references. 
1292
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 10. 
1293
 See OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Request for input BEPS ACTION 11: Establish methodologies to 
collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it, 4 August 2014 – 19 September 2014, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, 4 August 2014. 
1294
 Cf. Charles E. Mclure, Jr., ‘Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union: The Commission’s Proposals’, 
36 Tax Notes International 45 (4 October 2004), at 48. 
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(‘allocation’). Basically, all nation states worldwide utilize the same approach to some extent 
for this purpose.
1295
If it is assumed that the supply side of income provides a proper conceptual foundation to 
build a cross-border profit attribution mechanism, the question arises as to whether the 
instruments that are currently used in international taxation are sufficiently equipped to serve 
their purpose. Do they work or do they fail? 
Unfortunately, it seems that is is the latter. In a global market the current system seems 
destined to fail. The system provides for some concepts that are completely outdated. In 
respect to some others, an economic rationale even is completely absent. Countries typically 
respond by introducing halfway anti-avoidance rules countering symptoms rather than the 
underlying causes of the arbitrage created.
1296
 However, if the proper tool is chosen out of the
available alternatives, nexus at origin perhaps may be sufficiently established. In the end, only 
the ‘significant people functions’ developed by the OECD to localize income merit some 
consideration to base upon some kind of nexus concept for this purpose.
1297
 However,
unfortunately, current international tax law does not seem to provide for any sufficient means 
to subsequently evaluate that taxable presence at origin. Even if the best-suited transfer 
pricing method is employed for this purpose, the profit split method, firm inputs cannot be 
evaluated objectively at the end of the day. On balance, the location of production, is 
therefore impossible to evaluate, rendering it conceptually and pragmatically unfeasible to 
allocate net value creation at origin. Corporate rents just cannot be properly sourced at origin. 
6.3.2 Current international tax system fosters profit shifting as a consequence 
The consequence of this, unfortunately, is that the current international tax system, in its 
presence of tax rate differentials, fosters the shifting of profit to low-taxing jurisdictions.
1298
Due to its poor design, the system facilitates the shifting of paper profits. Various features of 
the current system completely lack economic rationales, providing various tools for the 
international business community to be used to influence the taxable profit attribution and 
their AETRs accordingly without substantially altering corporate investment.
1299
 In addition, in
the current presence of tax rate differentials, real investment location decisions are being 
distorted as well, ceteris paribus, having the consequence of providing incentives to locate 
investment and subsequent returns – real profits – to tax jurisdictions subjecting corporate 
profit to comparatively lower AETRs. “The basic idea is that a firm that is able to choose 
between two profitable location decisions would decide to locate production where post-tax 
1295
 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapters 1, 4 
and 5. 
1296
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 271: “Because of weaknesses in the 
residence rules, source rules, and transfer-pricing rules, and the flexible nature of accounting rules, many countries 
have adopted anti-avoidance rules to limit abuses arising under the arm’s-length/source-rule methodology.” 
1297
 To discover the origin of income, for nexus establishment purposes, reference is essentially made to a ‘functional 
and factual analysis’, analyzing the functions performed (labor), the assets used (capital) and risks assumed. See 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, OECD, 
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, 
OECD, Paris, 2010, and 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) in conjunction with 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii). 
1298
 See for instance Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry 
J. Aaron et al (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 343: “… the locational allocation of resources is 
distorted by differentials in the corporate profits taxes levied in various states.” 
1299
 Obviously, the flawed international tax law ‘toolkit’ may be used by well-advised MNEs to optimize their tax costs. 
This is often seen as wrongful corporate behavior, encroaching upon subjective beliefs on good corporate 
governance. In my view, however, as corporate tax equals corporate cost, which from a business economics 
perspective should be minimized, there is not much ‘wrong’ with tax planning. States levy tax. In the event that the 
public feels that MNEs do not pay their ‘fair share’, in my view, it is the obligation of the states involved to design a 
properly functioning international tax system. If they do not, causing tax planning and avoidance (opportunities) as a 
result of this, this matter is not for the MNEs to resolve. If the public feels that corporations should pay a ‘fair share’ of 
corporate tax which the public feels that they do not, in my view, one should proceed to criticize the tax law drafters 
for designing poor tax rules that facilitate profit shifting rather than referring to some subjective popular beliefs on 
corporate responsibilities to pay fair shares of corporate tax. The levying of corporate tax is the responsibility of the 
state, not that of a multinational. Fair share accordingly is not a corporate responsibility, it is the primary responsibility 
of the nation state. 
314
net present value is the higher, i.e., the country where the AETR is the relatively lower.”
1300
Accordingly, the current regime not only promotes the shifting of paper profits, it fosters real 
profit shifting as well. That is, although the tax responsiveness to real activity, as said, seems 
less apparent than the tax responsiveness to locating ‘paper’ investments.
1301
 Perhaps that, in
view of the presence of paper-profit shifting opportunities, there is little need to engage into 
real profit shifting. 
Moreover, multinationals may often be able to credibly threaten the origin state to relocate 
and invest elsewhere. Consequently, countries seeking to attract foreign investment or to 
preserve domestic investment as often may have no choice but to compete with each other 
for investment by lowering their AETRs under the global average: tax competition. This, in 
reality, occurs, either through reductions of general corporate tax burdens, i.e., the ‘race to 
the bottom’ hypothesis,
1302
 or via the reduction of effective tax burdens relating to certain
economic activities. These activities may involve both portfolio investment and direct 
investment activities. The measures involving portfolio investments typically revolves around 
the incentivizing of sheltering portfolio investment proceeds and proceeds from intra-group 
financing arrangements. The incentives that such tax havens provide to the ‘IP HoldCos’ or 
‘shell companies’ of multinationals are generally referred to as ‘IP-holding regimes’, or 
‘headquarters regimes’. The measures involving direct investments typically involve granting 
incentives to attract investment in intellectual property, transportation, or production. The 
incentives that such ‘production tax havens’ provide to such mobile direct investment activities 
are sometimes referred to as ‘tax holidays’, i.e., where these relate to certain types of direct 
investment proceeds.
1303
 ‘Tax free zones’ or ‘low-taxed economic zones’ may be put in place
where the countries involved seek to attract direct investments to certain pre-designated 
areas within their territories.
1304
 The awarding of such tax incentives to attract investment
triggers (harmful) tax competition and (illegal) fiscal state aid issues – the latter where 
European Union law applies.
1305
So why is that? What causes the international tax system to be broken? To answer that 
question, some further elaboration on the current nexus standards and allocation standards is 
called for.  
1300
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 716. See also James R. Hines, Jr., ‘Lessons 
from Behaviorial Responses to International Taxation’, 52 National Tax Journal 305 (1999), at 308-319. 
1301
 See for some analysis and literature references Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union 
– Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. Intuitively, the explanation for this
may be that to the extent it may be possible to shift paper profits by engaging into intra-firm tax planning 
arrangements and obtain a tax saving accordingly there is no need to shift taxable profits by relocating real 
investment. Why shift real investment if the tax saving could also be made available through less burdensome 
means, i.e., through ‘box and arrow tax planning’? As it seems easier to shift paper profits than real profits, it has 
been argued in the literature that tax planning opportunities and the presence of tax havens may even be considered 
economic efficient. That is, since the planning opportunities in the international corporate tax systems, i.e., the 
availability to structure ones way around ones moral obligation to contribute to society, would accordingly render 
investment location decisions less responsive to corporate taxation. See Qing Hong et al, ‘In praise of tax havens: 
International tax planning and foreign direct investment’, 54 European Economic Review 82 (2010, No. 1), at 82-95. 
Such an approach seems to imply corporate tax to constitute a pure economic cost – and with that it equivalently 
seems to imply that the abolishment of business income taxation would promote economic efficiency. In my view, 
such an approach disregards the notion of taxation as a means to finance public expenditure, i.e., something from 
which society as a whole benefits from, firms included. 
1302
 See for a comparison Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU 
Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, 
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 7. 
1303
 See on such tax incentives the recent OECD briefs to G20: Part 1 of a Report to G20 Development Working 
Group on the impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, OECD, Paris, July 2014, and Part 2 of a Report to G20 
Development Working Group on the impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, OECD, Paris, August 2014. 
1304
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 
Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1588, and International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in 
International Corporate Taxation, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 7 on the pervasiveness of 
tax incentives undermining revenue in developing countries. 
1305
 For some further elaboration, see Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the 
CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
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6.3.3 Nexus in international taxation; why only ‘significant people functions’ has 
some appeal to locate income at origin 
6.3.3.1 Nexus required to establish taxable presence, but instruments are often 
arbitrary 
The process of geographically allocating multinational business income requires two steps to 
be taken. First, the business activities that a firm undertakes within a particular taxing 
jurisdiction need to exceed a certain minimum threshold: nexus. Nexus refers to the location 
of income (‘where?’). To the extent that the chosen threshold test has been met and a taxable 
connection with the respective taxing jurisdiction has been established, subsequently, 
second, the business income derived by the taxpayer, or a part thereof, needs to be attributed 
to that respective taxing jurisdiction: allocation. Allocation refers to the evaluation of the 
located income (‘how much?’). 
Various instruments have been adopted in international tax to identify nexus. The question as 
to which one applies in a particular scenario depends on various (legal) facts and 
circumstances. Yet, some of the instruments chosen for this purpose have, at best, become 
outdated, e.g., the ‘permanent establishment’ concept. More often the expressions of nexus 
that are used in international taxation completely lack economic rationale, such as the 
company’s ‘place of incorporation’. Arbitrage, paper profit shifting opportunities, investment 
location distortions, and decreased corporate tax revenues are the inevitable consequence of 
this. Let us further scrutinize matters. 
6.3.3.2 Broken nexus concepts: corporate nationality, corporate residence, and the 
permanent establishment threshold 
6.3.3.2.1 Broken nexus concepts in international tax law 
All nexus concepts utilized in international taxation set a qualitative threshold standard 
referring to legal and physical-geographical connecting factors. The problem, however, first, is 
that legal realities do not always correspond with economic realities. Typically, only the 
legalities agreed upon by third parties are driven by market forces.
1306
 Intra-firm legal realities
are not. Second, the same has also become true regarding the physical-geographical brick 
and mortar realities currently required to establish taxable presence, for instance under the 
permanent establishment threshold. Also these no longer necessarily correspond with 
economic reality. The digitization of the economy, for instance, has made the requirement to 
establish a physical presence within a country to service its market rather insignificant.
1307
Perhaps, in the end, only the presence of people, the firm’s workers operating their 
employment contracts, the production factor of labor that is, may be of some help in providing 
a proxy to localize income at its origin.  
1306
 See for a comparison Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 177: “Profit 
shifting between two entities mainly takes place when they are under common control, whereas below that level 
external shareholders can be expected to oppose measures that artificially reduce one company’s profits or increase 
its tax burden.” See also Benjamin F. Miller, ‘None Are So Blind as Those Who Will Not See’, 66 Tax Notes 1023 (13 
February 1995), at 1030: “For entities that are 50-percent-or-less owned, a self-policing mechanism exists in the form 
of the other shareholders.” 
1307
 See e.g. Lee A. Sheppard, ‘The Digital Economy and Permanent Establishment’, 70 Tax Notes International 297 
(22 April 2013), Charles McLure, Jr., ‘Alternatives to the concept of permanent establishment’, 1 CESifo Forum 10 
(2000), at 10-16, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 
(1996-1997), Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-279, as well as Tatiana Falcão et al, ‘Assessing the Tax Challenges of the 
Digital Economy: An Eye-Opening Case Study’, 42 Intertax 317 (2014), at 317-324, and Manoj Kumar Singh, ‘Taxing 
E-Commerce on the Basis of Permanent Establishment: Critical Evaluation’, 42 Intertax 325 (2014), at 325-333. See 
on the matter also OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 1: Address the 
tax challenges of the digital economy, 24 March – 14 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 24 March 2014, and 
OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Addressing the tax 
challenges of the digital economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014. 
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6.3.3.2.2 The sheer meaninglessness of corporate nationality (incorporation seat 
system) 
References for nexus establishment purposes to legalities may be recognized in the 
international tax principle of (corporate) nationality, i.e., the ‘nationality principle’. Corporate 
nationality is used by many countries, e.g., the United States, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands, to determine a company’s place of residence for tax purposes and with that its 
unlimited liability to corporate tax.
1308
 Corporate nationality constitutes a subjective, ad
personam, taxing principle, established by reference to the statutory seat of a corporation, or 
the domestic laws of the state on the basis of which it was incorporated (i.e., the so-called 
‘incorporation seat system’). 
Where nexus is established accordingly, a legal formality decides on the location of corporate 
income. Typically, the use of the nationality principle entails a worldwide tax liability, 
recognizing the taxpayer’s worldwide income for tax calculation purposes. Indeed, the state 
claiming tax entitlement on the basis of the nationality principle subsequently steps down to 
provide double tax relief to secure single taxation in respect of the taxable entity’s foreign 
source income.
1309
 However, the residual of the corporation’s profits derived is located for tax
purposes in the country of the corporation’s nationality. 
Indeed, such an approach is administratively convenient. It however operates quite arbitrarily. 
The place of incorporation generally is a historic fact, which, as a rule, cannot be changed 
formally.
1310
 However, being neatly assisted for tax purposes by the ‘as made-available’
separate entity approach – or corporate veil – a multinational may deploy the concept of 
corporate nationality for its benefit by setting up a new company in (or, if legally available, 
merging or converting it into)
1311
 a jurisdiction wherever it desires to, and, accordingly have
the (residual) profits of the investments undertaken through that company being allocated to 
that jurisdiction as a result of this.
1312
 The multinational may accordingly establish an
additional tier to its multi-nationality.
1313
A formal-legal criterion such as corporate nationality, however, constitutes a completely 
meaningless concept to establish nexus for profit allocation purposes. That is, it lacks 
economic basis. Corporate nationalities have very little to do with income production. 
Furthermore, the globalization of markets drives corporate law systems of states to a certain 
degree of congruency, for instance regarding the entity’s legal personality, its limited legal 
liability and the tradability of shareholders’ interests. In the end, for instance, there is not too 
much difference between a US Corp., a UK Ltd., a Dutch BV, a Luxembourg SARL, a Belgian 
BVBA, or a Swiss AG in this respect. Via this means, multinationals basically have a broad 
palette of substantially interchangeable legal forms at their disposal through which they may 
legally organize their business affairs. Any of such decisions leaves the conduct of actual 
business operations virtually unaffected. This reality renders the nationality of a legal form 
substantially meaningless as a tool to establish a taxable corporate presence. 
1308
 See for instance, Article 2(4) Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act 1969. In the Netherlands, companies incorporated 
under Dutch law, – Dutch corporate nationals – their Dutch nationality is used to deem these entities’ corporate tax 
place of residence in the Netherlands. Under Dutch corporate income tax law, a company’s place of residence is 
generally determined by reference to its place of effective management. 
1309
 See Article 5 OECD Model Tax Convention in conjunction with Article 7 OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1310
 Notably, within the European Union the Court of Justice has made intra-European Union cross-border transfers of 
real seats of corporations possible, also in respect of entities formed under incorporation seat civil law systems. See 
Court of Justice, Cases C-378/10 (VALE) and C-210/06 (Cartesio). 
1311
 Within the European Union, corporate nationalities of companies themselves are mobile as well since corporate 
European Union law allows for cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, making it possible, for instance for 
a Dutch limited liability company to merge into a Luxembourg limited liability company, accordingly obtaining 
Luxembourg nationality and the accompanying allocation of its residual profit to Luxembourg. See Directive 
2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited 
liability companies. 
1312
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 270. 
1313
 See for a comparison Michael J. Graetz, ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies’, 54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001), at 261-336. 
Graetz at 320: “… in the case of corporations, the idea of residence is largely an effort to put flesh into fiction, to find 
economic and political substance in a world occupied by legal niceties. It is no accident that we call corporations 
doing business around the world "multinationals.” 
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In addition, since many states uphold the concept of corporate nationality to establish nexus, 
regardless, multinationals have been freely granted an instrument lacking an economic 
rationale to set-up their legal tiers within taxing jurisdictions employing comparatively higher 
or lower taxing levels and have their profits being allocated to those jurisdictions accordingly. 
The global entrepreneur, the multinational, is the first to choose. As corporate tax, from a 
business economics perspective, constitutes a cost, it is not hard to imagine that multinational 
firms may employ this arbitrary concept as a tool to attempt to have their rents artificially 
allocated for tax purposes to the taxing jurisdiction of their preference, i.e., sometimes even 
without materially altering their underlying business operations.
1314
 Indeed, countries have
adopted a variety of anti-abuse mechanisms to counter some of the adverse effects that they 
have created. However, these often are of no substantial assistance.
1315
 Perhaps it would be
worthwhile to just eliminate the concept of corporate nationality to establish tax jurisdiction. 
6.3.3.2.3 The shallowness of corporate residence (real seat system; place of effective 
management) 
Corporate residence: a physical-geographical connecting factor 
References for nexus establishment purposes to physical-geographical connecting factors 
rather than formal-legal criteria may be recognized in the concept of corporate residence, the 
‘domicile principle’. Corporate residence is used by various countries, e.g., Germany, 
Luxembourg, Hungary and the Netherlands, to determine a company’s residence for tax 
purposes, and with that its unlimited liability to corporate tax under domestic tax law.
1316
Corporate residence constitutes a subjective, ad personam, taxing principle, established by 
reference to the presence of company management. Various countries, e.g., Hungary, 
Luxembourg, and Germany, require domestically formed companies to be managed within 
their respective domestic territories to even exist under their domestic civil laws, i.e., the so-
called ‘real seat system’.
1317
 In these countries transfers of management to abroad will, as a
general rule, cause the entity to cease to exist legally.
1318
 This is not the case with
‘incorporation seat systems’, used for instance by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The Netherlands refers to the company’s place of effective management to establish its 
corporate tax residence. Real seat transfers from the Netherlands to abroad, e.g., 
1314
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 8 on ‘corporate inversions’ in US tax 
practice: “Another (…) problem is that the current system is based on an increasingly artificial distinction between 
MNEs whose parent is incorporated in the United States and MNEs whose parent is incorporated elsewhere. The 
former, but not the latter, are subject to worldwide taxation with its attendant complexities (which are primarily the 
foreign tax credit and Subpart F). But in today’s world, this distinction is less and less meaningful for MNEs as the 
sources of capital, location of R&D, location of production, and location of distribution become increasingly 
globalized. The current distinction has led to a spate of inversion transactions, in which U.S.-based MNEs formally 
shift the location of incorporation of their parent offshore without changing the location of any of their business 
activities. Arguably, it has also encouraged takeovers of U.S.-based MNEs by larger foreign-based MNEs who can 
benefit from territorial systems of taxation.” See on the matter also U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax 
Policy, ‘Corporate Inversion Transactions: Tax Policy Implications’, Doc 2002-12218 (31 original pages), 2002 TNT 
98-49, May 21, 2002. 
1315
 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapter 5. 
1316
 See for instance, Article 2(4) Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act 1969. In the Netherlands, companies incorporated 
under Dutch law, i.e., companies having a Dutch nationality, their nationality is used to deem their corporate tax place 
of residence in the Netherlands. Under Dutch corporate income tax law, a company’s place of residence is generally 
determined by reference to its place of effective management. 
1317
 Notably, the real seat approach may also be acknowledged to express the nationality principle in international 
taxation, as a transfer of the seat to abroad will cause the entity to cease to exist. A German GmbH, for instance, has 
a German nationality as it necessarily needs to be managed in Germany in order to legally exist. However, as 
management activities necessarily need to be performed at a geographical location, I categorize the ‘real seat’ under 
‘residence’, i.e., by reference to its meaning as the ‘place of effective management’, activities that need to be 
performed at a particular geographic location as well. This enables me to argue in the following paragraphs that the 
‘place of management’, actually is a location of source/situs/origin. Analytical categorizations in this respect in 
international taxation are not further discussed. 
1318
 Notably, within the European Union the Court of Justice has made intra-European Union cross-border transfers of 
real seats of corporations possible, also in respect of entities formed under incorporation seat civil law systems. See 
Court of Justice, Cases C-378/10 (VALE) and C-210/06 (Cartesio). 
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Luxembourg, do not cause companies incorporated under Dutch law to cease to exist as the 
Netherlands is an incorporation seat country. In international tax law, the place of residence of 
such Dutch-Luxembourg ‘dual resident’ companies for double tax treaty application purposes 
is typically governed by the ‘tie-breaker rule’ in the applicable tax treaty, which attributes the 
company’s place of residence to the country within which its place of effective management is 
situated.
1319
Where nexus is established accordingly, a physical-geographic criterion, the location of the 
company’s managers, decides the location of (residual) corporate income. Typically, the use 
of the residence principle entails a worldwide tax liability as well. Indeed, the state claiming 
tax entitlement on the basis of the residence principle subsequently steps down to provide 
double tax relief in respect of the taxable entity’s foreign source income, i.e., to secure single 
taxation.
1320
 However, the residual of the corporation’s profits is assigned for tax purposes to
the country of the corporation’s residence. 
Seemingly straightforward at first glance; arbitrary and utterly complex in the end 
Such an approach referring to the management location for profit attribution purposes seems 
relatively straightforward at first glance. The place of effective management, in principle, 
provides for a more substantive tax jurisdiction concept than corporate nationality does, as it 
implies the actual undertaking of economic activities by persons at a certain geographic 
location. Viz., it aims at discovering the geographic location where the people responsible for 
the entity’s operations perform their management tasks and functions. It refers to the location 
where the competent and responsible board members in fact govern the legal entity.
1321
Accordingly, the place of effective management represents a geographic location where the 
multinational firm produces parts of its rents. Namely, also at that location, the firm brings 
together production factors, firm inputs, labor. A group company’s place of residence for tax 
purposes may therefore be considered to constitute an expression of the supply view of 
income, referring to the geographical source of income at origin. 
However, the residence principle tends to operate quite arbitrarily in practice. In reality, the 
place of effective management is typically determined by reference to ceremonial events, 
such as the location where the board of directors meets and decide on key corporate 
affairs.
1322
 Being neatly assisted by the ‘as made available’ separate entity approach for
corporate tax purposes, a multinational may deploy the concept of corporate residence for its 
benefit by setting up a new company in (or merging it into) any jurisdiction it wants, making 
sure to arrange that the necessary ceremonial events take place within that jurisdiction, and, 
accordingly have the (residual) profits of the investments undertaken through that company 
being allocated to that jurisdiction. Indeed, a particular group company may have its place of 
tax residence within a certain taxing jurisdiction for the single reason that the board decisions 
concerning that company have been taken there more or less randomly. In practice, this is 
sometimes referred to as ‘fly-in fly-out management’. The actual presence of economic 
activities undertaken within a nation state’s territories through such a separately taxed group 
company could indeed actually be quite moderate, yet to establish a tax residence within that 
country. The increased mobility of labor, i.e., the mobility of corporate management in this 
1319
 See Article 4(3) OECD Model Tax Convention. As double tax conventions typically apply only bilaterally, 
conflicting taxing principle issues may not be resolved in cases where three countries are involved. Issues for 
instance arise when a national of a certain country (Country A) resides in a second country (Country B) and derives 
income from sources situated in a third country (Country C), and is consequently taxed by all three countries 
involved. The outcome of the application of the tie-breaker rule in the double tax convention in place between 
Countries A and B which identifies the taxpayer as a country B resident may not apply beyond that treaty’s scope of 
application – i.e., it is arguable whether the taxpayer involved may be regarded as a Country B resident under the 
double tax convention in place between Countries A and C. The treaty texts do not satisfactorily resolve such 
triangular issues, i.e., some extensive treaty interpretation is required to arrive at such a conclusion. This is not 
further discussed. 
1320
 See Article 5 OECD Model Tax Convention in conjunction with Art. 7 OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1321
 Of relevance is the location where the decisions regarding the entity’s key affairs are taken. Where do they take 
place? Where are the board meetings held? Where do the director’s reside? At which location does the entity keeps 
its books? Where does the shareholders’ meeting take place? 
1322
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 270. 
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respect, has the consequence that the establishment of a group company’s place of tax 
residence and its subsequent unlimited liability to local corporate taxation accordingly ends up 
being a somewhat arbitrary exercise. The arbitrage potential especially holds when it is 
recognized that the residual profits derived from the operations carried on through that 
company are subsequently allocated entirely to the residence jurisdiction. Viz., as 
multinational firms are basically free in their decision to geographically locate their 
subsidiaries for corporate tax purposes, these residual profits produced become mobile for 
tax allocation purposes, ending up at least to some extent being subject to the discretion of 
the respective multinational firm. 
Further, reality reveals that the matter may be more complex than it initially seems. Even if 
the location of management is acknowledged as one of the factors where income originates, 
a multinational in fact does not have a single place of residence. It does not reside 
somewhere, as it operates globally. Indeed, the management functions may be performed in 
a range of countries, and, in reality they are. “Management personnel may be geographically 
dispersed rather than being located in a single central location.”
1323
 Today, even basic
headquarter functions may be split and located in different countries.
1324
 Modern
telecommunication techniques have exacerbated matters. Videoconferencing, internet, 
intranet and e-mail have enabled directors to discuss and decide on matters without 
physically being at the same location.
1325
 Take for instance a group of directors working from
a range of countries discussing and deciding on corporate affairs through secured intranet 
trafficking or videoconferencing. How would one identify any of the multinational group 
company’s places of residence, if corporate management is dispersed across various 
countries in such a way? I would not know, to be honest. 
Perhaps, the establishment of residence on the basis of the corporation’s place of effective 
management may therefore ultimately prove unworkable as the digitized global economy 
diminished the need for the board to meet at one physical location.
1326
 Some countries,
therefore, have created administrative safe harbors to facilitate matters for the purpose of 
attracting corporate headquarters to their jurisdictions by providing legal certainty in this 
area.
1327
 Further, the effective management of a controlled group company may even be
effectively outsourced to trust offices. In summary, there is not necessarily much to it to 
constitute the effective place of management to establish nexus within the taxing jurisdiction 
of choice (and the allocation of the residual as a consequence). This, notably, holds true even 
if it would be feasible to unambiguously identify the location of effective management in the 
first place. 
It may therefore not come as a surprise that multinational firms in search of reducing global 
tax costs may use their discretionary powers in this area to create a taxable presence in 
taxing jurisdictions imposing lower than average global AETRs. Indeed, the decision on where 
to locate corporate headquarters is similar to any other location decision, as headquarters 
activities are just one in a variety of functions performed within the multinational (while being 
awarded the residual profit of the company involved).
1328
 It is no secret that, despite political
1323
 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at 25. 
1324
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 710. Devereux refers to Desai for some 
verification. 
1325
 See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-
1997), at 528. 
1326
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard 
Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1596.  
1327
 In the Netherlands, for instance, a ministerial decree is in place providing the required ‘substance criteria’ with 
regards to so-called group ‘servicing entities’ or ‘flow-through entities’ (in Dutch: ‘dienstverleningslichamen’) for 
automatic information exchange purposes; Ministerial Decree of 22 December 2011, No. BWBR0030973 (in Dutch: 
‘Uitvoeringsbesluit international bijstandsverlening bij de heffing van belastingen’). Substance requirements and 
accompanying administrative rules to obtain a ruling (APA/ATR) from the Dutch tax authorities on the tax implications 
of a certain transaction or set of transactions are found in a range of decrees; Ministerial Decree of 3 June 2014, Nos. 
DGB 2014/296M, DGB 2014/3101, DGB 2014/3102, DGB 2014/3098, and DGB 2014/3099. 
1328
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 710-711. Devereux argues that management is 
just one in a number of functions performed for questioning the validity of a government that seeks to effectively tax 
multinationals on their worldwide income. 
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pressures to the contrary, nation states compete with each other in response to multinational 
location decisions to persuade multinational firms to set-up (local) headquarters, holding 
companies, and financing companies within their territories.
1329
 That is, by subsequently
granting them some kinds of beneficial tax treatment if they do so (so-called ‘headquarter tax 
havens’).
1330
 Through such means, states may seek to attract management and financing
activities from abroad – or to preserve such activities at home.
1331
 Empirical evidence
suggests that (intermediate) headquarter locations, like other location decisions, are driven by 
taxation.
1332
 It hardly needs to be argued that this reality exacerbates the ‘race to the bottom’,
putting additional pressures on tax revenues, budgets and the financing of the welfare state in 
the end.
1333
Murky tax framework: ‘place of residence’ actually is ‘place of source’ 
In addition to this, the tax concept of ‘place of residence’ is being applied within a somewhat 
murky conceptual framework. As each company, as a rule, constitutes a single taxpayer, the 
scenario may arise that a subsidiary company that is effectively controlled by its parent 
company, for tax purposes, nevertheless constitutes a single taxpayer, recognized separately 
from its parent, having a place of effective management that is separate from its controlling 
parent company’s. In addition, that subsidiary’s effective place of management does not 
necessarily correspond with the parent’s place of effective management, even when it is 
effectively controlled by that parent company. This holds true, regardless of whether the 
multinational firm concerned is ultimately governed in a centralized manner, something that in 
today’s reality does not really seem an exception to the rule.
1334
 This effect is caused by the
adopted separate entity approach. A multinational firm accordingly not only constitutes a 
multi-national for corporate tax purposes, it constitutes a multi-resident as well.
1335
To be honest, I find this tax reality somewhat hard to wrap my mind around. In Chapter 4, 
appreciating the theory of the firm, I argue for the recognition of the multinational firm as a 
single taxable entity, since it economically is a single unit. Under such a unitary approach, the 
tax place of effective management of a group company to determine its domicile backslides 
into a place of management, an expression of the situs principle discussed in the following 
1329
 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A 
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 9, arguing that 
“[t]he literature has consistently found that MNEs are sensitive to corporate tax rate differences across countries in 
their financial decisions.”  
1330
 Reference can be made at this place to the soft-law efforts undertaken within the European Union’s institutions 
addressing the use of such ‘harmful tax regimes’ within the European Union. In the late 1990s the Council of 
Economics and Finance Ministers adopted the Code of Conduct for business taxation; see Conclusions of the 
ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy (OJ 98/C 2/01). With that it initiated a ‘soft 
law’ process ‘peer pressuring’ the European Union Member States to roll back existing harmful tax measures (e.g., 
the former Belgian Coordination Center regime, and the former Dutch tax ruling practice), and to refrain them from 
introducing any such measures in the future. This process is being monitored by the Code of Conduct Group up until 
present. 
1331
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 
Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1582-1583. Avi-Yonah notes at 1583 that: “[t]he current situation 
resembles a multiple-player assurance ("stag hunt") game: all developed countries would benefit if all re-introduced 
the withholding tax on interest because they would gain revenue without the risk that the capital would be shifted to 
another developed country. However, no country is willing to attempt to spark cooperation by imposing a withholding 
tax unilaterally; thus, they all "defect" (that is, refraining from imposing the tax) to the detriment of all.” 
1332
 Cf. Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 698-719. For some verification, Devereux refers 
to Johannes Voget, ‘Headquarter Relocations and International Taxation’, Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation working paper 10/08. See also Johannes Voget, ‘Relocation of headquarters and international taxation’, 95 
Journal of Public Economics 1067 (2011, No. 9-10), at 1067-1081. 
1333
 See also Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 
7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1334
 See, e.g., OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapter 
3. 
1335
 See for a comparison Michael J. Graetz, ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies’, 54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001), at 320. To 
secure that the subsidiary company does cause the foreign parent to have nexus in the subsidiary country, Article 
5(6) OECD Model Tax Convention provides that the subsidiary does not constitute a permanent establishment of its 
parent. 
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section of this chapter.
1336
 If seen from that perspective, the tax place of residence of a group
company actually and merely constitutes a geographical source of the business income 
derived by the taxable multinational firm. In such an alternative context recognizing economic 
realities, the place of residence would actually constitute a place of source. This conceptually 
renders domicile to a species of the genus situs.
1337
 Please note that the presence of firm
inputs – nexus – within a taxing jurisdiction, such as a place of management, does not explain 
the portion of the firm’s business income that is to be allocated to that nexus location. The 
issue of allocation is an analytically separate matter. 
All in all, these matters render the concept of corporate residency a relatively shallow tool to 
base tax jurisdiction upon. This particularly holds true if the subsequent allocation of the 
entity’s residual profit to the residence state is taken into consideration.
1338
 Although allocation
is further discussed separately in section 6.3.4, it may be fair to say at this point that under 
the current use of the residence principle in international taxation, a bit too much weight 
seems to be assigned for tax jurisdiction purposes to the country of ‘effective management’. 
Particularly when it is recognized that the undertaking of management functions is just one in 
a range of functions performed within multinational firms. 
6.3.3.2.4 Situs, perhaps, but many of its expressions in international tax have reached 
breaking points 
Situs: a physical-geographical connecting factor aimed at locating income at its origin 
References for tax jurisdiction establishment purposes to physical-geographical connecting 
factors may further be recognized in the concept of source, the ‘situs principle’. The situs 
principle is generally used by nation states to determine a foreign, i.e., a non-national or non-
resident, company’s taxable presence within its jurisdiction. Typically, states subject foreign 
entities that operate commercial activities within their territories to a limited liability to tax. 
Situs constitutes an objective, in rem, taxing principle, established by reference to physical-
geographical connection factors within the respective taxing jurisdiction, such as the presence 
of tangible property (branch, factory, et cetera) or individuals (representatives, ‘significant 
people’). Accordingly, the international tax regime adopts a substantive connecting factor that 
seeks to localize income producing firm inputs. Its purpose is to identify the geographic 
location where the entrepreneur brings together production factors for the purpose of 
producing profits, i.e., the geographic origin of income. 
Within the international tax regime, consensus has been established that the country of 
source has the primary entitlement to tax business proceeds. To secure single taxation, these 
‘source states’ generally disregard foreign source income items for tax calculation purposes. 
In Chapter 3 I argue that this differential tax treatment on the basis of corporate residence or 
nationality entails an (in)directly discriminatory tax treatment.
1339
 Typically, although the
1336
 Notably, with regards to shipping companies tax jurisdiction is attributed completely to the country where the 
effective management of the enterprise, i.e., the business operation, is situated. See Article 8 OECD Model Tax 
Convention. Profit is exclusively allocated to that location. As a consequence, this incentivizes shipping companies to 
manage their business operations from a low-taxing jurisdiction. See on this matter, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-
2000), at 1595. 
1337
 See for a comparison Klaus Vogel, ‘“State of Residence” may as well be “State of Source” – There is No 
Contradiction’, 59 Bulletin for International Taxation 420 (2005), at 420-423. Also Vann recognizes the corporate 
residence rule as “at bottom a sourcing rule like the PE rule…” See Richard J. Vann, ‘Taxing International Business 
Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World’, 2 World Tax Journal 291 (2010), at 293-294. 
1338
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), 
at 527. 
1339
 As discussed in Chapter 3, I find it difficult to appreciate why nation states should be entitled to subject foreigners 
directing investment towards their territories to diverging tax burdens solely on the basis of the tax place of residence 
of the foreigner receiving the returns on their capital investments. Notably, subsequent to the designation of the 
residence state for tax convention application purposes the distributive rules divide the taxing entitlements among the 
countries of source and residence. Typically the residence state steps down in favor of the source state and provides 
double tax relief. In non-treaty scenarios the similar often goes, however then on the basis unilateral means. As 
double tax conventions typically apply only bilaterally, conflicting taxing principle issues may not be resolved in cases 
where three countries are involved. Issues for instance arise when a resident of a certain country (Country A) derives 
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foreign countries of residence and nationality step down to provide double tax relief in respect 
of the taxable entity’s local source income to secure single taxation,
1340
 the residual of the
corporation’s profits, that is, the profits derived to the extent that they are not geographically 
attributable to local sources, as said, is assigned for tax purposes to the first mentioned home 
countries. 
Both situs and origin essentially refer to the location of income production. Both address the 
supply-side of income, firm inputs and hence the place where the entrepreneur employs its 
production factors in its business process. Accordingly, conceptually, as a nexus at origin 
concept, situs indeed merits some consideration. Viz., if it is assumed that the nexus 
expressions that are currently used in international taxation operate adequately, income can 
be located at its origin. Note that the subsequent evaluation of that location, i.e., the matter of 
allocation should analytically be kept separate in this respect. Then, the question is whether 
these nexus expressions serve their purpose. 
Situs expressions in international tax: a motley collection
1341
The international tax regime, unfortunately, makes use of a motley collection of nexus 
expressions referring to situs. Some of these make some sense, others do not.
1342 
Of these
expressions, the place of effective management has already been identified in the above as 
being one of them – although in the disguised appearance of an expression of the residence 
principle. Notably, the place of effective management is commonly used as a derivative to 
establish the taxable presence of another taxpayer as well. This, for instance, is the case with 
dividend, interest, and royalty payments or (technical) service fees that ‘arise’ in the source 
state for double tax convention allocation purposes.
1343
 For taxing right allocation purposes
business income from carrying on a business through a permanent establishment situated in a second country 
(Country B) to which income can be attributed which arises from sources in a third country (Country C), and is 
consequently taxed by all three countries involved. The treaty texts do not satisfactorily resolve such triangular 
issues. As the taxpayer at hand resides in Country B nor Country C, the double tax convention in place between 
these countries is not applicable (i.e., as double tax conventions only apply to residents of one of the contracting 
states). Consequently, Country B in which the permanent establishment is situated is not required to provide for 
double tax relief for taxes levied in Country C. Only in cases where both Countries A and B are European Union 
Member States, Country B would be required to provide for relief on the basis of the free movements. See Court of 
Justice, case C-307/97 (Saint Gobain). This is not further discussed. 
1340
 Art. 5 OECD Model Tax Convention in conjunction with Art. 7 OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1341
 The header of this section referring to ‘a motley collection’ has been drafted in the style of Kemmeren, see Eric 
C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘Source of income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea for an Origin-
Based Approach’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 430 (2006), at 432. 
1342
 See for a comparison Brian J. Arnold, ‘Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits under Tax Treaties’, 
57 Bulletin for International Taxation 476 (2003), at 492 Arnold, who concludes that “[t]he existing threshold 
requirements for source-country taxation in the OECD and UN Models are a curious mix of principled policy and 
practical considerations. For most business, a relatively high threshold consisting of a fixed place of business is 
necessary. (…) Some business activity, such as entertainment, however, is taxable by the source country without any 
minimum threshold at all. There is no principled explanation for the lack of a threshold with respect to certain types of 
business profits.” Arnold argues at 491 that, in principle, the same threshold requirement should apply to all types of 
business profits. See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 
Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 544. Avi-Yonah refers to the difficulties encountered in international taxation 
that, in general, revolve around the classification and assignment of sources approach under the double tax 
convention networks of states. Double tax conventions typically require a classification of income items into e.g., 
business profits (art. 7), inter affiliate transactions (art. 9), royalties (art. 12), service fees (art. 12), dividends (art. 10), 
capital gains (art. 13), et cetera, prior to the assignment of the accordingly classified income items to geographical 
sources. As the geographical assignment differs per class of income, the sourcing process becomes relevant. 
Problematically, though, is that it is not always easy to properly disentangle the contracts underlying the provisions of 
goods or services. Should, for instance, a lump sum credit card payment for a downloaded 5 year software license 
(e.g., a firewall) be considered a sale of a good, the remuneration in return for the provision of a service, a gain on a 
disposal of intellectual property or a royalty payment for the use of a copyright? The issue arises both as regards 
intra-group transactions and transactions between third parties. Avi-Yonah argues to take a step back and ask 
whether having separate source rules for each category of income makes any sense. He arrives at the conclusion to 
sidestep the classification issue and merely decide on whether the proceeds should be considered active (direct 
investment) or passive (portfolio investment) and adopt a single sourcing rule to apply to them. That could, for 
instance, be a quantitative nexus criterion (economic presence test, gross-income threshold rule, et cetera). Notably, 
the combined profit split approaches in transfer pricing would resolve the matter as regards the intra-group 
transactions (articles 9) since the tax consolidation (combined reporting) would eliminate the issue.  
1343
 For tax treaty application purposes, royalty payments sometimes include fees for (technical) services rendered. 
That is, technical service fees are commonly considered to constitute ‘royalties’ under the broadened royalty article, 
typically Article 12, in the tax treaties concluded by capital importing developing countries and countries with 
transition economies. 
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under double tax conventions concluded, the place of tax residence of the company in which 
the shares are held, the tax residence of the debtor, the licensee and the customer of the 
technical service (i.e., the payor) typically constitute the geographical source of the income 
producing activities of the shareholder, the creditor, the licensor and the service provider (i.e., 
the payee), respectively.
1344
 That constitutes the location where these payments ‘arise’ and
the situs of the income accordingly.
1345
 It may not come as a surprise that the utilization of the
internationally mobile ‘place of residence’ for derivative nexus establishment purposes 
triggers arbitrage issues in intra-firm environments, which are similar to those set forth in the 
section above.
1346
 This particularly holds true as source tax rates applied by countries
differentiate, both under the application of domestic tax systems and double tax convention 
networks. These rate differentials trigger ‘tax treaty-shopping’ opportunities, i.e., the 
channeling of income streams through interposed low-taxed flow-through entities to reduce 
global AETRs,
1347
 as well as ‘most-favored nation’ issues (i.e., tax discrimination under a
synonym analytically).
1348
The perhaps best-known situs expression in international tax is the ‘permanent establishment’ 
threshold.
1349
 It is used in some variations, the most common of which is the ‘fixed permanent
1344
 An exception to this rule applies in the event that the payments are attributable to a permanent establishment of 
the recipient situated in the other contracting state. This is not further discussed.  
1345
 Such taxing rights typically are effectuated by subjecting these payments to withholding taxes levied on a gross-
basis. 
1346
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 271: “Source rules are sometimes 
simple and sometimes quite complex. Some are difficult to manipulate, whereas others invite manipulation. (…) 
Some source rules depend on the taxpayer’s residence. Because residence is easily manipulated, those source rules 
also are easily manipulated.” McIntyre further refers to the “US rule that determines the source of income from the 
sale of goods by reference to the place where title to the goods passes, as a well-known example of a source rule 
that is easily manipulated”. Please note that, as said, an exception to the rule is the location where the income 
‘arises’. In international taxation, dividends, interest, and royalties, as well as in certain cases fees for (technical) 
services rendered seem to ‘arise’ for tax base allocation purposes at the location of the customer and thereby the 
destination jurisdiction. That is, as it designates the tax base to the place of the customer’s residence or the place 
where it carries on a business through a permanent establishment. Accordingly, these attributional rules in 
international tax echo those in European Union value added taxation. 
1347
 To counter treaty shopping countries typically respond by introducing complex anti-avoidance clauses in their 
double tax treaties, such as ‘limitation on benefits clauses’, or ‘main purpose tests’. See OECD, OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in 
inappropriate circumstances, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014, OECD, and OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances, 14 March 2014 – 9 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2014. The OECD suggests countries to 
adopt either a limitation on benefits clause’ or a ‘principle purpose tests’, or a combination of these measures in their 
double tax conventions networks. Traditionally, the matter has been sought to be resolved by requiring that the 
recipient of the payment qualifies as the ‘beneficial owner’, i.e., the ‘owner of the income’. The introduction of anti-
abuse provisions, nevertheless, has been considered necessary as the ‘beneficial ownership criterion’ typically is 
interpreted quite formally and, hence, is not always too useful. The beneficial owner is the person (individual or entity) 
that is legally entitled to dispose of the receipts. That is, even if the (interposed) entity that is legally entitled to the 
payments is controlled by a shareholding company (informally referred to as the ‘ultimate beneficial owner’. See on 
this matter the British Indofood case (United Kingdom Court of Appeal, 2 March 2006, [2006] EWCA Civ 158 
(Indofood) and the Canadian Prévost case (Canada Federal Court of Appeal, 26 February 2009, 2009 FCA 57, 
[2010] 2 F.C.R. 65 (Prévost). For some discussion and analysis of the concept of beneficial ownership, see OECD, 
2014 Update to the OECD model tax convention, OECD, Paris, 15 July 2014, as well as Jan Gooijer, ‘Benficial 
Owner: Judicial Variety in Interpretation Counteracted by the 2012 OECD Proposals?’, 42 Intertax 204 (2014), at 
204-217. On limitation on benefits clauses, see John Bates et al, ‘Limitation on Benefits Articles in Income Tax 
Treaties: The Current State of Play’, 41 Intertax 395 (2013), at 395-404. The international tax regime does not 
resolve the issue at its roots, e.g. in a manner as suggested in Chapter 3, by tax-treating the multinational group as a 
single taxable entity. Such an approach would eliminate intra-firm legal transactions, and, with that, the arbitrage 
possibilities. 
1348
 That is, the differential tax treatment of a non-resident taxpayer from one country in comparison to the non-
resident taxpayer of another. As discussed in Chapter 3, I find it difficult to appreciate why nation states would be 
entitled to subject foreign economic operators directing investment towards their territories to diverging tax burdens 
solely on the basis of their tax place of residence. 
1349
 Worth noting also is the concept of the ‘dependent
 
agency permanent establishment’. Characteristic is its 
orientation towards the presence of the production factor of labor, a person performing representative functions within 
a country’s territories on behalf of its principal, thereby establishing the latter’s taxable presence in that country. The 
representative can be an individual or a company. As the representatives of companies operating as an agent, in the 
end, are individuals as well, also in that event the matter boils down to the presence of labor. The agency permanent 
establishment concept requires the representative to be economically dependent from its principal, so third-party 
representatives, commissionaires and agents fall outside its scope. Further, as the concept requires the 
representative to be able to legally bind its principal, the presence or absence of an agency permanent establishment 
typically is under the multinational firm’s control. This renders the agency PE concept a relatively meaningless 
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establishment’.
1350
 The permanent establishment concept constitutes a qualitative threshold
criterion for establishing nexus within a taxing jurisdiction. A permanent establishment is not a 
legal entity or a taxable entity. Essentially, the concept is oriented towards tying down the 
physical-geographical presence of the entrepreneur’s business organization within the taxing 
jurisdiction.
1351
 The OECD for instance, even considers the presence of a permanent
establishment attainable in the absence of people.
1352
 Characteristic of the fixed permanent
establishment is the orientation towards the presence of tangible capital, as it aims at 
identifying a fixed place of business through which the entrepreneur carries on its business 
activities, i.e., a physical presence such as a premise, store, or factory.
1353
 Accordingly, a
person’s non-physical presence within a jurisdiction, e.g., by means of a data network or an e-
store, is not captured due to the lack of a physical connection with the taxing state.
1354
instrument to establish nexus at origin. Although it should be said that the concept does have some appeal, as, e.g., 
an employee may also trigger the taxable presence of a multinational firm at origin. However, the concept of 
‘significant people functions’ may be considered more suitable in this respect. See further hereunder. For some 
elaboration on agency permanent establishments, see, Keith R. Evans, ‘Leased Equipment: When Does a 
Permanent Establishment Exist?’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 489, at 507-509, Jacques Sasseville et al, ‘General 
Report – Is there a permanent establishment?’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international 
(2009) 17, at 49-55, Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin 
for International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-280, Sergio André Rocha, ‘Agency Permanent Establishment ‘Brazilian 
Style’: Taxation of Profits Earned Through Commission Merchants, Agents and Representatives’, 41 Intertax 444 
(2013), at 444-449, and Alessio Persiani, ‘Some Remarks on the Notion of Permanent Establishment in the Recent 
Italian Supreme Court Jurisprudence’, 40 Intertax 675 (2012), at 675-682. On the issues involving so-called 
‘commissionaire structures’, both generally and with a particular focus to the Norwegian international tax system, see 
Rainer Zielke, ‘Commissionaire Structure as an Agency Permanent Establishment (PE): Low Risk for Foreign 
Principals Constituting a PE in Norway – Dell Products v. Government of Norway, Decision of the Norwegian 
Supreme Court of 2 December 2011’, 40 Intertax 494 (2012) at 494-496. 
1350
 See Art. 5 OECD Model Tax Convention. Alternative usages of the permanent establishment threshold (see the 
OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions and the actual double tax treaty networks of countries) typically refer to the 
time period during which the economic activities concerned are carried on. For instance, the ‘construction permanent 
establishment’ on construction activities generally refers to a period lasting at least 12 months, the ‘offshore 
permanent establishment’ on natural resources exploration or exploitation activities commonly requires a period 
exceeding 30 days (the term varies per treaty), the ‘substantial equipment permanent establishment’ on the use of 
equipment or machinery related to such exploration and exploitation activities often call for a period in excess of 12 
months, and the ‘services permanent establishment’ on the place of services performed generally sets forth a time 
period to lapse of at least 6 months. This, however is not always the case. The ‘insurance permanent establishment 
rule’, for instance, refers to premiums collected in the territory, or the insurance of risk located within the territories of 
one of the contracting states, without making reference to a time period requirement to be met. Further, something 
similar holds with respect to the establishment of nexus regarding entertainment activities of artists and sportsmen 
(art. 17 OECD Model Tax Convention). In this respect, nexus is established at the place of show performance, 
irrespective of its duration. Regarding immovable property, taxing rights are allocated to the country where the real 
estate is situated. For some further elaboration and analyses of the PE concept, see OECD, Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration, Revised Proposals Concerning the Interpretation and Application of Article 5 (Permanent 
Establishment), Revised Public Discussion Draft, OECD, Paris, 19 October 2012, Joel Nitikman, ‘The Painter and the 
PE: What Constitutes a Fixed PE in Canada’, 56 Tax Notes International 681 (30 November 2009), and Keith R. 
Evans, ‘Leased Equipment: When Does a Permanent Establishment Exist?’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 489. Notably, 
on the offshore PE rules in the Dutch double tax treaty network see Jean-Paul van den Berg, ‘The Netherlands - Is 
there a permanent establishment?’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2009) 
463, at 463-481. See also Jacques Sasseville et al, ‘General Report – Is there a permanent establishment?’, in 
International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2009) 17, at 17 – 63. Sasseville and Skaar refer 
to the various tests to be performed to scrutinize whether the permanent establishment threshold is met, i.e., the 
‘place of business test’, the ‘location test’, the ‘duration test’, the ‘right to use test’, the ‘business activity test’, and the 
‘business connection test’. 
1351
 Cf. Jacques Sasseville et al, ‘General Report – Is there a permanent establishment?’, in International Fiscal 
Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2009) 17, at 17-63, and Jean Schaffner, ‘The Territorial Link as a 
Condition to Create a Permanent Establishment’, 41 Intertax 638 (2013), at 638-651. 
1352
 Example of stand-alone server in Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital, OECD, Paris, 2010. Interestingly, in its Permanent establishment Attribution Report, the OECD refers to 
the significant people to allocate corporate profit. Unless I am mistaken, this would mean for the server-permanent 
establishment in the absence of people that analytically there should be no room for assign a profit to it. 
1353
 Cf. Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266. See for a comparison Jacques Sasseville et al, ‘General Report – Is there 
a permanent establishment?’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2009) 17, at 23-
24, who set forth that the term ‘place of business’ does not require any presence of human beings. See also Keith R. 
Evans, ‘Leased Equipment: When Does a Permanent Establishment Exist?’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 489, at 502, 
who submits that the human intervention is not a requirement for the existence of a permanent establishment. 
Further, see OECD, Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, OECD, 
Paris, 2010. 
1354
 Cf. Jacques Sasseville et al, ‘General Report – Is there a permanent establishment?’, in International Fiscal 
Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2009) 17, at 23. For some discussion on the permanent 
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Notably, to foster international trade and administrative convenience, a permanent 
establishment is deemed absent if the business operations performed within a state are of a 
preparatory or auxiliary nature.
1355
 A controlled subsidiary company, as a rule, is not
considered to constitute a permanent establishment of its foreign parent company.
1356
 The
same holds true for a workforce; by itself, a workforce also does not trigger the presence of a 
permanent establishment. 
Unfortunately, despite its objectives to locate income at its origin, the permanent 
establishment concept proves poorly equipped to face the realities of today’s globalizing 
economy. The times in which making of a cross-border profit required entrepreneurs to 
establish a physical presence at a certain location abroad have long since passed. The issue 
is not a novel one, though.
1357
 Traditionally, the international tax regime has encountered
difficulties in taxing the remote seller and the remote service provider in the source state.
1358
This being said, however, internationalization and the rise of e-commerce and cloud 
computing,
1359
 as well as the rise of intangible production factors such as intellectual property
rights
1360
 have, at least, exacerbated things. E-commerce, for instance, has made it possible
to sell large quantities of product into a demand jurisdiction without any need to establish a 
physical presence there.
1361
 “[T]he growing importance of the service component of the
economy, and of digital products that often can be delivered over the Internet, has made it 
possible for business to locate many productive activities in geographic locations that are 
distant from the physical location of their customers.”
1362
 Contemporary developments in
business realities have rendered the permanent establishment as a foundation concept to 
establish nexus at origin an archaic relic from yesterday’s bricks-and-mortar industries.
1363
This evidently triggers inequities and arbitrage. What could be considered equitable in using a 
nexus concept that is able to tax the proceeds from the old-fashioned record shop down the 
street, while being unable to properly subject to tax the commercially identical proceeds from 
an e-record shop, i.e., a website from which a consumer may download music on its portable 
media player for a fee paid through its credit card? And this simply because the website 
establishes a virtual presence, which is left untaxed for lacking a physical-geographic 
connection with the taxing jurisdiction involved? I do not see any reason why new-economy 
establishment concept in the area of e-commerce, see OECD, Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital, OECD, Paris, 2010, par. 42.1-42.48. 
1355
 See for some discussion Jacques Sasseville et al, ‘General Report – Is there a permanent establishment?’, in 
International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2009) 17, at 40-43. 
1356
 Article 5(7) OECD Model Tax Convention. 
1357
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 
511. 
1358
 The latter, e.g., may be recognized to explain the usage of the ‘service permanent establishment’ in Article 5(3)(b) 
of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 
establishing situs at the location of service performance. For an analysis of the ‘Service PE’ from the perspective of 
the Austrian international tax system, see Stefanie Steiner et al, ‘Services and the Service PE under Treaty Law from 
an Austrian Perspective’, 40 Intertax 566 (2012, No. 10), at 566-572. 
1359
 See OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 1: Address the tax 
challenges of the digital economy, 24 March – 14 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 24 March 2014, OECD, OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Addressing the tax challenges of 
the digital economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014, as well as Aleksandra Bal, ‘Tax Implications of 
Cloud Computing – How Real Taxes Fit into Virtual Clouds’, 66 Bulletin for International Taxation 335 (2012), and 
Oliver Heinsen et al, ‘Cloud Computing under Double Tax Treaties: A German Perspective’, 40 Intertax 584 (2012, 
No. 11), at 584-592. 
1360
 See on this matter, e.g., Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce 
and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 5-17, who refer to the changes 
in the way MNEs conduct international business, i.e., from the traditional way on a country-by-country basis to the 
adoption of new global business models, such as e-commerce and shared services or intangible assets. See for a 
comparison also Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income From International Use and Dispositions of Intellectual 
Property’, 36 Tax Law Review 233 (1980-1981), who recognizes issues in geographically locating proceeds from 
intellectual property commercialization. 
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 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 
Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1587. 
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 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at 25. 
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 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013. For some 
analysis and discussion involving the permanent establishment concept in the context of some recent OECD 
developments from a German international tax law perspective, see Lukas Hilbert et al, ‘OECD Discussion around 
the Definition of Permanent Establishments: A German view on Proposed Amendments to the Model Commentary 
and Their Effect on Business Profit Allocation and International Assignments’, 40 Intertax 462 (2012), at 462-476. 
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ventures should be tax-favored over old-school bricks-and-mortar investments. The arbitrage 
is obvious. Local markets may be serviced without things leading to effective business 
taxation. The absence of permanent establishment entails that e-business proceeds are 
attributed to the respective entity’s country of residence.
1364
 However, as the backstop nexus
concept of tax residence is mobile, the current system facilitates firms to accomplish their e-
proceeds to being substantively left untaxed by any jurisdiction. That is, as they are able to 
set-up legal entities for this purpose in low-taxing jurisdictions. This encourages tax-induced 
arbitrary profit shifting arrangements. It is no secret that this is today’s reality.
1365
 This
fundamentally undermines the single tax principle as well as the benefits principle and ability 
to pay principle.
1366
 As a result of this, various scholars have suggested amending the
permanent establishment threshold concept. That is, for instance, by reference to quantitative 
tests, such as supply-side ‘factor presence tests’ (payroll or capital threshold tests), or 
demand-side VAT-style remote seller rules (turnover threshold tests).
1367
 The alternatives to
the current permanent establishment concept are further discussed hereunder in sections 
3.3.4 and 4.4.2.2 of this chapter. 
6.3.3.3 Situs, perhaps indeed, but only by reference to ‘significant people’ 
‘Significant people functions’: its current use in international taxation 
Notably, one expression of nexus at origin in international taxation has not yet been 
discussed: the ‘significant people functions’, i.e., the performance of economic activities by 
people relevant to the multinational firm, i.e., the firm’s workers effectively. Although not 
generally being identified as such, it does provide a nexus concept at origin. Notably, it should 
be mentioned that the concept of ‘significant people functions’ is discussed at this point on its 
individual merits, i.e., separate from the context within which it is currently applied in 
international taxation. 
In current international tax practice, the concept of ‘significant people functions’ is first used in 
performing the ‘functional and factual analysis’, one of the building blocks of the generally 
applied methodology to attribute business profits to taxing jurisdictions.
1368
 The concept is
embedded in the first step of the ‘two-step analysis’, i.e., the ‘Authorised OECD Approach’ on 
the basis of which business profits generally are attributed to permanent establishments.
1369
The functional and factual analysis is being performed to constitute the various items on the 
functionally separate permanent establishment’s tax balance sheets and tax profit and loss 
accounts (‘nexus’). Moreover, it is employed to identify so-called ‘internal dealings’, i.e., 
1364
 See e.g. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-
1997), at 524 who recognizes that the rise of e-commerce will ‘accelerate’ a trend towards preferring residence-
based taxation over source-based taxation, because it will increase the difficulty of the latter. 
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 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapter 2. 
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 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 
507 (1996-1997), at 509, who refers to the undermining of the single tax principle and the benefits principle in this 
respect. Avi-Yonah argues that the single tax principle is undermined because e-commerce makes it much easier to 
earn income from cross-border transactions that is not subject to tax by any jurisdiction. The benefits principle is 
undermined because under current rules income from e-commerce may not be taxable by the source jurisdiction. 
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 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 425 (1996-1997), at 497-
499, and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-
1997), at 510, who propose to use as a concept to establish nexus for proceeds from electronic commerce a de 
minimis amount of gross income earned within the taxing jurisdiction. To establish the place of consumption, both 
Hellerstein and Avi-Yonah refer to the billing address of the customer. By doing that, they essentially advocate the 
adoption of destination based tax jurisdiction concepts in international taxation. See for a comparison also Dale Pinto, 
‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 266 
(2006), at 266-279. Notably, in its recent discussion draft on the digital economy, the OECD refers to modifying the 
permanent establishment threshold by reference to a new tax nexus standard based on ‘significant digital presence’. 
See OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 1: Address the tax challenges 
of the digital economy, 24 March – 14 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 24 March 2014, at 65. In its final report 
however the OECD seems to indicate that reform proposals would need to be found within the existing international 
tax framework; see OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; 
Addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014, at 18 and 149. 
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 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010. 
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operations or modes of property transfers within a legal entity equivalent to intra-group legal 
transactions. It should be mentioned, however, that intra-entity financing arrangements are 
not recognized as a taxable event. Accordingly, notional interest payments and notional 
dividend distributions are impossible.
1370
 Despite the use of the ‘functionally separate entity
approach’ for taxable profit attribution purposes, economic reality upholds its strongholds 
here, i.e., the firm as a unitary business. Notably, under the second step in the ‘two-step 
analysis’, the taxable business profits are allocated under the application of the arm’s length 
standard (‘allocation’). 
Further, the concept of ‘significant people functions’ is generally utilized in performing the 
‘functional and factual analysis’ in the area of transfer pricing – i.e., at least its properties 
are.
1371
 In this respect, the concept serves two purposes. First, it is used as one of the
‘comparability factors’ under the ‘comparability analysis’. Second, it is used in the area of 
transfer pricing to localize firm inputs under the application of the ‘(residual) profit split 
method’, i.e., under the ‘contribution analysis’ c.q. the ‘residual analysis’.
1372
 Notably, here the
concept is generally referred to under the term ‘functions performed’. With respect to its role 
in the comparability analysis, the assessment of the ‘functions performed’ serves the purpose 
of analyzing intra-firm legal transactions for their economic substance. Similar to the tax-
recognition of internal dealings in permanent establishment profit attribution, intra-group 
transactions are recognized as a taxable event as well.  
The role of the concept in the ‘first step’ in permanent establishment profit attribution is 
conceptually akin to its role in the ‘comparability analysis’ in transfer pricing. Analytically, the 
sole difference is the diverging legal contexts in which the concept applies. A permanent 
establishment and its head office do not constitute separate legal entities and, accordingly, 
are incapable of mutually entering into legal transactions. Conversely, the parent and its 
subsidiary do, allowing them to enter into contractual arrangements with one another. 
However, as both utilize the ‘(functionally) separate entity approach’ for profit attribution 
purposes, the matter ends up analytically at the same place, i.e., the ‘(significant people) 
functions performed’. The exception to the rule is intra-firm financing. In attributing profit to 
permanent establishments, intra-entity financing arrangements, as said, generally are not tax-
recognized (‘unitary approach’ rather than ‘functionally separate entity approach’; no thin 
capitalization issues). The converse holds true in transfer pricing with respect to intra-group 
financing arrangements (‘separate accounting’, thin capitalization issues). Intra-group legal 
1370
 Worth noting is that the OECD seems somewhat ambivalent when it comes to the financing of business 
operations carried on through permanent establishments. The OECD submits that it does not see much room for 
recognizing notional debt relationships between the permanent establishment and its deemed functionally separate 
head office in the absence of external debt. See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the 
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 157. Further, at 29 of its report on the 
attribution of profits to permanent establishments, the OECD refers to the impossibility for tax allocation purposes to 
treat one part of an entity as being able to guarantee a risk assumed by another part of the same entity. To 
substantiate things, the OECD refers at 30 and 99-104 to the internal condition of the permanent establishment that 
its creditworthiness is generally the same as the enterprise of which it is part. Indeed, this can be considered true, as 
the OECD sets forth itself, it is based in this respect on the factual situation of the enterprise, the single economic 
unit. The OECD accordingly seems to promote a unitary approach in this respect. However, when it comes to the 
attributing of ‘free’ capital to the permanent establishment, things change a bit. In that respect the OECD amongst 
others authorizes the ‘thin capitalization approach’, which basically entails that a debt to equity ratio should be 
assigned to the permanent establishment by reference to third party equivalents, i.e., as if it were an entity 
functionally separate from its head office. Consequently, the application of the ‘thin capitalization approach’ may 
result in the scenario where the aggregate amount of free capital that is attributed to the permanent establishment 
may exceed the equity capital in the enterprise as a whole (par. 134). This strikes me as odd as the OECD itself sets 
forth also that the permanent establishment’s creditworthiness is the same as the enterprise of which is it is part. That 
latter would, I assume, entail that the permanent establishment’s free capital – its ‘cushion against the crystallization 
of risks into actual losses’ – could not exceed the enterprise’s equity. That is, indeed, a unitary approach as implicitly 
favored by the OECD at earlier places in its permanent establishment profit attribution report. The adoption of a 
unitary approach accordingly seems to promote the capital approach (and the ‘fungibility approach’), i.e., some kind 
of pro rata parte allocation of equity capital among head office and permanent establishment (see par. 121-127). Yet, 
that does not correspond with the concept of treating the permanent establishment functionally separately from its 
head office, as that would promote a thin capitalization approach (and ‘tracing approach’). Notably, the converse 
holds with respect to affiliated entities. That is, with the exception of benefits of multinational synergies in debt 
financing, referred to as ‘passive association’. 
1371
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 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, Chapter 2, at section C.3.2., par. 2.118 et seq. 
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realities – the firm as segregated into separately taxed legal entities – maintain their 
strongholds here.
1373
 This differential tax treatment in the area of profit allocation between
head offices and permanent establishments on the one hand and group companies on the 
other triggers some controversies and discussions in practice as to whether this constitutes 
discriminatory tax treatment.
1374
With respect to its role in the application of the ‘(residual) profit split transfer pricing method’, 
the assessment of ‘functions performed’ serves the purpose of establishing the location of 
firm inputs (‘nexus’). This is a first step to subsequently evaluate the relative contributions of 
these firm inputs to the multinational firm profit making through the various multinational group 
entities. The profit split method is typically applied as a ‘last resort’ transfer pricing method. It 
is applied in the event that the general transaction-oriented third party benchmark approach in 
transfer pricing proves useless, due to the absence of third party comparables. In practice, 
profit splits are typically employed where the intra-group trade in fact concerns the 
multinational firm’s commercial exploitation of its high-worth, key value-driving intangible 
assets, such as its property rights over intellectual achievements (e.g., trademarks, brands, 
patent rights or know-how).
1375
 Notably, the issue of evaluating the functions performed is
discussed as an analytically separate matter in section 6.3.4. 
Situs at origin; ‘significant people functions’: the profits are where the people are 
In its spearhead role under the ‘functional and factual analysis’ in both profit attribution and 
transfer pricing, the concept of ‘significant people functions’ provides a tax jurisdiction concept 
that is oriented most directly towards identifying the location of the employed production 
factors. That is, relative to the situs concepts mentioned earlier. Under the application of the 
‘functional and factual analysis’, one essentially aims at identifying the nature of the economic 
activities undertaken within a certain jurisdiction (‘functions performed’), the utilization of 
assets in this respect (‘assets used’) and the commercial risks that are incurred in the process 
(‘risks assumed’). Subsequently, one scrutinizes the equity and debt capital that is required to 
objectively bear these risks.
1376
1373
 Worth noting is that the OECD seems to take a somewhat ambivalent approach when it comes to subsidiary 
financing. Opposite to the intra-entity equivalents, intra-group financing and guaranteeing arrangements are 
recognized for tax purposes. However, similar to PEs and head offices, while it is legally possible to assign risk to 
individual legal entities, economically, the creditworthiness of a particular group company tends to correspond with 
the creditworthiness of the multinational group of which it is part. Illustrative is the reality that group companies that 
finance their investments with debt may benefit from lower financing costs solely by reason of its affiliation with the 
group of which it is part (‘passive association’, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, par. 7.13). The OECD nevertheless does not recognize a service 
provision in the benefits from being passively associated with the group, thereby assigning the synergy benefits in 
this respect to the respective subsidiary. Notably, US federal taxation shows evidence of adopting a similar approach, 
see 26 CFR 1.482-9(k)(3)(l)(3)(v) (passive association). The separate entity approach requires the taking into 
account of the perspective of the subsidiary on a stand-alone basis, though. That would, unless I am mistaken, call 
for the recognition for tax purposes of an intra-group service provision. Yet, as such an approach slopes away from 
economic realities, i.e., the multinational group as being one entity (unitary approach), in my view, the struggling of 
the OECD with multinational synergy benefits is illustrative for the conceptual problems in the use of separate 
accounting and arm’s length pricing. This is further discussed hereunder. Notably, tax parity in line with economic 
reality may be achieved by consistently treating the multinational group as a single taxable entity, e.g., in a manner 
as discussed in Chapter 4. 
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 As regards the absence of a tax parity in the treatment of multinational operations through permanent 
establishments and subsidiaries triggers the question whether the economic reality of the multinational group as one 
economic entity should be considered, e.g., as the OECD does regarding the permanent establishment and its head 
office in the area of notional financing and guaranteeing. Should a unitary approach also be adopted in respect of the 
intra-group legal realities? The OECD considers the diverging tax treatment not to be inconsistent or discriminatory 
by pointing at the legal differences between permanent establishments and group companies. However, in my view, 
the inconsistency, indeed, arises, as the legal differences are irrelevant from an economic perspective, since the 
intra-firm economic circumstances are identical. Both scenarios deal with a single economic entity, the multinational 
firm. The OECD’s approach treats economically similar circumstances differently by pointing at the (economically 
irrelevant) intra-group legal differences. That constitutes a discriminatory tax treatment in my view. 
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 Notably, with the term exploitation is meant the utilization for profit. Cf. Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of 
Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at 333. 
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 With respect to the attribution of debt and equity, the separate entity approach basically requires an equity 
allocation that is sufficient to bear the risks assumed in conjunction with the performance of functions and the use of 
assets by the respective entity. In the area of PE profit attribution, the OECD authorized some varieties in 
approaches in this area, e.g., the so-called ‘capital allocation approach’ and ‘fungibility approach’, as well as the 
‘capital allocation approach’ and ‘tracing approach’ mentioned in the above. This is not further discussed. For some 
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The term ‘significant people functions’ aims at identifying the geographical location where the 
relevant people for the multinational firm’s business operations perform their economic 
activities.
1377
 Significant people are basically the firm’s workers who actively make decisions
on entering into the performed business operations, manage the risks involved in the 
business processes and utilize the firm’s property. Significant people are those who are 
authorized, responsible and competent to perform the relevant functions in the business 
process.
1378
 In addition, as the OECD considers that equity and debt capital follow the
economic risks incurred, which for their part follow the functions performed,
1379
 and as it
considers that assets are to be allocated geographically to the taxing jurisdictions in which the 
significant people utilize them for the benefit of the firm’s business operations – i.e., rather 
than where these assets are physically located –
1380
 things boil down to the following nexus
concept: the profits are where the significant people are.
1381
This approach, economically, makes some sense, that is, to the extent that one pursues the 
objective of allocating business income to the state of origin. In a business environment, 
economic power, profit and value (today’s worth of expected future profits) as well as the 
accompanying commercial risks tend to converge.
1382
 Only the effective property owner may 
elaboration, see OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010. 
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 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, and for some discussion Danny Oosterhoff, ‘The True Importance of Significant 
People Functions’, 15 International Transfer Pricing Journal 68 (2008). 
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 See for instance the ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court in the so-called ‘dividend mixer cases’, Dutch Supreme 
Court, Nos. 37 652 and 40 586, Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 2003/246, and 
Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 2008/255. 
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 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 91: “capital follows risk”. Moreover, the OECD, idem, at 70: “risks follow the 
functions performed”. Further, idem, e.g., at 72, the OECD sets forth that the property rights relating to “assets follow 
the significant people”. In addition to this, idem, at 57: “profit follows functions” (i.e., activities). Accordingly, the matter 
basically boils down to the discovering of the location of the significant people, as the profits should be there where 
these significant people perform their business functions. See for a comparison OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Chapter 1 at par. 1.45-1.49. 
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 Accordingly, proceeds from distant manufacturing operations performed by utilizing mobile wireless ICT 
technologies, would, e.g., be assigned for tax purposes to the country where the significant people perform their 
functions. The exception to the rule is immovable property. The OECD Model Convention assigns the taxing rights 
with respect to income derived from the commercial exploitation of real estate consistently to the country in which the 
real estate is situated.  
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 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 24, par. 57: “the approach is linking the earning of profit to the performance of 
functions equating functions to activities.” 
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 See, e.g., Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000). See also 
Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income From International Use and Dispositions of Intellectual Property’, 36 Tax 
Law Review 233 (1980-1981),at 257, who refers to the association between ownership (power) and the rights to profit 
through the property’s economic utilization. See further, OECD, Discussion Draft; Revision of the Special 
Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Related Provisions, 6 June 
to 14 September 2012, OECD, Paris, 2012, reflecting on the pivotal role of the concept of control, at par. 41: 
“Moreover where associated enterprises are retained to perform functions related to the development, enhancement, 
maintenance or protection of intangibles, it is expected that, in a situation where contractual entitlements and 
functions are in alignment, the party or parties claiming contractual entitlement to intangible related returns will 
exercise control over the performance of those functions and the associated risks, will bear the necessary costs 
required to support the performance of the function, and will provide arm’s length compensation to any associated 
enterprise physically performing a relevant function.”, and, at par. 54: “In summary, for a member of an MNE group to 
be entitled to intangible related returns, it should in substance, perform and control ..., bear and control …” Further, 
see the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, 
on the matter at par 1.45: “Usually, in the open market, the assumption of increased risk would also be compensated 
by an increase in the expected return, although the actual return may or may not increase depending on the degree 
to which the risks are actually realised.”, at par. 1.49: “In arm’s length transactions it generally makes sense for 
parties to be allocated a greater share of those risks over which they have relatively more control.”, at par. 9.23 on 
business restructurings: “In the context of paragraph 1.49, “control” should be understood as the capacity to make 
decisions to take on the risk (decision to put the capital at risk) and decisions on whether and how to manage the 
risk, internally or using an external provider. This would require the company to have people – employees or directors 
– who have the authority to, and effectively do, perform these control functions. Thus, when one party bears a risk,
the fact that it hires another party to administer and monitor the risk on a day-to-day basis is not sufficient to transfer 
the risk to that other party.”, at par. 9.29: “Another relevant, although not determinative factor that can assist in the 
determination of whether a risk allocation in a controlled transaction is one which would have been agreed between 
independent parties in comparable circumstances is whether the risk-bearer has, at the time when risk is allocated to 
it, the financial capacity to assume (i.e. to take on) the risk.”, at par. 9.39: “In general, the consequence for one party 
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exercise the bundle of ownership privileges, utilize them for the benefit of its business 
operations, make the decisions on the forms of commercial exploitation and investment, and 
effectively bears the risks involved. Control (i.e., regardless of the legalities), profit/loss, and 
value are inextricably linked. And, in the end, it is people who decide on business matters, not 
equipment or legal constructs. It is sometimes said that “[t]he real measure of a company’s 
value is now seen to rest on its people and technology-software ideas rather than its 
hardware equipment and real estate”.
1383
 Accordingly, fundamentally, the origin of income
refers to the human intervention or intellectual element as the quintessential component for 
actual wealth creation, recognizing income to originate where people actually perform 
economic activities. In view of the origin-based tax jurisdiction concepts that are present in the 
international tax regime, this is acknowledged to its fullest by the concept of ‘significant 
people functions’.
1384
6.3.3.4 ‘Significant people’: all the multinational’s employees, calling for ‘labor factor 
presence test’ 
So, who are these significant people? Who should be identified as being ‘significant’? The 
OECD refers to a spectrum of people functions ranging from support or auxiliary functions to 
significant functions relevant to the attribution of economic ownership of assets and/or the 
assumption of risk.
1385
 It is the significant people we are looking for. While thinking of this, the
picture of a Russian matryoshka doll comes into my mind. The quest for significant people 
seems to require a break-down of the functions performed into ever smaller sub-functions to 
be separately appraised at their fair market values in the subsequent allocation process. It 
seems that this would end up in assessing the activities undertaken by each individual 
worker. With respect to intangible asset creation, development and exploitation, the OECD 
refers to significant people as those involved in the active decision-making and management 
of the respective assets, i.e., the management below strategic level of senior 
management.
1386
 Let us refer to the firm’s ‘middle management’ in this respect, the
intermediate executives. 
Although I understand the pragmatics of this approach, it begs an answer to the question of 
whether the OECD a contrario considers people performing functions within the multinational 
other than ‘significant people functions’ to be ‘insignificant’, i.e., not to add value to the 
multinational firm. Should that be considered true? Do these ‘insignificant’ people, i.e., 
identified a contrario as the firm’s upper management and lower management, as well as the 
operational workforce, not add value to the firm? Are they economically worthless? 
Insignificant? I would answer this question in the negative. First, this strikes me as odd, 
considering that management is also and simultaneously used in international tax to direct the 
of being allocated the risk associated with a controlled transaction, where such a risk allocation is found to be 
consistent with the arm’s length principle, is that such party should: bear the cost … and generally be compensated 
by an increase in the expected return”, and, at par. 9.41: “risk carries profit potential”. Finally, see, OECD, Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 179: “In arm’s length dealings, it generally makes sense for parties to be allocated a greater share over 
risks over which they have relatively more control.” 
1383
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 6. 
1384
 See for a comparison Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘Source of income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the 
Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based Approach’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 430 (2006). As the shifting of 
people functions accordingly entails the shifting of profits, this may explain the legislative efforts undertaken in 
German tax legislation to subject hidden reserves, i.e., the current worth of expected future earnings, to corporate tax 
upon the relocation of functions to abroad. See for some discussions on this matter Patrick Cauwenbergh et al, ‘The 
New German Transfer Pricing Rules on Cross-Border Relocation of Functions: A Preliminary Analysis’, 48 European 
Taxation 514 (2008), at 514-526, Peter H. Dehnen, ‘Germany’s New Transfer Pricing Rules on Transfers of Business 
Functions Abroad’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 508 (2008), Heinz-Klaus Kroppen et al, ‘Regulation on 
Business Restructuring: Decree-Law on the Relocation of Functions’, 16 International Transfer Pricing Journal 63 
(2009), Stephan Rasch et al, ‘OECD Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings’, 2 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 100 (2009), Stephan Rasch et al, ‘OECD Guidelines on Business Restructuring 
and German Transfer of Function Regulations: Do Both Jeopardize the Existing Arm’s Length Principle?’, 18 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 57 (2011). 
1385
 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 62. 
1386
 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 87. 
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tax place of residence, and with that the entitlement to tax those profits that cannot be 
attributed to the permanent establishment abroad. Second, substantively, I would say that, as 
a multinational firm strives for profit maximization, every individual worker would need to be 
considered ‘significant’, i.e., in an academic sense of the language used. If a particular worker 
is non-productive, he does not do its work properly and therefore does not add value to the 
firm. In other words, if he is insignificant, I would assume that this worker would be let go. 
That is, under the assumption of the absence of labor market imperfections. For that reason 
and as a necessary consequence, every worker whose employment contract is not 
terminated apparently proves its significance. 
As a result, seen from that perspective, the adoption of the concept of ‘significant people 
functions’ ends up establishing nexus within every jurisdiction in which the multinational has 
its worker(s) operational. This seems a fair position to take, as the OECD itself, for instance, 
sets forth that the active decision-making and management may often be devolved 
throughout the entire enterprise.
1387
 Indeed, multinationals operate integrated global business
enterprises. And if the rents are produced by the firm’s workers, it seems to make sense to 
geographically localize corporate rents by geographically localizing its workforces; that is, 
under a supply-view income assignment. Yet, the presence of a workforce does not trigger 
the presence of a permanent establishment. 
Notably, it is worth mentioning that it has been argued in tax literature that the concept of 
‘significant people functions’ accordingly provides a profit sharing approach conceptually 
similar to some kind of payroll formulary apportionment (‘payroll-FA’), i.e., the apportionment 
of corporate profit to taxing jurisdictions solely by reference to salaries and wages paid.
1388
 To
be honest, while recognizing the conceptual similarities, I am not sure whether that is actually 
the case. In international taxation, the ‘significant people functions’ concept constitutes a 
nexus expression. It does not say anything about the subsequent allocation process, i.e., the 
division of the overall corporate profit across tax jurisdictions. Payroll-FA, indeed, includes a 
nexus component similar to the concept of ‘significant people functions’ in international tax, as 
it seeks to identify the location where the workers exercise their employment contracts.
1389
However, payroll-FA proceeds by subsequently attributing corporate profit to taxing 
jurisdictions directly proportional to wages and salaries paid.
1390
 This differentiates from the
approach taken in international taxation. International tax, subsequent to the establishment of 
tax jurisdiction, e.g., by reference to the ‘functional and factual analysis’, proceeds to allocate 
corporate profits across countries, e.g., by reference to an endogenous evaluation of the 
relative contributions of significant functions performed. That is, converse to payroll-FA, it 
does not seek to attribute profits directly proportional to wage costs. It basically seeks to 
evaluate the significant workers’ inputs at their fair value. Accordingly, only ‘step 1’ in 
international tax and payroll-FA analytically coincide. Kindly note that the German local trade 
tax (‘Gewerbesteuer’) levied by the German municipalities operates a payroll-only formulary 
system that geographically divides the trade tax regarding ‘multi-municipal’ business 
operations.
1391
All in all, nexus at origin, indeed, may be identified, provided that the proper instrument is 
chosen out of the available alternatives. It seems that the instrument oriented to discovering 
situs most directly is the ‘significant people functions’. Rather than utilizing the concepts of 
nationality, residence, or the old-fashioned ‘permanent establishment’ threshold, it may 
perhaps be worthwhile to just aim at geographically locating the multinational firm’s workers 
for corporate tax nexus purposes.  
1387
 See, e.g., OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, at Chapter 3 
1388
 See e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better 
International tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World Tax 
Journal 371 (2011), at 393. 
1389
 Reference is made to the payroll factors in formulary apportionment (United States, European Union CCCTB 
proposal) and formulary allocation (Canada). 
1390
 Payroll-FA provides for a proxy. Empirical evidence suggests that payroll and corporate profit do not correlate 
directly proportionally. See James R. Hines Jr., ‘Income misattribution under formula apportionment’, 54 European 
Economic Review 108 (2010, No. 1), at 108-120. 
1391
 See § 29 (Zerlegungsmaßstab) in conjunction with § 31 (Begriff der Arbeitslöhne für die Zerlegung) of the 
German Trade Tax Act (Gewerbesteurgesetz, GewStG). This is not further discussed. For some reading and 
analysis, see Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009). 
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Accordingly, the supply side of income basically and essentially seems to call for some 
alternative nexus concept that makes reference to the presence of workers within a tax 
jurisdiction. The taxable presence of multinational, e.g., could then be achieved by means of 
some quantitative ‘labor factor presence test’, which refers to, e.g., the operations undertaken 
by the multinational workforce within a country (‘workforce presence test’, or ‘PE-when-
functions-performed-rule’) – subject to a de minimis threshold (‘payroll State A exceeds 
amount €x’).
1392
 Some kind of an ‘asset factor presence test’, a ‘debt and equity factor
presence test’, a ‘capital factor presence test’, or perhaps even a ‘risk factor presence test’, 
do not seem to be required as both capital and risk, as well as the assets used, follow the 
functions performed by the significant people – that is, the firm’s workers.
1393
 Let us proceed
with allocation. 
6.3.4 Allocation in international taxation, why SA/ALS fails 
6.3.4.1 Allocation required to evaluate taxable presence 
The second step in the process of geographically attributing multinational business income to 
taxing jurisdictions, subsequent to the identification of nexus and a taxable presence, is the 
evaluation of localized firm inputs. Multinational profits need to be divided geographically 
among the jurisdictions in which it is operational. But how? 
The instruments used in international taxation for this purpose, both in respect of the 
attribution of profits to PEs and to affiliated entities, are the ‘(functionally) separate approach’ 
or ‘separate accounting’ (‘SA’) and the ‘arm’s length principle’ or the ‘arm’s length standard’ 
(‘ALS’). The SA/ALS methodology is commonly referred to as ‘transfer pricing’. 
However, unfortunately, SA/ALS seems destined to be inadequate to serve its designated 
purpose, both conceptually and pragmatically. SA/ALS fails to provide an objective instrument 
to allocate corporate profit inter-jurisdictionally. Let us assess why that is. 
6.3.4.2 Transfer pricing: a world of ‘smoke (SA) and mirrors (ALS)’ causing the 
‘continuum price problem’ 
6.3.4.2.1 A ‘universe of pretense’ 
Ultimately, to divide the multinational’s total profit among the nation states involved, the 
international tax regime seeks to identify its relative contributions to the production of 
corporate profits within those states. The system accordingly aims at evaluating net value 
added at origin (situs).
1394
The methodology generally used for this purpose, transfer pricing, is built on two fictions: the 
‘separate entity approach’ and the ‘arm’s length standard’.
1395
 The transfer pricing system
1392
 The approach taken in Article 15 OECD Model Tax Convention, perhaps, could provide some inspiration in 
designing such an alternative ‘permanent-establishment-when-functions-performed-rule’. 
1393
 Vleggeert, for instance, suggests to allocate the group’s worldwide third-party debt by reference to its assets 
used, i.e., some kind of ‘asset-factor debt allocation key’; see Jan Vleggeert, ‘Interest Deduction Based on the 
Allocation of Worldwide Debt’, 68 Bulletin for International Taxation 103 (2014), at 103-107. The US international tax 
system makes use of an assets based formulary mechanism to allocate interest expenses; see 26 CFR 1.861-9T – 
Allocation and apportionment of interest expense (temporary).  
1394
 Cf. Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 712, Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing 
Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international 
taxation 586 (2002), at 587, and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 
Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275. Worth noting is that the SA/ALS standard may be considered a 
product of history rather than argument. See Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 
30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 1986). Cf. Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to 
Transfer Pricing – Should the Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 
Journal of Australian Taxation 196 (2004).  
1395
 See for a comparison, Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing 
– Should the Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian 
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implicitly assumes that the apparent tax-independent constituent parts making up a 
multinational (SA), ‘operating in concert, earn the same amount of income as would a group 
of unrelated entities operating in their own self-interests’ (ALS).
1396
 However, this is not reality.
In reality, the multinational group operates as a single entity (see also Chapter 4),
1397
 and its
integrated business units share a joint interest, i.e., the objective of maximizing profit, the goal 
of generating infra-marginal returns. As transfer pricing accordingly defies reality, it has been 
referred to by commentators to operate in a ‘universe of pretense’, a mysterious “world of 
smoke and mirrors”,
1398
 as in ‘Alice’s adventures in Wonderland’, “turning reality into fancy,
pretending it to be the real world”.
1399
So, the international tax regime has created fictions to capture reality. That is not necessarily 
problematic. No problems would arise if the regime fulfills its task. Yet, the fictions created in 
tax cause a real-world problem: ‘the continuum price problem’. 
6.3.4.2.2 Fiction 1: The ‘smoke’ – multinational firm is single entity in reality, yet 
separate accounting (SA) in tax is the standard 
Let us proceed, and, first, assess the ‘smoke’ (separate accounting; SA). In today’s 
globalizing economy, multinationals operate as a single economic entity for the purpose of 
maximizing its rents on a global scale.
1400
 The multinational business operations are
functionally integrated, typically both vertically and horizontally.
1401
 That is regardless of
Taxation 196 (2004), and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin 
for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275. See for some details of the historical origins of the arm’s length standard 
Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 1986), and 
Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 30. 
1396
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 277. See also Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; 
The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income 
Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Working Paper 2006:9, at 7. 
1397
 Notably, in Chapter 4, I advocate taxing multinational firms as a single taxable entity by means of tax 
consolidation. See for a comparison Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 178: “ 
(…) rationale for taxing affiliated companies on a consolidated basis is acknowledging the fact that taxing businesses 
on a separate entity approach artificially divides up the profits earned by unitary enterprises.” 
1398
 See e.g., Michelle Markham, The transfer pricing of intangibles (2005), quoting R.J. Misey Jr. at 23. 
1399
 See Jerome R. Hellerstein, ‘Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting with 
Formulary Apportionment’, 60 Tax Notes 1131 (23 August 1993), at 1136-1145. See further Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation’, University of Michigan 
Law School, John M, Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 07-017 (2007), arguing that the arm’s 
length standard does not reflect economic reality. Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to 
International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 832. 
1400
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 264: “Indeed, without much 
exaggeration, one might define the multinational as a legal structure for obtaining economic rents on a global scale, 
particularly marketing rents and rents from intangible property.” Further, cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall 
of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, John M, 
Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 07-017 (2007). See also Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for 
Unitary Taxation of International Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201 (2008), at 203 and David L.P. 
Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 (2004), at 57. Further, see Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the 
Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 1986), at 657, who sets forth that the affiliates of a 
multinational do not necessarily treat other affiliates as wholly separate corporations. Further see Jerome R. 
Hellerstein, ‘Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting with Formulary 
Apportionment’, 60 Tax Notes 1131 (23 August 1993), at 1136-1145. Worth noting is OECD, Discussion Draft; 
Revision of the Special Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and 
Related Provisions, 6 June to 14 September 2012, OECD, Paris, 2012, at par. 83, reflecting an implicit appreciation 
by the OECD of the multinational’s common profit motive: “… is consistent with the assumption that MNE groups 
seek to optimize resources allocations, at least on an after tax basis.” 
1401
 Notably, vertical integration occurs when a multinational engages into two or more primary economic activities 
within the same value chain (e.g., manufacturing and distribution of a product or product line). Horizontal integration 
occurs when a multinational engages into economic activities within two or more value chains (e.g. manufacturing 
and distribution of two or more products or product lines). See for some discussion David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The 
Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer 
Pricing Journal 55 (2004), at 58. 
334
whether the firm operates its business enterprise through a branch structure or a subsidiary 
structure.
1402
However, in taxation, multinationals are deemed to be segregated into (functionally) separate 
entities for profit allocation purposes, able to enter into internal tax-recognized arrangements. 
Legal entities and permanent establishments are deemed to operate on a stand-alone basis 
in this respect, (functionally) separate from the multinational firm from which they are an 
integral part, i.e., the concept of the ‘(functionally) separate entity’ or ‘separate accounting’.
1403
Separate entities that are part of a functionally integrated multinational firm are referred to as 
‘associated enterprises’.
1404
 Companies and corporations typically even constitute single
taxpayers for corporate tax purposes (see also Chapter 4). As a consequence, dealings and 
legal transactions internal to the firm are recognized for tax allocation purposes. These 
constitute a taxable event. This ‘transactional approach’ entails a break-down of the 
aggregate of internal relations within an integrated group into a multitude of separately 
distinguished transactions.
1405
Accordingly, the concept of separate accounting constitutes ‘fiction 1’, the ‘smoke’, since, in 
reality, multinationals are not functionally segregated. Worth noting is that the OECD also 
refers to the ‘functionally separate entity approach’ for PEs as a ‘mere fiction’.
1406
Economically, the same is true for the utilization of the ‘separate entity approach’ for affiliated 
entities.
1407
 The (functionally) separate entity approach for both PEs and group companies
initiates a fictitious turn of events. It entails the recognition of intra-group legal reality for tax 
allocation purposes, devoid of economic ratios, and hence, a fiction as well.
1408
 As will be
shown, this lies at the heart of the issues that have emerged.
1409
6.3.4.2.3 The consequence: a potential for arbitrage 
In a cross-border context, the recognition of intra-firm legal realities for tax allocation 
purposes triggers a potential for arbitrage: ‘paper profit-shifting’.
1410
 As the various sub-units
1402
 Cf. Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 199, and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275. 
1403
 Cf. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, 
Preface at par. 5, as well as at par. 1.6, as well as OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on 
the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 8-11. 
1404
 The OECD Model Tax Convention considers enterprises to be associated where a) an enterprise of a Contracting 
State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting 
State (e.g. parent and subsidiary), or where b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State (e.g., ‘sister’ 
companies). See Article 9(1) OECD Model Tax Convention. For some reading and analysis, see Ramon S.J. 
Dwarkasing, ‘The Concept of Associated Enterprise’, 41 Intertax 412 (2013), at 412-429.  
1405
 See for a comparison 26 CFR 1.482-1(b)(2)(ii) in conjunction with 26 CFR 1.482-1(f)(2)(i) (Aggregation of 
transactions). 
1406
 See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 11 and 176. 
1407
 Interestingly, the OECD considers the opposite to hold for group companies. In its Report on the Attribution of 
Profits to Permanent Establishments, the OECD refers to the separate entity approach for subsidiaries as reality. See 
OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 13 and 176. Contra OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, as the OECD considers the multinational to constitute a single entity at 25. 
1408
 See Jerome R. Hellerstein, ‘Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting with 
Formulary Apportionment’, 60 Tax Notes 1131 (23 August 1993), at 1136-1145. 
1409
 See also Sol Picciotto, ‘Transfer pricing is still dead ... From Independent Entity Back to the Unitary Principle’,  
73 Tax Notes International 13 (6 January 2014), at 13-18. 
1410
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 7: “… it is well known that the SA 
methodology gives MNEs scope for strategic tax planning and tax avoidance, to the detriment of collection of public 
revenues. In particular, the current arm’s length-based system for multinational groups to shift taxable profits between 
each Member State provides possibilities for multinational groups to shift taxable profits between the different EU 
countries in which they operate (ie, by strategically manipulating the internal transfer prices of their intra-group 
transactions or by altering the financial structure of the group members in order to minimize the groups’ overall tax 
liabilities) This causes tax-induced distortions to the international allocation of corporate tax bases across EU 
335
(subsidiary or branch) of the multinational firm that are deemed functionally segregated for tax 
allocation purposes in fact are functionally integrated, the tax recognized intra-firm 
transactions and dealings are not founded on real world third-party market factors.
1411
In a third-party business environment, the agreed prices and contractual terms underlying the 
provisions of products and services are the outcome of a bargaining process in which the 
parties involved have opposing economic interests. The established value of the transaction 
lies outside the control of the individual parties entering into it. This makes it feasible for tax 
allocation purposes to rely on the legalities in this regard, as these are the outcome of a third-
party bargaining process. In such a third-party business environment, the mutually opposing 
economic interests of the parties involved constitute the market forces that drive the fair 
market value of the property transfer.
1412
 In such a case, legalities and fair market value may 
fairly be considered to match. Aggressive tax planning operations, for instance, typically do 
not occur outside the controlled environment within the functionally integrated multinational 
firm.
1413
 With respect to third-party transactions, it may be argued that a sufficient ‘self-
policing mechanism’ exists in the form of the opposing underlying economic interests that 
drive third-party market transactions in a competitive business environment.
1414
In an intra-firm environment, however, such opposing economic interests are absent. Here, 
the market forces are directed differently. They converge, as the multinational and its 
functionally integrated parts share a common economic interest: the optimization of the 
combination’s after-tax economic rents.
1415
 As a consequence, the internal transfer prices of
intra-firm transactions and dealings are of no commercial significance to the multinational 
firm, since it merely reallocates taxable profit internally. 
As a result, the recognition of intra-firm transactions and dealings for tax allocation purposes 
provides an incentive to the multinational firm. The transactional approach affects the 
volumes of taxable profits realized by the segregated parts of the firm in the jurisdictions in 
which they are active. Furthermore, corporate tax constitutes a cost from a micro-business 
economics perspective. Consequently, the common objective of optimizing multinational after-
tax profits triggers the associated enterprises involved to utilize the (functionally) separate 
entity approach for their benefit and strategically set the transfer prices for intra-firm 
provisions of goods and services. That is, for the purpose of subsequently shifting taxable 
countries and is an additional reason for tax competition among national governments (further than the traditional tax 
competition for real investment), as identified by recent literature)…” 
1411
 Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 825. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 1.2: “When independent enterprises transact with each other, the 
conditions of their commercial and financial relations (e.g. the price of goods transferred or services provided and the 
conditions of the transfer or provision) ordinarily are determined by market forces. When associated enterprises 
transact with each other, their commercial and financial relations may not be directly affected by external market 
forces in the same way,” and, for a comparison, at par. 9.13 regarding the transfer pricing of business restructurings 
(i.e., for transfer pricing purposes defined as the cross-border redeployment by a multinational enterprise of functions, 
assets and/or risks; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, 
Paris, 2010, par. 9.1. Further, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, par. 9.48: “A business restructuring may involve cross-border transfers of 
something of value, e.g. of valuable intangibles, although this is not always the case. It may also or alternatively 
involve the termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements, e.g. manufacturing arrangements, 
distribution arrangements, licenses, service agreements, etc.” 
1412
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), 
at 547. The fair market value of property may be defined as: “the price at which the property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of all relevant facts and with equity to both (i.e., the exchange will be fair and neither will gain 
advantage in negotiation or in the terms of sale).” See for a comparison Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of 
Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at 156, and William P. Elliot, ‘Development, Ownership and 
Licensing of Intellectual and Intangible Properties – Including Trademarks, Trade Names and Franchises’, Taxation 
of Corporate Transactions 21 (2004), at 50. 
1413
 See for a comparison Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 177, and 
Benjamin F. Miller, ‘None Are So Blind as Those Who Will Not See’, 66 Tax Notes 1023 (13 February 1995), at 1030. 
1414
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38, Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 
177, and Benjamin F. Miller, ‘None Are So Blind as Those Who Will Not See’, 66 Tax Notes 1023 (13 February 
1995), at 1030. 
1415
 Cf. Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary Taxation of International Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 201 (2008), at 201.  
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earnings and profits to the relatively low-taxing jurisdictions and deductible expenses and 
losses to the relatively high-taxing jurisdictions. 
The arbitrage potential as made available obviously begs to be employed as a tool to shift 
taxable profit to reduce the global AETR. It is no secret that strategic transfer pricing 
arrangements are set up by multinationals as a means to achieve this exact purpose.
1416
 Note
that key for the arbitrage potential is that the market forces driving the values of transactions 
in an intra-firm environment differ from those in a third-party business environment. 
6.3.4.2.4 Fiction 2: The ‘mirrors’ – arm’s length standard (ALS) in tax to counter 
arbitrage potential created, yet in reality firm derives rents 
In international tax, the arbitrage is sought to be resolved through the introduction of a second 
fiction: the arm’s length standard (‘ALS’) – the ‘mirrors’. For tax allocation purposes, it has 
been deemed that the tax-recognized intra-firm transactions undertaken by the parts of the 
firm that are deemed functionally segregated are driven by third-party market forces.
1417
 It is
hypothesized that associated enterprises set their transfer prices as if they are unaffiliated. 
Accordingly, the charging for the provision of goods or services by one segment of the firm to 
another segment of the same firm occurs by reference to a third-party equivalent. What would 
a third-party do? The ratio underlying the arm’s length standard is to promote the tax parity of 
affiliated and unaffiliated taxable corporate entities.
1418
 Accordingly, SA/ALS seeks to tax-treat
different economic circumstances on par, and, hence, implicitly promotes inequity and the 
non-neutrality of legal form.
1419
The benchmark utilized to obtain the arm’s length transfer price (or range of arm’s length 
prices)
1420
 is the comparable price (or range of prices) for a comparable transaction as would
be undertaken by third parties in comparable circumstances.
1421
 For this purpose, a
comparison is made between the controlled transfer price and the uncontrolled ‘third-party 
price’ or ‘third-party range’.
1422
 The assessment undertaken in the quest to determine the fair
market value(s) of the intra-firm transaction(s) is referred to as the third-party ‘comparability 
analysis’.
1423
 In practice, the analysis is generally performed by reference to profit level
indicators found in publicly available financial data (annual accounts, reports, et cetera), 
1416
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International 
Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, John M, Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 07-017 
(2007), and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 199, as well as Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin 
for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275.  
1417
 Cf. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, 
Preface at par. 6, as well as par. 1.6. 
1418
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 1.8. Cf. U.S. Regulations, 26 CFR 1.482-1(a)(1).  
1419
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 713. Devereux argues that the placing of a 
controlled taxpayer with an uncontrolled taxpayer on a tax parity entails inequality. He further sets forth that the 
required treatment of intra-group transactions by making reference to outsourced equivalents induces a distortion of 
the choice of organizational form and in the level of investment undertaken. 
1420
 On arm’s length price ranges, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 3.63-3.66. See also 26 CFR 1.482-1(e). 
1421
 Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 830. 
1422
 Transactions are typically considered comparable if none of the differentials could materially affect the factor 
being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin) or if reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to 
eliminate the material effects of any such differences. 
1423
 For the purpose of determining the comparability of the intra-firm transaction with a third-party transaction, the 
OECD forwards its ‘five factors of comparability’: (1) the specific characteristics of the property or services being 
purchased or sold; (2) the functions performed by the parties to the transaction (taking into account assets used and 
risks assumed); (3) the contractual terms and conditions employed; (4) the economic circumstances of the parties 
involved, and; (5) the business strategies pursued by the parties. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at section D.1.2 and Chapter III. See also 
OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 183 and 189-194. The US adopts similar comparability factors in its 
Section 482 Treasury Regulations, see 26 CFR 1.482-1(d). 
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commonly made accessible and manageable via commercial databases.
1424
 The primary 
burden of establishing the arm’s length nature of the reported taxable profit is typically passed 
on to the taxpayer, i.e., profit allocation is a ‘DIY-affair’.
1425
To the extent that associated enterprises are not considered to set their prices at arm’s 
length, the taxable profits realized accordingly are adjusted to an arm’s length standard. The 
non-businesslike transfer price is adjusted to a businesslike transfer price. To achieve single 
taxation, a transfer pricing adjustment in one state may be followed by a reverse adjustment 
in the other state (i.e., the ‘corresponding adjustment’).
1426
 Administrative procedures are
typically available as a means to this end (mutual agreement procedures or sometimes 
arbitration procedures).
1427
 The final allocated profit is the result of offsets among the whole
body of intra-group transactions.  
In reality, however, as said, intra-firm modes of transfers are not driven by third-party market 
forces. ALS hypothesizes a market environment that is opposite to business economics 
realities. It neglects that there is a commercial reason for a multinational firm to decide to 
keep certain economic activities in-house, rather than to outsource them to a third-party. That 
is, as the firm strives for profit optimization, that decision would be the more profitable one. 
ALS essentially requires answering the question “what would have happened if the ownership 
link had been absent and the respective entity was motivated by its own economic 
interest?”
1428
 But in reality, the ownership link is present and the multinational’s business units
are motivated by the shared economic interest of deriving economic rents for the benefit of 
the multinational firm. ALS feigns a market which actually is not there, i.e., ‘fiction 2’, 
accordingly. Perhaps, it is not that surprising that SA/ALS is incapable of yielding sensible 
results.
1429
6.3.4.2.5 The consequence: the ‘continuum price problem’ 
The stacking of fictions renders the system broken 
1424
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, Chapter III, section A.4.3. 
1425
 Typically, for tax administration purposes, MNEs are required to comply with strict documentation requirements, 
requiring them to carefully monitor, substantiate and administer the intra-group transactions undertaken. Accordingly, 
while it is the states involved that are primarily interested in taxing their share of multinational profits, it is the 
multinational that is the first to substantiate the appropriate transfer price. For some comments on the division of the 
burden of proof in transfer pricing and documentation requirements, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at Chapters IV (par. 4.11-4.17) and V. See 
also OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 224-226. 
1426
 See Article 9(2) OECD Model Tax Convention. For some further comments on corresponding adjustments, see 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 
Chapter IV, par. 4.32-4.39. 
1427
 Mutual agreement procedures under Article 25 OECD Model Tax Convention may for instance lead to bi-
/multilateral advance pricing agreements (so-called ‘MAP-APAs’). See for some comments on the mutual agreement 
procedure OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at Chapter IV, par. 4.29-4.31. On administrative approaches to avoid and resolve transfer pricing disputes 
forwarded by the OECD, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at Chapter IV, par. 4.166-4.168. Notably, within the European Union, the 
European Union Arbitration Convention applies, enabling taxpayers to bring transfer pricing issues before an 
arbitration court issuing a binding resolution. Many double tax conventions make arbitration available. To the extent 
that they do not, the states involved are not legally required to reach agreement on the transfer prices set. Double 
(non-)taxation may be the consequence – as was for instance the case in the infamous $3.4 billion GlaxoSmithKline 
settlement. 
1428
 Cf. Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 249 and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286. See also Steve Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – 
On Balance Better’, 28 Law and Policy in International Business 1133 (1996-1997), at 1136. 
1429
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines A Proposal for 
Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 5. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate 
Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion 
Paper 2007:08, at 8. 
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The stacking of fictions in taxation has an unfortunate real-world consequence. It creates the 
so-called ‘continuum price problem’, rendering the SA/ALS-system broken.
1430
 As said,
SA/ALS deems the segregated parts of the multinational to earn an equivalent amount of 
income as would a group of unrelated entities, motivated by their own commercial interests. 
However, “[t]he multinational firms did not come to dominate international markets by earning 
the same profits as their local competitors”.
1431
 Multinationals derive economic rents, excess
earnings, which explains not only their presence in the market, but their survival in a 
competitive business environment as well. The key problem with SA/ALS is its incapability to 
properly account for these rents. 
SA/ALS would perhaps work in a fictitious world of perfect competition without specialty 
products. In such an environment, it would be immaterial whether activities are outsourced or 
kept in-house. General profit maximization theory suggests that marginal returns in such a 
case diminish and end up at zero (i.e., profit reaches its maximum point where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost). Further, the intuition is that as long as profit-making 
possibilities are available, competitors will enter the market to provide comparable products 
and services. That would push down prices until the point of equilibrium where the profit is 
nil.
1432
Accordingly, that would imply that in such a fictitious world the SA/ALS-system would 
ultimately produce transfer prices set at cost, i.e., without a profit mark-up. In theory, such a 
pricing without a mark-up would not be problematic, as no marginal profits would be made. 
Interestingly, that would also imply that corporate tax would end-up being abolished, as 
marginal profit would simply diminish.
1433
 In such a world without profits, there would be no
need for profit taxation. A fortiori, a profit division mechanism would be redundant as well. 
SA/ALS would work in a world without the need to split profits among jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, in such a world multinationals operating integrated businesses would not exist. 
Viz., as there would be no room for economic rents – the key driver behind the real-world 
emergence of multinationals – there would be no need to functionally integrate business.
1434
Tragically, the fictitious world of SA/ALS would only work in a fictitious world of perfect 
competition where profit is nil. 
Internalization theory: keeping matters in-house is more profitable 
In reality though, there is no perfect competition. The very reason that multinationals exist 
boils down from the commercial benefits available from economic integration relative to 
1430
 To the best of my knowledge, the term has been mentioned first by Langbein. See Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The 
Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 1986), at section 3. Langbein 
provides for some US tax case law to substantiate his thesis. He also addresses the potential for promoting (or at 
least tolerating) undertaxation effects as a consequence of the matter. Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall 
of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, The 
John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper 2007:73, who refers to the created taxable profit shifting 
opportunities as a consequence of this. See also Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible 
Assets, E-Commerce and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 15. See 
further Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 
34, Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 832 and 840, as well as Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary Taxation of International 
Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201 (2008), at 206, David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length 
Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 
(2004), and Erik Röder, ‘Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as Alternative to a CCCTB with Formulary Apportionment’, 
4 World Tax Journal 125 (2012), at section 2. See also Steve Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – 
On Balance Better’, 28 Law and Policy in International Business 1133 (1996-1997), at 1159. Also the OECD refers to 
this argument. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, 
Paris, 2010, at par. 1.10. 
1431
 Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 277. 
1432
 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et 
al (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 334: “… in competitive industries there are no economic profits 
except as a transitory phenomenon.” 
1433
 See for some further analysis, see Ruud de Mooij, ‘Will corporate income taxation survive?’, 3 De Economist 153 
(2005). 
1434
 Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 834, who refers to the presence of synergy rents as the very raison d’être of the multinational 
firm. 
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market transactions.
1435
 Multinationals internalize business activities to avoid the costs that
arise due to market inefficiencies (i.e., transactional costs, costs of mutual trust issues and 
risk management) that are apparent to third-party dealings.
1436
 Multinational integration
occurs to obviate these hazards external to the firm, e.g. quality control, security of 
information, and reputational issues. It is the common control through which these risks are 
managed. Multinationals are able to reduce costs through synergy by accordingly taking 
advantage of economies of scope and scale.
1437
 The ability to avoid (internalize) transaction
costs lies at the heart of the firm’s structure. It provides multinationals economic advantages 
and sources of profitability.  
The cost of market imperfections are minimized where interdependent business is brought 
under common ownership and control. Multinationals accordingly arise where business 
integration through control mechanisms offers advantages over entering into market 
transactions, i.e., the ‘theory of the firm’, or ‘internalization theory’.
1438
 Within the multinational
enterprise, market transactions are eliminated and replaced by the entrepreneur coordinator. 
Effectively, this entails the supersession of the price mechanism as costs savings from 
internalizing business.
1439
 Indeed, there is a commercial reason for keeping certain activities
in-house: it is more profitable. 
Firm specific rents due to specialty products 
Further, and perhaps even more substantial, firms provide specialty products in the real-
world. There is another reason why multinationals have thrived in a competitive market 
environment and have come to dominate cross-border trade and investment in today’s 
globalizing marketplace. They gain their competitive advantages relative to their competitors 
by providing unique products and services allowing them to generate excess earnings.
1440
1435
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines A Proposal for 
Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 5. 
1436
 Cf. Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the 
Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 
(2004), at 239 and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for 
international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in 
a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, 
at 8-9.  
1437
 See also Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer Pricing Journal 30 
(2001), at 34. Further see Richard M. Bird, ‘Shaping a New International Tax Order’, 42 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 292 (1988), at 292-299. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, respectively at par. 9.1. and 9.57 on the commercial rationales for 
business restructuring: “Since the mid-90’s, business restructurings have often involved the centralisation of 
intangible assets and of risks with the profit potential attached to them,” and: “Business representatives who 
participated in the OECD consultation process explained that multinational businesses, regardless of their products 
or sectors, increasingly needed to reorganize their structures to provide more centralized control and management of 
manufacturing, research and distribution functions. The pressure of competition in a globalised economy, savings 
from economies of scale, the need for specialization and the need to increase efficiency and lower costs were all 
described as important in driving business restructuring.” Cf. Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of 
Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), 
at 5, and Patrick Cauwenbergh et al, ‘The New German Transfer Pricing Rules on Cross-Border Relocation of 
Functions: A Preliminary Analysis’, 48 European Taxation 514 (2008), at 514, referring to the “stripping out” of 
functions. 
1438
 The theory of the firm has been developed by Coase. See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 
Economica 386 (1937), at 386-404 and Ronald H. Coase, ‘Lectures on the Firm’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organizations 3 (1988), at 3-47. Langbein also refers to Coase’s theory of the firm to establish his ‘price continuum 
problem’. See Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 
February 1986), at 666-667. Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income 
Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 832-833. See also Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the 
Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern 
Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 (2004), at 237-238, as well as Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary 
taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-
286. 
1439
 Notably, David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual 
Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 (2004), at 58 refers to the benefits of integration as the 
‘OLI paradigm’, i.e., the generally accepted microeconomic rationale for the emergence and international commercial 
successes of MNEs compared to independent enterprises by making reference to the advantages of available 
‘Ownership’, the advantages of available alternative ‘Locations’ for production and the advantages of ‘Internalization’. 
1440
 See Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 832 who refers to residual profits in this respect.  
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The novelty element is recognized at least in the eyes of the modal customer who is loyal to 
the product. It is the novelty item that explains why customers stand in line and keep coming 
back to buy that particular tablet, apparel, or the soft drink of that particular brand.
1441
 This
allows multinationals to derive their firm specific rents.
1442
 Firm specific rents may be present
either on the supply side of income or on the demand side of income; they do not have a 
definite geographic location.
1443
The novelty product, the innovative advantage that is responsible for the rent-production is 
generally driven by the multinational firm’s underlying high-worth intangible assets such as 
brands or patents. These effectively place the multinational in a monopoly position, with the 
sole right of commercial exploitation. It is that unique element that enables the multinational to 
drive actual arm’s length competitors out of the market.
1444
 “Only companies that have
valuable intangibles can actually offer unique products and services and thus can escape the 
continuing process of price erosion”.
1445
 “The competitive atmosphere of the global
marketplace has compelled multinationals to focus on continuous innovation, achieved by 
means of massive investment in intangible assets. A further contributing factor to this surge in 
the importance of intangibles in global trade is the rise of information technologies, especially 
the internet.
1446
 Investment in intangibles has thus become a fundamental source of
continuing profitability and increased market share of leading international corporations.”
1447
SA/ALS neglects internalization theory and novelty items, thereby leaving the residual 
uncalled for 
The ‘continuum price problem’ in SA/ALS comes to light. SA neglects the internalization 
theory. It ignores the differences between market transactions governed by market forces and 
intra-group transactions governed by control mechanisms.
1448
 ALS also neglects the novelty
element.
 1449
 By relying on external comparables, it ignores that multinationals actually derive
their rents through the commercialization of intangibles provided by a monopoly for which no 
comparables exist.  
In consequence, the sum of the stand-alone returns of the separate associated entities as 
determined in accordance with SA/ALS differs from the profit of the multinational group as a 
whole. SA/ALS accordingly is incapable of accounting for the economic benefits that have led 
to the emergence of the multinational in the first place. The difference may be explained in 
various terms, for instance, the ‘residual’, the ‘synergistic benefits of internalization’, the 
1441
 See for a comparison Yariv Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer 
Pricing Purposes’, 28 Virginia Tax Review 81 (2008). 
1442
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 265: “In the real world of imperfect competition, 
multinational enterprises have flourished through their ability to exploit what are commonly called economic rents. 
(…) They may be described as a type of intangible property that allows the holder to extract profits above the 
average return on capital. Economists often detect the existence of economic rents by observing that above-average 
profits are being earned. In this respect, economic rents serve a function for economists that is analogous to the 
function that goodwill serves for accountants. That is, the rent is a residual asset that explains why profits are greater 
than might otherwise be anticipated by economic theory.” 
1443
 Cf. Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working 
Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008), and 
Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation 
of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 265. 
1444
 Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’, 74 Texas Law 
Review 1301 (1996), at 1343. See also Monique van Herksen et al, ‘Identifying, valuing, and migrating intangibles: 
trouble ahead’, TPI Transfer Pricing, May 2008: “intangibles are by definition unique”. 
1445
 See Fred C. de Hosson, ‘Multinational Enterprises and the Development, Ownership and Licensing of 
Trademarks and Trade Names’, 11 Intertax 398, at 398. 
1446
 See Michelle Markham, The transfer pricing of intangibles (2005), at Chapter 1.  
1447
 See Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes 
International 895 (5 December 2005), at 895-906. 
1448
 Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 832, and Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length Approach to Transfer 
Pricing – Should the Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational Entities?’, 7 Journal of 
Australian Taxation 196 (2004), at 198, as well as Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global Formulary 
Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286. 
1449
 See Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 832 referring to residual profits in this respect.  
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‘multinational efficiency premium’,
1450
 or the ‘economic rents’. These firm specific benefits are
unavailable to unaffiliated parties dealing on an arm’s length basis. The difference constitutes 
the return to the entrepreneurship of the entrepreneur coordinator, the marginal product of the 
entrepreneur, its ‘infra-marginal return’.
1451
 That is, the remuneration for the production factor
of enterprise.
1452
Arbitrage and controversy as a consequence 
The theoretical deficiency translates in practice into arbitrage, controversy, enforcement 
deficits and compliance issues.
1453
 Unable to account for the residual, SA/ALS arbitrarily and
thereby inherently subjectively assigns it to one part or certain parts of the economic entity, 
i.e., the ‘continuum price problem’. Particularly, the one-sided ‘transaction-based transfer
pricing methods’ – see hereunder – fall short of providing meaningful guidance to answer the 
question of how to allocate the multinational efficiency premium.
1454
 This provides
multinationals some leeway in assigning the residual to any designated part of the firm at their 
discretion and thereby to the (low-)taxing jurisdiction. That is, in tax, the residual is mobile. 
Accordingly, SA/ALS may be considered to promote undertaxation.
1455
 Even the OECD
acknowledges that there are “no widely accepted objective criteria for allocating the 
economies of scale or benefits of integration between associated enterprises”.
1456
 Obviously,
tax authorities may want to warrant their share of multinational earning power. They may not 
be willing to see the residual left untaxed. Not surprisingly, this may trigger controversies and 
1450
 See David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual 
Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 (2004), at 61. 
1451
 See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 Economica 386 (1937) and Ronald H. Coase, ‘Lectures on the 
Firm’, 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organizations 3 (1988). 
1452
 See for a comparison the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
447 U.S. 207, 228, at 222-223, 100 S. Ct. at 2109 (1980), where the court noted that: “separate accounting, while it 
purports to isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to income 
resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale” (…) Since such factors 
arise "from the operation of the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the income of the 
business as having a single identifiable 'source.'” Cf. Jerome R. Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation Under the Commerce 
Clause: the History Revisited’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in 
Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 53, at 67.  
1453
 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting 
Better International tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World 
Tax Journal 371 (2011), at 379.  
1454
 See David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual 
Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 (2004), at 74. Francescucci argues that the application of 
one-sided transfer pricing methods does not account for the synergistic benefits of internalization with the result that 
the excess profit is allocated to the jurisdiction other than that of the tested party. See for a comparison, OECD, 
Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013, at par. 130: “A 
one-sided comparability analysis does not provide a sufficient basis for evaluating a transaction involving intangibles.” 
Cf. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at 
par. 6.14: “Arm’s length pricing for intangible property must take into account for the purposes of comparability the 
perspective of both the transferor of the property and the transferee.” Another example is the geographical allocation 
of the benefits of passive association. That is, the economic benefit of a lower interest rate being charged to an 
enterprise upon the financing of a certain investment with debt (say, a rate charged of 7%), due to that enterprise 
being part of a multinational group rather than it standing alone (say, rate charged of 10%). The benefit (of in this 
case 3%) is attributed to the operational group company. That is, since the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 7.13, does not recognize a service 
intra-firm service arrangement. Would the OECD recognize a service granted to the operational subsidiary for which 
an arm’s length remuneration should be charged, the benefits of being passively associated with the multinational 
group would be distributed to the parent company or perhaps assigned in a certain pro rata parte manner among the 
multinational group entities. Only an explicit guarantee (e.g., from the parent company, further reducing the rate 
charged to the subsidiary to, say 5%) constitutes an intra-group service rendered for which a fee should be charged 
(in this case of, say, max. 2% payable by the subsidiary to the parent company). See on this matter also OECD, 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 September 2014. Notably, the US adopts a similar approach, see 26 CFR 
1.482-9(k)(3)(l)(3)(v) (passive association). 
1455
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 253. See also Michael Mazerov, ‘Why 
arm’s length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), arguing at 28-32, that this “costs the federal and state 
treasuries billions of dollars annually in unjustified and unnecessary revenue losses: a public policy failure that 
borders on the scandalous”, and “creates inequities in tax payments and thereby tilts the competitive playing field by 
allowing global corporations to play transfer pricing games that entirely domestic firms are not even eligible to enter”. 
1456
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
1995, at par. 1.9. 
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disputes between multinationals and tax authorities, as well as controversies among the tax 
authorities of the countries involved (the latter, notably, sometimes even at the expense of the 
taxpayer). Enforcement and compliance issues, legal uncertainties, and double (non-
)taxation, may be the inevitable consequence.
1457
 The subjective nature of determining an
appropriate arm’s length profit makes it virtually impossible to forecast the outcome in 
substantive terms of any transfer pricing discussion.
1458
The problems in practice typically center on intangible asset commercialization.
1459
 This may 
be explained as follows. Asset ownership provides the owner a monopoly right to 
commercially exploit it. It is that exclusivity privilege that secures the property’s commercial 
value.
1460
 Further, the exclusivity entitlement essentially renders the required quest in transfer
pricing to explore and collect external data on comparables conceptually pointless.
1461
Notably, this holds true also for the exclusive exploitation rights relating to commonly 
available routine (in)tangible assets. However, these do not trigger that many controversies in 
practice. This may be explained by acknowledging the relatively limited economic interests 
involved. Routine items are typically not of much value to the firm. Note further that this may 
also explain why, in practice, the desired taxable arm’s length mark-up may sometimes be 
established upfront and substantiated subsequently via a ‘smoke and mirrors’ benchmark 
analysis performed by a transfer pricing specialist (c.q. wizard).
1462
1457
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International 
Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, John M, Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 07-017 
(2007), who refers to the created climate of legal uncertainty and huge administrative burdens for taxpayers, tax 
authorities and tax courts. See also Hamaekers refers to the heavy administrative burdens that result from the 
essential role of comparables; Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer 
Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 36, Michael Mazerov, ‘Why arm’s length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 
(1994), arguing at 28-32 that this “diverts too many scare resources both public and private, to tax planning, complex 
accounting and auditing practices, and lengthy litigation”, and “fails to guarantee any substantial degree of 
international uniformity in the division of income for tax purposes,” and Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined 
Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties 
(2003) 245, at 271-272: “Transfer-pricing rules are extremely complex, to the point, perhaps, of being incapable of 
fair administration. They are also easy to manipulate, for their operation depends on factual matters typically under 
the control of the taxpayer. In addition, the rules are not uniform. Many different arm’s-length pricing methods are 
arguably applicable to the same set of transactions.” On administrative approaches to avoid and resolve transfer 
pricing disputes forwarded by the OECD, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at Chapter IV. 
1458
 See for a comparison Steve Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – On Balance Better’, 28 Law 
and Policy in International Business 1133 (1996-1997), at 1158. Further, see Michael Mazerov, ‘Why arm’s length 
falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), at 28-32, referring in this respect to an “audit roulette”, which 
explains “why the federal government and national governments are suffering massive revenue losses under the 
current system and why cases can drag on for a decade and cost both sides millions of dollars.” 
1459
 See for a comparison, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law 
Review 507 (1996-1997), at 546 and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the 
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation’, 15 Virginia Tax Review 89 (1995).  
1460
 On the value of property, e.g., that of intangible assets, see Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual 
Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at 7: “intellectual property values, as such, come from the rights to exclude 
others from using it.” See also Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income From International Use and Dispositions of 
Intellectual Property’, 36 Tax Law Review 233 (1980-1981). Lokken argues at 240 and 253 that intellectual property 
rights derive their value from the owner’s right to exclude others from using it. The right to use, Lokken submits, is the 
principal ingredient of the bundle of rights comprising ownership. At 277, Lokken establishes that intellectual property 
is valuable because competitors are refrained from using or exploiting the associations that constitute the property. 
Intellectual property yields income to its holder as competition is restrained. In a constitutional state, the opposite 
holds as well. Without the exclusivity right, the property would be worthless. Cf. Fred C. de Hosson, ‘Multinational 
Enterprises and the Development, Ownership and Licensing of Trademarks and Trade Names’, 11 Intertax 398, at 
401: “Without the recognition and (…) the protection of the trademark in a state’s legal system, there is no ownership 
and thus no value.” Indeed, the very essence underlying value is ownership. Without ownership rights, property is 
worthless since non-exclusive. If available to all to utilize, why pay for it? If property is at one’s free disposal, it would 
be commercially worthless. That would discourage investment and innovation, which explains why (intellectual) 
property ownership rights exist in the first place. The exclusivity privilege provides an incentive to produce socially 
desirable innovations. Without some guarantee of private ownership, investors would not put resources into inventive 
activities as their findings would rapidly be imitated, leaving them with no profit. The rights assist creators to 
appropriate returns of their innovation for themselves, i.e., the monopoly privilege.  
1461
 See, for a comparison, Richard M. Bird, ‘Shaping a New International Tax Order’, 42 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 292 (1988), at 296, and Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible 
Assets (2000), at 399. 
1462
 See for a comparison Steve Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – On Balance Better’, 28 Law 
and Policy in International Business 1133 (1996-1997), at 1156-1157: “ the "best fit" nature of the regulations invites 
tax planners first to calculate the transfer price using all four methods, then choose the method that has the best tax 
consequences, and finally build a case as to why the method represents the "best fit." 
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The issue comes to light when intangibles are involved, as the exclusivity privilege now 
relates to high-worth intellectual achievements, intellectual property rights.
1463
 Intangibles
such as brands, patents, software and the like typically are the multinational’s key rent 
drivers, its ‘crown jewels’, and, hence of great commercial value to the firm.
1464
 Intangibles
provide the multinational its advantage over its competitors and with that the potential to 
produce infra-marginal returns. Multinationals do not sell their crown jewels on the market; 
they keep them in-house. This explains the non-existence of third-party benchmarks in this 
area.
1465
 That is, to base upon the arm’s length nature of intra-firm transactions, such as intra-
group intangible asset licensing arrangements, i.e., transactions that independent enterprises 
do not engage into.
1466
 And this perhaps explains the presence of ‘IP HoldCos’ or ‘shell
companies’ in low taxing jurisdictions.
1467
In summary, multinationals thrive in the global marketplace by generating rents that are the 
outcome of market imperfections and the global provision of unique products and services. 
Multinationals are able to produce and market these novelty items globally as a functionally 
integrated monopolist. Their excess earnings are driven by their exclusivity privileges in 
commercially exploiting the property rights on intellectual achievements, intangibles, the 
multinationals’ backbones. International taxation, however, encounters severe difficulties in 
geographically capturing these rents. No wonder. It adopts legal and physical-geographical 
connecting factors (‘nexus’), and a functionally segregated (SA – the ‘smoke’) market value 
oriented (ALS – the ‘mirrors’) tax allocation methodology. 
Is traditional SA/ALS appropriate in a global market dominated by multinationals? I tend to 
think not, there is a conceptual defect in its fundamental design.
1468
 And interestingly, it is the
mere presence of multinationals in the market that illustrates this. 
1463
 See for a comparison Yariv Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer 
Pricing Purposes’, 28 Virginia Tax Review 81 (2008). 
1464
 Note that it is not the intellectual achievement itself that constitutes the object of the discussion, it is the property 
rights associated with it (e.g., trademarks, (design) patents, copyrights, and know-how, trade secrets, recipes). 
Intellectual achievements may be legally protected, first, by means of statutory in rem entitlements, e.g., regulated by 
written statutes, such as trademark laws, patents laws, and copyrights laws). These provide exclusivity rights to the 
legal owner within a certain jurisdiction during a definite (e.g. patents) or indefinite (e.g., trademarks) time-period. 
Second, intellectual achievements may be protected by means of non-statutory ad personam entitlements, i.e., by 
keeping the data secret (e.g. know-how, trade secrets, or recipes). To keep data secret, walls of legal protection 
against infringements are built by means of tort (e.g., antitrust law) or contract (e.g., confidentiality agreements with 
business partners or employees). Cf. Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets 
(2000) at 27-54. Contra, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
OECD, Paris, 2010, at 2.137 and 9.80: ‘not all valuable intangible assets are legally protected’. 
1465
 See for a comparison Roberto Moro Visconti, ‘Exclusive Patents and Trademarks and Subsequent Uneasy 
Transaction Comparability: Some Transfer Pricing Implications’, 40 Intertax 212 (2012, No. 3), at 212-219. 
1466
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax 
policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 712, who also refers to the difficulties of 
finding comparables, especially in cases where legal transactions between affiliated entities may not be replicated. 
Worth noting is the somewhat awkward language used in this respect in OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer 
pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013, at 134: “In conducting a comparability analysis 
[emphasis added, MdW] with regard to a transfer of intangibles, it is therefore essential to consider the unique 
features [emphasis added, MdW] of the intangibles.” I have some difficulties putting my mind around this. How is one 
to find a comparable relating an unique intangible? Moreover, interestingly, in setting forth a description of features of 
intangibles to be taken into consideration when performing the comparability analysis, the OECD does not forward 
any features of the characteristics of the underlying intellectual achievement. Rather, it focuses on legal terms 
relating to the intangible asset transfers or the modes involving its economic value. This may perhaps be explained 
by recognizing the uniqueness of the intellectual achievement. Inconveniently, here the OECD implicitly forwards the 
principal argument to establish the intrinsic failure of ALS, i.e., the required quest for the third-party equivalent. The 
gist is that it is not there. The intellectual achievement is unique. 
1467
 See for a comparison, Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce 
and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 5-17, who refer to the 
international tax practice of assigning income to special purpose subsidiaries in tax-haven countries. See on the 
utilization of shell companies for taxable profit shifting purposes also U.S. Department of the Treasury and Internal 
Revenue Service, A Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code, Notice 88-123 (1988-2 C.B. 458), 
18 October 1988, Washington D.C. (‘White Paper’). Further, see Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the 
Internal Market (2009), at 17, who refers to evidence that the enforcement of the arm’s length standard is not 
sufficient to prevent profit shifting by manipulating transfer prices. For this purpose, Mayer cites Martin A. Sullivan, 
‘Data Show Big Shift in U.S. Income to Tax Havens’, Tax Notes International 28 (2 December 2002), at 876-879.  
1468
 Cf. Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 
1986), at 656 and 666, and Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. 
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6.3.4.3 Recognizing the continuum price problem in transfer pricing trends: towards 
‘residual profit splitting’ 
6.3.4.3.1 Evolution in transfer pricing methods reveals a shaking-off of traditional 
SA/ALS concept 
While recognizing the continuum price problem, the following should be submitted. An 
assessment of the transactional based and profits based transfer pricing methods used in 
practice today reveals an implicit recognition of the problem, and in response to that a 
conceptual shaking-off of traditional SA/ALS as well as a subsequent conceptual sloping 
towards a formulary approach. An analytical lining-up of the transfer pricing methods under 
OECD and US standards, reveals that these first move away from the concept of separate 
accounting to subsequently, second, cast aside the arm’s length standard altogether. In its 
attempts to geographically localize and evaluate the residual, SA/ALS seems on its way to 
cancelling itself out. 
Fig.82. ‘Comparing OECD and US TP-approaches’ 
An analytical lining-up of the various OECD and US transfer pricing methods is attainable as all 
share common grounds.
1469
 The US differentiates in practice between transfer pricing methods
applicable in respect of (in)tangible transactions and service transactions. 
1470
 The OECD does 
not make such a categorization. The difference, however, is more of a practical than of a 
conceptual nature. Moreover, similarly, neither the OECD nor the US adopts a particular 
Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 272: “[T]he transfer-pricing 
rules (…) are flawed conceptually”. See also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), 
at 18: “All these practical problems seem to support theoretical objections (…) against the current transfer pricing 
regime. Probably the most relevant line of argument is that the current implementation of the arm’s length standard is 
not consistent with the economic realities of integrated multinational enterprises. (…)Problems in taking into account 
of the increased profitability of integrated groups of companies represent another aspect. Economic theories on 
multinational enterprises imply that enterprises combine into groups and replace market supplies by intragroup 
transactions if and because this leads to increased profitability. This is the reason why the higher degree of 
integration of businesses makes the arm’s length fiction appear more and more artificial. Traditional transfer pricing 
does not take account of the additional profitability of internationally integrated enterprises, and several authors have 
suggested alterations to the current methods that would add some formulaic elements to distribute residual profits 
that are earned beyond what would have been realized by independent entities.” See also Michael Mazerov, ‘Why 
arm’s length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), at 28-32: “[T]he corporate income tax is critically ill and 
the arm’s length medicine isn’t working. Side- effects or no, a new formula is called for.” “That (…) arm’s length 
pricing adjustments are not a cure but only a very poorly functioning life support system is suggested by the alarm 
bells that go off on an almost daily basis.” And: “The theoretical and practical shortcomings of the arm’s length 
system have been described and illustrated much better than I can possibly do in the space available here. However, 
no one has described the inherent futility of the arms ‘s length approach more straightforwardly than the anonymous 
practitioners quoted in the cover story of International Tax Review, October 1993, which aired corporations’ opinion of 
various global tax issues. As one corporate tax specialist said: “When you multiply a situation by hundreds of 
thousands of transactions, conducted in different economic situations, involving a range of different products, then 
the problems, the cracks in the theory, really start to show. (…) Another person stated the obvious: “It would be 
impossible to have an APA for each product line, and there is no one product line that can be singled out.”” Notably, 
the OECD, indeed quite ambivalently, refers to transfer pricing as not being an exact science, but simultaneously to 
ALS as being sound in theory. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 1.13 and 1.14. I have some difficulties appreciating this. 
1469
 The OECD methods are laid down in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at Ch. II. Most countries generally endorse the methods in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in their domestic transfer pricing laws. Exceptions, for instance, are Brazil and China, who adopt 
their own rules (which sometimes refer to fixed margins). See for some elaboration UN Practical Transfer Pricing 
Manual for Developing Countries, Ch. 10 (Country practices). In the US, the arm’s length standard and the available 
transfer pricing methods are laid down in Section 482 IRC and the US Treasury Regulations under Section 482 IRC, 
26 CFR 1.482. 
1470
 See 26 CFR 1.482-1(a)(1). Section 1 “sets forth general principles and guidelines to be followed under section 
482. Section 1.482-2 provides rules for the determination of the true taxable income of controlled taxpayers in 
specific situations, including controlled transactions involving loans or advances or the use of tangible property. 
Sections 1.482-3 through 1.482-6 provide rules for the determination of the true taxable income of controlled 
taxpayers in cases involving the transfer of property. Section 1.482-7T sets forth the cost sharing provisions 
applicable to taxable years beginning on or after January 5, 2009. Section 1.482-8 provides examples illustrating the 
application of the best method rule (26 CFR 1.482-1(c)). Finally, § 1.482-9 provides rules for the determination of the 
true taxable income of controlled taxpayers in cases involving the performance of services.” 
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hierarchy in transfer pricing methods. The taxpayers involved are required to apply the ‘most 
appropriate method’ (OECD)
1471
 or the ‘best method’ (US), though.
1472
 Further, with respect to
intra-firm intangible asset transactions, both the OECD and the US effectively recognize some 
kind of ‘hindsight-approach’, i.e., the possibility of ex post altering transfer prices dependent on 
the actual commercial performance of the intangible’s exploitation in the market. The OECD sets 
forth that the arm’s length standard may require associated enterprises to agree on so-called 
‘price adjustment clauses’.
1473
 Section 482 of the US IRC contains the so-called ‘commensurate
with income standard’, which allows the US tax authorities to adjust ex ante established arm’s 
length transfer prices ex post, i.e., on a hindsight basis, if the returns yielded differ from the 
expected return at the time of the investment.
1474
 In addition, both the OECD and US enable
taxpayers to employ alternative non-specified transfer pricing approaches in cases where the 
specified methods produce non-meaningful results, for instance based on valuation techniques 
(e.g., income approach, replacement cost approach, market value approach). Finally, both the 
OECD and the US sees room for cost allocation, i.e., the charging for certain activities by 
reference to costs incurred with no markup, i.e., activities for which independent parties would not 
be willing to pay.
1475
The ‘SA/ALS-cancelling-itself-out effect’ may be appreciated if one recognizes the trends in 
practice towards an increased application of the ‘residual profit split’ method in transfer 
pricing. On the basis of this method, the combined profit (or loss) of the associated 
enterprises involved is attributed geographically by reference to some firm specific key that is 
referred to as the ‘relative contributions of functions performed’. The combination of profits 
encroaches upon the concept of separate accounting. As it considers the profit of the 
combination as a whole, it is implicitly oriented towards a unitary approach that recognizes the 
combination as a single entity. The practice of subsequently allocating the combined profit by 
reference to an evaluation of functions performed erodes the concept of arm’s length pricing. 
It surpasses the need to perform a third-party comparability analysis and allocates profit 
directly by reference to the activities undertaken. It accordingly breaks away from the 
foundation underlying the arm’s length standard, i.e., the comparison of the intra-firm 
transaction with a third-party equivalent. 
As will be shown, however, ultimately even the residual profit split method proves unfeasible 
as a key to evaluate firm inputs at their origin. This paves the way to analytically introduce the 
formulary alternatives in this area. Please keep this in mind as we proceed. 
6.3.4.3.2 Blowing away the smoke: towards ‘combined profit’ 
1471
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.2., and OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 184. 
1472
 See 26 CFR 1.482-1(c). 
1473
 See further, OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, 
Paris, 2013, at par. 201: “… independent enterprises might not find that pricing based on anticipated benefits alone 
provides an adequate protection against the risks posed by the high uncertainty in valuing the intangible property. In 
such cases, independent enterprises might adopt shorter term agreements or include price adjustment clauses in the 
terms of the agreement, to protect against subsequent developments that might not be predictable.” See further at 
205: “If independent enterprises would have insisted on a price adjustment clause in comparable circumstances, the 
tax administration should be permitted to determine the pricing on the basis of such a clause.” On price adjustment 
clauses, see also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, 
Paris, 2010, Chapter VI at par. 6.30-6.35. See on price adjustment clauses also OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 
Paris, 16 September 2014. 
1474
 For some discussion on the ‘commensurate with income’ requirement, see Yariv Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes’, 28 Virginia Tax Review 81 (2008). See also 
William P. Elliot, ‘Development, Ownership and Licensing of Intellectual and Intangible Properties – Including 
Trademarks, Trade Names and Franchises’, Taxation of Corporate Transactions 21 (2004). Further, note section 
367(d) and 26 CFR 1.367(d)-1T. In respect of US outward bound intra-group intangible property transfers, this 
section establishes that the non-US transferee/user of the intangible is deemed to pay the US transferor/developer a 
royalty that is commensurate with the income derived by the non-US associated entity from using the intangible. The 
section applies regardless whether, in fact, such a royalty is paid or not. This may even result in US withholding tax 
levied on deemed royalty payments for the use of intangible property in the US. 
1475
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 7.9-7.11, as well as 26 CFR 1.482-9(b) (services cost method), 26 CFR 1.482-9(k)(3)(l)(3)(iv) 
(shareholder activities), and 26 CFR duplicative activities .482-9(k)(3)(l)(3)(iii). 
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Comparable uncontrolled pricing, but there is no third-party comparable 
The concept of SA/ALS is acknowledged to its fullest under the first set of OECD and US 
transfer pricing methods in the line-up. These are the transaction-based comparable 
uncontrolled price method (OECD/US),
1476
 the comparable uncontrolled transaction method
(US),
1477
 and the ‘comparable uncontrolled service price method’ (US).
1478
 These fully
appreciate the segregation of associated enterprises charging arm’s length prices for intra-
firm transactions, as this method requires a comparison of the price charged for the controlled 
transaction to the price charged for the comparable uncontrolled transaction. The arm’s length 
value of the intra-firm transaction is accordingly evaluated by reference to the market value of 
the comparable transaction undertaken by the respective associated enterprise in its dealings 
with actual third parties. 
However, unfortunately, the comparable uncontrolled price method has foregone its purpose 
in the current global marketplace. As elaborated in the above, multinational firms typically 
derive their rents by innovatively exploiting monopoly privileges that are carefully being kept 
in-house. Open markets on which multinationals trade their intermediate intangibles with third-
parties are seldom, if ever, to be found.
1479
 Multinationals do not trade their rent producing
crown jewels on the market. Comparable third-party transactions are absent.  
The CUP-method is a relic from a mercantile past where international trade primarily evolved 
around bulk goods traded at readily available global commodity prices.
 1480
 That holds true
regardless of the fact that the comparable uncontrolled price method is generally preferred, 
e.g., by the OECD over the other transfer pricing methods if different methods can be applied
in an equivalently reliable manner.
1481
 In the end, it is of no use to properly allocate the
multinational residual. 
Resale minus and cost-plus, but practical problems and conceptual issues (one-
sided, comparables absent) 
Where actual third-party transactions are absent, SA/ALS is still fully acknowledged under the 
second set of methods in the line-up. These are the transaction-based ‘resale price method’ 
(OECD/US),
1482
 the ‘gross services margin method’ (US) on the one hand,
1483
 and the ‘cost-
plus method’ (OECD/US),
1484
 and the ‘cost of services plus method’ (US)
1485
 on the other.
These methods also appreciate the segregation of associated enterprises charging arm’s 
1476
 On US CUP, see (1.482-3(b), tangible property) OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 22 July 2010, at par. 2.13-2.20. 
1477
 On CUT, see 1.482-4(c). 
1478
 On CUSPM, see 1.482-9(c) 
1479
 See also Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and 
International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 10. 
1480
 SA/ALP was introduced in the 1920s, an era where related parties were relatively autonomous and only a 
relatively small amount of international trade of tangible goods occurred – typically the trading of bulk goods not 
embodying unique and complex technologies, with respect of which the prices of which were globally set on 
commodity trading markets. The readiness of available spot market prices of these commodities may explain the 
introduction of arm’s length pricing regarding intra-group trade (with the particular focus on comparable uncontrolled 
prices, the primacy of CUP. See also Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income 
Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 837 who refers to the primacy of applying the comparable 
uncontrolled price to an intra-group transaction is a relic from a mercantile age. See further Michael Mazerov, ‘Why 
arm’s length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), at 31, and J.T. van Egdom RA, Verrekenprijzen; de 
verdeling van de winst van een multinational (2011), at 76-77. 
1481
 See e.g., OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.3: “…where (…) the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) and another transfer pricing 
method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the CUP method is to be preferred.” 
1482
 On US Resale Price Method, see 1.482-3(c) –Gross margin of a distributor, tangible property). See also OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.21-
2.38. 
1483
 On GSMM, see 26 CFR 1.482-9(d). 
1484
 On US Cost Plus Method, see (1.482-3(d) – Gross margin of a manufacturer, tangible property). See OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.39-
2.55. 
1485
 On CSPM, see 26CFR 1.482-9(e). 
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length prices for intra-firm transactions, since all require a comparison of the price charged for 
the controlled transaction to the price charged for a third-party equivalent.
1486
To arrive at the arm’s length price (range), the OECD resale price method and its US 
equivalents require a comparison of the gross resale price margin earned on a resale of 
goods to a third-party following a controlled purchase to the gross resale price margin earned 
on a resale in a comparable third-party scenario (i.e., had the product been purchased from a 
third-party). It evaluates whether the charged amount in the controlled environment is arm’s 
length by reference to the margin realized in a comparable uncontrolled environment. 
As regards the cost plus method, the arm’s length price (range) is determined by means of a 
comparison of the gross mark-up realized on the costs incurred from a third-party transaction 
preceding a controlled transaction to the gross mark-up on costs incurred in a comparable 
third-party scenario (i.e., had the product been provided to a third-party).
1487
 It evaluates
whether the charged amount in the controlled environment is arm’s length by reference to the 
gross cost-plus mark-up earned in a comparable uncontrolled environment. Under both 
clusters of methods, the value of the intra-firm transaction is accordingly sought to be 
evaluated by reference to the market value of a third-party comparable.
1488
However, unfortunately, these transaction-based methods have also foregone their purpose 
in the current global market place. That is for both practical and conceptual reasons. In 
practice, both the multinational and the tax authorities need to know the profit margins of 
unrelated party transactions.
1489
 That triggers a problem as information on third-party gross-
profit level indicators may neither be available nor reliable, e.g., in publicly available 
commercial data. Further, uncertainties and potential double (non-)taxation issues may arise 
as the commercial accounting standards used in practice (e.g., IAS/IFRS, US GAAP) 
sometimes differentiate in defining gross and net returns.
1490
 And finally, practical issues may 
emerge as the transactional approach adopted here requires per-transaction pricing, 
particularly when the multinational involved undertakes substantial volumes of internal 
transactions. 
Conceptual issues emerge first, since these transfer pricing methods are all one-sided 
methods. Only one of the parties involved in the intra-group transaction is assessed, i.e., the 
tested party. Under the resale price method the tested party is the controlled reseller. Under 
the cost-plus method it is the controlled supplier. Typically, the tested party is the associated 
enterprise performing the less complex part of the functions involving the controlled 
transaction (e.g., low-risk manufacturing, reselling, servicing; distribution / marketing).
1491
 The
1486
 Please note that the transaction based transfer pricing methods are favored by the OECD over the profits based 
methods. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.3: “… where a traditional transaction method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the 
traditional transaction method is preferable to the transactional profit method. Moreover, where (…) the comparable 
uncontrolled price method (CUP) and another transfer pricing method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, 
the CUP method is to be preferred.” This makes sense as these methods quintessentially recognize SA/ALS, while 
the profits based methods conceptually move away from it. This may also explain the traditional hesitation of the 
OECD towards these latter mentioned methods. Today, the OECD has embraced them, since the traditional 
transactional methods have proved to be of an increasingly lesser use to allocate profits in today’s global economy. 
The US traditionally has lesser problems with profits based methods. This, perhaps, may be explained by pointing at 
their experiences with formulary apportionment systems that are in place to divide interstate corporate profits to the 
US states. Formulary systems typically divide the combined profits by means of predetermined formulas – see 
section 4 hereunder. 
1487
 Notably, J.T. van Egdom RA, Verrekenprijzen; de verdeling van de winst van een multinational (2011), at 82, 
argues that it would seem to make sense to establish the arm’s length mark-up on budgeted costs. Otherwise, the 
scenario could occur that a cost-inefficient operation would be rewarded a relatively higher profit. 
1488
 In practice these methods are commonly applied in respect of sales of(semi-finished) products, for instance under 
intra-firm long-term buy-and-supply arrangements, or the provision of services, for instance under intra-firm (joint) 
facility agreements. Notably, Andrew Casley, ‘The Basic Framework of the Cost-Plus Method’, 6 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 38 (1999), at. 38-44, sets forth that cost-plus mark ups typically range between 5 and 15%. 
1489
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 10. 
1490
 See M. Cools, ‘International Commercial Databases for Transfer Pricing Studies’, 6 International Transfer Pricing 
Journal 5 (1999), at 178-182. See also Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 35. 
1491
 See e.g., OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 
2013, at par. 209: “In a transfer pricing analysis where the most appropriate transfer pricing method is the resale 
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remainder of the transactional profit is allocated to the non-tested associated party in the 
transaction. 
The consequence of adopting such one-sided methods is that they tend to underestimate the 
transfer price as it assigns all unallocated profit to the non-tested party, i.e., the seller under 
the resale price method and the buyer under the cost-plus method.
1492
 This provides
multinationals some discretion in geographically attributing the residual. Moreover, under the 
cost-plus method, the value of the internal transaction is measured by reference to costs 
incurred, i.e., the idea of the costs of replacement as value indicator. This may be regarded 
as conceptually unsound as costs do not correlate to value, particularly when intangibles are 
involved.
1493
Second, and more substantially, these methods in the end are also conceptually incapable of 
properly allocating multinational rents. That is, for the same reasons as submitted in the 
above. As said, multinational firms derive their rents by innovatively exploiting the monopoly 
privileges they keep in-house. As outside markets are absent here, the requirement to search 
for comparables, and with that the use of these transfer pricing methods, is senseless since 
comparable third-party transactions do not exist. 
Breaking with ‘transactional approach’: TNMM and comparable profits method, but still 
conceptually problematic (one-sided, comparables absent) 
To counter some of the practical difficulties of charging an arm’s length price per individual 
intra-firm transaction, the third set of transfer pricing methods in the line-up starts sloping 
away from traditional SA/ALS by throwing overboard the traditional transactional approach. 
These methods are (effectively) the ‘transactional net margin method’ (OECD),
1494
 and the
‘comparable profits method’ (US)
1495
 and ‘comparable profits method for services’ (US).
1496
These are attached to the segregation of associated enterprises and the reliance on third-
party comparables. But contrary to the traditional transaction transfer pricing methods, they 
move away from the concept of pricing individual intra-firm transactions. 
Viz., the transactional net margin method (OECD), for instance, allows accounting for firm 
level aggregates of controlled transactions. To arrive at the arm’s length price (range), the 
transactional net margin method requires a comparison of the net profit margin (EBIT) relative 
to an appropriate base (turnover at origin, costs or assets) earned on a particular controlled 
transaction or an aggregation of controlled transactions with the operating income earned in a 
comparable third-party scenario. If the margin is determined relative to turnover, the method 
operates as a net variant of the resale price method. If it is determined relative to costs, it is a 
net variant of the cost-plus method.
1497
price method, the cost-plus method or the transactional net margin method, the less complex of the parties to the 
controlled transaction is often selected as the tested party. (…) That would generally be the case where only the non-
tested party uses intangibles”. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.26 and 3.18, and OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 
September 2014.  
1492
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 10. 
1493
 See for a comparison James R. Hines Jr., ‘Income misattribution under formula apportionment’, 54 European 
Economic Review 108 (2010, No. 1), at 108-120, as well as OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing 
aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013, at par. 161: “in some limited circumstances, transfer pricing 
methods based on the estimated cost of reproducing or replacing the intangible may be utilised.” See also OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Chapter VI at 
par. 6.27: “there is no necessary link between costs and value.” And see OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 
September 2014. 
1494
 On TNMM, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, 
Paris, 2010, at par. 2.58-2.107. 
1495
 On CPM, see 1.482-5 (tangible property). 
1496
 See 26 CFR 1.482-9(f). 
1497
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.58. Notably, for some illustrations of TNMM and sensitivity effects of utilizing gross and net profit level 
indicators, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, 
Paris, 2010, Annex I to Chapter II. 
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The comparable profits method (US) conceptually foregoes the transactional approach 
altogether. To arrive at the arm’s length profit attribution, it requires a comparison of the 
operational profit (EBIT) in the controlled environment to the operating profit in a comparable 
third-party scenario. It accordingly compares overall results rather than individual 
transactions, i.e., an income comparison.
1498
 Notably, the comparable profits method operates
identically to the transactional net margin method where the latter computes matters by 
reference to firm level aggregates of controlled transactions.
1499
 As both methods allow for a
conceptual bypassing of the transactional approach, the value that the tested party adds to 
the multinational firm is sought to be evaluated by assessing the profitability of third-parties 
performing equivalent business operations.
1500
 The transactional approach, accordingly,
proves to not be a necessity in transfer pricing. 
However, unfortunately, these transfer pricing methods have also foregone their purpose in 
the current global market place. That is particularly for conceptual reasons, as they may 
resolve some of the pragmatic concerns. As these methods allow for income comparisons, 
there is no need to transfer the price of individual transactions. Accordingly, there is no need 
to disentangle the often sizeable aggregates of intra-firm transactions, i.e., scenarios where it 
may be practically unfeasible to analytically segregate them.
1501
 Further, as operational profits
are assessed, net-profit level indicators may be used. These typically are more easily 
extractable from the public financial data of companies. It also mitigates the aforementioned 
issues of accounting standards differentials in defining gross and net returns. These 
administrative eases may explain the popularity of these methods in practice.
1502
Conceptual issues emerge for similar reasons as those set forth in the above. First, these 
transfer pricing methods are also one-sided methods. Just one of the parties involved in the 
intra-group transaction is assessed, i.e., the tested party – typically, the associated enterprise 
performing the less complex functions.
1503
 The non-tested associated party is awarded the
1498
 Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 830, and Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer 
Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 35. 
1499
 Cf. Toshio Miyatake, ‘General Report – Transfer Pricing and intangibles’, in International Fiscal Association, 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2007) 17, at 32. See also Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies 
of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 
(2006), at 13. 
1500
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 11. In practice these methods are commonly 
applied to associated enterprises performing low risk routine functions, such as toll and contract manufacturing, 
contract R&D and contract marketing, and limited risk distribution functions. See for a discussion of one of the 
variants of the method as applied in practice, C.J. Eduard A. Sporken et al, ‘Possible Application of the Berry Ratio 
for the Distribution Function in the Consumer Electronics Industry in Europe’, 17 International Transfer Pricing 
Journal 257 (2010). The authors contend that the Berry ratio, i.e., the ratio of gross profit to operating expenses (i.e., 
cost plus on operating expenses), could be seen as being included in the OECD Guidelines. They consider the Berry 
ratio to establish a relative net margin, constituting an appropriate profit level indicator under the TNMM method, e.g., 
to be employed for intra-group distributors in the consumer electronics industry. The authors contend that the Berry 
ratio is not dismissed under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as the Guidelines do not precisely define what is 
exactly meant by a net margin within the TNMM. Notably, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, refer to the use of Berry ratios under TNMM in par. 2.100-
2.102. 
1501
 See e.g., 26 CFR 1.482-1(f)(2)(i) (Aggregation of transactions), and 26 CFR 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(1) on embedded 
intangibles. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 3.9-3.12 on the pricing of aggregates of transactions and package deals. On package 
deals see further, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, 
Paris, 2010, at par. 6.17: “The transfer price may be a package price, i.e. for the goods and for the intangible 
property, in which case, depending on the facts and circumstances, an additional payment for royalties may not need 
to be paid by the purchaser for being supplied with technical expertise. This type of package pricing may need to be 
disaggregated to calculate a separate arm’s length royalty in countries that impose royalty withholding taxes.” For 
some discussion on aggregated transactions and mixed contracts see, Toshio Miyatake, ‘General Report – Transfer 
Pricing and intangibles’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2007) 17, at 17-38. 
1502
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 11. 
1503
 See e.g., OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 
2013, at par. 209: “In a transfer pricing analysis where the most appropriate transfer pricing method is the resale 
price method, the cost-plus method, or the transactional net margin method, the less complex of the parties to the 
controlled transaction is often selected as the tested party. In many cases, an arm’s length price or level of profit for 
the tested party can be determined without the need to value the intangibles used in connection with the transaction. 
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residual. This again has the consequence of underestimating the profit allocated to the tested 
party, which provides multinationals some discretion in attributing their rents geographically. 
Second, and more substantially, these methods in the end are also conceptually incapable of 
properly allocating multinational rents. That is, again, for similar reasons as set forth above. 
Integrated multinationals may derive profits that exceed the joint profits of non-integrated 
companies performing similar functions.
1504
 Further, as multinationals derive their rents
through the utilization as a monopolist of innovative advantages, the required search for 
comparable profit levels is senseless as third-party comparables do not exist. 
Breaking with ‘separate accounting’; comparable profit split, but still a conceptual 
issue: comparables still absent 
To resolve the conceptual issues that arise under the one-sided methods, the fourth transfer 
pricing method in the line-up gets rid of the ‘smoke’. It not only bypasses the transactional 
approach, but also moves away from the concept of separate accounting, i.e., the ‘SA’ in 
‘SA/ALS’. The method referred to is the American profits-based ‘comparable profit split 
method’.
1505
 It conceptually slopes away from SA, since it relies on the allocating of the
‘combined profit’, i.e., the pooled profit of the combination of associated enterprises involved 
by reference to third-party comparables.
1506
 The profits are subsequently divided by reference
to a third-party comparison. Taking the combined profits as a starting point, apparently, SA 
proves not to be a necessity in transfer pricing.
1507
Viz., to arrive at the arm’s length profit attribution, the comparable profit split method requires 
a comparison of the combined operating profit of the associated enterprises conducting the 
business activity involved to the combined operating profit of uncontrolled taxpayers whose 
transactions and activities are functionally similar to those of the tested affiliated taxpayers. 
Each uncontrolled taxpayer’s percentage of the combined operating profit or loss is used as a 
reference to allocate the combined operating profit or loss of the relevant business activity in 
the controlled environment. The value that the tested associated entities add to the 
multinational is accordingly sought to be evaluated by assessing the profitability of third-
parties performing equivalent business operations. 
But unfortunately, the comparable profit split method is also of little use in today’s global 
market, particularly for conceptual reasons. Although the method may be considered a two-
sided transfer pricing method – contrary to the one-sided methods referred to in the above – 
That would generally be the case where only the non-tested party uses intangibles.” See also OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.58: “A transactional 
net margin method is unlikely to be reliable if each party to a transaction makes valuable, unique contributions (…). In 
such a case, a transactional profit split method will generally be the most appropriate method (…). However, a one-
sided method (traditional transaction method or transactional net margin method) may be applicable in cases where 
one of the parties makes all the unique contributions involved in the controlled transaction, while the other party does 
not make any unique contribution. In such a case, the tested party should be the less complex one.” See further 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 
2.26 and 3.18. See also OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 September 2014. 
1504
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 11. 
1505
 On comparable profit split, see 26 CFR 1.482-6(c)(2).  
1506
 The concept of ‘combined profit’ is conceptually similar to the pooling of corporate profits, e.g., under a UK-style 
profit-pooling mechanism or a German-style ‘Organschaft’ system. However, here the cross-border profits are being 
pooled. The income earned by a group of related companies engaged in a common enterprise is determined by 
adding together, i.e., ‘combining’, the stand-alone profits of the various tax-segregated entities. Accordingly, this 
approach appreciates that the income earned by such a group is, in substance, the income of the enterprise itself, 
rather than the income of its constituent corporate parts. The concepts of combined profit and ‘combined reporting’ is 
also adopted is US formulary apportionment. For some elaboration on ‘combined reporting’ in the US, see Michael J. 
McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business 
Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 255. One analytical step further is cross-border tax consolidation, i.e., as 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. 
1507
 This holds regardless of whether the intra-firm transactions re-emerge subsequent to the splitting process to fill in 
the arm’s length transfer prices, i.e., the ensuing reverse process of calculating the allocated profit back to the 
(individual) intra-firm transactions undertaken by the (functionally) separate entities. Effectively, then, the allocation 
has already been done. Such a subsequent filling-in of numbers re-introducing separate accounting and arm’s length 
pricing, then merely fulfills administrative purposes. 
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this does not entail that the method provides for an objective tool to objectively attribute the 
residual. As said, multinationals derive profits in excess of the joint profits of non-integrated 
companies performing similar functions. The consequence is that this transfer pricing method 
is incapable of accounting for these profits. Further, it fails to account for the infra-marginal 
returns generated through the commercial exploitation of the firm’s unique intangibles. Again, 
the required third-party comparison is senseless. That is regardless of the fact that the smoke 
has now been blown away. 
6.3.4.3.3 Breaking the mirrors: approximating ‘relative contributions of functions 
performed’  
To resolve the issues that arise by requiring third-party comparables in an environment where 
these do not exist, the fifth set of transfer pricing methods in the line-up casts aside the 
‘mirrors’. These methods not only bypass the transactional approach and the separate entity 
approach, they also conceptually and essentially do away with the arm’s length standard, i.e., 
the ALS in SA/ALS. The methods referred to are the profits-based ‘(residual) profit split 
method’ (OECD/US),
1508
 and the ‘profit split method for services’ (US).
1509
 They conceptually
slope away from SA, as they also rely on the allocation of ‘combined profit’. Moreover, they 
move away from ALS as they seek to divide the combined profit by means of a firm-internal 
allocation key referred to as the ‘relative contributions of functions performed’. That is, rather 
than through a third-party comparability analysis.
1510
 It accordingly seems that ALS also
proves not to be a necessity in transfer pricing. 
Namely, to geographically assign the multinational’s overall corporate profit – particularly the 
indistinguishable residual –
1511
 the profit split method first identifies the combined profit of the
associated business enterprises conducting the respective integrated business operation.
1512
Subsequently, second, it splits combined profit as derived by the combination. That is, in 
proportion to the relative economic contributions of its integrated parts in the respective 
countries involved. No third-party comparability analysis is performed for this purpose.
1513
 The
1508
On Profit Split, see 26 CFR 1.482-6, tangible property. On Residual profit split, see 26 CFR 1.482-6(c)(3). On 
Transactional (residual) profit split method, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.108-2.149. 
1509
 See 26 CFR 1.482-9(g). 
1510
 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A 
Proposal for Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 3-18. Notably, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.133 make reference to profit 
splitting by reference to third-party comparables. Here the OECD’s profit split method conceptually operates as a US-
style ‘comparable profit split method’. 
1511
 See e.g., OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.109: “The main strength of the transactional profit split method is that it can offer a solution for highly 
integrated operations for which a one-sided method would not be appropriate. (…) A transactional profit split method 
may also be found to be the most appropriate method in cases where both parties to a transaction make unique and 
valuable contributions (e.g. contribute unique intangibles) to the transaction, because in such a case independent 
parties might wish to share the profits of the transaction in proportion to their respective contributions and a two-sided 
method might be more appropriate in these circumstances than a one-sided method. In addition, in the presence of 
unique and valuable contributions, reliable comparables information might be insufficient to apply another method. 
On the other hand, a transactional profit split method would ordinarily not be used in cases where one party to the 
transaction performs only simple functions and does not make any significant unique contribution (e.g. contract 
manufacturing or contract service activities in relevant circumstances), as in such cases a transactional profit split 
method typically would not be appropriate in view of the functional analysis of that party.” See also OECD, Revised 
discussion draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013, at par. 220: “In some 
circumstances where reliable uncontrolled transactions cannot be identified, transactional profit split methods may be 
utilised to determine an arm’s length allocation of profits for the sale of goods or the provision of services involving 
the use of intangibles. One circumstance in which the use of transactional profit split methods may be appropriate is 
where both parties to the transaction make unique and valuable contributions to the transaction,” and OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 6.26: “In cases 
involving highly valuable intangible property (…), the profit split method may be relevant (…).” See also OECD, 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 September 2014. 
1512
 See for some analysis Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce 
and International Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 11. 
1513
 See for some analysis Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 
40 Tax Notes International 895 (5 December 2005), at 895-906. 
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economic contributions – the values added at origin – are determined on the basis of a 
‘contribution analysis’. This essentially is a functional and factual assessment of the functions 
performed. The contributions of these functions (‘nexus’) are subsequently evaluated and 
weighted (‘allocation’). The evaluation and weighting of the functions performed generally 
occurs indirectly, i.e., on the basis of proxies referring to firm-internal allocation factors.
1514
These factors typically are asset values, capital invested, costs incurred, wages, headcounts, 
ftes, time spent, turnover (at origin), et cetera.
1515
 Notably, the residual profit split method
operates correspondingly with the exception that it first seeks to allocate the returns from 
routine-contributions using third-party comparables. It then apportions or allocates the 
residual using the profit split method – assuming that this profit is attributable to the non-
routine firm rents.
1516
 Notably, parallel to the upcoming of intangibles and e-commerce, the
profit split method is utilized to an increasingly greater extent in tax practice.
1517
Interestingly, in its attempts to assign multinational rents, transfer pricing practice ends up 
using firm-internal, endogenous profit producing factors like assets, payroll and sales to 
approximate the relative values of the functions performed.
1518
 The profit split method is
argued, e.g., by the OECD to produce at arm’s length results as it is said to intend to 
approximate the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in a third-
party environment.
1519
 However, this raises the question of how to substantiate that. “Once
you do not base the ALS on finding comparables, then it is not very meaningful to say that a 
particular method is or is not compatible with the ALS, because if there are no comparables 
you cannot prove that the result reached by that method was not what unrelated parties would 
have done at arm’s length.”
1520
 Some submit that the profit split method is a pragmatic
solution since it does not require third-party comparables.
1521
 It may also be recognized as
1514
 See e.g., OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.141. 
1515
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.134-5. 
1516
 Under the residual profit split method, the contributions producing the residual are determined on the basis of a 
‘residual analysis’. This essentially is a ‘contribution analysis’ performed to split the residual profit. See OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.121. 
For some illustration, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
OECD, Paris, 2010, Annexes II and III to Chapter II. 
1517
 See for instance Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer Pricing Journal 
30 (2001), at 38, who refers to the emergence of this transfer pricing method. Already in 2001, Hameaekers argued 
that an increased application of profit split may reduce problems in the transfer pricing area. He concludes that the 
method deserves a more prominent position in international taxation. See also Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An 
Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 826 who refers to 
the steady drift toward the use of some formulary allocation. Further see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 546. For a comparison, see Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International tax Policies by 
Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World Tax Journal 371 (2011), at 382, 
referring to the increased reliance of tax authorities on profit split methods. See further David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The 
Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 2: Solutions to Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 235 (2004), at 240, and Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing 
of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes International 895 (5 December 2005), who argues at 901 that “as a result of the 
unique nature of intangible property, other less traditional transfer pricing methods [i.e., profit split methods, MDW] 
have become more relevant in ascertaining the arm’s length nature of transactions involving those assets”. See 
finally Toshio Miyatake, ‘General Report – Transfer Pricing and intangibles’, in International Fiscal Association, 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2007) 17, who sets forth at 33 that: “the PSM, especially the RPSM, appears to 
be used more often than the CUP because appropriate comparables cannot be found for unique and highly valuable 
intangibles.” 
1518
 The profit split method accordingly introduces formulary elements in transfer pricing. See Michelle Markham, ‘Tax 
in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes International 895 (5 December 2005), 
at 901. 
1519
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.108, and 2.116. 
1520
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for 
Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 4-5. 
1521
 See for a comparison, Toshio Miyatake, ‘General Report – Transfer Pricing and intangibles’, in International 
Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2007) 17, at 33: “(…) the PSM [profit split method; MdW], 
especially the RPSM [residual profit split method; MdW], appears to be used more often than the CUP [comparable 
uncontrolled price, MdW] because appropriate comparables cannot be found for unique and highly valuable 
intangibles. The RPSM may be the most flexible and pragmatic method and it may have a merit in the three 
situations of (a) providing a pragmatic allocation of income between different classes of contributed intangibles 
without having to resort to third party transactions of dubious comparability; (b) dealing with situations involving a 
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implied critique; transfer pricing practice embracing a method not in line with SA/ALS as it 
does not necessarily involve comparables.
1522
In my view, it may be considered fair to observe that embracing the profit split method has 
essentially resulted in watering down SA/ALS in the process. SA/ALS has been surpassed 
and regarded as being unable to capture the residual by vainly seeking a comparable. That is, 
by arriving at some unitary taxation and formulary allocation approach approximating firm 
inputs at origin by reference to internal data. Indeed, essentially, the profit split method may 
be considered a quasi-formulary approach.
1523
 In addition, it may accordingly be
acknowledged that the practice of resorting to formulas in transfer pricing to assign a 
geographical source to corporate profit implicitly recognizes that income “does not have an 
ascertainable “true” source.”
1524
 Along with the smoke, the mirrors have been taken away as
well. It seems that this is simply what the global market needs.
1525
6.3.4.4 But how to objectively evaluate the fair value of firm inputs at origin? 
Upside: profit split recognizes that firm constitutes a single entity 
The conceptual upside of the profit split method is that it does away with the economically 
faulty SA/ALS approach in transfer pricing. By combining the associated enterprises’ profits, it 
recognizes that the firm constitutes a single economic entity. Further, by casting aside the 
third-party comparability analysis, it recognizes that intra-firm transactions are being 
undertaken for business reasons. Under the profit split method, firm rents are included in the 
profit division process. Perhaps its increased use in tax practice may be seen as a de facto 
recognition of the unsuitability of SA/ALS. 
This begs the question as to why not go all the way?
1526
 Why not combine the multinational’s
worldwide profit and split it across countries on the basis of the (residual) profit split method, 
i.e., some form of global profit splitting by reference to tailored firm-internal apportionment
formulae? Indeed, why bother entering into the fictitious world of SA/ALS just to realize that it 
does not work properly, and in turn leave it again? That is, why arrive at a profit allocation 
methodology that recognizes the unitary business characteristics of a multinational and 
proceed to allocate its worldwide rents by means of internal commercial data? Tax scholars 
have already suggested leapfrogging the whole thing, advocating the use of global profit splits 
or regional variants thereof.
1527
highly integrated global business; and (c) dividing the profits from business operations where contributions to 
intangible values are made serially by two or more related parties.” 
1522
 See for some analysis of this argument, Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of 
Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes International 895 (5 December 2005), at 901. 
1523
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International tax 
Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World Tax Journal 371 (2011), 
at 383. 
1524
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 264. 
1525
 See for a comparison Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in 
Henry J. Aaron et al (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 343. 
1526
 That is, in the style of Michael Mazerov, ‘Why arm’s length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), at 
28-32: “In actual transfer pricing practice, national tax authorities have already moved far down the continuum from 
arm’s length towards formula based profit splitting. Why not go all the way?” 
1527
 See for a comparison e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law 
Review 507 (1996-1997), at 510 who suggests some sort of global profit split by reference to functions performed. 
See further Antonio Russo, ‘Formulary Apportionment for Europe: An Analysis and A Proposal’, 33 Intertax 1 (2005), 
at 1-31, who proposes a pan-European residual profit split as an alternative to the Commission proposals for 
European Union wide formulary apportionment under its CCCTB Project. See also David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The 
Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer 
Pricing Journal 55 (2004), as well as David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – 
part 2: Solutions to Conceptual Shortcomings‘, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 235 (2004). Francescucci 
arrives at using multilateral RPSM to capture the multinational efficiency premium. He does not seem to go as far to 
propose global profit splits, though. Finally, see for a comparison OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing 
aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013 in which the OECD seemed to move towards establishing 
an analysis from the perspective of the multinational’s worldwide business operation, i.e., at least within the context of 
allocation profits from intangible asset commercialization. At par. 151: “The selection of the most appropriate transfer 
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Such a utilization of the (residual) profit split method to divide multinational worldwide 
combined profits attracts some difficulties, however. Yet, many of these may be resolved. 
First, it has been argued that the application of the profit split method may encounter 
difficulties in practice as the parties involved, i.e., both the associated enterprises and the tax 
administrations, may have difficulty accessing information from foreign affiliates.
1528
 As a
response, it should be noted that multinationals should have the required data readily 
available. The growing risk management demands in financial reporting and corporate 
governance require multinationals to be ‘in control’ of their business processes, including their 
tax positions.
1529
 Further, data availability issues for tax administrations may be resolved by
means of automatic information exchange mechanisms and / or country-by country reporting. 
Accordingly, the issue of data availability is an analytically separate matter. Second, it has 
been argued that problems may arise in computing multinational combined revenues and 
costs.
1530
 That is, since the associated enterprises’ commercial and tax accounting books
differentiate due to the diverging approaches taken in this respect by the various countries 
involved. Also, this is an analytically separate issue, namely the mismatches in tax base 
computations, i.e., a disparity in taxable profit base definitions to be precise. This may be 
resolved by approximating tax base definitions. Tax base design has been discussed in 
Chapter 5 of this study. Further, worth noting is that worldwide combined reporting is utilized 
today regardless; for instance, under the California state income tax system (i.e., on an 
elective basis), and the global tax consolidation approaches in the French and Italian 
corporate tax systems which have been mentioned in Chapter 4 of this study.
1531
 A third issue
recognized is that the use of the profit split method requires a geographical assignment of 
costs incurred.
1532
 This also is an analytically separate matter. Viz., it is an issue of nexus
rather than allocation. Regardless of the merits of the argument in itself, the geographical 
localization of costs incurred is a matter dealt with in the first step of the profit attribution 
process (‘nexus’) under the functional and factual analysis. 
Downside: subjectivities may leak in as future events need to be forecasted 
One pivotal issue revolving around the use of the profit split method holds up. One problem 
truly seems unsolvable. How could the fair value of firm inputs at origin be segregated and 
evaluated? Profit splitting requires an analysis of how each function performed within the 
pricing method should be based on a functional analysis that provides a clear understanding of the MNE’s global 
business processes and how the transferred intangibles interact with other functions, assets and risks that comprise 
the global business.” Notably, Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. 
Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, argues at 264 that “[t]he OECD 
has been promoting, with the support of the financial services industry, the use of a formula for assigning financial 
services income derived from global trading of financial instruments to particular taxing jurisdictions.” 
1528
 See e.g., OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.114. 
1529
 Under corporate governance and risk management standards, today, MNEs are required to substantiate their 
positions in business or internal control frameworks. These are drafted for the purpose of issuing ‘in control 
statements’ to the multinational’s stakeholders on various subjects, including corporate taxation. Indeed, as 
Christensen puts it, “in a world of just-in-time inventory and activity-based cost accounting, it seems unreasonable to 
assume that the international manager does not have ready access to volumes of needed information.” See Steve 
Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – On Balance Better’, 28 Law and Policy in International 
Business 1133 (1996-1997), at 1156. Christensen proceeds to argue that “[t]his internal information is exactly what 
an international tax auditor would be looking for in a formulary apportionment world.” 
1530
 See e.g., OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.114: “it may be difficult to measure combined revenue and costs for all the associated enterprises 
participating in the controlled transactions, which would require stating books and records on a common basis and 
making adjustments in accounting practices and currencies.” 
1531
 See for some remarks Michael Mazerov, ‘Why arm’s length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), at 
28-32, submitting that “[s]ix tax years have come and gone since California, under intense political and economic 
pressure, abandoned mandatory worldwide unitary reporting and permitted all corporate taxpayers to make a water’s 
edge election.” On the concept of worldwide unitary combination, see Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State 
Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984). 
1532
 See e.g., OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 2.114: “when the transactional profit split method is applied to operating profit, it may be difficult to 
identify the appropriate operating expenses associated with the transactions and to allocate costs between the 
transactions and the associated enterprises' other activities.” 
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multinational contributes relative to its overall profit making.
1533
 But what is the value of the
functions performed? Unfortunately, neither the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines nor, e.g., 
the US transfer pricing regulations under Section 482 IRC provide much guidance in 
establishing how the relative contributions of the functions performed and assets used could 
be evaluated.
1534
 The OECD sets forth that “[v]aluation techniques can be useful tools.”
1535
Let us therefore assess these techniques. 
Essentially, value may be described as today’s worth of expected future economic 
benefits.
1536
 In practice, there are three generally accepted valuation methodologies: cost,
market and income techniques. The first evaluates by reference to the cost of replacement, 
the second technique refers to market comparables and the third valuation method seeks to 
measure value by reference to the present worth of anticipated net economic benefits to be 
received in the future. When it concerns the evaluation of firm inputs at origin for tax allocation 
purposes, by deduction only the third technique merits some consideration.
1537
 This is
because cost ultimately does not explain rent, and market comparables are absent since rent 
production involves the commercialization of specialty items. Only the income-based 
valuation techniques truly focus on the income producing capabilities of multinational 
production factors. 
The issue emerges. The splitting of profits by utilizing income-based valuation techniques 
requires some knowledge on the value of firm inputs and with that, future economic benefits. 
In practice, appraisers make use of discounted cash flow analyses or sophisticated Black-
1533
 For a comparison see Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 206 (footnote 
1294): “Using a specific formula for each group that individually reflects the relative contribution of each factor to 
profits, as proposed by Weiner, Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union (2005), p. 19, 
does not seem practicable, as this would necessitate for each group of companies regular complex analyses of how 
income is generated. Therefore, only the application of predetermined formulae is discussed (…).” Mayer argues 
against the use of tailored apportionment formulae, which interestingly is a profit division approach substantially 
identical to utilizing the profit split method. Consequently, Mayer’s argument would equivalently need to hold when 
assessing the profit method. 
1534
 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, 
at par. 2.116 merely set forth that “the combined profits are to be split between the associated enterprises on an 
economically valid basis that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an 
agreement made at arm’s length.” See Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 37, who also refers to the absence of OECD guidance on the relative weights 
to be put on the various functions performed. For a comparison, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 564, mentioning in respect of intangibles that the US 
Regulations refer to the location where the costs of developing the intangible asset that are presumed to give rise to 
the residual were incurred. Unfortunately, though, the location of cost does not say much about the location of profit. 
Cost, profit and value (the expected future profit) do not correlate. This renders the location of cost to geographically 
allocate profit somewhat meaningless. See for a comparison, OECD, Discussion Draft; Revision of the Special 
Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Related Provisions, 6 June 
to 14 September 2012, OECD, Paris, 2012, at par. 112: “There is little reason to believe that there is any correlation 
between the cost of developing intangibles and their value or transfer price once developed ”, and at par. 135: 
“Valuation of intangibles on the basis of mark-ups over development costs is unlikely to provide an accurate measure 
of value and is generally discouraged.(…) Moreover, application of a resale price method analysis will be unlikely to 
constitute the most appropriate method for determining an arm’s length price for intangibles or rights in intangibles in 
most situations.” See for a comparison James R. Hines Jr., ‘Income misattribution under formula apportionment’, 54 
European Economic Review 108 (2010, No. 1), at 108-120. 
1535
 See OECD, Revised discussion draft on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles, 30 July 2013, OECD, Paris, 2013, 
at par. 163. See for a comparison OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at Chapter VI. See also OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, Paris, 16 September 
2014. For some illustrations on the guidance on intangible asset valuation, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Annex to Chapter VI: “Examples to Illustrate 
the Guidance on intangible Property and Highly Uncertain Valuation”. For some analysis on this matter, see Andreas 
Oestreicher, ‘Valuation Issues in Transfer Pricing of Intangibles: Comments on the Scoping of an OECD Project’, 39 
Intertax 126 (2011, No. 3), at 126-131. 
1536
 See for thorough analyses on valuation, particularly in the area of intangibles Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of 
Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), 638 pages. At 157, 163, 215 and 257, Smith and Parr define value 
as the present worth of future economic benefits. See further United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Series: Investment Promotion, Intellectual Assets: Valuation and Capitalization, United Nations Publications, 
Geneva/New York, 2003, at 1-173. 
1537
 Cf. Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at Chapters 6 and 13, 
e.g., at 391: “… the future economic benefits of ownership are key to transfer pricing issues”. 
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and-Scholes real option-based valuation techniques for this purpose.
1538
 These approaches
are also utilized by tax practitioners.
1539
 Yet, both valuation approaches require speculating
the future. It is particularly difficult to objectively assess future volatile cash flows from the 
firm’s rent yielding production factors, such as its intangible assets. The future is pretty hard 
to predict. Perhaps, accordingly, it may ultimately be impossible to truly objectively forecast 
future income, having the inevitable consequence of subjectivities leaking into the equation. 
Further, corporate value may differentiate depending on the eye of the beholder.
1540
Shareholders, the insurers, banks, the accountant and the taxman may not share views on 
the fair value of firm inputs.
1541
6.3.4.5 Perhaps tax allocation should not rely on subjective beliefs on future earnings 
So, the matter indeed seems to boil down to the premise that, at least up until now, it seems 
unfeasible to objectively allocate income on an origin basis. No objective formula proves 
available for this purpose. Fortunately, I am not alone in submitting this.
1542
 Perhaps, in the
1538
 Income based methods such as discounted cash flow (‘DCF’) and real option (‘RO’) based valuation approaches 
estimate the net worth of future income streams with a view to the time value of money and potential future decision 
making. They seek to estimate the duration of the income streams by reference, e.g., of the expected economic 
useful life of the (intangible) assets used in the business process and the economic risks that are associated with the 
generation of the estimated income. To translate future income into present value, the future income stream is 
multiplied with a discount rate. Comparing DCF to RO methods, the latter is seen as an improvement to DCF 
evaluations. An issue with DCF is that it does not account for the flexibility of management to change course and 
defer, adapt, revise or abandon its decisions at later times in response to unforeseen developments in the market. As 
DCF basically refers to a ‘one-time-all-or-nothing-decision-making-approach’ which fails to include any value for 
information becoming available in the future, it may accordingly undervalue or overvalue an investment project. 
Econometric options based valuation techniques seek to take unforeseen future events into account by introducing a 
chance factor into the model. Such a factor ‘change’ seeks to account for the volatility of e.g., the firm’s intangible 
assets. For analyses of these methods, see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Series: Investment 
Promotion, Intellectual Assets: Valuation and Capitalization, United Nations Publications, Geneva and New York, 
2003, at 1-173, and Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at Chapter 
13. Notably, option pricing theory was primarily developed for use in the financial markets but has been extended to 
evaluate intangible assets also. The key paper on option pricing theory is Fischer Black et al, ‘The Pricing of Options 
and Corporate Liabilities’, 81 Journal of Political Economy 637 (1973), at 637-654. 
1539
 See e.g., OECD, Discussion Draft; Revision of the Special Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Related Provisions, 6 June to 14 September 2012, OECD, Paris, 2012, at 
par. 109: “The application of income- based valuation techniques, especially valuation technique premised on the 
calculation of the discounted value of projected future cash flows, may be particularly useful when properly applied 
and when based on appropriate assumptions.” Cf. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Chapter VI at par. 6.20, and OECD, OECD Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, 
Paris, 16 September 2014, at 78 et seq. Notably, see Toshio Miyatake, ‘General Report – Transfer Pricing and 
intangibles’, in International Fiscal Association, Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2007) 17, at 34, setting forth that 
the income approach (relative to the market approach and cost approach), particularly the discounted cash flow 
method is most frequently used in practice. Further, see Christopher J. Faiferlick et al, ‘Using Real Options to 
Transfer Price Research-based Intangibles’, 7 Derivatives and Financial Instruments 43 (2005), at 43-47. 
1540
 See Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at Chapter 6. Yariv 
Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes’, 28 Virginia 
Tax Review 81 (2008). 
1541
 Please note that the commercial records of firms may not be that helpful either. Financial accounting standards 
such as US GAAP and IFRS typically use cost based accounting methods to assess company values. These reflect 
the cost approach where value is measured by reference to the costs that are necessary to recreate the property that 
is being valued. Yet, as cost does not explain profit and with that value, the ‘value gap’ also arises in commercial 
accounting, i.e., the difference between the firm’s equity in its balance sheets and its market value. Typically, the 
firm’s crown jewels, often not included in the financial statements, are responsible for the value gap. See on this 
matter Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), at Chapter 5. 
1542
 See Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 
1986), at 660. Further, see Richard M. Bird, ‘The Interjurisdictional Allocation of Income’, 3 Australian Tax Forum 333 
(1986), at 334, who argues that the unitary nature of the multinational entity makes it impossible to define an 
objective and determinative profit allocation standard. See further Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Formulary 
Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and 
Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World Tax Journal 371 (2011), at 380 who set forth that there is no one 
metric that explains the opaque process through which MNEs generate profit. See also Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use 
of Combined Reporting by Nation States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al eds., The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax 
Treaties (2003) 245, at 260 who argues that income does not have a true source and, therefore, any quest for finding 
it is futile. Finally, see Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax 
policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 700 and 712, who sets forth that ‘the 
basic problem is that it may be impossible, even conceptually, to identify that part of a multinational company’s 
income which is generated in the home (or, indeed, any other) country.’ “Attempting to tax that part of the 
multinational’s income which is due to the central management – as opposed to any operational activities – requires 
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style of Hellerstein, in the end, the resolution of that question may be more a matter of faith 
than of logic.
1543
Should we have faith in splitting profits by means of subjective income-based valuation 
techniques? I tend to answer this question in the negative. Perhaps the required forecasting 
of future events and the subjectivities necessarily leaking in as a consequence may perhaps 
not be considered too problematic where it concerns business transactions in the market. 
However, the converse should hold true in my view when it concerns the imposition of tax – 
i.e., the democratically legitimized obligation to monetarily contribute to the financing of public
expenditure. The subjectivities involved cause legal uncertainties and increased compliance 
costs. Several countries do not accept profit split methods or subject their application to 
extreme transfer pricing scrutiny.
 1544
 In practice, the subjectivities cause controversies and
disputes as the parties involved may have different views on the appropriate division of the 
multinational’s overall profit, and with that, the amounts of tax payable in the countries 
involved.
1545
 Controversy may not only arise in the relationship between taxpayers and the tax
authorities of countries, but also among the tax authorities of the countries involved.
1546
 The
latter perhaps even at the expense of the multinational concerned.
1547
 Some commentators
suggested to resolve things pragmatically and settle the matter and establish single taxation 
through binding bilateral or multilateral advance pricing agreements.
1548
 This, nevertheless
still does not answer the question of what kind of profit split to agree upon in such ‘MAP-
APAs’. 
As a consequence of the inherent subjectivities involved, it seems that the profit split to be 
agreed upon in the end revolves around the powers that the parties – i.e., the taxpayer and 
the tax authorities of the countries involved – bring to the bargaining table.
1549
 The battle for
a value to be given to those activities which is extremely difficult to identify. Further, the multinational company may 
even make higher profit because it operates globally – being able to exploit different factors in different countries. If 
so, the requirement to allocate its profits between jurisdictions may have no underlying conceptual basis at all.” 
1543
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The 
Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 104. Hellerstein argues 
that the true source of income may be impossible to identify.  
1544
 See Wagdy M. Abdallah et al, ‘Transfer Pricing Strategies of Intangible Assets, E-Commerce and International 
Taxation of Multinationals’, 32 International Tax Journal 5 (2006), at 11. 
1545
 See Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes 
International 895 (5 December 2005), at 901. 
1546
 Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes 
International 895 (5 December 2005), explains at 896 that “[t]he potential for controversy is heightened when 
intangible assets are involved because of their often unique nature…” 
1547
 See Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes 
International 895 (5 December 2005), at 895-906. Illustrative is the infamous GlaxoSmithKline case, which Markham 
mentions also. The case involved a transfer pricing dispute between the drug company GlaxoSmithKline and the US 
and British tax authorities. Both the US and Great Britain considered that the firm rents were essentially driven by 
functions performed within their jurisdictions. This triggered a multi-billion dollar amount of economic double taxation. 
In the end, the matter was settled, however, at the expense of GlaxoSmithKline who ended up paying tax twice 
regardless. The double tax convention between the US and Great Britain does not provide for an arbitration 
procedure. 
1548
 See Michelle Markham, ‘Tax in a Changing World: The Transfer Pricing of Intangible Assets’, 40 Tax Notes 
International 895 (5 December 2005), at 906: “APAs may be an ideal vehicle for that innovation, because they can be 
made to suit individual fact scenarios.” See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), at 548, who refers to the pursuing of negotiating 
advance pricing agreements on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Further see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall 
of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, John M, 
Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 07-017 (2007). Notably, Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An 
Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), defines an APA, at 
830: “An APA is an agreement between a taxpayer and the tax authorities whereby the parties agree on a particular 
transfer-pricing methodology to be applied to a specific set of transactions for a specified term. An APA can be 
unilateral or multilateral. Unilateral APAs are agreements between a taxpayer and one tax authority; multilateral 
APAs are agreements between a taxpayer and several tax authorities. APAs are allowed by the OECD guidelines 
and are used in Canada, the United States, and many other countries”. For some further comments of the OECD on 
APAs, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par.4.123-4.165, and its Annex to Chapter IV: Guidelines for Conducting Advance Pricing Arrangements 
under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (“MAP APAs”). For an overview, e.g., of the Luxembourg policy for issuing 
APAs to group companies performing intra-group financing activities, see Frank van Kuijk et al, ‘The Luxembourg 
Financing Circular: Something New on the Horizon?’, 39 Intertax 626 (2011, No. 12), at 626-637. 
1549
 Cf. Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002), at 839: “[T]he uncertainty created by the arm’s-length principle often benefits a country that has a 
relatively sophisticated and more aggressive tax administration”. Li proceeds and refers to Charles Irish calling this 
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the profits may ultimately be won by the economically strongest and, perhaps, the most 
aggressive negotiator at the bargaining table.  
In my view, that cannot produce a fair division of tax.
1550
 One should not forget that taxation
needs to be democratically legitimized. The profit division processes as described in the 
above occurs outside the public eye. That is also because privacy laws are typically in place 
in countries to protect the interests of individual taxpayers. Regardless, as clear standards are 
absent, subjectivities leak in, which may have as a consequence that the bargaining powers 
of the parties at the table ultimately affect the profit division and with that the tax revenue of a 
country. Particularly considering the volumes of potential tax revenues at stake, this reality 
may be considered “not healthy for the tax system”.
1551
6.3.4.6 Perhaps tax allocation should rely on predetermined formulae; towards 
formulary apportionment 
The recognition of these fundamental downfalls of transfer pricing has lead scholars to 
advocate the approach of splitting multinational (residual) profits by reference to 
predetermined formulae, a set of fixed factors.
1552
 Such a split could be made available for
application on a global basis,
1553
 or – the second-best alternative – on a regional basis (i.e.,
e.g., North American Free Trade Association, European Union, et cetera).
1554
 Accordingly, the
“the other harmful tax competition”. See Charles R. Irish, ‘The Other Harmful Tax Competition: Why a Few Countries 
Have Expanding Tax Bases, While Most Have Eroding Tax Bases’, 24 Tax Notes International 901(2001), at 901-
909. Li: “Irish argues that aggressive US transfer-pricing practices often hurt opposing governments. The result is a 
troubling erosion of the tax base of weaker countries. In practice, MNEs would be more willing to enter into APAs with 
a dominant tax administration in order to avoid onerous penalties or adverse transfer pricing adjustments.” See also 
Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 International Transfer Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 30. 
1550
 See for a comparison Steve Christensen, ‘Formulary Apportionment: More Simple – On Balance Better’, 28 Law 
and Policy in International Business 1133 (1996-1997). At 1158, Christensen considers APAs expensive and 
intrusive, even unneeded as there is an alternative: formulary apportionment. He further refers to the unavailability of 
MAP-APAs to smaller businesses that desire to conduct international transactions through related entities. In 
addition, in ‘the very existence of ‘stamp approval of APA’, Christensen sees an illustration of the ‘failure of ALS in the 
US tax system to develop concrete and reliable standards’. 
1551
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for 
Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 3-18 and at 9. 
1552
 See the references in the following two footnotes. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary 
Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 3-18. Avi-
Yonah proposes a compromise, a hybrid ALS/FA-system at 3: “Use FA in the context of the ALS. Specifically, I would 
suggest using FA to allocate the residual profit in the profit split method”. Further, see Michael Mazerov, ‘Why arm’s 
length falls short’, 5 International Tax Review 28 (1994), at 30. 
1553
 See Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax 
Journal 823 (2002). Notably, Li seems to (purposely) employ the term ‘global profit split’ not in the typical meaning of 
profit split as commonly used in transfer pricing, but actually to propose some form of formulary apportionment, i.e., 
allocation on the basis of a formula reflecting the economic factors that contribute to profit making. Also Cockfield 
mentions this, see Arthur J. Cockfield, ‘Formulary Taxation versus the Arm’s Length Principle: The Battle Among 
Doubting Thomases, Purists, and Pragmatists’, 52 Canadian Tax Journal 114 (2004), at 115. Further, see Nobert 
Hezig et al, ‘Between extremes: Merging the Advantages of Separate Accounting and Unitary Taxation’, 38 Intertax 
334 (2010), at 334, who make a plea for employing ALS for routine transactions and to supplement it with FA where 
necessary, thereby benefitting from the advantages of both attribution methodologies while to some extent limiting 
their disadvantages. Further, see François Vincent, ‘Transfer Pricing and Attribution of Income to Permanent 
Establishments: the Case for Systematic Global Profit Splits (Just Don’t Say Formulary Apportionment)’, 53 Canadian 
Tax Journal 409 (2005), at 409.  
1554
 For a proposal to adopt a formulary approach on the level of NAFTA, see, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, ‘Formulary 
Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone’, 49 Tax Law Review 691 (1993-1994), at 691-744. Also Jinyan Li, 
‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 
(2002), at 843, refers to McDaniel. See further Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-
States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, who mentions 
the alternative of employing formulary approaches at regional levels as well (North American Free Trade Association, 
European Union), i.e., at 246 and 293-293. McIntyre further refers to Robert S. McIntyre and Robert S. McIntyre et al, 
‘Using NAFTA to Introduce Formulary Apportionment’, 6 Tax Notes International 851 (5 April 1993), at 851-856, and 
Mike McIntyre, ‘Harmonizing Direct Taxes in the EEC’, 2 Tax Notes International 131 (1990), at 131-132. See also 
Alicia Munnell, ‘Taxation of Capital Income in a Global Economy: An Overview’, New England Economic Review 33 
(1992), at 33-51, and Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘Economic Integration and European Taxation of Corporate Income at 
Source: Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience’, 29 European Taxation 243 (1989), at 243-250. The application of 
a formulary approach on regional bases, sometimes referred to as ‘water’s edge’, may perhaps be pragmatically and 
politically more feasible than its global alternative. However, regional approaches trigger profit allocation issues at the 
regional borders. That is, since at these borders SA/ALS would apply, thereby analytically re-introducing the issues 
accompanying its use in a manner as elaborated upon extensively in the above subsections. Cf. Charles E. McLure 
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next analytical step in the ‘profit allocation continuum’ has been taken: the introduction of 
formulary approaches into the analysis. 
Worth noting is that the OECD explicitly rejects formulary approaches as they consider 
predetermined formulae to be unable to produce arm’s length outcomes.
1555
 Implicitly, the
OECD does allow for fractional approaches on ad hoc bases in specific circumstances.
1556
Further the OECD sees some room for adopting safe harbors, i.e., an approach that 
essentially resembles a formulary allocation on a predetermined basis.
1557
Conversely, the US shows less reluctance with formulary approaches. Its proposed global 
dealing regulations, for instance, provide that ‘in appropriate circumstances, the use of a 
multifactor formula is allowed to determine an arm’s length allocation of combined profits in a 
global trading situation’.
1558
 In addition, under the available 50/50 method, the US uses a two-
factor property and sales formula to apportion income from the production and sale of 
goods.
1559
 Perhaps the conceptually more relaxed views on the matter may be explained by
Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Income’, in 
Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 243, at 
258. 
1555
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 1.15. and section C. Cf. Michelle Markham, The Transfer Pricing of Intangibles (2005), at 147, Markham 
also sets forth that the OECD does not reject fractional approaches as such, but specifically the use of predetermined 
formulae. 
1556
 See for a comparison OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 
OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 2.132. As regards to the application of the profit split method, the OECD explicitly 
forwards that it is not desirable to establish a prescriptive list of criteria or allocation keys. Understandably, as the 
adoption of predetermined allocation keys would basically introduce formulary apportionment. Indeed, formulary 
apportionment systems exactly resort to prescriptive allocation keys (payroll, assets, sales). Moreover, formulary 
approaches may also be recognized to be authorized by the OECD under the indirect-charge methods regarding 
certain intra-group service provisions provided, e.g., by parent companies or group service centers. Indirect-charging 
may occur on the basis of allocation keys by reference to turnover, staff employed. See OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 7.23-7.25. Also in 
respect of cost contribution arrangements (‘CCAs’) the OECD authorizes formulary approaches referring to sales, 
units used, produced or sold, gross or operating profit, the number of employees, capital invested, and so forth. See 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 
8.3 and 8.19. Cf. David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The 
Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 (2004), at 67. Further, see OECD, Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 211-215 regarding CCAs, and 216-220 regarding internal services. On US perspectives on cost sharing 
arrangement, see 26 CFR 1.482-7. Notably, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par.8.3 defines CCAs as follows: “A CCA is a framework agreed among 
business enterprises to share the costs and risks of developing, producing or obtaining assets, services, or rights, 
and to determine the nature and extent of the interests of each participant in those assets, services, or rights. A CCA 
is a contractual arrangement rather than necessarily a distinct juridical entity or permanent establishment of all the 
participants. In a CCA, each participant’s proportionate share of the overall contributions to the arrangement will be 
consistent with the participant’s proportionate share of the overall expected benefits to be received under the 
arrangement, bearing in mind that transfer pricing is not an exact science.” For some further reading and analysis, 
see Theresa Stradinger, ‘Classification of Cost Allocation Agreements’, 41Intertax 665 (2013), at 665-675. 
1557
 Worth mentioning, is OECD, Discussion Draft; Revision of Section on Safe Harbours in Chapter IV of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Draft Sample Memoranda of understanding for Competent Authorities to Establish 
Bilateral Safe Harbours, 6 June to 14 September 2012, OECD, Paris, 2012. See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, at par. 4.93-4.122. In these documents the 
OECD argues that for administrative convenience reasons, states may consider to adopt safe harbor transfer pricing 
rules. In the view of the OECD caution should be taken, though, as safe harbor rules theoretically do not coincide 
with the arm’s length standard. The OECD arrives at the conclusion that the adoption of safe harbor rules may be 
worthwhile in straightforward cases. Interestingly, this begs the question that if the case at hand is straightforward, 
why should states resort to safe harbor rules in such straightforward cases in the first place? 
1558
 See 26 CFR 1.482-8(e)(2) in conjunction with Notice 94-40 (Global Trading Advance Pricing Agreements, 1994-1 
C.B. 351, 25 April 1994) published by the US Internal Revenue Service. The notice provided a generic description of 
the experience of the IRS with functionally integrated global dealing operations. See also the IRS’s Proposed 
Regulations on Arm's Length Allocation of Income From Global Dealing Operation (REG-208299-90), (3 June 1998). 
For some analysis on this matter, see Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income 
Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), at 830. Worth noting is that the OECD in its profit attribution report 
sees room for adopting the profit split method, i.e., a quasi-formulary approach in cases involving the 
commercialization of intangibles in relation to integrated global trading business operations. See OECD, Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 
2010, at par. 204. 
1559
 See US IRC section 863 and 26 CFR 1.863. See on this also Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined 
Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties 
(2003) 245, at 264. Notably, see Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Memorandum, Number: 
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reference to the common use of formulary apportionment systems in the US to divide state 
income tax bases between the states. 
Notably, in the process, the alleged analytical gap between ALS and formulary apportionment 
(‘FA’) has been bridged.
1560 
The analytical difference between the profit split transfer pricing
method and formulary apportionment does not seem that big. The approaches are 
conceptually much alike. Both, for instance, approximate the geographical source of income 
by reference to a formula. The profit split essentially differentiates from formulary 
apportionment at only one point. The profit split utilizes formulae by reference to firm specific 
inputs which are assessed at the time of investment. FA splits profit by reference to a 
predetermined formula, for instance on the basis of payroll, assets and sales. 
The question arises as to which factors to put into such a formula. Indeed, the time has come 
to take a closer look at formulary apportionment. Notably, as will be shown, again a 
conceptual crossroads shall emerge, i.e., the question as to whether to attribute profits to the 
origin state, to the destination state, or to both. 
6.4 Tax pie sharing under the supply-demand and demand-side alternatives: 
‘Formulary Apportionment’  
6.4.1 Traditional FA aims at fairly approximating the location and value of firm 
inputs at origin and firm outputs at destination 
The traditional formulary systems seek to allocate taxing entitlements to the tax jurisdictions 
of both origin and destination. They seek to do this by fairly approximating the location and 
value of firm inputs and outputs on the basis of a predetermined fixed formula.
1561
 Formulary
20051001F (Release Date: 3/11/2005), at 4: “Under the 50/50 method, 50% of the gross income from Section 863 
Sales is allocated to production activity and 50% is allocated to sales activity”. 
1560
 See for a comparison International Monetary Fund, IMF Policy Paper; Spillovers in International Corporate 
Taxation, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 2014, at 31, David L.P. Francescucci, ‘The Arm’s Length 
Principle and Group Dynamics – part 1: The Conceptual Shortcomings’, 11 International Transfer Pricing Journal 55 
(2004), at 56: “… smoothly bridging the gap…”. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: 
A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation’, University of Michigan Law School, John M, Olin Center for 
Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 07-017 (2007). Avi-Yonah argues that despite the common practice of 
contrasting the ALS and formulary methods of dealing with the transfer pricing problem, they are actually not 
dichotomous, but, instead, rather form the two extreme ends of a continuum ranging from the comparable 
uncontrolled price method to predetermined formulas. Avi-Yonah explains that the profit split method conceptually 
operates in a manner akin to formulary apportionment as it starts with the profits of the enterprise as a whole and 
allocates the business income in a formulary fashion. This brings him to forward that the distinction between ALS and 
FA largely is a matter of semantics, not substance. Also Li refers to this, Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An 
Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002) at 838. Li argues that 
the arm’s length standard and formulary apportionment should not be viewed as polar extremes, but rather should be 
viewed as a part of a continuum of methods ranging from CUP to predetermined formulas. Please note that such a 
conceptualization of the sloping of the transfer pricing methods from ALS to FA has been recognized in a similar 
manner in the above subsection also. Further, see further Hubert M.A.L. Hamaekers, ‘Arm's Length - How Long?’, 8 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 30 (2001), at 37, who recognizes an analytical difference between formulary 
apportionment and the profit split methods as a consequence of the absence of a predetermined formula under the 
latter. See also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 13: “The main difference 
between the current application of formulaic methods in international tax law and formulary apportionment as 
practicised in some subnational apportionment systems appears to be that predetermined formulae are used in the 
latter but not in current national and international tax law.” Finally and notably, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, 
‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International tax Policies by Utilizing the 
Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, 3 World Tax Journal 371 (2011), at 371. In this Article, 
the authors cross the analytical line from basing the residual profit split on firm specific factors (market value of non-
routine functions) to splitting the residual by means of a predetermined formula, i.e., a limited formulary 
apportionment regime. See on the arm’s length versus formulary apportionment debate also Wolfgang Schön, 
‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part III)’, 2 World Tax Journal 227 (2010), at 227-261. 
1561
 See for analyses of the formulary approach, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income 
Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984), Michael Lang et al (eds.), Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (2008), Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), Charles E. McLure, Jr., 
‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et al, The Economics of Taxation 
(1980) 327, at 327-346, Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula 
Apportionment of Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues 
and Options for Reform (2000) 243, at 243-292, Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-
States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, Joann M. 
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systems essentially seek to localize and evaluate both the production and marketing sides of 
income generation. Where does the global entrepreneur produce and sell its product? 
Contrary to SA/ALS, traditional formulary apportionment recognizes income generation as the 
outcome of the interplay of both supply and demand.
1562
 FA seeks to attribute corporate tax
base to both the investment jurisdiction (origin) and the jurisdiction where the firm’s goods 
and services are marketed (destination).
1563
 Appreciating that corporate income lacks
geographical attributes, formulary systems modestly seek to provide a fair geographical 
division of income rather than identifying the ‘true’ geographic source of income.
1564
 The
weighing of factors accordingly is considered a matter of judgment.
1565
 Notably, taxable profit
division on the basis of formulary mechanisms conceptually differs from the profit division 
approaches in international taxation. Internationally, as said, the corporate tax base is sought 
to allocate income merely by reference to the tax jurisdictions of origin (i.e., the location of 
firm inputs). 
Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and 
Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation 
Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate 
Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs 
Union Working Paper 2006:9, Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The Elusive Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax: The State 
Case’, 9 Public Finance Quarterly 395 (1981), at 395-413, Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘Economic Integration and 
European Taxation of Corporate Income at Source: Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience’, 29 European Taxation 
243 (1989), at 243-250, Jerome R. Hellerstein, ‘Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate 
Accounting with Formulary Apportionment’, 60 Tax Notes 1131 (23 August 1993), at 1136-1145, Joann M. Weiner, 
‘Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the 
International Level’, 13 Tax Notes International 2113 (23 December 1996), Jack M. Mintz, ‘Globalization of the 
Corporate Income Tax: The Role of Allocation’, 56 Finanzarchiv 389 (1999), at 389-423, Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary 
taxation – The Case for Global Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-
286, Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary 
Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 586 (2002), at 587, Charles E. Mclure, Jr., ‘Corporate Tax 
Harmonization in the European Union: The Commission’s Proposals’, 36 Tax Notes International 45 (4 October 
2004), at 45-69, Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What 
the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 
199-220, Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘Lost in Translation: Contextual Considerations in Evaluating the Relevance of US 
Experience for the European Commission's Company Taxation Proposals’, 58 Bulletin for international taxation 86 
(2004), at 86-98, Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer 
Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 103-111, 
Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition 
within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1562
 Cf. Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 228-246. 
1563
 It would be consistent to apportion both profits as losses. However, the CCCTB for instance only apportions 
profits under the sharing mechanism, see Article 86(2) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). Losses are carried forward on a non-shared 
basis. This creates complexities where mergers and acquisitions are involved in the presence of ring-fenced loss 
carry forwards. These need to be geographically divided to make sure that CCCTB losses do not cross European 
Union Member State tax borders, see Chapters X and XI Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). See on this matter Jan van de 
Streek, ‘The CCCTB Concept of Consolidation and the Rules on Entering a Group’, 40 Intertax 24 (2012), and Jan 
van de Streek, ‘The CCCTB Rules on Leaving a Group’, 40 Intertax 421 (2012). This is not further discussed in this 
study, as in my view, the matter may be circumvented easily by apportioning losses prior to the application of a carry 
forward mechanism. In that case, the issue would not rise in the first place. 
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 Cf. e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), 
The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 253, Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income 
Allocation in the 21st Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 103 (2005), at 104, and Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: 
Principles and Applications to the European Union’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European 
Union, Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 46, at 46-77. 
1565
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 33. See for a comparison Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements 
of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 6 (par. 13): 
“The Commission Services consider that the weighting of the factors is not a technical issue and recommend that any 
discussion on the weighting be carried out at political level…” 
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6.4.2 Formulary apportionment systems: the US, Canada, and the CCCTB 
6.4.2.1 Some well-known examples 
The best known examples of countries that have traditionally been utilizing formulary 
approaches to divide corporate tax bases at subnational levels of government are the US 
(‘formulary apportionment’) and Canada (‘formulary allocation’). Within the context of the 
European Union, the European Commission’s 16 March 2011 proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (‘CCCTB’) envisages a formulary approach to share the 
European Union-wide corporate profits of European Union businesses among the European 
Union Member States. Before proceeding, it may be worth briefly addressing some of the 
basic characteristics of the US, Canadian and CCCTB systems.
1566
6.4.2.2 Formulary apportionment in US state income taxation: a glance 
With regards to the US, the District of Columbia and all the states except Wyoming, 
Washington, South Dakota and Nevada autonomously employ a state corporate income tax 
system. State income taxes are imposed in addition to the federal income tax that is levied 
from corporations at a marginal rate of 35%. The state tax rates roughly differentiate between 
5% and 10%. 
The US states’ practices of using formulary mechanisms to divide the corporate profits of 
multistate (unitary) businesses to the taxing jurisdictions in which they have a business 
connection operate within a framework of mutually diverging state income tax systems. Each 
US state operates its own system. The states’ autonomy to levy state income taxes on 
corporations is constrained by federal statutes
1567
 and the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of the United States which sets forth the constitutional limitations of the states’ 
autonomy in taxation.
1568-1569
 The field of US state income taxation is characterized by a high
degree of non-uniformity. Although the federal corporate tax base is used by most states as a 
1566
 Other countries employing formulary systems at sub-national levels of government include Germany and 
Switzerland. These are not further discussed. For analyses and comments, see Stefan Mayer, Formulary 
Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5. 
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 See for instance 15 USC §381. This provision – often referred to by its 1959 enacting legislation as U.S. Public 
Law (PL) 86-272 – requires the physical presence (e.g., a branch or office) of an out of state remote seller of physical 
goods situated within a state to establish its taxable presence for state income tax purposes. This legislation has 
been enacted in response to an US Supreme Court case basically constitutionally validating the establishing of a 
taxable presence for state income tax purposes of an out of state remote seller lacking an in-state physical presence, 
see Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Worth noting further is the Business Activity Tax 
Simplification Act of 2011 (HR 1439) that was introduced to Congress on 8 April 2011 but had never been taken up 
by the broader chamber upon its passing of the House Judiciary Committee on 7 July 2011 before Congress ended 
its session. The Bill would expand the provisions of PL 86-272 (including the physical presence requirement for a 
business to be subject to state income tax) to apply also to services and intangibles. 
1568
 The relevant clauses in the US Constitution are the Due Process clause and the Commerce clauses (U.S. 
Constitution, amendment XIV, section 1 and U.S. Constitution, article I, section 8, cl. 3. Some key rulings of the 
United States Supreme Court are Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, Chairman, Mississippi Tax Commission, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 98 
S. Ct. 2340 (1978), Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983), Tyler Pipe v. Wash. Dept. of Rev., 
483 U.S. 232 (1987), Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), and Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994). Also worth noting is the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Geoffrey Inc. v. 
South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E. 2d 13 (1993) with respect of which the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
(510 US 992 (1993). On the unitary business definition, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 
445 U.S. 425, 100 S. Ct. 1223 (1980), Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228, at 222-
223, 100 S. Ct. at 2109 (1980), Asarco Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), F.W. Woolworth Co. v. 
Taxation and Revenue Dept. of the State of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354 (1982), and Allied-Signal, Inc. ex rel Bendix 
Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992). 
1569
 Notably, US constitutional law further requires the states to distinguish between so-called business income and 
non-business income. Apportionment by formula only applies with regards to the former. Non-business income is 
allocated to taxing jurisdictions directly on the basis of sourcing rules. This matter is not further discussed for the 
making of such a distinction – although required under US constitutional law – analytically is irrelevant. Cf. Walter 
Hellerstein, ‘The Business-Nonbusiness Income Distinction and the Case for Its Abolition’, 21 State Tax Notes 725 
(September 3, 2001), at 725-739, and Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company 
Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public 
Finance 199 (2004), 199-220, at 217. See for a comparison Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working 
Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud 
TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 7 (par. 15). Neither the Canadian system nor 
the CCCTB proposal, e.g., makes such a classification. 
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starting point for state tax base calculation purposes, many states subsequently adopt 
alterations, for instance, by way of tax incentives to implement their individual social and 
economic tax policies (accelerated depreciation, tax credits, et cetera).
1570
 Furthermore, each
state uses its own formula or sets of formulae.
1571
 Industry specific formulae apply to
particular sectors of industries (e.g., construction, transportation, television and broadcasting, 
financial institutions).
1572
 To attract investment, some states allow taxpayers to choose out of
a variety of formulae.
1573
 State taxes are deductible for US federal income tax purposes.
1574
Harmonization efforts have been made in the US by the Multistate Tax Commission, i.e., an 
advisory intergovernmental state tax agency created in 1967 by the Multistate Tax Compact. 
The compact provides for a model state income taxation statute. It incorporates nearly 
verbatim the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), a model which was 
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1957.
1575
 The Multistate Tax Commission
also provides for non-binding recommendations of best practice. The Multistate Tax 
Commission is currently in the process of discussing revisions to the compact.
1576
 The
traditional equally-weighted three-factor ‘Massachusetts formula’ (1/3 tangible assets and 
rental expense, 1/3 sales and other receipts, and 1/3 payroll),
1577
 which spread among the US
states in the 1950s upon the promulgation of UDITPA, is being debated. Following 
developments in states practices, it has been suggested to increase the weight on the sales 
factor. That is to arrive at a double-weighted gross receipts factor (1/4 payroll, 1/4 capital, 1/2 
sales).
1578
 Thirty-seven US states follow all or parts of UDITPA.
1579
 US states increasingly turn
to destination based sales-only FA in attempting to attract investments and employment into 
their territories.
1580
6.4.2.3 Formulary allocation in Canadian provincial/territorial tax system: a glance 
In Canada, the ten provinces and the three territories levy corporate income taxes. These are 
imposed in addition to the Canadian federal corporation tax. The Canadian system is 
characterized by a high degree of harmonization.
1581
 This has been achieved through the tax
collection agreements (‘TCAs’) that have been concluded by the Canadian federal 
1570
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the European Community?’, 46 National Tax Journal 441 (1993), at 447, and Stefan Mayer, Formulary 
Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 86. 
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 For an overview of the formulae adopted by the US States as of January 1, 2013, see David Spencer, ‘Unitary 
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Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 25, and Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and 
Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of 
Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, 
at 58-59. 
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 See for some examples, Chris Kelling, ‘Arizona Governor Vetoes Corporate Credit for Tuition Donations, OKs 
Superweighted Sales Factor’, 36 State Tax Notes 632 (30 May 2005), at 632-633, and Chris W. Courtwright, 
‘Governor Approves Single-Sales-Factor Apportionment Incentive’, 44 State Tax Notes 16 (2 April 2007), at 16. 
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 Sec. 164 of the US IRC. 
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 For some historical notes, see John S. Warren, ‘UDITPA – A Historical Perspective’, 38 State Tax Notes 133 (3 
October 2005), 133-136. 
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 See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, 
at 10-14, and Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV Recommended Amendments As 
approved for Public Hearing, 6 December 2012. 
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 Article IV.9 Multistate Tax Compact. 
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 See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, 
at 10-14, and Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV Recommended Amendments As 
approved for Public Hearing, 6 December 2012. 
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 See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, 
at 3, referring to Commerce Clearing House, ¶ 11-505, 25 April 2012. 
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April 2013, at 2-5. 
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General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 4, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The 
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government and the provinces, with the exceptions of Quebec and Alberta, and the historical 
developments that led to the conclusion of these TCAs. 
The Canadian system may be described as a ‘piggyback’ one.
1582
 The TCAs provide that the
provinces levy corporate tax from corporations that have Canadian nexus on taxable income 
as defined under the federal act. The interprovincial/territorial allocation of corporate profits to 
permanent establishments occurs by reference to a harmonized, equally-weighted two-factor 
formula (1/2 payroll, 1/2 gross revenue).
1583
 Similar to practices in the US, Canada has
adopted sector specific formulae as well.
1584
 No capital factor is used. In exchange for
adhering to the federal statutes, the Canada Revenue Agency, i.e., the federal tax collecting 
agency, collects the provincial taxes free of charge on behalf of these provinces through a 
system of unified tax returns at tax rates specified by the provinces. The sub-national levels of 
government, however, remain autonomous in deciding the applicable tax rates, and the use of 
tax credits to the post-allocated tax base for the purposes of setting tax policy.
1585
 The
provincial tax rates generally range between 10% (Alberta) and 16% (Prince Edward Island / 
Nova Scotia). Quebec and Alberta operate and collect their own tax and accordingly have 
some flexibility in the design of their tax system. However, generally, these provinces adopt a 
tax base definition and allocation formula that is very similar to their Canadian 
counterparts.
1586
The Canadian tax system has upheld its uniformity. Businesses have come to accept the 
benefits of harmonization.
1587
 Moreover, the Canadian system is stabilized and supported by
a structure of equalization payments. The Canadian federal government makes funds 
available to the less wealthy – so-called ‘have not’ – provinces to equalize their fiscal 
capacities;
1588
 that is, relative to the ‘have’ provinces who do not receive equalization
payments. The sub-national corporation taxes are not deductible from the Canadian federal 
tax base. Instead, to give room for these taxes, the federal Income Tax Act provides for an 
abatement of 10% from the basic federal tax rate of 38%.
1589
 It basically provides for a
deduction from the federal tax otherwise payable of an amount equal to 10% of the 
corporation’s taxable income that is allocated in a tax year to Canadian provinces and 
territories. The abatement is unavailable for income that is allocable to foreign jurisdictions. 
Foreign income is not generally subject to provincial or territorial taxes.  
6.4.2.4 Formulary apportionment in the EU under the proposed CCCTB: a glance 
Within the European Union, the Commission envisages the proposal for a CCCTB to 
constitute ‘a comprehensive solution’ for the inequities and inefficiencies that are currently 
present under the application of the twenty-eight different corporate tax systems in the 
European Union.
1590
 Under the Commission’s proposal, the CCCTB would operate electively,
1582
 See Nicholas D. LePan, ‘Comments on Musgrave’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income 
Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 247, at 247-249. 
1583
 See Sec. 402(3) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1584
 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 25, and Ana 
Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-
Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-
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1585
 The provinces make use of tax credits to attract investment. See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment 
and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General 
Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at Chapter 6, and at Joan Martens Weiner, ‘CCCTB and 
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i.e., as an available alternative to the corporate tax systems of the European Union Member
States.
1591
 The CCCTB would accordingly constitute the 29
th
 corporate tax system within the
European Union. 
In addition to the formulary approach to divide corporate profit within the European Union, the 
CCCTB proposal’s key properties are the tax consolidation of affiliated corporate entities that 
have nexus within the European Union, and the harmonized taxable base definition to 
calculate the tax consolidated group’s European Union-wide corporate profits.
1592
 The intra-
European Union division of the group’s common tax base occurs through a sharing 
mechanism, which echoes the ‘Massachusetts formula’ under UDITPA. Also the CCCTB 
proposal makes use of an equally-weighted three-factor formula (assets, payroll, sales).
1593
The European Commission explicitly remarks that “the transfer prices which are calculated for 
tax purposes no longer serve any underlying commercial rationale in the Internal Market”.
1594
No industry specific formula variant has been proposed for technical and administrative 
convenience reasons.
1595
 This is the case regardless of the fact that a ‘safeguard clause’ has
been introduced, which is directed at correcting unfair outcomes under the application of the 
general formula.
1596
 The CCCTB proposal does not allow for European Union Member States
making use of tax credits to reduce post-apportioned tax base.
1597
Economic and Social Committee, An Internal Market without company tax obstacles achievements, ongoing 
initiatives and remaining challenges, COM(2003)726 final, 24 November 2003. 
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 See Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 
121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee have voted in 
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of a mandatory CCCTB (after an introductory period). See European Parliament on the proposal for a Council 
directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 
2011/0058(CNS)), A7-0080/2012, 28 March 2012, Amendments 14, 21, 22; changes proposed to recital 8, Article 6a 
(new) and Article 6b (new), and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a 
Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121 final – 2011/0058 
(CNS), ECO/302, 26 October 2011, at 1.3. 
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 See Chapter X Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS).  
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The Commission cannot accept the amendment, Commission Communication on the action taken on opinions and 
resolutions adopted by Parliament at the April 2012 part-session, (SP(2012)388), 30 May 2012, considering an 
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companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM(2001) 582 final, Brussels, 23 
October 2001, at 39. 
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Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 17 (par. 69-70), and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group 
(CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, 
CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 9 (par. 19). See further Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 52, An overview of the main issues that emerged during 
the discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 
27 February 2007, at 10 (par. 47): “Few experts commented on this point, mainly considering that there should be as 
little differences as possible, the financial sector being one potential candidate to a 'special' formula”. The introduction 
of industry specific formulae would produce qualification issues and demarcation problems to the extent that a 
horizontally integrated firm would engage into business operations falling under diverging formulae. 
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COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). The safeguard clause applies save for unanimity consensus of the European 
Union Member States’ authorities involved. 
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The CCCTB proposal does not foresee tax rate harmonization. The Commission considers 
the decisions on the tax rates to remain at the level of European Union Member State 
sovereignty.
1598
 Rate harmonization would likely face political resistance in the European
Union Member States as this would involve a substantial transfer of fiscal autonomy from the 
states to the union. 
6.4.3 The virtues of common and theoretically sound approaches, also under  FA 
6.4.3.1 FA is about profit division, not about tax unit definitions, tax base definitions or 
double tax relief mechanisms 
Formulary apportionment is a methodology used to divide corporate profit among taxing 
jurisdictions by reference to a predetermined formula that fairly reflects the income-generating 
activities of a firm within a taxing jurisdiction. Nothing more, nothing less. Analytically, FA has 
nothing to do with tax unit definitions, tax base definitions, or double tax relief mechanisms. 
Taxing jurisdictions may even adopt mutually diverging formulae to attribute multijurisdictional 
profit, as the US state income tax practices show. 
This holds true, although formulary apportionment systems have often been associated with a 
harmonized taxable entity definition; FA is typically coupled with a tax grouping concept like 
tax consolidation or combined reporting. Formulary apportionment is also sometimes 
associated with tax base uniformity, territorial taxation and geographic limitations to which the 
formulary system applies. The latter is generally referred to as the ‘water’s edge limitation’. 
These associations, however, are not a conceptual necessity and should accordingly be kept 
separate analytically.
1599
 This has not always been fully appreciated.
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6.4.3.2 A common approach: also under FA 
Although the concept of dividing profit by reference to a formula should not be analytically 
confused with the taxable entity, the tax base and double tax relief mechanisms, this does not 
mean that a common approach, also under a formulary approach, would not be beneficial.
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consolidation”, and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 
60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 
November 2007, at 5 (par. 7): “The sharing mechanism itself is not the purpose of the comprehensive tax reform, but 
a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the consolidation”. 
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Reform (2000) 243, at 287. See for a comparison Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group 
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As mentioned in this study’s introduction, the non-uniformity in international corporate taxation 
triggers double (non-)taxation issues, inequities and investment distortions. This holds true 
also where formulary apportionment is used to geographically attribute tax base among taxing 
states rather than SA/ALS. A common approach cancels out hybrid entity and hybrid income 
mismatches, as well as mismatches in the geographic allocation of the taxable base.
1602
As regards to the differentials in the US states’ income tax systems, various commentators, 
for example, have argued that the US precedent is a route not to be followed.
1603
 Differentials
in the apportionment formulae trigger double (non-)taxation within the US, as well as 
overtaxation and undertaxation of multijurisdictional business operations relative to in-state 
business activities. This is generally considered inequitable. It also distorts the business 
decision of whether to invest across the respective US state’s tax-border. This holds true 
regardless of the fact that the US Supreme Court has sanctioned formulae differentials in the 
US state income tax systems and the resulting double (non-)taxation under the US 
Constitution.
1604
 The US Supreme Court is not institutionally equipped to require uniformity.
That would be a matter for US Congress to resolve.
1605
 It has been set forth in the literature
that “the similarity of tax bases, brought about by the existence of the federal tax base, seems 
to be the only really strong point of the present system.”
1606
It may be argued that only common approaches in international tax law design sufficiently 
secure single taxation and may accordingly promote global efficiency.
1607
 Economic analyses,
for instance, provide some evidence suggesting the merits of obtaining agreement on a 
common profit allocation methodology.
1608
 These have argued that the use of a common
formula is the most beneficial in terms of optimizing the social welfare of the participating 
taxing jurisdictions taken together as a whole. Social welfare would be higher under any 
common formula, regardless of how it is defined, relative to using non-uniform formulae. 
Worth noting is that this meets the observations of the US state tax authorities close to a 
century ago: “there is no right rule of apportionment (…) the only right rule (…) is a rule on 
which the several states can and will get together as a matter of comity”.
1609
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That is the case even though single jurisdictions may benefit in the short term – although at 
the others’ expense – from individually taking a deviating course by adopting diverging 
formulae on a stand-alone basis.
1610
 The tendencies of the US states to move towards sales-
only FA to attract corporate investment towards their jurisdictions supports this argument.
1611
States using sales-only FA promote inbound investments relative to states (also) using origin 
based formula factors, since firm inputs are being left untaxed under such a destination-based 
tax base attribution system. Note that in the equilibrium sales-only-FA is neutral towards the 
investment location decision. That is, as sales-only FA assigns profits only to the jurisdiction 
of firm outputs by reference to the demand side of income production.
1612
 Production locations
are irrelevant in this respect. Sales-only FA has emerged in the US since the 1980s upon its 
constitutional validation by the US Supreme Court in the case of Moorman.
1613
In designing a framework model of taxable profit division by reference to a formulary 
approach, a coordinated approach such as that used in Canada may accordingly be favored 
over the approaches lacking uniformity that are used in the US.
1614
 Also the Commission in its
CCCTB-proposal recognizes the benefits of uniformity and accordingly proposes a 
harmonized European Union-wide formula to share corporate profit within the European 
Union.
1615
 As shown in the Canadian precedent, a standard of setting fiscal policy would
remain within the realm of state sovereignty, also under a common approach, through the 
autonomy in deciding on the tax rates to be applied to the post-apportioned tax bases.
1616
Illustratively, within the context of the European Union, the European Commission is 
considering that “[t]he determination of tax rates is treated as a matter inherent in Member 
States’ tax sovereignty and is therefore left to be dealt with through national legislation.”
1617
6.4.3.3 Unlimited taxation, Dutch-style double tax relief: also under FA 
At this place some brief comments are worth making linking the previous chapters with a 
formulary approach to divide profit across taxing jurisdictions.  
In Chapter 3, I made a plea for adopting unlimited taxation for all corporate taxpayers having 
a business connection with a taxing jurisdiction.
1618
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residence. With respect to these taxpayer’s foreign income, double tax relief would 
subsequently be granted by means of the Dutch-style tax exemption mechanism. There is no 
reason why such a double tax relief system could not be linked to a formulary system. 
Conceptually, formulary systems can operate either within a worldwide system or a territorial 
system. Also, formulary systems analytically could function very well under an approach 
whereby foreign income is exempt from the tax base (base exemption system), or where the 
foreign tax is credited against the domestic tax on worldwide income (credit system). This is 
just like the taxing systems using SA/ALS. Moreover, formulary systems may accordingly also 
operate under a worldwide system where the domestic tax attributable to the foreign income 
is credited against the domestic tax on worldwide income, i.e., worldwide taxation of both 
resident and non-resident corporate taxpayers using the Dutch-style tax exemption 
mechanism for double tax relief purposes. It should be kept in mind that FA is about profit 
division, not double tax relief. 
The arguments forwarded in Chapter 3 advocating the adoption of worldwide taxation for all 
taxpayers having local nexus and granting double tax relief by reference to the Dutch-style tax 
exemption mechanism holds up equally under a formulary system as it does under SA/ALS. 
As extensively discussed, import neutrality promoting exemption systems in the current 
international tax regime hinder outbound investment, while export neutrality promoting credit 
systems impair inbound investment. Only the advocated approach of unlimited taxation 
combined with the Dutch-style tax exemption for foreign income truly secures unilateral tax 
neutrality and non-discrimination in relation to both inflows and outflows of resources across 
the tax-borders.
1619
 This holds up under the adoption of both SA/ALS and FA for profit
attribution purposes. As said, profit allocation methodologies should not analytically be 
confused with territorial systems or worldwide systems. They should also not be confused 
with double tax relief mechanisms. That is, as said, for these being analytically separate 
matters. 
6.4.3.4 Economic rent taxation: also under FA 
Chapter 5 addresses the issue of tax base design. The formulary systems currently in place in 
the US and Canada, as well as the proposed CCCTB, compute the corporate taxable base by 
reference to base definition approaches common in corporate taxation. Despite the 
differentials in terms of cost deductions and deduction limitations, stock valuation rules and 
(accelerated) depreciation mechanisms for tax base computation purposes, all basically 
subject the realized nominal return to equity to corporate tax. That is, also regardless of the 
presence of tax incentives subsequent to the apportioning process, such as tax credits to 
post-apportioned tax base. Essentially, these formulary systems all adopt a traditional 
corporate income tax base. 
The consequence of using a traditional realization-based return to equity standard for 
corporate tax base computation purposes is a tax-favoring of debt financing over equity 
financing. The formulary systems currently in place in the US and Canada accordingly suffer 
the same financing discrimination defect as traditional corporate income tax systems in the 
international tax regime employing SA/ALS do. The same holds true for the proposed 
CCCTB. As discussed in Chapter 5, to eliminate the financing discrimination issues and to 
arrive at a tax base computation approach that would be neutral towards marginal investment 
decisions, only infra-marginal returns should be subject to the tax. For that reason, I 
advocated an approach of making use of an allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’).
1620
 This
argument holds up equally under a formulary system as it does under SA/ALS. There is no 
Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation Whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax 
Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 9, and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Intra-Firm 
Transactions – What if Member States Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double 
Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 12. 
1619
 Ibidem, and Maarten F. de Wilde, Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing 
Economy, 38 Intertax 281 (2010), and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘On X Holding and the ECJ’s Ambiguous Approach 
towards the Proportionality Test’, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), at 170-182. 
1620
 Cf. Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-Flow Tax’, 155 De 
Economist 417 (2007), at 417-448, and Serena Fatica et al, ‘Taxation Papers; The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: 
Consequences And Solutions’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 2012:33. 
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reason why an ACE could not be linked to a formulary system. Profit allocation methodologies 
should not be confused with tax base design issues. Again, that is for these constituting 
analytically separate matters. 
6.4.3.5 The group as a taxable entity: also under FA 
With respect to the tax unit definition under a formulary system, matters should be elaborated 
somewhat further. First, conceptually, taxing jurisdictions using formulary apportionment to 
divide corporate profit are not necessarily required to harmonize the tax unit, just as the use 
of SA/ALS does not. The CCCTB proposal, for instance, defines taxpayers as the eligible 
companies that opted to apply the system.
1621
 Eligible are those companies that have been
established under the laws of a Member State and are subject to the corporate tax of a 
Member State. With regards to third country company forms, the CCCTB refers to those 
companies that have specifically been listed in an annex to the CCCTB proposal.
1622
 The
CCCTB proposal does not in itself decide on the (non-)transparency for tax purposes of a 
particular legal entity, as it refers to the states involved for this purpose. These may have 
differing views on the matter.
1623
To the extent that differential approaches are adopted at opposite sides of the tax-border(s), 
hybrid entity issues may leak into the system. This holds up to the extent that some taxing 
jurisdictions involved consider a particular corporate entity as tax-transparent, while others 
treat it as non-transparent. Issues may also arise, for instance, under the CCCTB proposal, to 
the extent that countries allow economic operators to elect for tax transparency treatment, like 
the US does under the ‘check-the-box-rules’ in its federal income tax system. Issues may, for 
instance, arise in regards to a US corporation operating a permanent establishment in a 
particular European Union Member State which classifies the corporation as an entity while it 
is being disregarded under the US entity classification rules (or vice versa).
1624
Accordingly, as in international taxation, hybrid entity mismatches may also arise under the 
application of a formulary system. Worth noting is that the CCCTB proposal explicitly seeks to 
resolve potential hybrid entity mismatch issues under the application of the CCCTB system by 
assigning the entitlement to classify a legal entity as (non-)transparent to the Member State 
where the entity is ‘located’.
1625
 The approach taken under the CCCTB triggers various
technical issues when the entity’s place of effective management and place of incorporation 
differentiate. In such a case the entity’s ‘location’ and its classification are indistinct as a result 
of this as well, causing the issue to be insufficiently resolved at the end of the day. This is not 
further discussed.
 1626
 Hybrid entity issues under formulary systems may alternatively be
resolved by using a coordinated approach in defining the taxable entity. 
Furthermore, second, it is not an analytical necessity to apply the formulary system to a tax-
consolidated group or combined group of affiliated companies operating a single business 
1621
 Article 4(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1622
 See Articles 2 and 3 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). The companies established under the laws of a Member State need to take 
one of the forms listed in an annex to the CCCTB proposal and need to be subject to a corporate taxation listed in 
another annex to the CCCTB proposal. Regarding the third country corporate forms, the CCCTB proposal forwards 
that the Commission shall adopt annually a list of eligible companies.  
1623
 Notably, the Presidency of the Council has suggested to introduce a deduction limitation at the taxpayer/payee 
level in cases where the payment involved is not included as a taxable item at the level of the taxpayer/recipient as a 
consequence of a hybrid entity mismatch; see the suggested Article 83a as found in the comments of the Presidency 
of the Council on the CCCTB proporsal (doc. 8387/12 FISC 49) published by the Council of the European Union, 16 
April 2012, no. 2011/0058(CNS). This is not further discussed. 
1624
 See for some further reading and analysis, David J. Rachofsky, ‘Overview of the U.S. Tax Consequences of 
Disregarded Entities’, 55 Bulletin for International Taxation 388 (2001), and Peter A. Glicklich et al, ‘U.S. Taxation of 
E-Commerce under Subpart F – Missing Pieces Leave Uncertainty’, 55 Bulletin for International Taxation 507 (2001). 
1625
 Articles 84 and 85 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1626
 See Matthijs Vogel, Comment on the CCCTB Proposal, Vakstudie H&I, Highlights and Insights on European 
taxation, 2011/6.1, at 61. 
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enterprise.
1627
 Formulary apportionment and tax grouping are not inextricably linked. FA deals
with the geographical attribution of tax base, it is not about tax unit definitions. This may be 
illustrated by reference to the Canadian formulary allocation system which applies on a per 
corporation basis to attribute corporate profits interprovincially to permanent establishments. 
Accordingly, the Canadian system makes use of a formulary approach only to interprovincially 
divide the profits of a single entity. The concept of tax grouping is alien to the Canadian tax 
system.
1628
 Hence, Canada, operates a hybrid system: SA/ALS applies to allocate profit to
corporations, regardless of whether they are part of a single economic entity. FA applies to 
distribute the profits of a single corporation among the provinces. Also a number of US states 
adopt FA to assign the profits of single corporations.
1629
 In US state income taxation, this
approach is referred to as ‘separate company reporting’.
1630
 Some US states allow firms to
elect to apply formulary apportion on a separate entity basis (i.e., contrary to ‘combined 
reporting’, a US tax grouping concept that is touched upon hereunder).
1631
Nevertheless, as argued in Chapter 4, in my view, the adoption of a common approach 
designating the group as a single taxable entity would promote equity and neutrality. That is, 
as the firm constitutes a single economic entity. The group concept has been defined in 
Chapter 4 by reference to a decisive influence criterion in conjunction with a business motive 
test requiring the corporate interest to be held as a capital asset.
1632
 Such an approach would
also cancel out hybrid entity mismatch issues. This holds equally true under the application of 
a formulary system. Accordingly, under the adoption of a formulary approach, I would favor 
using the ‘unitary taxation approach’ in this respect. In my view, as set forth in Chapter 4, the 
tax consolidation should apply mandatorily, as elective systems promote arbitrage.
1633
As forwarded in Chapter 4, cancelling out the recognition of intra-group legal reality within the 
tax group for corporate tax purposes would entail a significant step in the direction of 
mitigating many of the current issues in international taxation. It would take away the key tools 
that are currently employed by countries and multinationals for engaging into artificial profit 
shifting through ‘tax sheltering’, i.e., the legal shifting of intangible resources available within 
the multinational to low or no-taxing jurisdictions.
1634
 The cross-border relocation of the firm’s
1627
 Cf. Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 27: “Neither 
consolidation nor (unitary) combination is required to implement a formulary apportionment system”, and at 9: 
“Formulary apportionment can be applied to distribute the income of a single entity, as in Canada, or to distribute the 
income of a related group of corporations, as in many US states.” 
1628
 Between 1932 and 1951 the Canadian tax system allowed affiliate corporations to file a consolidated tax return. 
In 2010, the Canadian Department of Finance issued a consultation paper ‘The taxation of corporate groups’ to 
assess the desirability of introducing a tax grouping regime in the Canadian tax system. However, matters have been 
put on a hold since the announcing in the 2013 Budget that the adoption of a tax grouping system is not a priority at 
this time. For some comments and background analysis, see Maureen Donnelly et al, ‘Policy Forum: Group Relief for 
Canadian Corporate Taxpayers—At Last?’, 59 Canadian Tax Journal 239 (2011), at 239-263. 
1629
 For a list see Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights 
from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at. 13. 
See also Michael McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al eds., The 
Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 246. 
1630
 See Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 204 
1631
 Ibidem, and Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 75-76, and 187. 
1632
 See also Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups in the Emerging Global 
Market’, 39 Intertax 62 (2011), at 62-84. 
1633
 See for a comparison on the optional CCCTB system, Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group 
Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & 
Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 56: “the Commission proposed making the consolidated base tax system 
with formulary apportionment optional. Although making the system optional may have many political advantages, it 
may also introduce some economic disadvantages”. On the allowing of companies to elect the way they are being 
taxed, Weiner refers to Jack Mintz, ‘European Company Tax Reform: Prospects for the Future’, 3 CESifo Forum 3, 
(2002), at 3-9, who argues that this “would substantially erode efficiency gains from harmonization since companies 
would have greater opportunities to engage in tax arbitrage domestically, not just with respect to cross-border 
transactions.” 
1634
 As discussed, it typically involves the intra-group legal shifting towards these jurisdictions of the firm’s financial 
resources or intellectual property. Commonly utilized tools in this respect are the setting-up and tax-establishing of 
controlled legal entities within such jurisdictions and the subsequent arranging of intra-group legal transactions to 
create tax-recognized income streams directed towards those jurisdictions. This is established quite easily because 
of the mobile characteristics of these intangible resources and the absence of third-party market realities in the 
controlled intra-firm environments within which these transactions generally take place. Textbook profit shifting 
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resources through controlled legal transactions would be rendered impossible.
1635
 “Full
consolidation is the only way of overcoming the problems linked to transfer pricing for intra-
group transactions.”
1636
Indeed, the CCCTB system envisages the formula to apply to the tax consolidated CCCTB 
group where the parent company is designated as the ‘principal taxpayer’.
1637
 Furthermore,
various US states apply their apportionment formulae to divide the combined profits of a 
group of affiliated corporations that operate a ‘unitary business’. This is a US state income tax 
practice of taxable profit pooling that is referred to as ‘unitary combination’ or ‘combined 
reporting’.
1638
 The concept of combined reporting is a conceptual cousin of tax consolidation.
Both entail the pooling of profits and the elimination of intra-group legal transactions for 
corporate tax purposes.
 1639
 Notably, making use of the concepts of unitary combination (‘UC’)
and formulary apportionment (‘FA’) in conjunction is generally referred to as ‘unitary taxation’ 
(‘UT’).
1640
Worth noting to substantiate things further are the tax planning opportunities relating to the 
non-tax grouping properties of the Canadian tax system and the US state income tax systems 
adopting ‘separate company reporting’. Economic analyses in these areas reveal that, indeed, 
such systems are exposed to base erosion and profit shifting opportunities.
1641
 It has been
found that the Canadian formulary allocation system is vulnerable to interprovincial profit 
shifting. Research on the Canadian system suggests that if corporate groups do not tax-
consolidate “a number of tax planning devices are essentially unrestricted for firms that 
arrangements involve intra-group debt financing and licensing arrangements. These generate tax-deductible interest 
and royalty payments in the countries where real investment takes place. Such tax planning tools have been readily 
made available under the tax systems of countries for MNEs to be utilized to arbitrarily shift real profit to low or no-
taxing jurisdictions. 
1635
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1636
 See for a comparison, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU 
Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, 
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9 referring to the merits 
of adopting unitary taxation within the European Union. At 8: “an EU CTB would address many of the tax obstacles 
imposed by the SA methodology and could contribute to improving the functioning of the Internal Market. In 
particular, the C+A [consolidation and apportionment, MdW] method referred to above would: (i) reduce compliance 
costs for companies, as they would not have to deal with many (up to 25) different national tax systems; (ii) allow, in 
general, full and automatic cross-border offsetting of losses across all group's members (ie, either with vertical or 
horizontal relationships); (iii) simplify costly intra-EU intra-group transfer pricing obligations, as intragroup 
transactions are eliminated out when calculating the CTB and therefore, in principle, there would be no need to price 
them at arm's length any longer; (iv) eliminate the profit shifting incentives that SA currently provides for MNEs and in 
consequence limit governments' incentives to compete for "shifty profits", which may result in inefficiently low 
corporate income tax rates; (v) reduce the risk of international juridical double taxation arising from the non-
coordination between some international tax rules.” 
1637
 See Chapter IX in conjunction with Chapter XVI Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1638
 The US Supreme Court considers the ‘unitary business principle’, i.e., the notion of recognizing the firm to 
constitute a single unit for corporate tax purposes regardless of its legal organization, “the linchpin of apportionability 
in the field of state income taxation”. See United States Supreme Court, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of 
Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 100 S. Ct. 1223 (1980), at 439. For some historical background and analysis, see Jerome R. 
Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: the History Revisited’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The 
State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 53, at 53-81. Michael McIntyre, ‘The 
Use of Combined Reporting by Nation States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits Under 
Tax Treaties (2003) 245, describes the US concept of ‘combined reporting’ at 256. 
1639
 The differences to a great extent are of an administrative nature. “The combined report differs from a 
consolidated return in a number of aspects. Perhaps most importantly, a consolidated return treats and taxes a 
number of related entities as a single taxpayer, whereas the combined report is used to determine the proper amount 
of income reportable by each entity engaged in a single unitary business and includable in its individual return. In 
other words, a consolidated return involves a single return while the combined report is not a return at all and does 
not relieve any entity from its duty to file a return,” Benjamin F. Miller, ‘Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California 
Practice’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary 
Combination(1984) 132, at 136. Notably, David R. Milton, ‘Comments on Miller’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The 
State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 182, at 190 argues that “there is no 
visible difference between this combination and a consolidation.” 
1640
 See Sijbren Cnossen, ‘Taxing capital income in the European Union: Summary and discussion’, in Sijbren 
Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 1, at 10. 
1641
 See Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of 
Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 243, at 252-253. 
373
incorporate separately in separate provinces”.
1642
 That is, this is accomplished by means of a
strategic setting of intra-group transfer pricing strategies, particularly through intra-group debt 
financing. It has also been found that companies that apportion income to permanent 
establishments under the formulary allocation system are less sensitive to changes in the 
provincial tax rates than comparable groups of companies that assign corporate profit to 
affiliates on a separate entity basis.
1643
 The lack of tax consolidation has therefore been
argued to be the main shortcoming of the Canadian system.
1644
 Similar results have been
found by the Multistate Tax Commission studying the US state income tax system on this 
aspect. The Multistate Tax Commission found that ‘combined reporting states’ are less 
vulnerable to tax sheltering than ‘separate entity states’.
1645
However, such an interprovincial (Canada) or interstate (US) shifting of corporate tax base 
through strategic transfer pricing may be considered not too problematic, or in any case, 
manageable,
1646
 at least relative to the international profit shifting opportunities under
SA/ALS. The subnational tax rate differentials within Canada and the US are, in terms of 
magnitudes and revenue volumes, less sizeable in comparison to their international 
counterparts. Furthermore, matters are mitigated in both Canada and the US, as federal taxes 
apply supplemental to the sub-national taxes. These federal taxes secure a minimum level of 
corporate taxation. And contrary to its international equivalents, the tax planning in these 
cases occurs within a single federal state. Finally, in Canada, matters are further mitigated as 
a result of the equalization programs.
1647
Given the sizeable differentials in the European Union Member States’ corporation tax rates, 
the inclusion of a tax-grouping concept in the CCCTB proposal in conjunction with the 
formulary sharing mechanism has nevertheless been argued to constitute the only valid 
alternative worthy of consideration.
1648
 Worth quoting at this point are the words of Miller on
the use of unitary taxation in US state income taxation: “Authorizing formula apportionment 
without providing for combined reporting is similar to supplying an armored force with tanks 
that cannot move.”
1649
 As Pomp puts it: “A state that does not require related corporations
conducting a unitary business to file a combined report is at the mercy of its corporate 
taxpayers.”
1650
 I can only concur with that.
6.4.3.6 Favoring worldwide unitary combination over water’s edge limitation 
Conceptually, the application of a formulary system is not necessarily confined to a restricted 
geographic area. That is, although the scope of the US, Canadian and CCCTB formulary 
systems’ applications are basically all geographically limited to the ‘water’s edge’, i.e., the 
respective country’s (US, Canada) or supranational organization’s (European Union) 
territories. As a rule, all US states treat foreign entities that operate outside US territories – 
e.g., foreign parent companies, foreign subsidiary companies, and foreign sister companies – 
as distinct entities for state income tax purposes.
1651
 That is the case even if these companies
1642
 See Jack Mintz et al, ‘Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: Theory and evidence from provincial 
taxation in Canada’, 88 Journal of Public Economics 1149 (2004), at 1149-1168. 
1643
 Ibidem. 
1644
 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 4. 
1645
 See Multistate Tax Commission, Corporate Tax Sheltering and the Impact on State Corporate Income Tax 
Revenue Collections, July 15, 2003. 
1646
 See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 176, and for a comparison also 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism 
for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 6 (par. 14). 
1647
 See also Jack M. Mintz, ‘Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It's All About Compliance’, 11 International Tax 
and Public Finance 221 (2004), at 221-234.  
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 Cf. Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of 
Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 243, at 252. 
1649
 Benjamin F. Miller, ‘Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California Practice’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The 
State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 132, at 132. 
1650
 Richard D. Pomp, ‘The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections (and Confessions) of a Tax 
Lawyer’, 16 State Tax Notes 939 (22 March 1999), 939-948, at 945. 
1651
 The exception is Alaska which requires firms that are engaged in oil and gas activities in Alaska to use worldwide 
unitary combination. 
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constitute a functionally integrated part of a group of companies which is being subject to 
taxation in the US.
1652
 Under its formulary allocation system, Canada basically does the
same.
1653
 And so does the CCCTB proposal. The proposed CCCTB system does not operate
across the outer geographical borders of the European Union’s territories, excluding the 
income and operations of third-country affiliates from the formulary apportionment system. All 
apply separate accounting at the water’s edge. Only US, Canadian and European Union 
source incomes, as attributed to these countries’ territories by reference to SA/ALS, are 
subject to the apportionment formulae. With regards to the attribution of returns on outbound 
investment and inbound investment across the water’s edge, these jurisdictions basically 
operate a traditional transfer pricing system, accordingly. 
It needs to be noted that until the mid-1990s, various US states, of which the most notable is 
California, applied their unitary taxation systems mandatorily on a worldwide basis.
1654
 This
approach has been referred to as ‘worldwide unitary combination’ or ‘worldwide unitary 
taxation’.
1655
 To compute the part of the firm’s profit that is subject to taxation in the taxing
state involved, this approach basically pools together the worldwide profit of the multinational 
firm and cancels out all inter-affiliate transactions worldwide. That is, the firm’s foreign profits 
derived through both domestic and foreign entities having no in-state nexus are included in 
the combined report. Subsequently, the apportionment formula is applied to the unitary 
combination’s worldwide earnings, taking into account both foreign and domestic inputs and 
outputs. Worldwide unitary combination accordingly assigns the firm’s worldwide profits 
geographically on a formulary basis by reference to the firm’s inputs and outputs. That is, 
regardless of the firm’s legal organization and regardless of whether the apportioning process 
attributes profit to locations outside or inside the respective taxing jurisdiction. Worth noting is 
that the US Supreme Court constitutionally sanctioned the accounting for unitary taxation 
purposes of both the firms’ profits derived through foreign subsidiary companies and foreign 
parent companies.
1656
However, the US states, acting independently, abandoned mandatory worldwide unitary 
combination in the mid-1990s. This occurred under the threat of federal legislation in 
response to political pressures of US trading partners, and the lobbying work of multinationals 
seeking ways to reduce their tax burdens.
1657
 Indeed, the practicing of worldwide unitary
1652
 It should be noted that states regularly apply extensive water’s edge definitions to enable themselves to include 
the entire income and apportionment factors of foreign (i.e., non-US) companies into the combined report for state tax 
calculation purposes. This, e.g., by referring to so-called ‘80/20 corporations’. ‘80/20 corporations’ are typically 
defined as corporations, regardless of the place incorporated or formed, that are members of a unitary group and 
whose property, payroll, and sales factors within the US is 20 percent or more. Qualifying foreign companies are fully 
accountable to state income tax under such rule. See for a comparison Sec 5(A)(ii) Multistate Tax Commission 
Proposed Model Statute for Combined Reporting, As approved by the Multistate Tax Commission August 17, 2006, 
As amended by the Multistate Tax Commission July 29, 2011. 
1653
 Please note that the Canadian system applies the formulary allocation mechanism to non-Canadian permanent 
establishments of Canadian resident companies. The income of Canadian companies that is allocable to foreign 
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outside the scope of application of the Canadian double tax conventions. With regards to the foreign PEs of 
Canadian corporations, Canada accordingly adopts some kind of a worldwide approach rather than a strict water’s 
edge limitation. Mayer explains that it may therefore be somewhat misleading to describe the Canadian system as a 
‘water’s edge’ system. See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 115. 
1654
 For an overview of US states that applied unitary combination on a worldwide basis, see Charles E. McLure Jr. et 
al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Income’, in Sijbren 
Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 243, at 256-257. 
1655
 For extensive analyses, see Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in 
Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984). 
1656
 The US Supreme Court constitutionally sanctioned worldwide unitary combination in Container Corp. v. Franchise 
Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983). Worldwide unitary combination for US corporations having non-US affiliates (both 
non-US subsidiaries and non-US parents) has been sanctioned by the US Supreme Court in Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
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 See e.g. Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula 
Apportionment of Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues 
and Options for Reform (2000) 243, at 254-258, and Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group 
Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & 
Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at par. 4.3. 
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taxation by these US states succumbed following fierce protests, controversy, heated 
debates, and even the threats from abroad of the introduction of retaliatory legislation.
1658
The practice of abandoning worldwide unitary combination has been explained in the 
literature as a political expedient.
1659
 The principal reason for the system’s abolishment was
its difference from the obtained international consensus of dividing multinational profits by 
employing SA/ALS. It differed and, therefore, it was considered bad. Particularly the 
assignment of profit to the location of firm outputs under supply-demand based formula 
factors renders FA to produce outcomes not corresponding with the supply-based profit 
attribution under SA/ALS – and vice versa of course. Dependent on facts and circumstances, 
the different approaches taken may produce double (non-)taxation. The key differential of FA 
adopting a supply-demand and SA/ALS using a supply approach may essentially explain 
many of the controversies in this area.
1660
Regardless, a range of US states, up until today, enable companies to apply worldwide 
unitary combination on an elective basis. California for instance allows firms to elect to file the 
tax return on a worldwide combined basis or by reference to water’s edge combination.
1661
Interestingly, “in 1993, the California legislature had proposed making water’s edge combined 
reporting mandatory, but eventually made water’s edge reporting optional in response to 
business interest in preserving the ability to file on a worldwide combined basis.”
1662
 Notably,
the exception is Alaska which currently requires oil and gas firms to apply mandatory 
worldwide combination. 
Various commentators argue, validly in my view, that in today’s global marketplace, a 
worldwide unitary business approach would conceptually be the most appropriate – see also 
Chapter 4 where the same approach has been advocated.
1663
 The argument, first, is that the
S-H-S concept of income, particularly the underlying ability to pay principle, essentially 
requires that the multinationals global profits are taken into consideration for corporate tax 
calculation purposes. Notably, the inclusion of foreign income in the taxable base does not 
mean that tax sovereignty is extended to foreign income as double tax relief is provided for 
those income items.
1664
 Moreover, second, the theory of the firm essentially requires that the
multinational group should be considered to constitute a single taxable entity for corporate tax 
1658
 For an overview of positions at the height of the debates surrounding worldwide unitary combination, see George 
N. Carlson et al, ‘Water’s Edge Versus Worldwide Unitary Combination’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State 
Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 1, at 1-40. 
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 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 292. 
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 Cf. Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 240: “Although a factor-
location formula may be designed to approximate the results of separate accounting, a formula that includes both the 
location of factors of production and of sales destination will not. There is a fundamental dichotomy between the two. 
Indeed, much of the tension in argument between those who advocate formula apportionment and those who in 
principle prefer separate accounting is attributable to the inclusion of the sales factor in the formula.”  
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 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 292. 
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 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 36. 
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450 (2000), at 460, COM(2003) 726 at 23, Benjamin F. Miller, ‘None Are So Blind as Those Who Will Not See’, 66 
Tax Notes 1023 (13 February 1995), at 1023-1035, Jinyan Li, ‘Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to 
International Income Allocation’, 50 Canadian Tax Journal 823 (2002), Michael Kobetsky, ‘The Case for Unitary 
Taxation of International Enterprises’, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 201 (2008), at 201-215, Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, 
The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, Kerrie Sadiq, ‘The Traditional Rationale of the Arm’s Length 
Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational 
Entities?’, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 (2004), Kerrie Sadiq, ‘Unitary taxation – The Case for Global 
Formulary Apportionment’, 55 Bulletin for international taxation 275 (2001), at 275-286. See also Michael J. McIntyre, 
‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits 
under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, as well as Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups 
in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 Intertax 62 (2011), at 62-84. 
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 Cf. Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), 
The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 228, at 235. 
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purposes, in line with economic realities.
1665
 “The income of a common enterprise should be
taxed without regard to its organizational structure. Substance should prevail over form. Form 
is elevated over substance when the income from the foreign activities of a common 
enterprise is excluded from the combined report if those activities are conducted through a 
foreign corporation but the income is included in the combined report if the activities are 
conducted through a foreign branch of a domestic company. Obviously, the operation of a 
common enterprise engaged in cross-border activities is not confined by the borders of a 
single country.”
1666
 From this perspective the application of the unitary business approach on
a worldwide basis is ‘but a logical corollary of the growing complexity of contemporary 
business reality’.
1667
 Cross-border tax grouping is even considered essential given the
arbitrage produced by multinational profit division under separate accounting. 
As a practically feasible alternative to worldwide unitary combination, various scholars have 
advocated introducing a cross-border tax grouping approach at regional levels, for instance 
within North America,
1668
 South America, the Asian-Pacific Region,
1669
 Africa,
1670
 and the
European Union – within which the initiative for this has already been launched by means of 
the CCCTB proposal.
1671
 The existing free trade organizations may perhaps provide the
stepping stones for building a legal framework in this respect. Accordingly, the water’s edge 
limitation would be set at the outer geographical borders of the territories of these regions. 
The application of a cross-border tax grouping approach on regional bases may perhaps 
indeed be pragmatically and politically more feasible than its global alternative. That would 
particularly hold true if the multilateral coordination at this point would include the world’s 
larger producing regions. 
However, the introduction of water’s edge limitations at regional levels would have the 
consequence of an inability to deal sufficiently with multinational firms that are operational 
across these regional tax-borders. As SA/ALS would apply at the water’s edge, such a 
regionalization of the unitary business approach would analytically re-introduce the profit 
allocation issues accompanying its use in the same manner as elaborated upon extensively in 
the above. As McIntyre notes: “Allowing some members of a combined group to exclude 
themselves from the combined report under a water’s-edge rule obviously opens up 
opportunities for tax avoidance. The principal danger, from the perspective of a nation-state, 
1665
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 
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of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013), at 40-55. 
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Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 292. 
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Formulary Apportionment’, 6 Tax Notes International 851 (5 April 1993), at 851-856. 
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Fiscal Documentation 99 (1991), at 99-111, and Richard J. Vann, ‘A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region? 
(Part II)’, 45 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 151 (1991), at 151-163. 
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1671
 The European Commission established its policy for developing the CCCTB in its Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Towards an Internal 
Market without tax obstacles; A strategy for providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-
wide activities, COM(2001) 582 final, 23 October 2001. It confirmed it in its Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, An Internal Market without 
company tax obstacles achievements, ongoing initiatives and remaining challenges, COM(2003)726 final, 24 
November 2003. Matters in this area were already being discussed prior to the Commission establishing its policy 
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is that the entities included in the combined group will deflect income derived by members of 
the group to entities engaged in the common enterprise that have been excluded from the 
combined group by the water’s-edge rule”
1672
 Various commentators, for instance, have
addressed the CCCTB’s vulnerability of being subject to base erosion and profit shifting 
across the water’s edge.
1673
The emergence of these issues under water’s edge limitations explains the presence of the 
halfway-house anti-abuse measures in formulary systems, common in international taxation. 
To cope with base erosion and profit shifting issues relating to water’s edge limitations, the 
CCCTB proposal, for instance, contains interest deduction limitations and a controlled foreign 
company regime.
1674
 In the field of US state income taxation, the Multistate Tax Commission
in its proposed ‘Model Statute for Combined Reporting’ suggests including controlled foreign 
companies in the combined report. This would be done to counter the tax-sheltering of profits 
in low-taxing jurisdictions.
1675
 However, at the end of the day, such anti-abuse rules are
merely fighting the symptoms of an ill approach. The issues involving the taxation of globally 
integrated multinational firms may only be truly overcome by means of the adoption of a 
coordinated worldwide tax-grouping concept, accordingly canceling out all intra-firm legal 
realities for corporate tax purposes – and with that the profit shifting and base erosion 
opportunities that they bring. 
The remaining part of this chapter takes the approach of adopting worldwide tax-consolidation 
or worldwide unitary combination to solve the problem of the water’s edge limitations 
producing analytically sub-optimal outcomes. As advocated in Chapter 4, the approach is 
taken whereby the firm is treated as a single taxable entity, since the multinational firm 
economically is a single entity.
1676
 Now let us return to the topic of profit attribution under FA.
6.4.4 FA does not put to an end real profit shifting but could end paper profit shifting 
if well-designed 
6.4.4.1 FA seeks to approximate location of income by locating income generating 
activities 
FA mechanisms, as said, generally seek to fairly divide corporate profit among tax 
jurisdictions by using a predetermined fixed formula. For this purpose, the traditional regimes 
apportion corporate earnings by reference to both the locations of firm inputs and firm 
outputs. The approaches taken in the US, Canadian and CCCTB systems basically all boil 
down to the same methodology. 
A typical apportionment formula takes the following form:
1677
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 The formula has been taken from Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 94. 
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 Pi expresses the profit that is apportioned to state I, whereby the taxable base may be
defined as the realized nominal return to equity, EBIT, or the economic rent (of which
I favor the latter, see Chapter 5);
 PT reflects the total profits of the taxable entity, whereby the taxable entity may be
defined as the single entity or the combined group, or tax consolidated group (of
which I favor the latter, see Chapter 4);
 ai expresses the weight that is attributed to the firm input factor of ‘assets’ at origin
(i.e., debits, property or assets);
 li denotes the weight that is attributed to the firm input factor of ‘labor’ at origin (i.e.,
payroll or salaries);
 ri expresses the weight that is attributed to the firm output factor of ‘revenue’ at
destination (i.e., sales or gross receipts);
 Ai/AT, Li/LT, and Ri/RT respectively represent the portions of assets, labor and
revenues located in state I relative to total assets, labor and revenue of the taxable
entity.
The application of such a mathematical profit attribution mechanism has the following effect. 
Corporate profit is apportioned to taxing jurisdictions uniformly and in proportion to the 
apportionment factors that are used in the formula. Profit is divided directly proportional to the 
factors that are located in the respective taxing jurisdictions. Under unitary taxation, 
moreover, profit is attributed uniformly among the controlled entities making up the enterprise 
involved. All legal entities are effectively attributed constant shares of the firm’s profitability for 
tax computation purposes. 
This, however, does not mean that formulary mechanisms are built on the implicit assumption 
that corporate profit, in reality, is generated uniformly by the operational group entities 
involved and geographically in proportion to the formula factors used.
1678
 That is, although
that outcome of the apportionment formula under unitary taxation is the anticipated one. 
Formulary systems, as said, do not seek to locate the source of income. Merely, as explained 
in the above, formulary systems modestly seek to establish a fairly reasonable proxy to share 
corporate profit among jurisdictions by reference to the performance of income generating 
activities within the taxing jurisdictions’ territories. It should be kept in mind that corporate 
income lacks geographic attributes. Corporate income has no geographic location.
1679
Empirical research undertaken suggests that although quintessential for income generation, 
neither firm inputs nor firm outputs explain profit or its location; as rents are increasingly firm 
specific, no correlations seem to exist between (the location of) inputs, (the location of) 
outputs and (the location of) profit.
1680
 As a result, as previously stated, any profit attribution
method, both the smoke and mirrors of SA/ALS as well as the predetermined formulae of FA, 
merely seem to provide for a proxy and are arbitrary as a consequence.
1681
 And if it would be
feasible to identify the true source of income, one would not need proxies. 
competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 
24-38.  
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The geographic profit attribution under formulary apportionment, indeed to some extent, is 
also arbitrary. It would surely be a coincidence if firm profitability across the countries would 
vary proportionally to the factors that are represented in the formula. Notably, the effect 
produced under a formulary approach is precisely one of the key reasons for the OECD to 
categorically reject the application of predetermined formulae to attribute business profits to 
taxing jurisdictions.
1682
 But, as said, the origin-oriented SA/ALS standard does not capture the
income’s true source either. Tax havens would not exist if it did. That is, at least to the extent 
that one agrees that multinationals do not earn substantial parts of their income in these 
jurisdictions. 
So why consider formulary apportionment? It should be noted that although formulary 
systems do not seek to identify the true geographical whereabouts of income, typical 
apportionment formulae are not built on randomly chosen factors. On the contrary, the factors 
chosen represent actual income generating activities undertaken within a firm, inputs and 
outputs representing the supply-side and demand-side of income production. As a 
consequence, if well-designed, formulary mechanisms do not incentivize paper profit shifting 
across countries to reduce effective tax burdens.
1683
Notably, in the US, the constitution requires the US states to adopt formula factors that 
“reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated”, i.e., the ‘external consistency 
test’.
1684
 The apportionment formula should reasonably represent the taxpayer’s economic
activities within the taxing jurisdiction involved. US constitutional law further requires the 
states to adopt a formula that is “such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no 
more than all of the unitary business' income being taxed”, i.e., the ‘internal consistency 
test’.
1685
 A challenged tax measure passes this test if the following question answers in the
affirmative: “if all 50 states enacted the challenged rule, would interstate commerce bear a 
burden that purely domestic commerce would not also bear?”
1686
 Accordingly, “a state tax
must be structured so that if every state were to impose an identical tax, interstate commerce 
would fare no worse than intrastate commerce.”
1687
 Kindly note that the approach taken under
1682
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, Chapter I at par. 1.25: “One such concern is that predetermined formulae are arbitrary and disregard market 
conditions, the particular circumstances of the individual enterprises, and management's own allocation of resources, 
thus producing an allocation of profits that may bear no sound relationship to the specific facts surrounding the 
transaction. More specifically, a formula based on a combination of cost, assets, payroll, and sales implicitly imputes 
a fixed rate of profit per currency unit (e.g. dollar, euro, yen) of each component to every member of the group and in 
every tax jurisdiction, regardless of differences in functions, assets, risks, and efficiencies and among members of the 
MNE group. Such an approach could potentially assign profits to an entity that would incur losses if it were an 
independent enterprise.” See for a comparison Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union 
Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the 
European Union; Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 243, at 258. Furthermore, see Yariv Brauner, ‘BEPS: An 
Interim Evaluation’, 6 World Tax Journal 10 (2014), at 31: “… the most important additional element required – the 
addition of formulary elements. Although important, it is the elephant in the room that has unfortunately fallen into the 
OECD’s … “blind spot”. The addition of formulary elements, some of which the OECD has been considering anyway, 
and dressing it with thinly veiled arm’s length rhetoric, is essential and particularly appropriate to the BEPS project.” 
And: “The language of Action 8 [i.e., the OECD’s action item to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with 
value creation, MdW] feeds further concern. Of course, it begins with the dictation that arm’s length is the consensus 
and cannot be breached, even if it fails. Regardless of the rhetoric, it is past time for the OECD to relax the escalation 
of this distinction between arm’s length and formulary taxation. The language of the Action Plan may lead one to 
falsely believe that arm’s length taxation is the end, not the means, to ward appropriate and stable allocation of tax 
bases among countries.” 
1683
 See e.g. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The 
Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 9 
(par. 21). 
1684
 See e.g., United States Supreme Court, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
1685
 Ibidem, and, e.g., United States Supreme Court, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 
175, 185 (1995).  
1686
 See Ruth Mason, ‘Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test’, 49 Boston College Law 
Review 1277 (2008), at 1283. See also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 
252-254. 
1687
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint 
on State Taxation’, University of Georgia School of law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-005, February 2007, at 
1.This working paper has been published in Tax Law Review; Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is "Internal Consistency" Dead?: 
Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation’, 61 Tax Law Review 1 (2007-2008). See 
380
the ‘internal consistency test’ in US constitutional law is identical to that taken in Chapter 3 
demonstrating the ‘internal consistency’ of the subjection of taxpayers having a taxable 
presence within a taxing state to unlimited taxation whereby double tax relief is granted by 
reference to the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption’ method.
1688
 In that chapter at section 3.2.3
reference is made to the approach taken, which is referred to as a ‘thought-experiment’. 
There is nothing artificial about the factors used in a typical apportionment formula, i.e., if 
well-designed. The payroll factor reflects a firm resource: the production factor of labor. The 
asset factor reflects a firm resource as well: the debits used by the firm in its business 
process as financed with equity or debt capital. The asset factor accordingly represents the 
production factor of capital, i.e., at least indirectly. The sales factor reflects the firm’s business 
outputs that constitute an essential component in the generation of income also. By assigning 
inputs and outputs to the jurisdictions of origin and destination, formulary systems accordingly 
seek to assign profit to the production states (supply-side) and marketing states (demand-
side). 
The arbitrary elements in apportionment formulae are not the factors themselves, but the 
proxies that are applied in locating, weighing and evaluating them. And, as we have seen, the 
use of judgments and proxies in these areas are a necessity as income has no true location. 
6.4.4.2 The formula factors and their effects further assessed 
6.4.4.2.1 Nexus and allocation, also required in FA 
Like any profit division mechanism, formulary systems also require the establishing of a 
taxable presence concept to geographically capture a firm’s economic presence within a 
jurisdiction (‘nexus’), and a methodology to subsequently evaluate the income that the 
respective firm is considered to derive at that particular geographic location (‘allocation’).
1689
With regards to the assignment of firm inputs, the aim is to localize the firm’s workers and 
assets at their origin, i.e., the location where the workers exercise their employment contracts 
and where the assets are functionally utilized in the business process (‘nexus’). The inputs 
are subsequently evaluated essentially by reference to the remunerations that the firm pays in 
return for utilizing its workers and assets in the business process (‘allocation’). Accordingly, 
the inputs are typically evaluated at cost, i.e., labor costs and the costs of the property used. 
Formulary mechanisms essentially utilize a cost-based evaluation technique in this respect. 
Expected future profit is disregarded. 
As regards the assignment of firm outputs, the aim is, or at least should be, to localize the 
firm’s customers at destination, i.e., where these customers utilize or consume the services 
and goods that were provided to them (‘nexus’). The outputs are subsequently evaluated 
essentially by reference to the remunerations that the firm receives in return for the goods and 
services that it provides (‘allocation’). Accordingly, the outputs are typically evaluated by 
reference to the firm’s gross receipts from third-party supplies of goods and services. 
Formulary mechanisms essentially utilize a revenue-based connecting factor. Cost-
                                                                                                                                                        
also the prequel to this article, Walter Hellerstein, ‘Is “Internal Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging 
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation’, 87 Michigan Law Review 139 (1988-1989). 
1688
 The approach has been taken identically in Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of 
Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy’, 38 Intertax 281 (2010), Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘What if Member States 
Subjected Non-Resident Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a 
Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 6, Maarten F. de 
Wilde, ‘Currency Exchange Results – What If Member States Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation 
Whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 
2011 (Volume 65), No. 9, and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Intra-Firm Transactions – What if Member States Subjected 
Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax 
Exemption?’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 12, Maarten F. de Wilde et al, ‘The New 
Dutch ‘Base Exemption Regime’ and the Spirit of the Internal Market’, 22 EC Tax Review 44 (2013). 
1689
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
381
deductions are not taken into account. The same holds true for financial outflows that cannot 
be regarded to constitute a revenue, e.g. loan repayments.
1690
6.4.4.2.2 A plea for coordinating nexus and allocation standards in line with inputs and 
outputs through ‘factor presence tests’ 
Formulary systems typically create disconnect between nexus and allocation rules 
Peculiarly, the Canadian formulary allocation system, the CCCTB’s sharing mechanism, as 
well as, traditionally, the apportionment systems in the US states, have created a disconnect 
between the nexus concepts used to establish a firm’s taxable presence within a taxing 
jurisdiction and the allocation approaches adopted to geographically divide the taxpayer’s 
taxable corporate profit. The standards used for these purposes typically differentiate. 
To establish a firm’s taxable presence (nexus), interestingly, it has traditionally been quite 
uncommon to refer to the utilized formula factors (payroll, assets, sales), for instance, by 
reference to quantitative ‘factor presence tests’. Under a factor presence nexus test, a firm’s 
taxable presence within a state arises by reference to the amounts of payroll, property and/or 
sales that a business enterprise has within that state, subject to a quantitative de minimis 
threshold (wages paid, assets values, turnover).
1691
 Such an approach would accordingly
align nexus and allocation in a manner corresponding with firm inputs and outputs. 
Instead, the lawmakers involved have traditionally set origin-based qualitative threshold 
standards for this purpose, referring to legal and physical-geographical connecting factors. 
Typical examples are the presence of a permanent establishment (Canada,
1692
 CCCTB
1693
),
the principal place of the corporation’s business conduct (Canada),
1694
 and the location of the
respective company’s registered office, its place of effective management or its place of 
incorporation (CCCTB).
1695
 Notably, in the US, the states are autonomous in designing their
nexus standards, save for constitutional
1696
 and federal legislative restraints.
1697
 The US
1690
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285. 
1691
 See e.g. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 202-205, Walter Hellerstein, 
‘State Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 425 (1996-1997), and Charles E. McLure, 
‘Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age’, 53 National Tax Journal 1287 (2000). See also 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible 
elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 15 
(par. 61), Multistate Tax Commission Policy Statement 02-02, Ensuring the Equity, Integrity and Viability of State 
Income Tax Systems, Amended October 17, 2002, and Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of 
the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at Appendix D. See also Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 56, Report and overview of the main issues that emerged during 
the discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007, Taxud E1 OP, 
CCCTB\WP\056\doc\en, Brussels, 20 August 2007, at 10-11 (par. 38-40) and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, 
Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 15 (par. 61). 
For some comparison, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law 
Review 507 (1996-1997), and Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 
60 Bulletin for International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-279. 
1692
 See Sec. 400(2) and 402(1), (2), and (3) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1693
 Article 86(1), Articles 4-6 and 54-55 in conjunction with Chapter XVI Proposal for a Council Directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). See e.g. Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements 
of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 15 (par. 61). 
The Commission Services “suggest that, at least for the time being, for the apportionment of the tax base a physical 
presence in the MS should be necessary….”. 
1694
 Sec. 400(2) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1695
 Ibidem. 
1696
 The Due Process Clause “requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the 
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”. United States Supreme Court, Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 
U.S. 340 (1954). The (Dormant) Commerce Clause requires the meeting of a ‘four-prong’ test for a state to subject an 
out-of-state firm to tax: (1) sufficient nexus should exist between the taxing state and the taxpayer, (2) the state tax 
may not discriminate against interstate commerce, (3) the tax needs to be fairly apportioned, and (4) the tax should 
fairly relate to the services provided by the taxing state. See United States Supreme Court, Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, Chairman, Mississippi Tax Commission, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). For in-depth analyses, see Jerome R. 
Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: the History Revisited’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The 
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states do not use the concept of permanent establishment to establish tax jurisdiction but that 
of “doing business in …”.
1698
 The traditional standard used in US state taxation is ‘physical
presence’.
1699
 Physical presence includes the carrying on of a trade or business (US), the
presence of owned or leased tangible property, the presence of a workforce, agents or 
representatives
1700
 or the firm’s legal or commercial domicile (US).
1701
Indeed, these nexus concepts to a great extent echo those utilized in international taxation. 
The concepts for basing nexus for US state tax purposes on the ‘carrying on of a trade or 
business’ and ‘legal or commercial domicile’ are analogues to the US federal tax concepts for 
basing nexus on the presence of a trade or business or permanent establishment, and the 
place of incorporation.
1702
 And these US federal tax concepts broadly correspond to their
equivalents in international taxation. 
US state income taxation holds some notable exceptions, however. First, the presence of a 
workforce constitutes nexus in US state taxation.
 
In international taxation, the mere presence 
of a workforce, as said, is generally insufficient to establish a taxable presence for corporate 
tax purposes.
1703
 That is, perhaps save for the ‘services PE’ laid down in the United Nations
Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries.
1704
 The
operation of this nexus concept establishes tax jurisdiction regarding “[t]he furnishing of 
services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through employees or other 
personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only if activities of that nature 
continue (for the same or a connected project) within a Contracting State for a period or 
periods aggregating more than 183 days in any 12-month period commencing or ending in 
the fiscal year concerned.” The ‘services PE’ concept is absent in the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and the double tax convention networks of countries operating the OECD’s 
permanent establishment concept. 
A second notable exception from the approaches taken in international taxation is the 
establishment of ‘economic nexus’ in US state taxation by reference to a firm’s ‘economic 
State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 53, at 53-81. If the out-of-state firm 
concerns a foreign firm (i.e., non-US) two additional tests apply under the Foreign Commerce Clause: (1) the state 
tax should not prevent the US federal government from “speaking with one voice when regulating commercial 
relations with foreign governments”, and (2) the state tax should not cause foreign firms to be exposed to an 
“enhanced risk of multiple taxation”. See United States Supreme Court, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 
U.S. 159 (1983), and United States Supreme Court, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 
U.S. 298 (1994). 
1697
 See 15 USC §381. This provision commonly referred to as PL 86-272 requires the physical presence of an out of 
state remote seller of physical goods situated within a state to establish its taxable presence for state income tax 
purposes. See also footnote 1567. 
1698
 For an overview and some analysis, see the online working document of Annette Nellen entitled ‘Economic 
Nexus; What actions have states taken to fill the void where PL 86-272 does not apply?’, available at 
http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/nellen_a/taxreform/economic_nexus.htm. 
1699
 See United States Supreme Court, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) where the physical presence 
test for sales taxes is described. For some elaboration, see Neal A. Koskella, ‘The Enigma of Sales Taxation Through 
the Use of State or Federal “Amazon” Laws: Are We Getting Anywhere?’, 49 Idaho Law Review 121 (2012), at 124 et 
seq. 
1700
 This has been referred to as ‘agency nexus’ or ‘attributional nexus’. See in this regard United States Supreme 
Court, Tyler Pipe v. Wash. Dept. of Rev., 483 U.S. 232 (1987), where the US Supreme Court held that “the crucial 
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly 
associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the sales.” Worth noting is 
that in the area of US sales taxation this concept has recently been extended by some states by reference as ‘affiliate 
nexus’ to establish a taxable presence of out-of-state e-tailers for sales tax purposes. Under legislation referred to in 
practice as “Amazon Laws”, these e-tailers are considered to have ‘click-thru nexus’ within a state for sales tax 
purposes when such a ‘vendor’ is “soliciting business through an independent contractor or other representative if the 
seller enters into an agreement with a resident of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other 
consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, 
to the seller;” N.Y. Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(vi). See for a discussion Neal A. Koskella, ‘The Enigma of Sales Taxation 
Through the Use of State or Federal “Amazon” Laws: Are We Getting Anywhere?’, 49 Idaho Law Review 121 (2012). 
1701
 See George N. Carlson et al, ‘Water’s Edge Versus Worldwide Unitary Combination’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
(ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 1, at 20. 
1702
 Ibidem. 
1703
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1704
 See Article 5(3)(b) of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries. 
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presence’ within the taxing state.
1705
 This would include an out-of-state firm’s intangible
presence within the taxing state’s territory, e.g., via the “presence of its intangible property” in 
that state.
1706
 An example is the subjection to state income tax of an out-of-state trademark
licensor lacking in-state physical presence for the purpose of imposing a state tax at source 
on the royalties that it receives on its out-of-state trademark licensing activities. The concept 
of ‘economic nexus’ has emerged following case law of the South Carolina Supreme Court 
validating in-state use of intangible property to establish nexus.
1707
A third exception worth noting is the increasing popularity in US state income taxation of 
operating ‘factor presence nexus’ by reference to a firm’s ‘factor presence’ within a state to 
establish tax jurisdiction for state income tax purposes.
1708
 The concept of ‘factor presence’ –
which is currently alien to international taxation – is further discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Consequence: disconnect creates potential for ‘nowhere income’ 
The consequence of the disconnect created between nexus standards and apportionment 
formulae is a potential mismatch between the establishment of a corporate taxpayer’s taxable 
presence within a jurisdiction and the allocation of corporate profit to that jurisdiction. This 
mismatch triggers the risk of creating so-called ‘nowhere income’, i.e., the assignment of 
corporate income to a jurisdiction where the economic operator involved lacks a taxable 
presence, accordingly leaving the assigned income items untaxed.
1709
Matters typically arise under the destination-based sales factor. That is, since the standards 
used in formulary systems to establish a taxable presence within a taxing jurisdiction 
commonly are predominantly oriented towards the origin state rather than the state of 
destination. The nexus standards used in formulary systems are commonly oriented towards 
business presence (supply-side) instead of customer presence (demand-side). A mere 
presence of the firm’s customer(s) within the territories of a particular jurisdiction generally 
does not give rise to the establishment of a taxable presence within that jurisdiction. Recent 
exceptions may be found in the formulary systems in the US states, though – see 
hereunder.
1710
Responses: ‘reconnect’ through throw-back rules and throw-out rules, profit attribution 
to taxable ‘group members’ (CCCTB) 
The traditional legislative responses in the US and Canada, as well as under the CCCTB – 
rather than attempting to coordinate nexus and allocation rules – is to introduce an additional 
1705
 For an overview of the concept of ‘economic nexus’ as currently applied by the US states, see the online working 
document of Annette Nellen entitled ‘Economic Nexus; What actions have states taken to fill the void where PL 86-
272 does not apply?’, available at http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/nellen_a/taxreform/economic_nexus.htm. 
1706
 See Supreme Court of South Carolina, Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E. 2d 13 (1993). 
That would produce, in international taxation terms, a net based taxation of royalty income at source of a non-
resident corporate taxpayer, a concept alien in international taxation. 
1707
 See Supreme Court of South Carolina, Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E. 2d 13 (1993), 
in which the court sanctioned the use of an economic presence standard for state tax purposes. The case involved 
an out of state (i.e., Delaware) trademark-holding company that licensed its trademarks for use by its South Carolina 
based affiliates. The Supreme Court of South Carolina observed that the trademark-holding company ‘had 
purposefully directed its activities toward South Carolina’; ‘the minimum correction required by due process is 
satisfied by the presence of intangible property’. The US Supreme Court refused to reverse this decision (it denied 
certiorari). The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly decide on issues relating to the use of economic nexus concepts 
for state income tax purposes. For an analysis of this case, see Jerome Hellerstein, ‘Geoffrey and the Physical 
Presence Nexus Requirement of Quill’, 8 State Tax Notes 671 (13 February 1995). 
1708
 Matters have been shifting in the US approximately since the early to mid-2000s. For an overview of states 
currently operating factor presence standards to establish jurisdiction to tax, see the online working document of 
Annette Nellen entitled ‘Economic Nexus; What actions have states taken to fill the void where PL 86-272 does not 
apply?’, available at http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/nellen_a/taxreform/economic_nexus.htm. 
1709
 For some background information and analysis, see Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by 
Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 287-
291. 
1710
 For an overview of states operating factor presence standards to establish jurisdiction to tax, see the online 
working document of Annette Nellen entitled ‘Economic Nexus; What actions have states taken to fill the void where 
PL 86-272 does not apply?’, available at http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/nellen_a/taxreform/economic_nexus.htm. 
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set of rules reassigning the apportionment factors to a taxing jurisdiction where the firm 
involved does have a taxable presence. This is done to accordingly avoid the potential for 
creating nowhere income. This is sought to be achieved by means of so-called ‘throw-back 
rules’, or ‘spread throw-back rules’; or alternatively, under the application of ‘throw-out 
rules’.
1711
Throw-back rules reapportion a factor that is attributed to a taxing jurisdiction in which a firm 
does not have a taxable presence to a taxing jurisdiction in which it does. The factor is 
basically ‘thrown back’ to the state where the firm does have a taxable presence. Under a 
throw-back rule, for instance, goods that are manufactured in one state and are shipped and 
sold in another state are reapportioned to the manufacturing state (origin state) if the seller 
does not have a taxable presence in the marketing state (destination state). Spread throw-
back rules basically do the same but, under their application, the factor is thrown back 
proportionally to all jurisdictions in which the taxpayer involved has a taxable presence. 
Throw-back rules are in place in the US,
1712
 Canada,
1713
 and the CCCTB Proposal.
1714
An alternative is the use of so-called ‘throw-out’ rules.
1715
 These exclude an item from the
formula which is otherwise included in an apportionment factor. The exclusion of such an item 
from the formula, i.e., from both the numerator and the denominator, has the effect of 
reassigning the corporate profits involved proportionally among all jurisdictions in which the 
taxpayer has a taxable presence. Throw-out rules, for instance, apply in the US with regards 
to proceeds from the commercialization of intangibles, e.g., royalties received in return for the 
licensing of intellectual property, dividend receipts on stock, or interest yields on bonds. 
These receipts may be thrown-out from the apportionment formula to the extent that they 
cannot be readily assigned to the taxpayer’s income-producing activities.
1716
1711
 See e.g. MTC Reg. IV.18.(c).(3): “Where business income from intangible property cannot readily be attributed to 
any particular income producing activity of the taxpayer, the income cannot be assigned to the numerator of the sales 
factor for any state and shall be excluded from the denominator of the sales factor,” Multistate Tax Commission, 
Allocation and Apportionment Regulations, Adopted February 21, 1973; as revised through July 29, 2010, at 40. For 
some information and analyses, see Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian 
J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 287-291, and William F. Fox 
et al, ‘How Should a Subnational Corporate Income Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured?’, 53 National Tax 
Journal 139 (2005), at 155. 
1712
 See, for instance, Article IV.16(b) Multistate Tax Compact, reapportioning the place of sales of tangible goods to 
the place of shipment if the taxpayer lacks a taxable presence in the jurisdiction where the purchaser is located: 
“Sales of tangible personal property are in this State if (b) the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, 
factory, or other place of storage in this State and (1) the purchaser is the United States Government or (2) the 
taxpayer is not taxable in the State of the purchaser.” 
1713
 See Sec. 402(4)(b) Canadian Income Tax Regulations: “(…) where the destination of a shipment of merchandise 
to a customer to whom the merchandise is sold is in a province or country other than Canada in which the taxpayer 
has no permanent establishment, if the person negotiating the sale may reasonably be regarded as being attached to 
the permanent establishment in the particular province or country, the gross revenue derived therefrom shall be 
attributable to that permanent establishment,” and Sec. 402(4)(h) Canadian Income Tax Regulations: “where gross 
revenue is derived from services rendered in a province or country other than Canada in which the taxpayer has no 
permanent establishment, if the person negotiating the contract may reasonably be regarded as being attached to the 
permanent establishment of the taxpayer in the particular province or country, the gross revenue shall be attributable 
to that permanent establishment.” 
1714
 See Article 96(4) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS): “If there is no group member in the Member State where goods are delivered 
or services are carried out, or if goods are delivered or services are carried out in a third country, the sales shall be 
included in the sales factor of all group members in proportion to their labour and asset factors.” 
 For some analysis, see Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper 
No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 
2006, which refers to throwback rules at 7-8 (par. 17). Notably, in the US, “[t]he throwback rule does not apply simply 
because a state chooses not to tax the sale. The sale will still be assigned to the destination state as long as that 
state has the jurisdiction to levy an income tax on the taxpayer regardless of whether the state, chooses to levy the 
tax,” Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 23. 
1715
 As an example, Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), refers to the using of a 
throw-out rule by New Jersey between 2002 and 2009, at 98. For some background information and analysis, see 
Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation 
of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 287-291. See also Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European 
Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 
11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 212-213. 
1716
 See e.g., MTC reg. section IV.18.(c)(3). 
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In addition, worth noting is that the CCCTB seeks to further mitigate the need of using throw-
back rules to tackle ‘nowhere income issues’ by assigning tax base to ‘group members’. The 
approach differs from that taken under its US and Canadian counterparts which assign tax 
base to tax jurisdictions directly.
1717
 Accordingly, tax base is assigned indirectly to the
European Union Member States, i.e., via the attribution of profit to taxable group members. 
Group members are the companies that belong to the same ‘CCCTB group’, i.e., the group as 
defined under the CCCTB provisions, having a taxable presence within the European 
Union.
1718
 The geographic presence of these group members is recognized by reference to
their tax place of residence within a European Union Member State or their presence in a 
European Union Member State through a ‘permanent establishment’. Corresponding with 
common international tax practices, the localization of a ‘group member’ by reference to its 
tax residence occurs on the basis of the respective company’s ‘place of incorporation’ or its 
‘place of effective management’. The same holds true for the permanent establishment 
concept. Following international tax law approaches, the localization of a ‘group member’ on 
this basis occurs by assessing whether a business venture is being conducted by a non-
resident group company through a ‘fixed place of business’ – like a store or branch – situated 
within the territories of a European Union Member State. 
By assigning the apportionment factors under the CCCTB sharing mechanism to corporate 
entities having a taxable presence within a European Union Member State, nowhere income 
issues generally do not arise. The approach taken assures that the firm’s entire taxable base 
is taxable.
1719
 This, however, comes with a price: arbitrage – see hereunder.
Effect ‘reconnect’: new disconnect, now between factor assignment and firm input and 
firm output locations 
The North American throw-back rules and throw-out rules as well as the indirect assignment 
of tax base to European Union Member States under the CCCTB perhaps resolve the arising 
nowhere income issues. However, these approaches create some problems of their own 
during the process as well. The ‘reconnect’ creates a new disconnect somewhere between 
the assignment of profit under the apportionment system and the locations of the firm’s real 
inputs and firm outputs. 
The assignment of profit to the jurisdictions where the firms involved have a taxable presence 
under the applied nexus standards does not necessarily correspond with the geographic 
locations of firm inputs and firm outputs. Under the application of the typical North American 
throw-back rules, for instance regarding the sales factor, sales are not attributed to the 
jurisdiction of destination. Rather, the application of these rules entails that the profits which 
are supposed to approximately relate to firm outputs in the destination jurisdiction are 
effectively assigned to the origin jurisdictions. That is, as the nexus concepts used are 
oriented towards the production states (permanent establishment, place of management, 
place of incorporation, et cetera), thereby reflecting the supply-side rather than the demand-
side. 
The traditional nexus standards used in formulary systems seem to miss that the sales factor 
is supposed to attribute profit to the demand jurisdiction. The arrival at such an approach 
would conceptually require the establishment of a nexus concept which makes reference to 
the location of the firm’s customers to which it sells its (in)tangible products and services. 
This, for instance, would be achieved under a sales factor presence test.
1720
1717
 For some background information and analysis, see Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s 
Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected 
Issues (2012) 221, and Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a 
solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1718
 See Article 86(1), Articles 4-6 and 54-55 in conjunction with Chapter XVI Proposal for a Council Directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1719
 Cf. Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 225-226, referring to this as ‘full 
accountability’. 
1720
 See for a comparison, Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 202-205, Walter 
Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 425 (1996-1997), and Charles E. McLure, 
‘Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age’, 53 National Tax Journal 1287 (2000). See also 
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Moreover, although the nexus standards in place in the various formulary systems are 
oriented towards locating the production state, their design may be considered somewhat 
outdated, perhaps even flawed. They at least seem to operate unsatisfactorily in today’s 
global economy. It has already been noted that the traditional nexus standards echo those 
applied in international taxation. It follows that the same inevitably holds true as to the 
problems that their application entail. Many of the traditional nexus standards in formulary 
systems fail to properly localize the jurisdiction of origin.  
For instance, as regards the establishment of nexus within a tax-jurisdiction by reference to 
the company’s place of incorporation (Canada, US, and CCCTB), effective management 
(CCCTB) or commercial domicile (US), it may be argued that such an approach is as arbitrary 
and vulnerable to manipulation as their counterparts are in international taxation.
1721
 It may be
deduced from well-known tax practices that the creation of nexus under such standards may 
not prove too difficult to achieve. That is, as this matter would likely revolve around 
ceremonial events like the chosen company laws governing the respective legal entity or the 
geographic location where the decisions concerning its governance are made. As said, these 
events may be directed with relative ease towards the tax jurisdiction(s) of choice, regardless 
of the location of real investment. Particularly, the international convergence of company 
laws, the cross-border mobility of corporate managers – ‘fly-in-fly-out-management’ – and the 
digitization of the global economy render these connecting factors rather meaningless and 
easily steered. As a result, the use of such nexus standards, also in formulary systems, 
seems to provide multinationals a readily available tool to establish a taxable presence in a 
‘home state’ at their discretion for the purpose of influencing the tax base allocation under the 
apportionment mechanism. 
The similar holds true with regards to the establishment of nexus within a tax-jurisdiction of 
out-of-state firms by reference to physical presence tests, such as the permanent 
establishment (Canada, CCCTB) or a trade or business (US). It may be deduced from known 
tax practices that this may also produce rather arbitrary results.
1722
 The requirement of a
physical-geographical presence, bricks and mortar, reflects yesterday’s economic realities. As 
discussed, the emergence of internet and e-commerce diminished the need for establishing a 
tangible presence within a country to enter its market.
1723
 A virtual presence through a
website may suffice; particularly where it concerns the supplies of IT-services or e-tailed 
goods. As a consequence, the proceeds from e-commerce activities may virtually be left 
untaxed in the ‘host state’. Like their equivalents in the international tax regime, the physical 
presence concepts in the formulary systems, like the permanent establishment threshold, 
miss the digitization of the economy completely.
1724
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible 
elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 15 
(par. 61), Multistate Tax Commission Policy Statement 02-02, Ensuring the Equity, Integrity and Viability of State 
Income Tax Systems, Amended October 17, 2002, and Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of 
the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at Appendix D. Please note that this analytically regardless of the 
presence of legislative acts to the contrary, such as 15 USC §381, Sec. 402 Canadian Income Tax Regulations, or 
Articles 4-6 and 54-55 in conjunction with Chapter XVI Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1721
 See for this argument in the context of the CCCTB proposal, Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the 
European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1722
 Ibidem. 
1723
 See for a comparison e.g., the use of this argument in the context of international taxation Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (1999-
2000), at 1596.  
1724
 See e.g. Lee A. Sheppard, ‘The Digital Economy and Permanent Establishment’, 70 Tax Notes International 297 
(22 April 2013), Charles McLure, Jr., ‘Alternatives to the concept of permanent establishment’, 1 CESifo Forum 10 
(2000), at 10-16, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 
(1996-1997), and Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-279. In its recent discussion draft, the OECD suggests to modify the 
permanent establishment threshold by introducing a new tax nexus standard that refers to a ‘significant digital 
presence’. That paves the way for introducing alternative permanent establishment threshold, such as, according to 
the OECD, i.e., the ‘virtual fixed place of business permanent establishment’, the ‘virtual agency permanent 
establishment’ and the ‘on-site business presence permanent establishment’; see OECD, OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 1: Address the tax challenges of the digital economy, 24 March – 
14 April 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris, 24 March 2014, at 65. In its final report however the OECD seems to indicate 
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Perhaps, in the end, only the presence of the firm’s workers exercising their employment 
contracts may be of some help in providing a proxy to localize income at origin, for instance 
by reference to a quantitative factor presence test (see section 6.3.3.4 for the same 
argument). As discussed earlier, under a strict origin approach the profits are where the 
significant people are. Conceptually, this calls for a ‘labor factor presence test’, which refers 
to, e.g., the operations undertaken by the multinational’s workforce within a country (e.g., 
‘working days test’) – subject to a de minimis threshold (‘payroll country A exceeds amount 
€x’).
1725
Effect of new disconnect: potential for artificial profit shifting through factor shifting 
The arbitrariness created by disconnecting the factor allocation from the input and output 
locations may be utilized to manipulate the system. The artificial relocation of corporate profit 
into the relatively lower tax jurisdiction may be achieved by engaging into factor shifting 
operations. The artificialities may be exploited both by firms (tax planning arrangements) and 
taxing jurisdictions (undue tax competition responses). 
The potentials for engaging in artificial tax planning operations are essentially all rooted in the 
use of the same nexus concepts as utilized in international taxation, i.e., the tax place of 
residence and the permanent establishment. These allow for the shift of formula factors 
without the need to substantially alter the underlying investments and trade activities. Please 
allow me to illustrate things by referring to the sharing mechanism in the CCCTB proposal. 
If the CCCTB proposal, for instance, would enter into force as it is currently drafted, there may 
be a risk that multinationals could game the formulary system by engaging into factor 
manipulation operations.
1726
 As the European Union Member States may only be able to
respond to this by lowering their corporate tax rates,
1727
 this may potentially result in undue
governmental tax competition responses. The arbitrage may involve: 
1. ‘Labor factor manipulation’ through ‘payroll group members’;
2. ‘Sales factor manipulation’ through ‘beneficiary group members’.
Ad 1. ‘Labor factor manipulation’ through ‘payroll group members’. Under the CCCTB’s labor 
factor, employees and payroll would be attributed to the group member(s) from whom the 
employees receive their remunerations. To the extent that employees substantially exercise 
their employment contracts under the “control and responsibility” of group member(s) other 
than the group member(s) paying the salaries and wages, the factor would be allocated to the 
that reform proposals would need to be found within the existing international tax framework; see OECD, OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project; Addressing the tax challenges of 
the digital economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, 16 September 2014, at 18 and 149. 
1725
 The approach taken in Article 15 OECD Model Tax Convention, perhaps, could provide some inspiration in 
designing such an alternative nexus rule. 
1726
 For an extensive analysis, see Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-
directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1727
 It is noted that profit shifting through factor manipulation may be infeasible to be struck down by other means. The 
CCCTB’s anti-abuse provisions like the ‘General Anti-Abuse Rule’ in Articles 80-83 of the CCCTB Proposal – 
targeting artificial legal arrangements set-up to avoid tax – seem to merely refer to excessive behaviors concerning 
tax base calculation. Consequently, the abuse of apportionment rules seems to fall outside the confines of the 
CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules; Cf. Comment by Dennis Weber on the CCCTB Proposal, Vakstudie H&I, Highlights and 
Insights on European taxation, 2011/6.1, at 57. (Perhaps some room upholds under the European Union’s abuse of 
law doctrine. Matters seem indistinct in this area. For some analysis see Peter Harris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A 
Toothless Tiger or Russian Roulette?’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 
, at 271-297. Furthermore, the ‘Safeguard Clause’ in Article 87 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), which is directed at correcting 
unfair outcomes under the general formula seems to apply only when all the European Union Member States’ 
authorities involved agree. Moreover, some uncertainties exist as to whether the rulemaking authority of the 
Commission laid down in Article 97 regarding the sharing mechanism would enable it to adopt substantial changes to 
the legislative act. I am not a cynic but it may be fair to say that it remains to be seen how much room will effectively 
be available at the end of the day to resolve issues that might emerge concerning multinational factor manipulation 
and European Union Member State tax competition responses. 
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first mentioned group member(s).
1728
 In regards to the latter, the exception would be the
meeting of the required reassignment thresholds. Please note that the jurisdiction of origin 
where the firm’s workers physically exercise their employment contracts seems irrelevant. 
The application of such an apportioning key may invite multinationals to set-up and establish 
for tax purposes ‘payroll group members’ in the comparatively lower European Union taxing 
jurisdiction to artificially steer CCCTB tax base into that jurisdiction.
1729
 That is, even though
the firm’s workers may actually exercise their employment contracts across the European 
Union. Perhaps, this may even hold up regarding workers that are posted on the basis of 
intra-group secondment contracts. Note that the presence of workers within a country does 
not in itself trigger the presence of a permanent establishment.
1730
As the labor factor in the CCCTB-proposal assigns one-third of the European Union-wide tax 
base, the consequence of using such a labor factor allocation rule may be that one-third of 
the European Union-wide tax base becomes instantly mobile as of the entry into force of the 
CCCTB.
1731
Ad 2. ‘Sales factor manipulation’ through ‘beneficiary group members’. Further, under the 
proposed CCCTB sales factor, revenues from – loosely phrased – portfolio investments and 
hedging transactions, as well as exempt revenues like gross proceeds from (third country) 
shareholdings (e.g., dividends, capital gains)
1732
 would be attributed to the group company
that qualifies as the “beneficiary”. That is, to the extent that the revenues have been earned 
“in the ordinary course of trade or business”.
1733
Notably, as I am not entirely sure how to interpret the ‘beneficiary’ receiving such revenues ‘in 
the ordinary course of trade or business’, I tentatively follow the suggestions that Hellerstein 
has submitted in this regard,
1734
 as well as the analogous guidance provided by the Court of
Justice of the European Union in the area of value added taxation on portfolio investment 
activities.
1735
 Using transfer pricing terminology I take it to mean that these types of gross-
receipts are attributed to the group member which beneficially owns these,
1736
 and
functionally performs the multinational’s shareholding management functions, treasury 
functions, cash-pooling functions and/or functionally manages the multinational’s hedging 
positions. These types of functions performed may be considered to constitute key 
components of the firm’s ordinary trade or business operations. At least, they do in the US 
formulary systems.
1737
 Please note that the jurisdiction of destination where the firm’s
customers utilize or consume the services and goods provided to them seems irrelevant. 
1728
 Articles 90-91 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS).  
1729
 See for a comparison Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 242-243. 
1730
 The risk of factor manipulation through the setting-up of payroll companies to which the workforce is legally 
assigned may occur to the extent that the terms ‘control and responsibility’ ultimately would be interpreted narrowly, 
for instance by reference to the exercising of legal control and responsibility. Further, this may hold even if the terms 
are interpreted in a less restricted sense, i.e., by allocating the tax base to the group member to whom the economic 
risks involving the utilization of the multinational’s workforce have been assigned. In transfer pricing it is well-known 
that the economic risks involving economic activities are quite mobile and can be legally assigned to group 
companies per the multinational’s discretion. 
1731
 The reality of such a planning tool may ultimately depend on the interpretation of the terms ‘control and 
responsibility’. The issue for instance may be substantially mitigated to the extent that these would need to be 
interpreted as corresponding with the location where the employment contracts are physically performed. However, 
as this does not seem to correspond with the language used the potential for arbitrage may be considered present – 
at least theoretically. 
1732
 Article 11(c)(d) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1733
 Article 95(2) in conjunction with 96(3) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1734
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 237-241. 
1735
 See, Court of Justice cases C-60/90 (Polysar), C-155/94 (Wellcome Trust Ltd), C-306/94 (Régie Dauphinoise), C-
80/95 (Harnas & Helm), and C-142/99 (Floridienne). 
1736
 Note that I refer by analogue to the ‘beneficial ownership’ concept in international taxation. 
1737
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 239. To substantiate the argument, 
Hellerstein refers by analogue to Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 39 Cal. 4th 750, 139 P.3d 1169, 47 Cal. 
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The use of such a sales factor apportioning key may invite multinationals to set-up and tax-
establish ‘beneficiary group members’ in the comparatively lower European Union taxing 
jurisdiction. That is, to subsequently functionally assign the portfolio investments, hedge 
positions, and shareholdings to that ‘beneficiary group member’ to steer CCCTB tax base into 
that jurisdiction.
1738
 Practical experiences in transfer pricing reveal that setting up such an
arrangement may not be too difficult to achieve. The mobile and intangible characteristics of 
the assets involved, their potential to produce significant turnover, and the moderate extent of 
labor force required to perform the relevant functions involved, may perhaps accordingly 
render the proposed CCCTB sales factor quite vulnerable and subject to manipulation. 
Interestingly, the practical experiences in US state income taxation have already fueled some 
thoughts about the planning strategies that multinationals may pursue under the CCCTB 
sales factor. Examples by analogue may be found in US state income tax practice.
1739
 First,
reference can be made to a California state income tax case involving a software company 
which obtained gross revenues from its sales of short-term portfolio investments through the 
performance of a treasury function.
1740
 It performed the function involved in the State of
Washington where the firm had its headquarters (the location of the company’s ‘commercial 
domicile’). The portfolio investment revenues accounted for 73% of total gross receipts (while 
producing less than 2% of net income). These revenues accordingly overshadowed the 
company’s core outputs, software sales. As a result, significant amounts of state income tax 
base were at risk of being shifted towards Washington which would leave it untaxed (as 
Washington does not operate a state income tax). The California Supreme Court resolved the 
matter by requiring the software company to apply the sales factor to the net portfolio 
investment income. Referring to the language used in the CCCTB proposal – “total sales”, 
“proceeds”, “revenues”
1741
 – this solution may however be unavailable under the CCCTB.
Second, reference can be made to another California state income tax case, which deals with 
the application of the sales factor on gross receipts from the sales of commodity futures that 
had been made to hedge against price fluctuations.
1742
 The case involved an enterprise
engaged in the sale of grain products like flour and cereal. The company engaged in hedging 
transactions to insure itself against fluctuations in the cost prices of the raw grain materials 
that it used in its business process. These enabled it to cancel out grain price fluctuation risks 
to stabilize profit margins. The company managed its hedging positions at its headquarters 
located in Minnesota. The Court of California concluded that the gross receipts from the 
selling of commodity futures were included in the sales factor. As the undertaken hedging 
transactions produced substantial turnover (not profit), a significant part of state income tax 
base was shifted from California to Minnesota. The California state income tax legislature 
responded by excluding amounts received from such hedging transactions from the sales 
factor per 1 January 2011.
1743
 Assuming that this issue may arise under the CCCTB by
analogy – and I do not really see why it would not – the CCCTB appears to be in need of 
amendment at this point as well. 
Rptr. 3d 216 (2006). Analogues to case law of the Court of Justice on European Union value added taxation, the 
performing of portfolio asset management and shareholding management functions may perhaps be considered part 
of ordinary trade or business operations where these functions performed “are effected as part of a commercial 
share-dealing activity, in order to secure a direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in 
which the holding has been acquired or where they constitute the direct, permanent and necessary extension of the 
taxable activity”. See, Court of Justice cases C-60/90 (Polysar), C-155/94 (Wellcome Trust Ltd), C-306/94 (Régie 
Dauphinoise), C-80/95 (Harnas & Helm), and C-142/99 (Floridienne). 
1738
 See for a comparison Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 242-243. 
1739
 References to US state income tax case law and legislation were drawn from Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning 
under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), 
CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 237-241. 
1740
 See Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 39 Cal. 4th 750, 139 P.3d 1169, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (2006). 
1741
 See Article 95 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1742
 See General Mills v. Franchise Tax Board, 172 Cal. App. 4
th
 1535, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 208 (1
st
 Dist. 2009). Michael 
J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of 
Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, addresses an equivalent issue at 286. 
1743
 Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 25120(f)(2)(L) (Westlaw 2011). 
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In addition to these US-style planning opportunities, treasury activities and hedging activities, 
the CCCTB sales factor also seems to produce some novel planning opportunities of its own. 
That is, with regards to the apportionment of shareholding revenues such as dividends and 
capital gains to the beneficiary. Such shareholding proceeds may be exempt from the CCCTB 
tax base under the ‘participation exemption regime’.
1744
The apportionment of tax base by reference to the group member functionally performing the 
multinational’s (third-country) shareholding management functions may trigger the risk of 
initiating a process whereby intra-group third-country transactions are set-up to inflate the 
sales factor. Under the composition of the proposed sales factor, multinationals would seem 
enabled to inflate that factor by establishing an ongoing process of extracting dividend 
streams from their (third-country) shareholdings financed with capital contributions.
1745
 Such
an establishing of circular dividend and capital contribution streams do not seem to affect the 
tax base in an upward sense, yet are recognized for CCCTB tax base sharing purposes under 
the sales factor. The receipts from such artificial sales factor inflating ‘shareholding-revenue-
carousels’ have the potential of fully eclipsing real outputs. 
The CCCTB proposal accordingly seems to potentially grant multinationals complete 
discretion as to the intra-European Union attribution of the sales factor. The CCCTB would 
accordingly provide multinationals some readily available tools to engage in artificial tax base 
shifting. The consequence may be that an additional one-third of the European Union wide 
tax base instantly becomes mobile as of the entry into force of the CCCTB Directive.
1746
If the aforementioned arbitrage holds up, potentially two-thirds of the European Union-wide 
tax base is at risk of being artificially shifted across the European Union upon the CCCTB’s 
entry into force. This may be considered particularly problematic since it may not be feasible 
to effectively strike down profit shifting through factor manipulation under the CCCTB’s anti-
abuse rules.
1747
 As the European Union Member States may only have the tax rate at their
disposal to influence multinational location decisions within the European Union, perhaps the 
CCCTB may accordingly initiate an unforeseen intra-European Union ‘race to the bottom’. 
This matter may arise in addition to the vulnerability of the European Union tax base being 
subjected to traditional base erosion and profit shifting operations across the water’s edge – 
i.e., since the CCCTB would apply a traditional SA/ALS corporate tax system in third country
relations. 
Resolve matter through aligning nexus and allocation by means of factor presence 
tests  
Perhaps therefore, matters need to be resolved via some other means. I would favor the 
coordination of nexus and allocation standards in line with input and output locations through 
the utilization of quantitative ‘factor presence tests’.
1748
 Under such an approach, as said, a
1744
 Article 11(c)(d) in conjunction with 95(2) and 96(3) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1745
 The dividend streams may be financed with equity but perhaps even with intra-group third-country debt. The 
financing of such cash-carrousels with intra-group debt may potentially even negatively affect the European Union tax 
base as the outbound intra-group interest payments involved may be tax-deductible. Perhaps such interest 
deductions could be restricted under the anti-abuse rules. 
1746
 The reality of such a planning tool may ultimately depend on the interpretation of the terms ‘beneficiary’, ‘the 
ordinary course of trade or business’, ‘total sales’, ‘proceeds’, ‘revenues’, and ‘exempt revenues’. The issue may be 
substantially mitigated to the extent that these would need to be interpreted as not to include portfolio investment 
proceeds, hedging transactions proceeds and revenues to which the CCCTB participation exemption applies. 
However, as this does not seem to correspond with the language used in the Proposal for a Council Directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), arbitrage potentials may 
be considered present – at least theoretically. 
1747
 As said, these rules do not seem to address the artificialities that may arise concerning the application of the 
sharing mechanism. 
1748
 See e.g. Walter Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 425 (1996-1997), and 
Charles E. McLure, ‘Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age’, 53 National Tax Journal 1287 
(2000), and Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, 
at Appendix D. See for a comparison Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 202-
205, as well as Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 56, 
Report and overview of the main issues that emerged during the discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second 
meeting – 11 June 2007, Taxud E1 OP, CCCTB\WP\056\doc\en, Brussels, 20 August 2007, at 10-11 (par. 38-40) 
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taxpayer would have a taxable presence within a taxing jurisdiction if it has any of the formula 
factors (property, payroll, sales), or a combination thereof located within that jurisdiction.  
The establishment of nexus by reference to such a test could be subject to a quantitative de 
minimis threshold: ‘wages paid, asset values, revenues in tax jurisdiction A exceed amounts 
$x, y, z’.
1749
 The US Multistate Tax Commission, for instance, suggests threshold amounts of
$50,000 regarding the property and payroll factors and $500,000 regarding the sales 
factor.
1750
 A conceptual equivalent of this approach may be found in the distance sales rules
in European Union value added taxation. These establish jurisdiction to tax in a Member State 
when the sales in that state exceed a quantitative threshold of either €35,000 or €100,000.
1751
To make sure that all profits are geographically assigned, including the cases where the de 
minimis threshold otherwise is not met, one may consider using as a back-stop rule that 
nexus is alternatively established when the aggregate formula attributes to the respective 
taxing jurisdiction more than a certain percentage of the firm’s overall profit (e.g. 25%).
1752
Such an approach should merit some consideration for two reasons. First, the alignment of 
nexus and allocation rules would eliminate the opportunities for creating nowhere income. It 
would accordingly render superfluous the need to adopt the ‘throw-back rules’, ‘spread throw-
back rules’, or ‘throw-out’ rules to reassign tax base to jurisdictions that have nexus to tax it, 
as found in the US and Canadian formulary systems. It would similarly render superfluous the 
perceived need to assign tax base to ‘group members’, as the CCCTB proposal does. 
Second, to the extent that the aligned nexus and allocation rules would match the firm input 
locations and firm output locations, which would render moot the opportunities to engage in 
artificial factor shifting operations. The issue of artificially shifting the tax base through the set-
up of factor manipulation operations would be resolved, since the shifting of corporate profit in 
that event would require the relocation of the firm’s workers or assets, a shift of real inputs 
accordingly, or the relocation of the firm’s marketplace, a shift of real firm outputs accordingly. 
The introduction of quantitative factor presence tests in the international tax regime to replace 
the archaic ‘tax place of residence concept’ and the ‘permanent establishment concept’ would 
indeed be a novelty. Nevertheless, in my view, there is no proper reason not to consider it. 
The replacement of the current nexus standards in international taxation with factor presence 
tests, such as those applied today in US state income taxation, would merely be a response 
to ‘today’s reality of an increasingly global world, suiting the nature of the global economy’.
1753
It should not be forgotten that the current international tax standards do not match 21
st
century business realities. 
and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 15 (par. 61). For some further comparison, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic 
Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-1997), and Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent 
Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 266 (2006), at 266-279. 
1749
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 287: “In general, a taxing jurisdiction 
should eliminate opportunities that taxpayers may have for creating nowhere income by coordinating the 
apportionment rules with the nexus rules. For example, a taxpayer should be treated as having a taxable presence in 
a country if it has a property, payroll, or receipts factor located in that country.” See also Stefan Mayer, Formulary 
Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 203: “Such a nexus test would realize the ideal that the nexus 
requirement should conform with the method of profit attribution.” 
1750
 Cf. Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at 
Appendix D. 
1751
 See Articles 33 and 34 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax. 
1752
 Cf. Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at 
Appendix D. 
1753
 This phrase has been drafted in the style of Avi-Yonah and Clausing. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming 
Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project 
Discussion Paper 2007:08, at sections 3.2.1. and 4.3. 
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6.4.4.2.3 Exploring suitable proxies for locating and evaluating firm inputs and firm 
outputs  
Components of factor presence tests: ‘scope’, ‘evaluation’, and ‘location’ 
How should these factor presence tests be defined? Their purpose, obviously, should be to 
match the firm inputs at origin and firm outputs at destination as closely as possible. What 
could be suitable proxies for classifying, evaluating and locating the payroll factor, asset factor 
and revenue factor? 
For this purpose, three components need to be taken into consideration. One needs to 
respectively address the formula factors’ scope (what?), evaluation (how much?), and 
location (where?). The factors should be classified, evaluated, and localized. This holds true 
for both the origin-based payroll and asset factors, as well as the destination-based revenue 
factor. Let us proceed and elaborate somewhat further on the design of the formula factors. 
That is, would one contemplate to include all three factors in the formula. A double factor 
formula or a single factor formula, for instance, could be considered also – see further 
hereunder. 
Payroll factor: employees, employee remunerations, location(s) of work performed 
Scope. As the payroll factor seeks to reflect the contribution of the production factor of labor 
to the generation of the firm’s corporate profit,
1754
 its scope, in substance, should cover the
firm’s employees.
1755
 The factor would include all persons that are in an employee-employer
relationship with the multinational firm, including managers and directors.
1756
 The factor,
accordingly, would basically address those persons (employees) who agreed under an 
employment contract to: 
 personally perform economic activities;
 on behalf, for the account and under the control c.q. supervision and responsibility of
the multinational firm (employer);
 for a specific or indefinite period of time;
 in return for a remuneration (wage, salary, et cetera).
The payroll factor should not include the relationships of the firm with truly self-employed 
persons, as those relationships constitute services performed for the firm by independent 
contractors.
1757
 That obviously holds up only if and to the extent that these persons,
substantially, cannot be considered employees in substance.
1758
 “Taxpayers should not be
permitted to artificially deflate the amount included in the payroll factor through the use of so-
1754
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 47. 
1755
 See for a comparison Sec. 402(7) Canadian Income Tax Regulations, Article 90 CCCTB Proposal, and Article 
IV(1)(c) Multistate Tax Compact. 
1756
 That is, provided that these directors do not have a controlling shareholding in the ultimate parent company. 
Notably, following the suggestions of Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), 
Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, 
CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 8 (par. 22), Article 90(3) Proposal for a Council Directive on 
a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS) sets forth that “[t]he 
definition of an employee shall be determined by the national law of the Member State where the employment is 
exercised”. This produces the potential for mismatches and double (non-)taxation issues as a consequence. The path 
chosen in the CCCTB proposal should therefore be considered a route not to be followed.  
1757
 See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 8 (par. 24), and Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: 
Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, 
at 21: “Payroll excludes payments made to independent contractors or to any person who is not classified as an 
employee, but it may include payments made to leased employees.” 
1758
 For instance, the Canadian system for this purpose includes in the payroll factor “services … that would normally 
be performed by employees of the corporation.” See Sec. 402(7) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
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called independent contractors who, in substance, act as employees.”
1759
 To the extent that
the services are obtained from truly independent contractors, these ‘leased’ services, 
conceptually, should be taken into account in the firm’s asset factor. That is, since the firm’s 
entitlements under the service contracts involved would be part of the firm’s debits.
1760
Please note that the definitional issues involving the scope of the labor factor are not 
indigenous to formulary apportionment. Actually, matters are conceptually similar to the 
classification issues that arise under the application of the distributive rules for employment 
income in the double tax convention networks of countries that follow Article 15 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. That is, although matters in the area of formulary apportionment in 
this respect are – or at least, should be – seen from the perspective of the multinational firm 
when attributing its profit geographically on the basis of a formulary approach. Under Article 
15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the perspective of the respective employee is taken. 
Valuation. The payroll factor seeks to address the remunerations that the firm pays in return 
for utilizing its workers to approximate the contributions of the workforce to the profitability of 
the multinational group. The factor accordingly needs to be evaluated by reference to actual 
employee compensation,
1761
 and should include wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses,
fringe benefits and other emoluments that are paid to the firm’s employees.
1762
 Both
employee compensation in cash and kind should be taken into consideration. Company cars, 
computers and telephones, et cetera, would need to be taken into account to the extent that 
these items are available for the employee’s personal use. These items should be evaluated 
by reference to the costs incurred, as the remunerations paid by the firm are the subject of the 
assessment.
1763
 Further, for the same reason the costs involving employer-provided social
security and pension entitlements should be considered as on the payroll as well.
1764
Notably, as it concerns the measuring of inputs, the payroll factors in formulary mechanisms 
do not aim to assess the relative productivity of the workforce, i.e., the ‘fair value’ of the 
worker(s); something, I can imagine, that is very difficult or perhaps even impossible to 
measure. The payroll factor addresses the labor costs involved to approximate the location of 
profit by reference to the contribution of labor to profit generation. It appreciates that costs do 
not explain profit; it modestly makes use of it as a proxy. The consequence is that relatively 
1759
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285. 
1760
 Ibidem. McIntyre sets forth that the use of ‘leased’ persons “presents problems similar to the problems that arise 
under the property factor from the use of leased property.” Further McIntyre argues that “[u]nfortunately, the 
American states generally do not treat leased employees the way they treat leased property. Instead, they typically 
omit contract employees from the payroll factor, thereby providing taxpayers with an opportunity to game the system.” 
Contra, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 56, Report 
and overview of the main issues that emerged during the discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second meeting 
– 11 June 2007, Taxud E1 OP, CCCTB\WP\056\doc\en, Brussels, 20 August 2007, at 4 (par. 12), which considers to 
include in the payroll factor employees that are leased from unrelated businesses. 
1761
 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, seems to take this point of departure also as it refers to the using all labor costs that are deducted from the tax 
base at 8 (par. 25). 
1762
 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285. In the US, the factor is evaluated by reference to 
“wages, salaries, commissions and any other form of remuneration paid to employees for personal services”. See 
Article IV(1)(c) Multistate Tax Compact. The Canadian system refers to “salaries and wages”, see Sec. 402(3)(b) 
Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1763
 Please note that the perspective from the firm is taken, not that of the employee’s. In cases where the employee’s 
perspective needs to been taken, for instance, for the purpose of measuring its wage income for wage tax purposes, 
the remunerations in kind by reference to retail values merits consideration. 
1764
 Cf., e.g., Article 91(4) CCCTB Proposal: “[t]he term “payroll” shall include the cost of salaries, wages, bonuses 
and all other employee compensation, including related pension and social security costs borne by the employer.” 
See for a comparison Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU 
Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, 
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 47. See also 
Robert A. Petersen, ‘Comments on Miller’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues 
in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984) 167, at 168. Petersen mentions that ‘in the US, the employer’s costs for 
social security and other government-mandated insurance programs are excluded from the formula’. Joann M. 
Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and 
Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, notes at 21 that the Canadian 
system does not include unemployment insurance contributions and pension plan contributions in the payroll factor.  
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greater parts of the taxable base would be attributed to taxing jurisdictions having relatively 
higher wage levels. This has triggered in the literature the question of whether the number of 
employees should be taken into consideration in the composition of the payroll factor to 
account for wage level differentials in countries.
1765
 This, for instance, has been done in the
CCCTB Proposal.
1766
 In my view, the number of workers should not be taken into
consideration. Wage level differentials are a consequence of labor market imperfections – or, 
i.e., at least an issue analytically separate from taxation. It follows that these should not be
sought to be ‘corrected’ through a tax base allocation system.
1767
Location. As the payroll factor seeks to reflect the contribution of the firm’s workforce in the 
origin state, the factor should localize the payroll where the firm’s employees actually exercise 
their employment contracts.
1768
 The factor should accordingly aim to identify the location(s) of
work performed. To the extent that a particular employee exercises its employment contract in 
various jurisdictions, some kind of attribution needs to be undertaken. Perhaps one may 
consider matching payroll with the location of work performed for this purpose by reference to 
some causality key. For administrative convenience reasons, however, I would favor doing 
this alternatively. I would advocate adopting a fractional approach, which refers to the 
respective worker’s working days within the taxing jurisdictions involved during the respective 
taxable period in the numerator, and the total number of working days in that period in the 
denominator, i.e., a ‘working days test’.
1769
 Sick days should be disregarded in my view, as
1765
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 47, Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing 
Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international 
taxation 586 (2002), at 594. See for some discussion on the appropriateness of adjustments to account for wage 
level differentials Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, 
CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 
November 2007, at 8 (par. 26), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working 
Paper No. 52, An overview of the main issues that emerged during the discussion on the mechanism for sharing the 
CCCTB, Taxud E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 February 2007, at 7 (par. 28-30), and 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism 
for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 6 (par. 15). 
1766
 See Article 90(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), which refers to a labor factor that consists of two equal weighted elements: 
payroll and number of employees: “The labour factor shall consist, as to one half, of the total amount of the payroll of 
a group member as its numerator and the total amount of the payroll of the group as its denominator, and as to the 
other half, of the number of employees of a group member as its numerator and the number of employees of the 
group as its denominator.” 
1767
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1768
 Cf. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The 
Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 6 
(par. 15), and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, 
CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 
November 2007, at 8 (par. 27), as well as Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the 
CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38, and Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation 
Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate 
Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs 
Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 47. 
1769
 The CCCTB, the Canadian provinces and the US states follow dissimilar procedures. As discussed in the above, 
the CCCTB does something dissimilar also. The CCCTB’s labor factor (Articles 90-90 CCCTB Proposal) arbitrarily 
attributes employees and payroll to the group member(s) from which the employees receive their remunerations. To 
the extent that employees substantially exercise their employment contracts under the “control and responsibility” of 
other group member(s) than the group member(s) paying the salaries and wages, the factor would be allocated to the 
first mentioned group member(s). The discrepancy with the location of work performed triggers the arbitrage issues 
involving the ‘payroll group members’ as referred to in the head text. For the Canadian approach see Sec 402(3)(b) 
Canadian Income Tax Regulations that refers to “employees of the permanent establishment”. Joann M. Weiner, 
‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, notes at 22 that “[t]he provinces generally 
assign salaries and wages to the permanent establishment where the employee normally reports to work. However, 
salaries and wages for head office administration are assigned to the location of the head office”. The US states 
typically operate rules in this area equivalent to Article IV.14 Multistate Tax Compact. These diverge from the 
approach taken in the head text as well: “Compensation is paid in this State if: (a) the individual's service is 
performed entirely within the State; (b) the individual's service is performed both within and without the State, but the 
service performed without the State is incidental to the individual's service within the State; or (c) some of the service 
is performed in the State and (1) the base of operations or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which the 
service is directed or controlled is in the State, or (2) the base of operations or the place from which the service is 
directed or controlled is not in any State in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's residence 
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those days are not working days. The same should hold for holidays and any other types of 
absences, since the respective employee is not productive for the firm when absent c.q. not 
working – regardless of whether or not he receives wages while absent. 
Please note that the issues involving the localization of the labor factor are not indigenous to 
formulary apportionment either. Actually, matters are conceptually similar to the issues in 
localizing employment income under the relevant distributive rules in the double tax 
convention networks of countries that follow Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. In 
fact, with regards to the individual income taxation of cross-border workers’ wages, the 
approaches for this purpose taken in international tax practice also often refer to the 
employee’s working days in the source state.
1770
This being said, matters boil down to the following nexus/allocation labor factor: 
‘                         
                                  
                                
’.
1771
 For administrative convenience
reasons, incidental work performed by the firm’s workers in a certain tax jurisdiction could be 
disregarded under a de minimis nexus threshold rule. Such a rule could be defined, for 
instance, as ‘nexus if payroll state A exceeds amount $, ¥, or €x’ (e.g., $, ¥, or €50,000),
1772
 or
‘nexus, alternatively, if the aggregate formula attributes more than x% of profits’ (e.g., 25%) – 
i.e., the latter would apply if the first mentioned nexus standard has not been met.
1773
 Notably,
the currency used would differentiate per taxing state – currency issues are discussed 
hereunder. 
That would perhaps effectively cancel out artificial tax base shifting through labor factor 
manipulation, for instance under the CCCTB by using ‘payroll group members’. Viz., the 
shifting of profit through the shifting of the payroll factor in that event would require a physical 
relocation of the multinational’s workers, a shift in real inputs accordingly. 
Asset factor: firm debits, costs incurred, location of functional utilization 
Scope. As the asset factor seeks to reflect the contribution of the production factor of capital 
to the generation of the firm’s corporate profit, its scope should cover all the firm’s debits, in 
my view.
1774
 That is, theoretically, regardless of the (insurmountable) problems that arise
would this approach be chased after to be implemented in practice – see hereunder. In 
principle, the factor should include all the firm’s property, regardless of whether it appears on 
the firm’s commercial balance sheets; i.e., otherwise the renowned ‘value gap’ in commercial 
accounting, produced by items that do not appear on the balance sheets for instance, would 
is in this State.” Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 97 notes that a few US 
states apply throwback rules for payments that are attributed to jurisdictions in which the taxpayer is not taxable. 
These are necessary to the extent that states operate nexus concepts on the basis of which the presence of a 
workforce does not establish a taxable presence. As discussed in the above, I would favor the coordinating of nexus 
and apportionment rules via ‘factor presence tests’. 
1770
 The inspiration for the approach taken in localizing the payroll-factor has indeed been found in the established 
case law of the Dutch Supreme Court – e.g., Dutch Supreme Court, Hoge Raad, 23 September 2005, No. 40179, 
Beslissingen in Belastingzaken Nederlandse Belastingrechtspraak 2006/52 – on the attribution of wage income under 
the distributive rules for employment income in the Dutch double tax convention network. These are equivalent to 
Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. See for a comparison, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 52, An overview of the main issues that emerged during the 
discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 
February 2007, at 6 (par. 27): “Among the possible methods, it was considered taking into account the rules that 
would be applicable to the personal income of the employee (Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention).” 
1771
 Please note that to the extent the application of the fraction involves a worker that is operational solely within a 
single state, the application of the fraction with regard to that worker would be 1. 
1772
 That would for instance cancel out short-term business trips from the equation in the majority of cases. 
1773
 Cf. Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at 
Appendix D. 
1774
 Cf. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 211. Mayer makes an exception for 
non-productive assets. He would exclude those from the property factor. I do not see the need for that, as I fail to 
recognize why profit-optimization driven multinational firms would own unproductive assets in the first place. If an 
asset would not be income-producing the firm would dispose of it. That renders superfluous the necessity for a rule 
excluding such assets from the property factor. 
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leak into the formulary system.
1775
 The asset factor would accordingly theoretically need to
include the multinational firm’s: 
 current assets:
o current tangible assets (e.g., inventories);
o current monetary assets (e.g., cash and cash equivalents, short-term portfolio
investments – shareholdings, receivables, securities, derivatives, et cetera –
and prepaid expenses);
o current intangible assets (e.g., short-term license interests and short-term
operational leasehold interests, short-term franchises).
 non-current (fixed) assets:
o fixed tangible assets (e.g., land, buildings, machinery, equipment, vehicles);
o fixed monetary assets (e.g., long-term non-portfolio investments, for instance
shareholdings held as a capital asset – ‘participations’);
o fixed intangible assets (e.g., goodwill, computer software, long-term license
interests and long-term financial leasehold interests, long-term franchises, as
well as intellectual property, such as in rem intellectual property rights like
patents, trademarks, trade names, et cetera, and ad personam intellectual
property rights like commercial know-how and technical know-how).
The scope of the asset factors in the formulary systems that are in place today is significantly 
limited, however. In the US systems, for instance, the asset factor is generally limited to “real 
and tangible personal property owned or rented and used during the tax period”.
1776
 Leased
property, accordingly, is included in the factor’s scope of application. Intangible assets and 
monetary assets are typically excluded. A similar approach can be found in the CCCTB 
Proposal, which limits the asset factor to “all fixed tangible assets owned, rented or 
leased”,
1777
 thereby even excluding inventories.
1778
 The Canadian formulary system does not
even use capital as an allocation factor in the first place because of the practical problems its 
use would raise.
1779
The exclusion of non-physical assets from the asset factor is generally explained by reference 
to the practical problems and arbitrage issues that their inclusion would produce.
1780
 These
arise as a consequence of their intangible, volatile, and mobile properties. “[A]s long as the 
apportionment mechanism relies on mobile factors under the control of the company, FA 
creates incentives for firms to shift factors across countries to minimize the groups' overall tax 
burden and thereby it may give rise to certain tax competition by governments to attract real 
economic activity into their territories, which may create some economic distortions.”
1781
Issues particularly arise with regards to high-worth intellectual property rights. These 
1775
 See on the value gap in commercial accounting relating to intellectual property and intangible assets, Gordon V. 
Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000). 
1776
 See Article IV(10) Multistate Tax Compact. 
1777
 See Article 92(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1778
 The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 9 (par. 31), argues the inclusion of inventories to produce profit shifting opportunities. See also Michael J. 
McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business 
Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 276: “if inventory is included in the property factor, the taxpayer can shift 
some portion of its income out of the production state by shipping its inventory outside that state.” Mayer on the other 
hand argues that the exclusion of inventories would not be necessary as their relocation would represent a shift of 
real economic activities. See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 211. 
1779
 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula 
Apportionment at the International Level’, 13 Tax Notes International 2113 (23 December 1996), at 2130 et seq, and 
Ernest H. Smith, ‘Allocating to Provinces the Taxable Income of Corporations: How the Federal-Provincial Allocation 
Rules Evolved’, 24 Canadian Tax Journal 5 (1976), at 551.  
1780
 See e.g., the Preamble to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), observation 21: “Intangibles and financial assets should be excluded 
from the formula due to their mobile nature and the risks of circumventing the system”. See also Christoph Spengel et 
al, ‘The Impact of ICT on Profit Allocation within Multinational Groups: Arm's Length Pricing or Formula 
Apportionment?’, ZEW Discussion Paper 2003:53, at 23. 
1781
 See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The 
Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 9-
10 (par. 22). 
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intangibles often are the multinational’s key rent drivers and are therefore of great commercial 
value to the firm.
1782
 However, because of that reality in combination with the mobile and
intangible characteristics of these assets, any attribution key seeking to evaluate and 
geographically locate intangibles for tax allocation purposes would be vulnerable and subject 
to manipulation. In the end, the inclusion of intangible assets in a formulary system seems to 
give rise to problems identical to those in transfer pricing.
1783
However, their exclusion from the asset factor has also attracted some criticism.
1784
 “[T]o omit
intangible assets from a potential EU formula altogether seems highly unsatisfactory (…). It 
would mean ignoring one of the potentially most important profit-generating factors, it would 
generally result in a misattribution of the group tax base (with an unduly low share going to 
jurisdictions where the corporation develops or holds more intangibles) - unless tangible and 
intangible assets are evenly distributed across all the group affiliates, which is highly unlikely 
– and it could distort corporate groups' choices between tangible and intangible assets (when
they were substitutes), thus rendering the tax system non-neutral and creating 
inefficiencies.”
1785
Nevertheless, the exclusion of intangibles from the asset factor does not mean that their 
contributions to income are disregarded in the profit division process. If intangibles are not 
expressly dealt with in the formula allocation, they piggyback on the profit division in 
proportion to the factors that are expressly dealt with (e.g., payroll, sales). The effect is 
conceptually similar to the application of a throw-out rule discussed in the above. Some 
commentators argue that such an indirect reflection of intangibles in the formula sufficiently 
accounts for their contribution to the generation of corporate profit. That is, as the profits from 
the commercialization of intangibles are reflected in the receipts on services and goods 
provided to third parties and the salaries paid to the workers that use the intangibles in the 
business process when they exercise their employment contracts.
1786
 Others disagree,
however.
1787
 The CCCTB Proposal takes a middle way and seeks to resolve things
pragmatically. In some circumstances the asset factor includes “the total amount of costs 
incurred for research, development, marketing and advertising”. Specifically: “In the five years 
that follow a taxpayer's entry into an existing or new group, its asset factor shall also include 
1782
 See e.g., Gordon V. Smith et al, Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets (2000), Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing 
the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 7 (par. 16), and Yariv 
Brauner, ‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes’, 28 Virginia 
Tax Review 81 (2008). 
1783
 Cf. Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary 
Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 586 (2002), at 595, Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘U.S. Federal Use of 
Formula Apportionment to Tax Income From Intangibles’, 14 Tax Notes International 859 (10 March 1997), at 866, 
and Paul R. McDaniel, ‘Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone’, 49 Tax Law Review 691 (1993-
1994), at 722 et seq. 
1784
 See e.g., Christoph Spengel et al, ‘The Impact of ICT on Profit Allocation within Multinational Groups: Arm's 
Length Pricing or Formula Apportionment?’, ZEW Discussion Paper 2003:53, at 23, and Stefan Mayer, Formulary 
Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 225. See for a comparison, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 52, An overview of the main issues that emerged during the 
discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 
February 2007, at 8 (par. 37): “The prevailing opinion was that intangible assets should be taken into account in a 
formula, although this raises important questions of valuation (especially for selfgenerated intangibles and intangibles 
that do not generate a stream of income) and of location (which company should account for the intangible, the 
company using it or the company receiving the royalty payment for granting the use of it?)”. 
1785
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 51. 
1786
 See e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, ‘Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate 
Accounting with Formulary Apportionment’, 60 Tax Notes 1131 (23 August 1993), 1136-1145, at 1141, and Benjamin 
F. Miller, ‘A Reply to ‘From the Frying Pan to the Fire’, 61 Tax Notes 241 (11 October 1993), at 251. 
1787
 See e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘U.S. Federal Use of Formula Apportionment to Tax Income From Intangibles’, 
14 Tax Notes International 859 (10 March 1997), at 865 (footnote 25), where he sets forth to disagree with the view 
“that it is not necessary to include intangibles in the property factor because their effect is adequately captured by the 
sales and payroll factors. Most obviously, the sales factor would not capture the transfer of intangibles within a unitary 
business; it would ignore them. The contribution of the sales factor would be the same (assuming the same ratio of 
numerator and denominator in the sales factor), regardless of the importance of intangibles and regardless of 
whether their value is based on R&D or on reputation. The issue at hand is whether the intangible asset should be 
attributed (at least in part) to the market country for purposes of the property factor.” See also Stefan Mayer, 
Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 225-228. 
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the total amount of [these] costs incurred by the taxpayer over the six years that preceded its 
entry into the group.”
1788
Valuation. The asset factor seeks to address the remunerations that the firm pays in return for 
utilizing its assets in the business process. The factor accordingly is generally evaluated by 
reference to the original costs of the property involved.
1789
 With regards to depreciable assets,
that amount would need to be adjusted by depreciation according to the accounting rules or 
the tax rules in that area.
1790
 Leased or rented assets are typically measured by reference to
the capitalized rental fees.
1791
Various commentators have argued that the assets in the factor should be evaluated by 
reference to fair market value instead of costs.
1792
 That is, first, since cost – as elaborated in
the above – do not explain profits. Further, second, the use of a cost-based profit division 
approach has the effect of attributing profit to taxing jurisdictions where the costs are higher, 
while costs in fact reduce profit.
1793
 That would accordingly seem to produce outcomes where
cost-inefficient operations would be rewarded a relatively higher profit. Interestingly, 
conceptually similar concerns have been raised by some commentators with regards to the 
application of the cost-based transfer pricing methods.
1794
 In response to that, it has been
forwarded that this does not seem to have raised concerns in US state income tax practice 
regardless, and moreover, basically that cost level differentials are the result of market 
inefficiencies – i.e., an issue like wage level differentials being analytically separate from 
taxation and are therefore not to be ‘corrected’ through a tax base allocation system.
1795
1788
 See for some discussion, Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment 
Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 231. 
Hellerstein sets forth that “[i]t is not entirely clear why this aspect of the factor evaporates after five years. 
Presumably, the theory is that whatever contribution these costs made to the taxpayer’s income has a useful life of 
only five years. This leaves open the question, of course, as to why costs incurred during the taxpayer’s membership 
in the group are not also counted. The answer, presumably, is that it would be easy to lodge these costs in a group 
member from a low-tax Member State. This disparity in treatment of ‘intangible’ costs is just another example of the 
tension between theoretical and practical concerns that informs the design of the CCCTB sharing mechanism.”  
1789
 See e.g., Article 94 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), and Article IV(11) Multistate Tax Compact. The US system uses historical cost. 
Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), notes at 212 that this aspect is criticized as it 
tends to “overvalue the contributions of long-lived assets and undervalues those of short-lived ones.” Mayer refers for 
this purpose to Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with 
Formulary Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 586 (2002), at 594.  
1790
 See e.g., Article 94(2)-(3) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS), which refers to the tax written down value. See Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements 
of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, which has 
suggested this at 10 (par. 36). Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU 
Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, 
European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, mentions at 49 that 
the written-down value could be indexed by a rate of inflation to avoid comparability issues between assets that had 
been acquired at different times. Both the US system and the CCCTB do not make such an inflation adjustment. For 
some critique, see Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What 
the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 211. 
1791
 See Article IV(11) Multistate Tax Compact: “Property rented by the taxpayer is valued at eight times the net 
annual rental rate. Net annual rental rate is the annual rental rate paid by the taxpayer less any annual rental rate 
received by the taxpayer from subrentals.” Article 94(4) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS) takes the same approach. 
1792
 See, e.g. Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the 
EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 211: 
“[T]he cost of assets provides a poor approximation of both their value and the use cost of capital,” Charles E. 
McLure, Jr., ‘U.S. Federal Use of Formula Apportionment to Tax Income From Intangibles’, 14 Tax Notes 
International 859 (10 March 1997), at 866, Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in 
Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285, Ana Agúndez-
Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-
Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-
General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 49, Christoph Spengel et al, ‘The Impact of ICT on 
Profit Allocation within Multinational Groups: Arm's Length Pricing or Formula Apportionment?’, ZEW Discussion 
Paper 2003:53, at 23. 
1793
 See Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 209. 
1794
 Notably, J.T. van Egdom RA, Verrekenprijzen; de verdeling van de winst van een multinational (2011), at 82, 
argues that it would therefore seem to make sense to establish the arm’s length mark-up on budgeted costs. 
1795
 Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 213. 
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It should be kept in mind that the objective of formulary systems is to approximate the location 
of corporate profit, amongst others, by reference to the remunerations paid to obtain the 
assets utilized in the business process. It makes use of a cost-based approach as a proxy to 
evaluate the attribution of property to profit generation. Formulary systems, as said, do not 
aim at localizing the profit. Furthermore, the pursuit of fair value for evaluation purposes in 
formulary apportionment would raise the same issues that the international tax regime is 
currently faced with under its use of SA/ALS, particularly where it involves the valuation of 
intangibles.
1796
 The fair value of the respective assets would also in formulary apportionment
be measured by reference to today’s worth of anticipated future rents, calculated by reference 
to discounted cash flow evaluations or sophisticated Black-and-Scholes real option based 
valuation techniques. As these techniques require the assessment of anticipated future cash-
flows, their use in formulary systems would produce the same issues as they currently do in 
transfer pricing (see above sections 6.3.4.4 and 6.3.4.5). The concerns raised, indeed, are 
identical – and, in my view, insurmountable. Firm inputs cannot be evaluated objectively at 
the end of the day. 
Location. As the asset factor seeks to reflect the contribution of the firm’s debits in the origin 
state, the factor should geographically localize the assets involved where these are actually 
utilized by the firm’s workers in the firm’s production process.
1797
 The factor should
accordingly aim to identify the locations of functional utilization, i.e., the locations of the 
‘functions performed’. The typical starting points in practice are the place of use
1798
 or the
location of the economic owner.
1799
 To the extent that property is mobile, or in-transit, and
used in or shipped across various jurisdictions, some kind of attribution needs to be 
undertaken. Perhaps one may consider matching the costs involved with the locations in 
which the assets are situated by reference to some causality key. For administrative 
convenience reasons, however, I would favor doing this alternatively. I would advocate 
adopting a fractional approach, which refers to the respective assets’ days of use within the 
taxing jurisdictions involved during the respective taxable period in the numerator, and the 
total number of days of use in that period in the denominator, i.e., a ‘time spent test’ 
comparable with the ‘working days test’ set out in the above.
1800
 Some adaptations could be
contemplated with regards to property in international waters, and property that is temporarily 
not in use. That is, if one were to consider using a property factor in the first place. 
This would boil down to the following nexus/allocation asset factor: ‘               
              
                                               
                                   
’.
1801
 For administrative convenience
reasons, incidental asset utilization by the firm’s workers in a certain tax jurisdiction could be 
disregarded under a de minimis nexus threshold rule. Such a rule could be defined, for 
1796
 Cf. Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary 
Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 586 (2002), at 595, Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘U.S. Federal Use of 
Formula Apportionment to Tax Income From Intangibles’, 14 Tax Notes International 859 (10 March 1997), at 866, 
and Paul R. McDaniel, ‘Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone’, 49 Tax Law Review 691 (1993-
1994), at 722 et seq. 
1797
 Cf. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 11 (par. 39), referring to the ‘place of effective use’. 
1798
 Article IV(10) Multistate Tax Compact, for instance, refers to “property (…) used in this State.” Article 93(2) 
CCCTB Proposal assigns to the user, save for the meeting of certain reassignment thresholds: “Notwithstanding 
paragraph 1, if an asset is not effectively used by its economic owner, the asset shall be included in the factor of the 
group member that effectively uses the asset. However, this rule shall only apply to assets that represent more than 
5% of the value for tax purposes of all fixed tangible assets of the group member that effectively uses the asset.” 
1799
 See Article 93(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS): “An asset shall be included in the asset factor of its economic owner. If the 
economic owner cannot be identified, the asset shall be included in the asset factor of the legal owner.” With regards 
to leased or rented assets, paragraph 3 forwards that these “shall be included in the asset factor of the group 
member which is the lessor or the lessee; [t]he same shall apply to rented assets.” 
1800
 See for a comparison Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: 
Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, 
notes at 21. Weiner mentions that such a rule which refers to the share of total time spent in the state during the tax 
period. 
1801
 Please note that to the extent the application of the fraction involves an asset that is utilized solely within a single 
state, the application of the fraction with regard to that asset would be 1. 
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instance, as ‘nexus if asset(s) state A exceeds amount $, ¥, or €x’ (e.g., $, ¥, or €50,000),
1802
or ‘nexus, alternatively, if the aggregate formula attributes more than x% of profits’ (e.g., 25%) 
– i.e., the latter would apply if the first mentioned nexus standard has not been met.
1803
Notably, the currency used would differentiate per taxing state – currency issues are 
discussed hereunder. Accordingly, the labor test and asset factor test would correspond. 
Please note that the issues involving the localization of the asset factor again is not 
indigenous to formulary apportionment. Actually, matters are conceptually identical to the 
issues that arise in geographically localizing assets in international taxation when analyzing 
the functions performed (labor), the assets used (capital) and risks assumed.
1804
 Indeed, the
approach echoes the concept of ‘significant people functions’ assessing the ‘functions 
performed’ in the area of transfer pricing, i.e., the approach taken (1) to attribute profit to 
permanent establishments under the first step of the ‘two-step analysis’, (2) to perform the 
‘functional and factual analysis’ as one of the ‘comparability factors’ under the ‘comparability 
analysis’, and (3) to perform the ‘contribution analysis’ c.q. the ‘residual analysis’ to localize 
firm inputs under the application of the ‘(residual) profit split method’ – generally referred to 
under the term ‘functions performed’. Indeed, the concept of ‘significant people functions’, as 
said earlier, provides for a nexus concept that is oriented most directly towards identifying the 
location of the employed production factors. We seem to have moved in a circle, from transfer 
pricing to formulary apportionment and back to transfer pricing; it has not been a coincidence 
that section 6.3.3.4 has called for a factor presence test. 
It follows that the same holds true for the localization of intangibles under the asset factor – 
i.e., if these are to be included in the apportionment system. Intangible assets such as
intellectual property do not have a geographic location by definition. In addition, multinational 
firms may (and typically do) utilize their intellectual property rights, such as their trademarks, 
brands, trade names and patents in their business process simultaneously at various places, 
regionally and perhaps even globally. 
Would it be possible to even develop an approach to properly divide the intangibles’ values 
(or costs by proxy) among the ‘significant people’, i.e., the firm’s workers of the multinational 
firm? Which key should be used? Localizing intangibles proportional to the numbers of 
employees? Or alternatively, by reference to wages paid? The first approach would end up 
attributing the (costs of) intangibles in proportion to employee numbers – i.e., some kind of 
‘headcount allocation’, or ‘fte allocation’. The second would produce a geographic localization 
of intangibles in proportion to the wages paid. That approach would basically end up 
producing payroll-FA, as the intangibles would effectively end-up piggybacking the payroll 
factor. Interestingly, in that event, the inclusion of intangibles into the formulary system would 
then basically produce the same outcome in terms of geographic profit division as its 
exclusion from the system would.  
So, would it be sensible to even try to pursue, in Langbein’s words, the “pointless task of 
localizing the non-localizable”?
1805
 Since profit does not have geographical attributes and
neither do intangibles, my answer to this question would be in the negative. Moreover, 
bringing into mind that firm rents are currently increasingly firm specific rather than location 
specific,
1806
 perhaps it merits some consideration to exclude an asset factor from the system
altogether.  
1802
 That would for instance cancel out short-term low-value asset utilization in a taxing jurisdiction from the equation. 
1803
 Cf. Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at 
Appendix D. 
1804
 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 
2010, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010, and 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) in conjunction with 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii). 
1805
 See Stanley I. Langbein, ‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length’, 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 
1986) at 670. See also Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income From International Use and Dispositions of 
Intellectual Property’, 36 Tax Law Review 233 (1980-1981), who argues at 244 that there is no objective method for 
dividing a gain on sale of intellectual property between the production and selling functions. 
1806
 Cf. Alan J. Auerbach et al, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working 
Paper 07/05, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st
 Century (2008). 
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As firm inputs cannot be objectively measured, the firm’s ‘crown jewels’ cannot even be 
located, perhaps it may be worth merely considering payroll to reflect inputs at origin. That is, 
provided that one would opt to divide profit by reference to firm inputs in the first place. In the 
end, fundamentally, the origin of income refers to the human intervention or intellectual 
element, recognizing that income originates where people actually perform economic 
activities. People produce income; equipment and legal constructs do not do so by 
themselves. The assets that are being employed in the business process merely provide 
means, or instruments, to enhance workforce productivity. 
But for firm input assignment purposes, these would end up being evaluated by reference to 
labor cost. Yet, it has been done in practice. At this point the Canadian system may be 
recalled, which divides profit interprovincially by reference to an equally weighted payroll-
sales formula. Assets are disregarded as an origin-based apportionment factor, only payroll is 
employed for that purpose. The German ‘Gewerbesteuer’, for instance, operates a payroll-
only formulary system.
1807
 That is a fully-fledged origin-based apportioning system solely
making reference to labor inputs, ignoring not only capital but also the destination municipality 
for trade tax division purposes. 
Intermezzo; the ‘value added key at origin’: the suggested but ill-featured alternative 
Notably, before proceeding to the sales factor, the following should be noted. It has been 
suggested in the literature to take together the contributions of the production factors of labor 
and capital and combine them into a single apportionment factor for profit division 
purposes.
1808
 That would produce an origin-based profit division methodology on the basis of
which the return to labor component and the return to capital component would be accounted 
for ‘by their relative importance in the generation of profit’.
1809
 The approach has been
referred to in the literature as ‘value added at origin’. It would provide for an alternative to 
traditional formulary apportionment. It only exists on the drawing board and has not been 
used in practice. But with regards to the CCCTB project, the European Commission did look 
into the possibility of attributing profit geographically by reference to such a value added key 
at origin.
1810
The value added at origin approach basically seeks to evaluate and localize the fair value of 
firm inputs, both labor and property in the production state. As discussed, in my view, this 
would be very difficult if not impossible to achieve, as, first, it would require the assessment of 
anticipated future cash-flows. Second, it would require a geographic localization of 
intangibles, a localization of the non-localizable. Furthermore, as the approach would provide 
for an origin-based attribution key, the production state would need to take into account the 
outbound flows of goods and services produced, including the intra-group provisions and 
flows of goods and services. That would consequently require an arm’s length evaluation of 
intra-group dealings.  
Accordingly, the use of a value added at origin key would reintroduce transfer pricing and with 
that the problems and arbitrage its use ensues. This transfer pricing property of the suggested 
methodology has been referred to in the literature as its ‘Achilles’ heel’.
1811
 If it would be
1807
 See § 29 (Zerlegungsmaßstab) in conjunction with § 31 (Begriff der Arbeitslöhne für die Zerlegung) of the 
German Trade Tax Act (Gewerbesteurgesetz, GewStG). 
1808
 See Sven-Olof Lodin et al, Home State Taxation - Tax Treaty Aspects (2001), at 47-50. For an extensive 
discussion, see Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated 
Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European 
Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 69-85. 
1809
 See Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary 
Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 586 (2002), at 593, and Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary 
Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-
General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 48. 
1810
 See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation in the 
Internal Market, Brussels, 23 October 2001, SEC(2001) 1681, at 414. 
1811
 Cf. Charles McLure, Jr., ‘The European Commission’s Proposals for Corporate Tax Harmonization’, 6 CESifo 
Forum 32 (2005), at 36, and Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European 
Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 
2005:8, at 49, both referring to Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income 
Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 
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feasible to properly appraise the relative contribution of functions performed in transfer 
pricing, the international tax regime would not be in need of an alternative profit division 
methodology. Value added at origin accordingly seems an ill-featured attribution key, and its 
use, in my view, should therefore not be pursued. Also, the CCCTB Working Group considers 
the method inappropriate for sharing the CCCTB.
1812
Sales factor: sales and services contributing to rent production, gross receipts, 
location of customer 
Scope. The sales factor seeks to reflect the contribution of the demand side to the generation 
of the firm’s rents, or the firm’s market for its product. Its scope should accordingly cover the 
goods and services the firm provides to its customers.
1813
 Intra-group sales should be
disregarded.
1814
 Principally, the factor would need to include all the goods and the services
that the firm supplies in the course of its business
1815
 – in my view, sales of intermediate or
goods,
1816
 occasional sales, incidental sales, and the sales of direct investments included.
1817
199 (2004), 199-220, at section 4.4. See also Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and 
Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of 
Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, 
at 82. 
1812
 See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 52, An 
overview of the main issues that emerged during the discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 
AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 February 2007, at 4-5 (par. 14-20). 
1813
 See for a comparison, Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285: “The revenue factor would 
include all of the receipts derived by the common enterprise from the marketing of its goods and services.” Notably, in 
defining ‘sales’, Article IV.1(g) MTC effectively refers to the transactions that are related to the taxpayer’s business 
income. See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 
2012, at 14. 
1814
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 53: “Logically, intra-group sales should be 
excluded from (…) this factor, as only third-party unrelated sales have contributed to the net group profits that the 
factor seeks to apportion.” See also Article 95(2), final phrase, CCCTB Proposal: “Intra-group sales of goods and 
supplies of services shall not be included.” Cf. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB 
WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, 
Brussels, 17 November 2006, which refers to throwback rules at 7-8 (par. 17), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 52, An overview of the main issues that emerged during the 
discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 
February 2007, at 9 (par. 40), and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), 
Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, 
CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 12 (par. 44). 
1815
 See e.g., MTC Reg. IV.15.(a) which refers to “transactions and activity in the regular course of the trade or 
business,” Multistate Tax Commission, Allocation and Apportionment Regulations, Adopted February 21, 1973; as 
revised through July 29, 2010, at 31. See also Sec. 402(5) Canadian Income Tax Regulations, which does not 
include in the gross receipts factor “interest on bonds, debentures or mortgages, dividends on shares of capital stock, 
or rentals or royalties from property that is not used in connection with the principal business operations of the 
corporation.” 
1816
 Indeed, I would also take sales of semi-finished into account. That is as the sales factor in my view seeks to 
identify the customer rather than the final consumer – as for instance European Union value added taxation (‘EU-
VAT’) does. Accordingly, issues involving chain transactions or other kinds of series of supplies over various phases 
in the production-distribution chain similar to those in EU-VAT would not arise (i.e., those involving ‘ABC-supplies’, or 
‘Reihengeschäfte’). Further, ‘tax cascading’ issues would not arise also as the system that is advocated in this study 
taxes rents rather than gross value added. See on the apparent tax cascading risks under the sales factor, Ana 
Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-
Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-
General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 54. It should be kept in mind that the system that is 
advocated in this study seeks to subject rents to corporate taxation. The geographical division of these rents under a 
destination-based sales factor does not alter matters analytically, i.e., because the sales factor merely apportions tax 
base rather than defining it. Since the advocated system subjects rents to tax – not gross proceeds, or value added 
like EU-VAT – tax cascading issues would not when intermediate sales are included in the sales factor. 
1817
 See e.g., Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Replacing Separate Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary 
Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 586 (2002), at 596: “The fact that investment income is included 
in apportionable income suggests that investment receipts should be treated like other receipts.” Contra MTC Reg. 
IV.18.(c) “Where substantial amounts of gross receipts arise from an incidental or occasional sale of a fixed asset
used in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business, those gross receipts shall be excluded from the sales 
factor. For example, gross receipts from the sale of a factory or plant will be excluded”, Multistate Tax Commission, 
Allocation and Apportionment Regulations, Adopted February 21, 1973; as revised through July 29, 2010, at 39. 
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The sales factor would include both business-to-consumer transactions (‘B2C transactions’) 
and business-to-business transactions (‘B2B transactions’).
1818
Only the sales that contribute to the production of the firm’s economic rents should be 
included in the sales factor’s scope of application.
1819
 The firm’s positions in respect of their
sales and services that do not contribute to the infra-marginal profit-making should be 
disregarded. That would hold true, first, for the shareholdings to which the ‘indirect tax 
exemption’ would apply, i.e., the double tax relief mechanism that has been developed and 
advocated in Chapter 5 to mitigate the tax cascading (economic double taxation) relating to 
the proceeds from actively held shareholdings. Participations to which the exemption would 
apply should be excluded from the sales factor.
1820
 Second, the firm’s hedging activities would
be excluded from the sales factor also, i.e., as their selling effectively does not produce 
corporate profit.
1821
 The same would hold true, third, for the firm’s portfolio investment
activities.
1822
 “If the purpose of the sales factor is to reflect the taxpayer’s market for its
product, then, unless the taxpayer is a securities dealer, receipts from its treasury function 
and other financial activities should be excluded.”
1823
 Further, an additional argument to
exclude portfolio investments from the sales factor is that these positions do not produce 
rents. Portfolio investments merely generate normal returns, rather than above-normal 
returns. And, as discussed in Chapter 5, my aim is to tax that above normal return (i.e., to 
secure neutrality in the financing decision). 
Further, it would also ensure that artificialities and arbitrage would not leak into the formulary 
system. Sales factor manipulation and sales factor inflation opportunities like those described 
in the above involving ‘beneficiary group members’ under the proposed CCCTB and the 
1818
 Note that I adhere to European Union value added taxation (‘EU-VAT’) language by differentiating between B2B 
and B2C sales. 
1819
 See for a comparison, Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 238: “[T]he US 
subnational state sales factors … defined ‘gross receipts’ … that they had to generate apportionable income.” 
1820
 See for a comparison Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive 
a solution?’, 7 Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38, where the author argues not to include tax exempt 
proceeds from participations in the CCCTB’s sales factor on the basis that these do not contribute to the CCCTB 
group’s profit making. See also Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 217, as 
well as Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 13 (par. 50), both arguing that base exempt proceeds should be excluded from the sales factor’s scope of 
application. 
1821
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. Reference can also be made to Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 25120(f)(2)(L) , 
on the basis of which the California state income tax legislature for similar reasons excludes amounts received from 
hedging transactions from the sales factor per 1 January 2011. The references to California legislation has been 
taken from Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 240. 
1822
 See e.g. Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 
2012, at 15, referring to the excluding from the sales factor, the “receipts of a taxpayer other than a securities dealer 
from hedging transactions and from the maturity, redemption, sale, exchange, loan or other disposition of cash or 
securities.” See for a comparison also MTC Reg. IV.18.(c).(3)): “For example, where business income in the form of 
dividends received on stock, royalties received on patents or copyrights, or interest received on bonds, debentures or 
government securities results from the mere holding of the intangible personal property by the taxpayer, the 
dividends and interest shall be excluded from the denominator of the sales factor,” Multistate Tax Commission, 
Allocation and Apportionment Regulations, Adopted February 21, 1973; as revised through July 29, 2010, at 40. 
1823
 See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, 
at16. See also Sec. 402(5) Canadian Income Tax Regulations, which does not include in the gross receipts factor 
“interest on bonds, debentures or mortgages, dividends on shares of capital stock, or rentals or royalties from 
property that is not used in connection with the principal business operations of the corporation.” And see also Sec. 
402(5) Canadian Income Tax Regulations, which does not include in the gross receipts factor “interest on bonds, 
debentures or mortgages, dividends on shares of capital stock, or rentals or royalties from property that is not used in 
connection with the principal business operations of the corporation.” See for a comparison also Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 56, Report and overview of the 
main issues that emerged during the discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007, 
Taxud E1 OP, CCCTB\WP\056\doc\en, Brussels, 20 August 2007, at 8 (par. 28): “The view of two of the experts was 
that financial revenues such as dividends or interests received should not be included in the sales factor,” and 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible 
elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 13 
(par. 50): “Revenues from passive income such as interest, dividends, deemed dividends and royalty should not be 
included, either - unless it represents the revenues accrued in the ordinary course of trade or business (the core 
business).” 
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equivalent planning opportunities in US state income taxation would not arise. As the 
performance of shareholding management functions, treasury functions, cash-pooling 
functions, and the management of hedging positions would be excluded from the sales factor, 
these activities would not affect the profit attribution process. Hence, these also could not be 
utilized for sales factor manipulation purposes. 
Valuation. The sales factor seeks to address the remunerations that the firm receives in return 
for the goods and services that it provides. Accordingly, the factor addresses revenue or 
gross receipts. That would include all receipts from the sales of goods, as well as the receipts 
from the provisions of services, including rentals and royalties, to the extent that these 
services are supplied in the course of the firm’s active business operations. Some 
commentators therefore refer to this factor as the ‘gross receipts factor’,
1824
 the ‘revenue
factor’,
1825
 or the ‘gross revenue factor’.
1826
 Others use the terms ‘gross receipts factor’ and
‘sales factor’ synonymously.
1827
 Since many of the American states refer to it as the ‘sales
factor’ and so does the CCCTB proposal, I will do the same and make use of the term ‘sales 
factor’ also. This merely is for the sake of convenience as I consider the terms basically 
synonyms in substance.
1828
Regardless of the terminology used, it should be noted that the sales factor typically does, 
and in my view also should, refer to the gross amounts that the firm receives from its 
customers for the product provided. Note that receipts from actively held exempt 
shareholdings (dividends, capital gains) would be excluded from the sales factor for the 
reasons set forth in the preceding paragraphs. The same would hold true for the receipts from 
the holding of financial instruments and passively held portfolio investments (hedging 
proceeds, dividends receipts, interests, received lease and licensing payments, et cetera).
1829-
1830
In my view, no adjustment should be made for costs incurred, such as overhead costs and 
costs to sales. It should be kept in mind that the objective of formulary systems is to 
approximate the location of corporate profit, amongst others, by reference to the 
remunerations that the firm receives in return for the product provided, i.e., its outputs. 
Formulary systems make use of a revenue-based approach as a proxy to evaluate the 
attribution of sales to profit generation. Taking into account costs incurred in evaluating the 
sales factor would effectively introduce firm inputs into the evaluation of the factor. Such a ‘net 
outputs approach’ would produce a somewhat confused outcome, double counting firm inputs 
1824
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 52 et seq. 
1825
 See Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold et al (eds.), The 
Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285, et seq., e.g. at 285: “The term “revenue” factor is 
used here to make clear that certain receipts, such as repayments of a loan, are not included in the factor but that the 
factor is substantially broader than the term “sales factor” would suggest”. 
1826
 In Canada, reference is made to the ‘gross revenue factor’. See Sec. 402(4) and (5) Canadian Income Tax 
Regulations. Cf. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 117-118. 
1827
 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 22. Weiner 
refers to UDITPA which defines ‘sales’ as ‘gross receipts’. 
1828
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in Brian J. Arnold 
et al (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003) 245, at 285: “Many of the American states 
refer to this factor as the “sales” factor because the most common items included in the factor are the proceeds from 
sales. Some states use the term “receipts” factor to signal that amounts received as lease payments, royalties, 
payments for services, and such are also included in the factor.” 
1829
 It is noted that some American states, e.g., California, adopt a net-approach with respect to the proceeds the 
selling of short-term portfolio investments through the performing of a treasury function. See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax 
Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis 
Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 237-241, making reference to a California state income tax case 
in which the court required the taxpayer to apply the sales factor on a net basis in this respect. Hellerstein refers to 
Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 39 Cal. 4th 750, 139 P.3d 1169, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (2006). 
1830
 Rather than applying a net-approach the Uniformity Committee Multistate Tax Commission considers the 
exclusion the better approach. See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV - Recommended 
Amendments, 3 May 2012, at 16: “Some states exclude these receipts entirely. Some limit inclusion to net rather than 
gross receipts. If the problem were only distortion, then a limitation to net may be fine. But if there is also a policy 
problem of inconsistency with the purpose of the sales factor, or a practical problem of how to source these treasury 
function receipts, then exclusion may be the better approach. The Committee chose exclusion.” 
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as these would also be recognized under the input factors. Furthermore, the pursuit of a net 
value added approach would require a geographic costs allocation. That would trigger 
intricate issues similar to those in transfer pricing – see further the upcoming paragraphs 
under the header ‘Intermezzo; the ‘value added key at destination’: an ill-featured alternative 
indeed’.
1831
Location. The sales factor seeks to reflect the contribution of demand to income-production. 
Accordingly, it should geographically aim at approximating the sales involved at the location 
where these are utilized or consumed by the customer, i.e., the destination jurisdiction. With 
regards to B2B-sales, the factor would need to be assigned geographically to the location 
where the customer makes use of the goods and services that were provided to it in its 
business process.
1832
 Regarding B2C-sales, the factor would need to be assigned to the
place of final consumption. The approach taken in this respect, accordingly, not only echoes 
the approach taken in the US.
1833
 and Canadian
1834
 formulary systems, and the CCCTB
sharing mechanism,
1835
 but also that in European Union value added taxation,
1836
 and the
US
1837
 and Canadian
1838
 sales tax systems.
A great diversity of keys is referred to in practice and in the literature to localize the firm’s 
customer. However, many do not reflect the destination jurisdiction at all, but, rather make 
use of origin based allocation keys. 
First, many place of sales rules effectively assign the sales factor to the origin jurisdiction 
rather than the destination state. Examples are:  
 the ‘place of the performance of the income-producing activities’ regarding the
provision of services (US);
1839
 the ‘place of the performance of the income-producing activities’ by reference to the
‘costs of performance’, i.e., if these activities are carried out in more than one taxing
jurisdiction (US);
1840
 the place of the customer location, yet, provided that the goods seller operates a
permanent establishment at that place (Canada);
1841
1831
 Cf. Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), 199-220, at 
216. 
1832
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. 
1833
 See, for instance, Article IV.16(a) Multistate Tax Compact, which sets forth the basic rule assigning sales to the 
location of the purchaser. 
1834
 Sec. 402(4) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1835
 See Article 96(1) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). 
1836
 See Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (‘EU-VAT’). 
EU-VAT seeks to locate the tax at the place of final consumption. For discussion and analysis, see European 
Commission, Green Paper; On the future of VAT – Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, 
COM(2010) 695 final, Brussels, 1 December 2010, and Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the future of VAT; Towards a simpler, 
more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the single market, COM(2011) 851 final, Brussels, 6 December 
2011. 
1837
 On the US sales and use tax system, see Neal A. Koskella, ‘The Enigma of Sales Taxation Through the Use of 
State or Federal “Amazon” Laws: Are We Getting Anywhere?’, 49 Idaho Law Review 121 (2012), at 124 et seq. 
1838
 See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 118. “Generally, the gross revenue 
factor measures sales at destination, in line with the Canadian retail sales tax system.” 
1839
 See Article IV.17(a) Multistate Tax Compact: “Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this 
State if (a) the income-producing activity is performed in this State.” Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘Replacing Separate 
Entity Accounting and the Arm's Length Principle with Formulary Apportionment’, 56 Bulletin for international taxation 
568 (2002), criticizes the ‘place of performance rule’ at 595 as being inconsistent with the destination principle. 
1840
 See Article IV.17(b) Multistate Tax Compact: “Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are in this 
State if (b) the income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this State and a greater proportion of the 
income-producing activity is performed in this State than in any other State, based on costs of performance.” Warren 
refers to the using of the ‘‘all or none’’ aspect of the ‘cost of performance rule’ arbitrary. See John S. Warren, 
‘UDITPA – A Historical Perspective’, 38 State Tax Notes 133 (3 October 2005), at 135. 
1841
 See Sec. 402(4)(a) Canadian Income Tax Regulations: “For the purpose of determining the gross revenue for the 
year reasonably attributable to a permanent establishment in a province or country other than Canada, (…) the 
following rules shall apply: (a) where the destination of a shipment of merchandise to a customer to whom the 
merchandise is sold is in the particular province or country, the gross revenue derived therefrom shall be attributable 
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 the place of services rendered, yet, provided that the service provider operates a
permanent establishment at that place (Canada);
1842
 the ‘group member in the Member State where the services are physically carried out’
(CCCTB);
1843
 the ‘group member located in the Member State where dispatch or transport of the
goods to the person acquiring them ends’ (CCCTB);
1844
 the vendor’s site of establishment.
1845
Second, the various throw-back rules effectively assign sales to the origin state as well.
1846
This holds up for those used in the US and Canada, as well as the CCCTB sharing 
mechanism. The throw-back rule in the US Multistate Tax Compact for sales of tangible 
goods, for instance, reapportions the sales of goods to the location from which these have 
been shipped, i.e., if the general rule would assign these sales to the customer location while 
the seller lacks a taxable presence there.
1847
 The Canadian rules reassign gross receipts from
supplies of goods and services in equivalent cases to the location of the corporation’s 
permanent establishment where the person attached to that establishment negotiated the 
contract.
1848
 The CCCTB’s ‘spread throw-back rule’ reassigns the ‘sales to all the group
members in proportion to their labor and asset factors,’ i.e., ‘if there is no group member in 
the Member State where goods are delivered or services are carried out, or if goods are 
delivered or services are carried out in a third country.’
1849
The use of such origin-oriented factor assignment rules is incoherent with the basic 
conception of allocating the sales factor to the destination state. This produces outcomes 
inconsistent with the understanding of attributing sales to the market jurisdiction. Further, it is 
conceptually unnecessary to make use of throw-back rules.
1850
 ‘Nowhere income’ issues can
alternatively be resolved by coordinating nexus and apportionment standards by reference to 
factor presence tests. 
Fortunately, though, there are also various allocation keys available which do seek to assign 
the receipts to the destination jurisdiction. Examples are: 
to the permanent establishment in the province or country.” The requirement of having a permanent establishment 
present transforms the initial destination basis allocation key effectively into an origin key. 
1842
 See Sec. 402(4)(g) Canadian Income Tax Regulations: “where gross revenue is derived from services rendered 
in the particular province or country, the gross revenue shall be attributable to the permanent establishment in the 
province or country.” Again, the requirement of having a permanent establishment present transforms the initial 
destination basis allocation key effectively into an origin key. 
1843
 See Article 96(2) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS): “Supplies of services shall be included in the sales factor of the group member 
located in the Member State where the services are physically carried out.” Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under 
the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB 
Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 229, is critical on the use such a ‘place of performance rule’ in the CCCTB Proposal: 
“Although the place where services are physically carried out may well reflect their destination, in many situations, 
particularly with respect to so-called ‘intangible services, this often will not be the case.” In addition, the assigning to 
the location of the group member effectively transforms the key into an origin key; basically in a manner similar as the 
Canadian system does. 
1844
 Article 96(1) CCCTB Proposal. The location of that group member may well reflect the customer location and with 
that the destination of the sale, this however is not necessarily the case. Again, the assigning to the location of the 
group member effectively transforms the key into an origin key; again, like the Canadian system does. 
1845
 Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For 
Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 53. Garcia also mentions the place of 
establishment of the internet service provider. As this would entail the establishing of a taxable presence of a third-
party, I do not think that such an approach merits consideration.  
1846
 Cf. Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), at 212. 
1847
 See Article IV.16(b) Multistate Tax Compact. 
1848
 See Secs. 402(4)(b), and 402(4)(h) Canadian Income Tax Regulations. 
1849
 See Article 96(4) Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 (CNS). Notably, the third country rule is an expression of the water’s edge limitation. 
1850
 Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can 
Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), argue at 213 that 
the use of a throw-out rule would be more sensible than using a throwback rule as ‘nowhere’ sales would simply be 
ignored under its application rather than assigned to the origin jurisdiction. 
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 the ‘state of the purchaser to which the property is delivered or shipped, regardless of
the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale’ (US);
1851
 the location of the customer to which the services are sold (US);
1852
 the ‘place where the goods are located at the time when the supply takes place’ (EU-
VAT);
1853
 the ‘place where dispatch or transport of the goods to the person acquiring them
ends’ (EU-VAT);
1854
 the ‘place of importation’ (EU-VAT);
1855
 the place of the customer’s ‘business establishment’, ‘permanent address’, or ‘usual
residence’,
1856
 i.e., its tax place of residence (EU-VAT regarding B2B-services);
1857
 the place of the customer’s ‘fixed establishment’, i.e., its permanent establishment
(EU-VAT regarding B2B-services);
1858
 the ‘place where the customer is established, has his permanent address or usually
resides’, i.e., the customer’s tax place of residence (EU-VAT regarding
telecommunication, broadcasting and electronic services);
1859
 the ‘place of effective use and enjoyment of the services’ (EU-VAT).
1860
In my view, the sales factor could best be attributed by approximating the customer location 
as closely as possible. Assessing the available approaches, I would advocate the following 
allocation standards: 
 B2C sales of tangible goods. As a rule, B2C sales of tangible goods would be
assigned to the place where these are located at the time that the economic risks
involving the products pass from the seller to the third-party buyer. If the goods are
1851
 See Article IV.16(a) Multistate Tax Compact: “Sales of tangible personal property are in this State if (a) the 
property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United States Government, within this State regardless 
of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale.” 
1852
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 229 (footnote 46). Notably, 
Hellerstein refers to “a number of states (…) explicitly abandoning the use of this traditional ‘place of performance 
rule’ for a ‘market state’ or customer location rule for assigning receipts from sales of services to the sales factor.” 
Hellerstein also mentions EU-VAT taking a similar approach in this respect. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment 
for the Internal Market (2009), refers to Ohio as a state that moved to sourcing services at destination. 
1853
 See Article 31 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
1854
 That is, to locate intra-European Union acquisitions of goods. See Article 40 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 
November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
1855
 That is, in cases where dispatch or transport of the goods begins outside European Union territories. See Article 
32 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax 
1856
 See Article 44 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax: 
“The place of supply of services to a taxable person acting as such shall be the place where that person has 
established his business. However, if those services are provided to a fixed establishment of the taxable person 
located in a place other than the place where he has established his business, the place of supply of those services 
shall be the place where that fixed establishment is located. In the absence of such place of establishment or fixed 
establishment, the place of supply of services shall be the place where the taxable person who receives such 
services has his permanent address or usually resides.”  
1857
 Cf. Court of Justice, Case C-73/06 (Planzer Luxembourg Sarl). See for a comparison Ana Agúndez-Garcia, 
‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional 
Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation 
& Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 53. Notably, EU-VAT adopts an origin based approach with regards to 
B2C-transactions, see Article 45 Council Directive 2006/112/EC. 
1858
 Ibidem. Worth noting is that the concepts of place of resident and permanent establishment to locate the 
customer in EU VAT are similar to those in international taxation. See also Rebecca Millar, ‘Echoes of Source and 
Residence in VAT Jurisdictional Rules’, Sydney Law School Research Paper 2009:44, and Rebecca Millar, 
‘Intentional and Unintentional Double Non-Taxation Issues in VAT’, Sydney Law School Research Paper 2009:45. 
1859
 See Article 58 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
Notably, with regards to intangible B2C services this destination based place of supply rule currently applies only to 
non-European Union based service providers supplying to European Union customers. Today, an origin based place 
of supply rule applies when EU-based businesses provide such intangible services. For EU-VAT purposes, these 
businesses are currently considered to supply these intangible services at the place of their tax residence, or the 
place where they operate a permanent establishment. However, the scope of the aforementioned destination based 
place of supply rule has been extended to also apply to European Union-based service providers as of 1 January 
2015. See Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008 amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the place 
of supply of services. 
1860
 See Article 59a(a) and (b) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax. This place of supply rule is available for the Member States to apply as a back-stop rule to prevent double 
taxation, non-taxation or distortion of competition. The interpretation of this rule is indistinct though. 
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transported, the sales would be assigned to the place of residence of the customer. 
That is, to approximate its place of consumption.
1861
 Administratively, for this purpose,
one may refer to the customer’s delivery address, or billing address, or alternatively 
its bank or credit card details – e.g., the place of the account used for (online) 
payment, or the customer’s billing address held by the bank involved. 
 B2B sales of tangible goods. B2B sales of tangible goods would be assigned to the
place where these are located at the time that the economic risks involving the
products pass from the seller to the third-party buyer. Administratively, one could
make use of the selling conditions involving the economic risk transfer in the
underlying trading contracts. That would effectively introduce an approach that
matches the applied International Commercial Terms (incoterms) in international
trade (‘Ex Works’, ‘Free on Board’, ‘Delivery Duty Paid’, et cetera). To the extent that
the application of this rule would locate (subsequent) sales in international waters,
those sales would be reapportioned to the place of importation chronologically
succeeding the economic risk transfer.
 B2C supplies of services including intangible sales. B2C supplies of services and
intangible sales (internet, telecommunication, et cetera) would be assigned to the
place where the customer resides. Administratively, drawing inspiration from the
literature and EU-VAT practices, one could refer for this purpose to the customer’s
(billing) address, or the customer’s bank or credit card details.
1862
 With regards to
electronic services provided (internet), reference can be made to the ‘location of the
residential fixed land line through which the service is supplied’.
1863
 One could also
think of using the various available electronic geo-location methods to locate the e-
sale, e.g., the ‘Internet Protocol (IP) address of the device used’, or ‘the Mobile
Country Code (MCC) of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) stored on
the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card that is used by the customer’.
1864
 B2B supplies of services including intangible sales. B2B supplies of services and
intangible sales (internet, telecommunication, et cetera) could be assigned to the
place where the customer functionally utilizes these services in its business process.
To the extent that the customer is active only in a single jurisdiction, the approach
taken would be identical to that regarding B2C services and intangible sales.
To the extent that the customer of the B2B intangible sales transaction operates a 
multijurisdictional business itself and utilizes the services internationally (e.g., cross-
border software licensing contracts), some kind of attribution needs to be undertaken. 
To my knowledge, little guidance is available here. In my view, as it would involve 
third-party transactions, an assessment of the contractual arrangements involved 
would allow coming a long way in identifying the places of functional utilization by the 
customer. The use of electronic geo-location methods may be useful when it 
concerns the provision of e-services. Nevertheless, a back-stop rule may be required 
1861
 See for a comparison,  
Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For 
Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, referring to the place of consumption at 53. 
1862
 See e.g., European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
282/2011 as regards the place of supply of services, COM(2012) 763 final, 2012/0354 (NLE), Brussels, 18 December 
2012. See also Walter Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 425 (1996-1997), at 
497-499, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507 (1996-
1997), at 510. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), referring to Hellerstein, at 1671, and Stefan Mayer, Formulary 
Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 218-219, also referring to Hellerstein. 
1863
 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
282/2011 as regards the place of supply of services, COM(2012) 763 final, 2012/0354 (NLE), Brussels, 18 December 
2012. 
1864
 Ibidem. Worth noting is a recent Dutch VAT ruling rendered by the Amsterdam Tax Court of Appeals involving the 
localization of chat sessions services provided to customers over the internet. The Court upheld the approach taken 
by the respective enterprise of locating the customers for VAT purposes by reference to their credit card details and 
IP-numbers. See Amsterdam Tax Court of Appeals, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 24 May 2012, no. 11/00577, 
Vakstudie-Nieuws 2013/2.22. 
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to counter arbitrage and potential misuse. Drawing inspiration from the ‘place of 
effective use and enjoyment of the services’ rule in EU-VAT, the ‘significant people 
functions’ in international taxation, and the ‘payroll factor’ in formulary apportionment, 
I would advocate using a fractional approach on the basis of which the sales 
regarding that B2B-customer would be assigned geographically by reference to the 
customer’s payroll in such cases. Then, customer payroll would be used to 
proportionally approximate the supplier’s turnover at destination. 
This boils down to the following nexus/allocation sales factor: ‘                   
 
                                    
                      
’.
1865
 Kindly note that the reference to a fraction is needed to deal
with intangibles sales that are utilized in more than one taxing jurisdiction. Incidental sales 
would be disregarded under a de minimis nexus threshold rule equivalent to the distance 
sales rules in EU-VAT. That rule would be defined as ‘nexus if sales state A exceed amount 
$, ¥, or €x’ (e.g., $, ¥, or €50,000), or ‘nexus, alternatively, if the aggregate formula attributes 
more than x% of profits’ (e.g., 25%).
1866
 Notably, the currency used would differentiate per
taxing state – currency issues are discussed hereunder. 
I feel that such an approach would capture the destination state in most cases. For the 
dealing with exceptionalities, inspiration may be drawn from the place of supply rules in EU-
VAT.
1867
 I consider EU-VAT place of supply rules to approximate the destination state
somewhat better than its equivalents in formulary apportionment do. Further, the use of the 
nexus threshold standard will ensure that insignificant selling volumes would not lead to a 
taxable presence. In effect, those sales would be attributed proportionally to the taxing 
jurisdictions in which the taxpayer has a taxable presence. 
That would perhaps effectively come a long way in cancelling out artificial tax base shifting 
through sales factor manipulation. Viz., the shifting of profit through the shifting of the sales 
factor in that event would require a relocation of the multinational’s marketplace, a shift in real 
firm outputs accordingly. Manipulation, for instance, of the sales factor in the CCCTB sharing 
mechanism would be tackled as revenues from portfolio investments, hedging transactions, 
and exempt revenues would be excluded from the sales factor. Factoring inflation by 
engaging into intra-group transactions would be infeasible as intra-group sales would also be 
excluded from the factor. Finally, the risk of inducing artificial tax planning operations involving 
third-party transactions would seem quite remote in my eyes.
1868
1865
 Please note that to the extent the application of the fraction involves a sale that is utilized solely within a single 
state, the application of the fraction with regard to that sale would be 1. 
1866
 The alternative rule would apply if the first mentioned nexus standard has not been met; cf. Multistate Tax 
Commission, Federalism at Risk, A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at Appendix D. 
1867
 See Title V Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
1868
 Within the context of the CCCTB proposal, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
proposed to take out the sales factor from the sharing mechanism for it allegedly being perceived easy to manipulate: 
“An independent sales agent (located in a non-CCCTB State) could be contracted as an intermediary to do the sales 
on behalf of the group to the relevant market, and thereby move the destination of the sales from the ‘intended’ state 
to the state of choice,” Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection for the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)), 25 January 2012. I doubt whether such 
manipulation would arise. I do not see the incentive. The planning would require the undertaking of third-party market 
transactions underlying the tax saving. Without the economic risk passage there would be no third-party sale. The 
intermediary third party would charge a (taxable and allocable) fee for its services as it would bear the economic risk 
involving the performing of its reselling function. That would erode the seller’s profit margin. Furthermore, in cases of 
sales of tangibles such a tax planning operation would likely trigger additional transportation costs. Finally, there still 
is the theory of the firm, i.e., the explaining of the firm’s existence by reference to the economic benefits of 
integration. Such a third-party tax planning operation would require the breaking up of the multinational into 
functionally disintegrated parts among the production-distribution chain. Due to the needed third-party reseller, the 
benefits of integration at that stage in the chain would need to be given up to obtain a tax saving. Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, 
The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 20, note that: “While it is possible that taxpayers may try to avoid 
taxation by using independent distributing agents for their sales, it is unlikely that they would be willing to relinquish 
real control over their marketing and distribution activities, since that is why they are organized in MNE form in the 
first place.” To my knowledge the issue also does not arise in European Union value added taxation. For a similar 
discussion, see Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 52, 
An overview of the main issues that emerged during the discussion on the mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud 
E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 February 2007, at 9 (par. 43), Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 56, Report and overview of the main issues 
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Intermezzo; the ‘value added key at destination’: an ill-featured alternative indeed 
Notably, before wrapping this section up, the following should be mentioned. It has been 
noted in the literature that it may also be considered to geographically attribute value added at 
destination.
1869
 The suggestion basically mirrors the value added at origin proposals
forwarded in the literature mentioned in the above.  
Such a value added key would require taking into account costs incurred at destination, rather 
than the mere gross receipts – the latter being the case at hand under a sales factor. “Such a 
determination would require the attribution of overhead and other costs to sales made to 
various destinations, creating (…) compliance and administrative problems and opening the 
way for manipulation of the attribution of value added.”
1870
 The need to geographically
allocate costs under such a destination-based value added attribution key, firm inputs 
accordingly, would produce issues similar to those under the property factor in formulary 
apportionment and cost attribution in transfer pricing. I can only agree that “[a]pportionment 
based on value added at destination seems to be totally unworkable.”
1871
Notably, analytically similar issues to those set forth in the above paragraph would arise 
under a destination-based cash flow tax discussed in the previous chapter, Chapter 5, section 
7. The operation of a cash flow tax requires a geographic attribution of the firm’s outbound
cash flows – the firm inputs that is. That requires an allocation of inputs equivalent to those 
under a destination based value added key. It accordingly creates issues equivalent to those 
set forth in the above paragraphs as well.  
In my view, the use of gross receipts – firm outputs accordingly – would suffice to attribute tax 
base geographically. Please keep in mind that the aim here is to divide the tax base, not to 
define it. 
6.4.5  Deciding on the matter: towards destination based sales only apportionment 
6.4.5.1 The effects of apportioning to input locations and output locations: real profit 
shifting 
This section addresses the economic implications of formulary apportionment. A known 
property of formulary mechanisms is that they provide an incentive to locate apportionment 
factors in low-taxing jurisdictions.
1872
 The available theoretical literature and empirical
research on formulary systems suggest that in the presence of differentials in effective 
average tax rates, multinationals engage in real profit shifting through factor shifting where tax 
jurisdictions respond by engaging in a tax competition game to attract and preserve 
that emerged during the discussion on the sharing mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007, Taxud E1 OP, 
CCCTB\WP\056\doc\en, Brussels, 20 August 2007, at 10 (par. 37), and Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud 
TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 2007, at 12 (par. 45). See also Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax 
Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis 
Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 237. The Commission cannot accept the Committee’s 
amendments. See Commission Communication on the action taken on opinions and resolutions adopted by 
Parliament at the April 2012 part-session, (SP(2012)388), 30 May 2012. 
1869
 See Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU 
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 199 (2004), 199-220, at 
section 4.4.3. 
1870
 Ibidem, at 216. 
1871
 Ibidem, at 217. 
1872
 See Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221, at 233, and Joann M. Weiner, ‘Using 
the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International 
Level’, 13 Tax Notes International 2113 (23 December 1996), at 2137. See also Opinion of the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB), COM(2011) 121 final – 2011/0058 (CNS), ECO/302, 26 October 2011, at 1.2.6, as well as Albert van der 
Horst et al, ‘Will corporate tax consolidation improve efficiency in the EU?’, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
2007:076/2. 
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investment, employment and sales.
1873
 Also, formulary systems produce tax competition. “[A]s
long as the apportionment mechanism relies on mobile factors under the control of the 
company, FA creates incentives for firms to shift factors across countries to minimize the 
groups' overall tax burden and thereby it may give rise to certain tax competition by 
governments to attract real economic activity into their territories, which may create some 
economic distortions. The potential distortions and economic effects of FA depend on the 
degree of mobility of the factors chosen. In general, the more weight on mobile factors, the 
more likely are the distortions regarding the allocation of factors.”
1874
 Hence, the mobility of
the formula factors drive the mobility – or the elasticity – of the tax base.
1875
It should be noted that the incentives referred to at this point in this study revolve around real 
profit shifting through the shifting of real inputs and outputs. It should be kept in mind that 
these matters do not involve the artificial profit shifting incentives c.q. tax avoidance 
operations.
1876
 These artificialities have already been extensively dealt with in the above
sections. 
To assess the economic implications of formulary mechanisms further, it is helpful to follow 
the various economists who consider the application of apportionment formulae to roughly 
correspond to the imposition of separate taxes on the factors used in the formula – the burden 
of which is shifted to the firm’s workers, owners and customers.
1877
 Seen from that
perspective, the traditional three-factor formula, for instance, would operate like a bundle of 
implicit excise taxes on payroll, assets and sales. The ‘tax-on-factor effect’ would then be 
seen as effectively transforming the corporate tax into a payroll tax, a property tax and a sales 
tax.
1878
 The ‘payroll tax’, the ‘property tax’ and the ‘sales tax’ components would be
considered to be borne respectively by the firm’s workers, owners and customers. From this it 
1873
 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et 
al (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 327-346, Roger Gordon et al, ‘An Examination of 
Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment’, 54 Econometrica 1357 (1986), Austan 
Goolsbee et al, ‘Coveting thy neighbor’s manufacturing: The dilemma of state income apportionment’, 75 Journal of 
Public Economics 125 (2000), at 125-143, Kelly D. Edmiston, ‘Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate 
Income Tax’, 55 National Tax Journal 239 (2002), at 239-262, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The 
Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: 
A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working 
Paper 2006:9, at 5 and 48, Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: 
Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, 
at Chapters 5 and 6, and Thomas C. Omer et al, ‘Competitive, Political, and Economic Factors Influencing State Tax 
Policy Changes’, 26 Journal of the American Taxation Association 103 (2004), at 103-126, who conclude that “that 
state governments compete for capital and jobs and respond to their competitors’ tax policy decisions with 
conforming policy changes”. 
1874
 See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The 
Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 9-
10 (par. 22-23). 
1875
 Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For 
Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 57. 
1876
 See for a comparison Joann M. Weiner, ‘Using the Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in 
Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International Level’, 13 Tax Notes International 2113 (23 December 
1996), at 2137 where she refers to the incentives under formulary systems to shift formula factors to comparatively 
low-taxing jurisdictions. 
1877
 The first to forward this approach has been McLure, Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: 
Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in Henry J. Aaron et al (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980) 327, at 327-346. See 
also, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 12, Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, 
GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 10 (par. 24), Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary 
Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-
General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at Chapter 5, Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; 
The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income 
Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Working Paper 2006:9, at Chapter IV. See finally Kelly D. Edmiston et al, ‘Economic Effects of Apportionment 
Formula Changes: Results from a Panel of Corporate Income Tax Returns’, 34 Public Finance Review 483 (2006), at 
485: “A series of papers in the 1980s established that, to the extent tax rates vary across jurisdictions, formula-
apportioned corporate income taxes are similar in their incidence to a set of implicit excise taxes on the 
apportionment factors (…). That is, the economic effects mimic the effects of sales taxes, payroll taxes, and property 
taxes.” 
1878
 The term ‘tax-on-factor effect’ has been taken from Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal 
Market (2009), at 263. 
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would follow that, in the presence of effective tax rate differentials, there is an incentive for 
firms to localize the factors in the comparatively low taxing jurisdiction. That would incentivize 
countries to respond by reducing the effective tax rate to attract these factors to their 
territories. 
The question of whether a formulary apportionment mechanism indeed transforms the 
corporate tax economically into excise taxes on the formula factors, in my view, depends, first 
on the question of whether the tax is actually borne by these factors in proportion to their 
weighting under the formula used. Indeed, the excise effect has been observed in the 
empirical literature.
1879
 However, it remains uncertain whether the tax is necessarily always
borne by the factors in the formula. At the end of the day, the tax incidence in a particular 
scenario is unknown as this depends on the relative elasticity in supply and demand in the 
respective markets involving the factors used.
1880
 It is not a given that the corporate tax is
actually and necessarily borne by the firm’s workers, owners and customers in proportion to 
the factor weighting. The incidence depends on the given price elasticity in the labor markets, 
the capital markets and the customer markets at a given time and place. It follows that the 
hypothesis that the tax in terms of tax incidence operates as an excise tax holds only under 
the assumption that the tax is proportionally borne by the factors in the formula – an 
assumption which, to my understanding, cannot be validated; at least, not until today. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the theoretical merits of the ‘excise tax effect’, the available 
empirical evidence, as said, does suggest multinational factor shifting and country tax 
competition responses. 
Furthermore, second, it should be kept in mind that formulary apportionment divides the tax 
base; it does not define it. The tax remains a corporate tax on rents, regardless of its 
apportioning and incidence. “[T]ax liabilities do not arise unless an MNE is earning profits 
worldwide.”
1881
 “In this sense, a tax on capital is a tax on capital is a tax on capital.”
1882
Out of the available factors, the asset factor is generally considered the most mobile formula 
factor. This is because firms have full control over where to geographically locate these 
inputs.
1883
 The labor factor is considered relatively less mobile, since it is less controllable by
the firm. That is regardless of the fact that the labor factor still may be considered controllable 
to a certain extent because of the multinational firm’s economic power over its workforce and 
is, hence, mobile to a certain extent as well. The discussions in current transfer pricing 
practice on the allocation of location savings involving the shifting of production to low wage 
cost countries
1884
 suggests by inference that firms do have some control on the geographic
1879
 See Kelly D. Edmiston et al, ‘Economic Effects of Apportionment Formula Changes: Results from a Panel of 
Corporate Income Tax Returns’, 34 Public Finance Review 483 (2006), at 483-504, and Austan Goolsbee et al, 
‘Coveting thy neighbor’s manufacturing: The dilemma of state income apportionment’, 75 Journal of Public 
Economics 125 (2000), at 125-143. 
1880
 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘Thoughts on the Future Of the State Corporate Income Tax’, 25 State 
Tax Notes 931 (23 September 2002), at 936-938, and Peter Harris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or 
Russian Roulette?’, in Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 
, 271-297, at 278. 
1881
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary 
Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 14. 
1882
 See Peter Mieszkowski et al, ‘The National Effects of Differential State Corporate Income Taxes on Multistate 
Corporations’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary 
Combination (1984) 253, at 257. Mieszkowski and Morgan argue that a tax on capital returns, on balance, remains 
such a tax under a formulary approach in the presence of tax rate differentials, i.e., despite the locational distortions. 
1883
 Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For 
Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 52, and Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, 
GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 10 (par. 24). 
1884
 On location savings and the question as to which jurisdiction to allocate them, see 26 CFR 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(C) for 
the implications under US international tax law, and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 2010, Chapter IX, at par. 9.148-9.153, for the OECD’s views on the matter. 
For some analysis, see Steven N. Allen et al, ‘Location Savings – A US Perspective’, 4 International Transfer Pricing 
Journal 158 (2004), at 158-164. All basically agree that the allocation of the location savings depends on the relative 
bargaining position of the parties involved in the transaction. Accordingly, the economic benefits of the location 
savings accrue to the party with the most bargaining power, for instance, as derived from that party’s non-routine 
intangible asset ownership. For a comparison see UN Practical Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries, 
that tends to assign location savings to the low wage cost country. For some reading and analysis on the impact of 
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localization of their workforce.
1885
 The sales at destination factor is generally considered the
least mobile formula factor, since – according to economic theory – sales are immobile 
because the demand curve is driven by the market, and lies outside the firm’s control for that 
reason.
1886
 “Firms have no control over where customers are located.”
1887
Available analyses suggest that the tax indeed is quite likely to be borne by the least mobile 
and economically least powerful market parties involved.
1888
 In view of that, it seems to follow
that the firm’s workers and consumers are likely to end up bearing the tax.
1889
 “FA may
therefore have some incidence effects on workers and consumers if greater weight is 
assigned to labour or 'sales by destination' respectively.” To which extent would things differ 
from the current SA/ALS system in international taxation? I am not sure.
1890
 The current
international tax system seeks to geographically localize taxable profit basically by reference 
to the place where the ‘significant people functions’ are performed, i.e., the jurisdiction of 
origin where the firm’s workers conduct the firm’s business activities. I can imagine that, 
under the current approach, the effective corporate tax burden ends-up being shifted to these 
‘significant people’ as well, perhaps producing an incidence pattern comparable with that 
under the labor factor in formulary apportionment. Matters do not seem too dissimilar to that 
extent, analytically that is, particularly considering the conceptual resemblances between 
‘significant people functions’ and ‘payroll-FA’ already identified in the above.
1891
 This,
however, is not further discussed. 
Available analyses further reveal the following effects. With regards to the origin-based firm 
inputs factors, it has been found that the comparative reduction by taxing jurisdictions of the 
weights put on the payroll factor and the asset factor (relative to sales factor weight 
decreases) has the effect of attracting and stimulating (new) employment and (new) 
investment in the respective taxing jurisdiction involved.
1892
 Weight increases on these factors
the manual for China, see Glenn DeSouza, ‘What the UN Manual Really Means for China’, 41 Intertax 331 (2013), at 
331-338. 
1885
 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 60, CCCTB: 
possible elements of the sharing mechanism, Taxud TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, Brussels, 13 November 
2007, at 12 (par. 45) 
1886
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 717, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming 
Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project 
Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 12, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), 
Working Paper No. 47, The Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, 
Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 8 (par. 17), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB 
WG), Working Paper No. 52, An overview of the main issues that emerged during the discussion on the mechanism 
for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1 AAG-GR-FF, CCCTB\WP\052\doc\en, Brussels, 27 February 2007, at 11 (par. 50). 
1887
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 32. 
1888
 Cf. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), Working Paper No. 47, The 
Mechanism for sharing the CCCTB, Taxud E1, GR/FF, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en, Brussels, 17 November 2006, at 10 
(par. 24). 
1889
 See e.g., Clemens Fuest et al, ‘Which workers bear the burden of corporate taxation and which firms can pass it 
on? Micro evidence from Germany’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 2012:16. The 
authors provide empirical evidence on the wage incidence of the German Gewerbesteuer levied at municipal level. 
They find that it takes up to two years for the corporate tax burden to be (partly) shifted to labor. The burden seems to 
be largely borne by incumbent workers; vulnerable workers (low-skilled workers, women, part-time workers and 
individuals with ‘low firm specific tenure’) share a relatively higher tax burden. See also Dietmar Wellisch, ‘Taxation 
under Formula Apportionment - Tax Competition, Tax Incidence, and the Choice of Apportionment Factors’, 60 
FinanzArchiv 24 (2004), at 24-41, who argues that a payroll-only formula is borne by the firm’s workers. A sales-only 
formula would shift the burden to the consumer. 
1890
 For some analysis, see Roger Gordon et al, ‘An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation 
under Formula Apportionment’, 54 Econometrica 1357 (1986), at 1357-1373, and Søren Bo Nielsen et al, ‘Tax 
Spillovers under Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment’, EPRU Working Paper Series 2001:07. 
1891
 The resemblance has also been identified by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and 
Prospects; Promoting Better International tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary 
Alternative’, 3 World Tax Journal 371 (2011), at 393. 
1892
 On the effects on the reducing of weights on the payroll factor, see Austan Goolsbee et al, ‘Coveting thy 
neighbor’s manufacturing: The dilemma of state income apportionment’, 75 Journal of Public Economics 125 (2000), 
at 125-143. On the effects of reducing the weight on the property factor, see Sanjay Gupta et al, ‘The Effect of State 
Income Tax Apportionment and Tax Incentives on New Capital Expenditures’, 25 Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 1 (2003), at 1-25, and Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European 
Union: Insights from the United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 
2005:8, at Chapter 5. 
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reduce the demand for labor and capital in these jurisdictions.
1893
 The assignment of tax base
to the jurisdiction(s) of origin, thus, is not neutral towards the decision as to where to 
geographically locate production.
1894
 Canada, for instance, operates a two factor payroll-sales
formula excluding the asset factor from the formula, thereby eliminating the direct location 
distortion to the production factor of capital.
1895
 The exclusion of payroll would eliminate the
location distortion to the production factor of labor.
1896
 Sales-only apportionment promotes
neutrality towards the decision as to where to locate production factors.
1897
With regards to the destination-based firm outputs factor the following effects arise. It has 
been found that the inclusion, comparatively, of relative weight increases on the sales factor 
relative to the reduction of weights put on the input factors have the effect of attracting and 
stimulating (new) employment and (new) investment in the respective taxing jurisdiction 
involved.
1898
 Sales factor weight increases, however, push relative commodity prices in the
taxing state upwards, whereas weight decreases lowers them, relatively that is.
1899
 The sales
factor accordingly affects the decisions as to where to sell. The sales factor promotes 
production factor neutrality.
1900
 A domestic investment “would not be advantaged or
disadvantaged compared to an investment abroad, and all multinationals that sell [locally] or 
[abroad] would be taxed on an equal basis, whether they are considered to be [“national”] or 
“foreign”.”
1901
 Sales only apportionment, however, does not produce market neutrality – which
calls for neutrality in deciding where to both produce and sell – as it would distort the selling 
location.
1902
Regardless of this, it has been argued in the literature that firms still have an incentive under 
the sales factor to sell as much product as possible, even in jurisdictions putting a relatively 
1893
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 48. Garcia, referring to Wellisch, notes that 
this explains the hostile attitude of unions towards payroll-FA – taking into mind the incidence on employment. 
1894
 Cf. Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base 
For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 49 and 52. 
1895
 See Joann M. Weiner, ‘Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the 
United States and Canada’, Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Taxation Paper 2005:8, at 17. 
1896
 See for a comparison Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A 
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 14. 
1897
 See e.g. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 267: “if a destination-based 
receipts factor is used in the apportionment formula, the portion of profits allocated according to that factor will be 
distributed irrespective of the place where the enterprise has established itself. As far as this amount is concerned, 
the enterprise will not benefit from moving activities to a jurisdiction with a lower tax rate, which will reduce the 
incentive effect of rate differentials and therefore the effects of tax competition,” and Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation 
Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate 
Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs 
Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 52: “thus the distortions from destination taxes will generally be smaller than those 
from origin taxes (i.e., a sales by destination factor complies better with the neutrality criterion). Greater relative 
weight on the sales factor would increase the excise tax effect on sales and reduce it on payroll and property, which 
is likely to create smaller overall efficiency costs from corporate taxation.” 
1898
 See Bharat Anand et al, ‘The weighting game: formula apportionment as an instrument of public policy’, 53 
National Tax Journal 183 (2000)’, at 183-199, and Roger Gordon et al, ‘An Examination of Multijurisdictional 
Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment’, 54 Econometrica 1357 (1986), at 1357-1373. Gordon and 
Wilson refer to an effect that they call ‘cross-hauling’, i.e., the incentive to shift production towards the jurisdiction that 
puts a relatively higher tax burden on sales, and the incentive to shift sales towards the jurisdiction that puts a 
relatively higher tax burden on payroll and assets (and conversely to the extent that the relative burdens are lower). 
1899
 See Peter Mieszkowski et al, ‘The National Effects of Differential State Corporate Income Taxes on Multistate 
Corporations’, in Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary 
Combination (1984) 253, at 254. 
1900
 See e.g., Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (2009), at 267: “(…) if a destination-
based factor is used in the apportionment formula, the portion of profits allocated according to that factor will be 
distributed irrespective of the place where the enterprise has established itself. As far as this amount is concerned, 
the enterprise will not benefit from moving activities to a jurisdiction with a lower tax rate, which will reduce the 
incentive effect of rate differentials (…).” 
1901
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, 58 Tax 
Notes 1511 (15 March 1993), referring to the US as the domestic jurisdiction. 
1902
 The term market neutrality has been derived from Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: 
economic principles and tax policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 700, 707 
and 716. Devereux argues that global optimality or market neutrality requires full harmonization across countries. 
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higher weight on the sales factor.
1903
 Economic ratio dictates that firms would still want to sell
in high-tax sales-only FA jurisdictions to serve their customers to the extent that business is 
profitable.
1904
 Such an incentive to sell regardless of the presence of a factor taxing it is
absent at the supply side regarding the payroll and asset factors. That is, because each 
currency value in tax savings at the supply side that is achieved by the shift of inputs to the 
comparatively lower taxing jurisdiction commercially equals a cost savings. Only a zero tax 
burden on firm inputs cancels out this incentive. Accordingly, the locational distortions at the 
demand side (outputs) seem less significant relative to the distortions at the supply side 
(inputs), theoretically that is. 
All in all, it seems that “[l]abor, capital and consumers in high-tax state(s) are “taxed” as the 
result of the higher rates of corporate tax. In contrast, factors of production and consumers in 
nontaxing states are “subsidized” by apportionment. From an overall (…) perspective, the 
local effects of apportionment tend to cancel each other out.”
1905
 Accordingly, “as long as tax
rates continue to differ across (…) [s]tates, economic inefficiencies will exist under formulary 
apportionment.”
1906
 It has therefore been argued that from a global welfare optimization
perspective, taxing jurisdictions would fare optimally under a harmonized approach where all 
taxing jurisdictions involved would apply identical systems under identical tax rates.
1907
 That
would, however, encounter tax sovereignty issues; these are discussed as a separate matter 
in section 6.4.5.4. 
6.4.5.2 Towards destination-based sales-only apportionment 
In the presence of effective tax rate differentials – a non-harmonized tax environment – it has 
been observed that taxing jurisdictions would serve their economic self-interest best if they 
adopt a single destination-based sales-only formula.
1908
 Sales-only formulae are generally
seen as effective economic development tools.
1909
 They incentivize domestic investment and
employment and accordingly promote economic growth and job creation. From the 
perspective of an origin oriented taxing jurisdiction, e.g., under SA/ALS or payroll-assets 
formulary apportionment, the sales at destination-oriented taxing jurisdiction would appear as 
a production tax haven to which the origin jurisdiction loses employment and investment, i.e., 
as the latter would not tax domestic inputs.
1910
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Insights from the United States and Canada’, European Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union 
Working paper 2005:8, at 43 referring to Marcel Gérard et al, ‘Cross-Border Loss Offset and Formulary 
Apportionment: How do they Affect Multijurisdictional Firm Investment Spending and Interjurisdictional Tax 
Competition?’, CESIfo Working Paper 2003:1004. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, 
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (1990-2000), at 1604-1606. 
1907
 See for a comparison Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax 
policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 700, 707 and 716. The similar argument 
has been used to advocate using uniform formulae in US state taxation, see Bharat Anand et al, ‘The weighting 
game: formula apportionment as an instrument of public policy’, 53 National Tax Journal 183 (2000), at 183-199, as 
well as Austan Goolsbee et al, ‘Coveting thy neighbor’s manufacturing: The dilemma of state income apportionment’, 
75 Journal of Public Economics 125 (2000), at 125-143. See for a comparison Joann M. Weiner, ‘Using the 
Experience in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International Level’, 
13 Tax Notes International 2113 (23 December 1996) who refers to the investment location distortions that arise 
under the present non-harmonization of state formulae in the US. 
1908
 See Kelly D. Edmiston, ‘Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax’, 55 National Tax Journal 
239 (2002), at 239-262, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal 
to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 13. 
1909
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 56. 
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 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 21. 
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If one state introduces a destination-based taxable profit attribution system, this creates an 
incentive for other states to establish a conforming tax policy, abolishing their origin-oriented 
tax attribution systems to introduce a destination-based system as well. “[I]f some countries 
adopt sales-based formulas, other countries will have an incentive to adopt sales-based 
formulas as well, in order to avoid losing payroll or assets to countries in which these factors 
are not part of the formula.” “[O]nce one state has made that move, it is in every state’s 
interest to move to a single-factor formula.
1911
 (…) [T]he result will be that all states use a
destination-based sales formula.”
1912
 This is not just theory. Experiences in US state income
taxation reveal an impressive trend for US states to increase the weight on the sales factor 
ever since the US Supreme Court constitutionally validated sales-only apportionment in the 
case of Moorman.
1913
 The rush towards sales-only apportionment in US state income taxation
continues today.
1914
So, which approach should be chosen from a welfare economics perspective: origin, 
destination or a combination thereof? Following the various eminent economists I would favor 
adopting a destination-based tax base division approach.
1915
 A destination based corporate
tax system would promote a global efficient and non-discriminatory allocation of resources. 
The allocation of firm rents to the market jurisdiction under such a system would accordingly 
eliminate the incentives to shift taxable profit by shifting controllable firm inputs across tax 
borders. Under a destination based allocation, “firms would have no incentive to shift income 
across countries because tax liabilities would be based on total world income as well as on 
the share of a firm’s sales that occur in each destination. Since there would be no tax savings 
associated with shifting income across countries, the overall incentive to locate real activities 
in low-tax countries would also be reduced.”
1916
 Taxing rents at destination would accordingly
reduce the tax distorted multinational decision-making as to where to invest, i.e., relative to 
the current origin-oriented international tax regime. 
Furthermore, a destination-based allocation of firm rents would likely reduce the elasticity – or 
mobility – of the tax base relative to the current system. In the presence of rate differentials, a 
destination-based tax base division would remain to distort the sales locations; i.e., market 
neutrality would not be achieved since a comparatively lower taxing jurisdiction, as said, 
would be relatively more attractive to sell (firm’s perspective) and buy (customer’s 
perspective). Yet, the tax base would be relatively inelastic since firms would be unable to 
significantly affect the demand-side.
1917
 Customers are considerably less mobile than the
firm’s assets and workforce.
1918
 In addition, as said, firms “have an incentive to encourage
1911
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‘Unitary taxation with combined reporting: The TP solution?’, International Tax Review (2013), 25 April 2013, at 2-5. 
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 Century (2008), Alan J. 
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sales in each market in order to serve the customers there.”
 1919
 “Even in a high-tax country,
firms still have an incentive to sell as much as possible.”
1920
 The immobility of the tax base
may accordingly significantly mitigate both multinational profit shifting incentives and country 
tax competition responses. 
The ideal would be to adopt a destination-based tax base attribution approach on a 
coordinated basis, e.g., on a global scale under the umbrella of the United Nations,
1921
 or
regionally, at the levels of the North American Free Trade Association and the European 
Union. “If the formula is adopted worldwide, it will by definition not distort investment location 
decisions (…), and can even encourage open markets and free trade.”
1922
 “Given that the EU
is already pursuing the possibility of FA within Europe, a natural forum for reaching 
international consensus on these issues would be the OECD. With international cooperation, 
the possibility of double or non-taxation would be reduced and there would be less room for 
MNEs to respond strategically to variations in country formulas.”
1923
Also, in the event that it would be impossible to attain a consensus to introduce a destination-
based tax base attribution, I would still argue for individual states to move towards assigning 
the tax base geographically to the market state as it would likely boost domestic 
competitiveness, attracting investment and employment, and driving economic growth as a 
consequence. As said, “states assigning relatively greater weight to the sales factor (versus 
payroll and property) will be a more attractive place to locate the property and payroll for 
business enterprises that produce within that state and export to another states (the tax 
burden of those firms within the jurisdiction is reduced), whilst the tax burden of firms that 
produce in other states and import into that state is increased.”
1924
Moreover, as said, if one country would move to a destination-based corporate tax system, 
particularly if that would be a major producing country, others would likely follow suit. That 
also is “[b]ecause of the widespread belief that imposing taxes on imports and exempting 
exports boosts national competitiveness and reduces trade deficits.”
1925
 Exemplary for the
‘built-in incentive’ for introducing sales-only apportionment is the internationally widespread 
adoption of destination-based value added tax systems since the 1960s. It may be argued 
that this “provides a good example of how tax innovations can spread without a coordinating 
supranational agency or world tax organization, simply on the basis of countries’ perception of 
their self-interest.”
1926
Analogous to the trends in US state income taxation, the end-result would likely be a 
worldwide adoption of sales-based corporate tax systems. Interestingly, the equilibrium 
reached would be identical to a transformation to destination based taxing systems under an 
internationally coordinated approach. The outcome would be an international tax regime 
providing for a globally efficient allocation of resources, i.e., a taxing system which fits the 
reality of the global economy. The downside of relying on unilateral activism, however, is the 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 56-57, and Marcel Gérard, 
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 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 14. 
1920
 Ibidem, at 12. 
1921
 See e.g., Vito Tanzi, ‘Is there a need for a World Tax Organization?’, in Assaf Razin et al (eds.),The economics of 
globalization: policy perspectives from public economics, Cambridge University Press, 1999, at 173-186. See for a 
comparison also Jack M. Mintz, ‘The Role of Allocation in a Globalized Corporate Income Tax’, International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/98/134, 1998, at Section VI. 
1922
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation’, 58 Tax 
Notes 1511 (15 March 1993). 
1923
 Ibidem, at 21. 
1924
 See Ana Agúndez-Garcia, ‘Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax 
Base For Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review Of Issues and Options’, European Commission 
Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union Working Paper 2006:9, at 56. 
1925
 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, ‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment’, The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007:08, at 13. 
1926
 Ibidem, at 13. 
418
creation of double (non-)taxation issues in the transitional period. Therefore, international 
coordination, in my view, would be first-best.
1927
As regards the revenue effects, a transformation from an origin-based to a destination-based 
system may entail a redistribution of tax revenues across countries. Matters would be hard, if 
not impossible to predict, though, as the distributional effects would depend on various future 
behavioral effects, both from the perspectives of the multinationals and the taxing jurisdictions 
involved.
1928
 What can be said though is that the question of which countries would gain and
which would lose seems to depend on the corporate sales to corporate income ratios, ceteris 
paribus. “The current tax-haven countries would likely experience large reductions in 
revenues. (…) In general, with the adoption of FA, high-tax countries would likely gain 
revenue at the expense of low-tax countries because high-tax countries tend to have higher 
shares of local corporate sales relative to corporate income.”
1929
6.4.5.3 The effects of currency exchange results under the advocated system 
One aspect that has not yet been assessed in this study is the impact of currency exchange 
rate mutations and interest rate mutations on the operation of the advocated system under a 
destination based sales only apportionment mechanism. The effects of currency exchange 
rates on formulary systems have occasionally been assessed in the literature; that is, in the 
presence of a common return to equity-based tax base definition.
1930
 However, to my 
knowledge, matters have not yet been looked into as regards the combined effects of 
mutations of currency exchange rates and interest rates where it involves a destination-based 
division of firm rents for tax purposes. That is, a formulary approach in the presence of a tax 
base definition that makes use of an allowance for corporate equity (‘ACE’). Further, under 
the advocated system, double tax relief would be granted by reference of a credit for the 
domestic tax that is attributable to the foreign income, i.e., the Dutch-style tax exemption 
mechanism that has been advocated in Chapter 3. 
Perhaps it is worthy to scrutinize at this place the effects of currency exchange rate mutations 
under such a taxation model. To my knowledge, this study is the first to perform such an 
assessment. Interestingly, an assessment of the advocated system reveals that it seems that 
it would operate neutral in regards to the allocation of firm inputs, also in the presence of 
movements in currency and exchange rates. Accordingly, the system would not distort 
investment location decisions, even in the presence of exchange rate and interest rate 
mutations. That, at least, is the hypothesis. 
1927
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The effects of movements in currency exchange rates and interest rates may perhaps be 
appropriately explained by means of some numerical examples adhering to a ‘Base Case’ 
environment and a ‘Test Case’ environment. The Base Case sets the scene: no interest rate 
and currency exchange rate mutations arise during the taxing period. Interest rate and 
currency exchange rate mutations are introduced in the Test Case. The movements in the 
rates in the Test Case relative to those in the Base Case are deduced by reference to the 
assumption of interest rate parity theory to hold.
1931
 Interest rate parity theory suggests that
the interest rate at a certain time in a given country (Country A) equals the interest rate in a 
given foreign country (Country B) plus/minus the expected rate of depreciation/appreciation of 
the currency of the first-mentioned country (Country A) over a given period. The intuition 
underlying interest rate parity theory is that in a perfect capital market, a risk-averse investor 
would be indifferent as to the available interest rates on deposits in countries because the 
exchange rates between those countries are expected to adjust such that the deposit returns 
are equal. 
Let us assume that the following scenarios apply. Notably, all currency exchange rates and 
interest rates are a given, except for the dollar interest rate in the Test Case environment; this 
rate is deduced by applying interest rate parity theory (figs. 83 and 84). 
Fig. 83. Base Case environment: no mutations in currency exchange rate and interest rate 
T0: Jan1. Y01 €/$ exch. rate Int. rate T0-T1 €/$ exch. rate T1: 31 Dec. Y 01 
Investment (equity 
financed) 
(given) 
1/1 spot rate 
(given) (given) 
31/12 spot rate  
1/1 forward rate 
(given) 
Investment return 
(return to equity) 
(deduced)  
€1,000.00 1.00 * 1.04 (4%) 1.00 €1,040.00 
$1,250.00 1.25 * 1.04 (4%) 1.25 $1,300.00 
Fig. 84. Test Case environment: mutations in currency exchange rate and interest rate 
T0: Jan1. Y01 €/$ exch. rate Int. rate T0-T1 €/$ exch. rate T1: 31 Dec. Y 01 
Investment (equity 
financed) 
(given) 
1/1 spot rate 
(given) 
(€ rate given)  
($ rate deduced) 
31/12 spot rate  
1/1 forward rate 
(given) 
Investment return 
(return to equity) 
(deduced)  
€1,000.00 1 * 1.02 (2%) 1 €1,020.00 
$1,250.00 1.25 * 1,0608
(6.08%)
1932
1.30 $1,326.00 
To assess the effects of the advocated system in the Base Case and Test Case environments 
in a numerical example, please let us return to the investment of our fictitious multinational 
Ben Johnson Dinghy Selling Company. Let us assume that Johnson is operational in two 
countries, selling dinghies in Country A and Country B. Country A uses the euro (€), Country 
B uses the US Dollar ($). 
1931
 See on interest rate parity, John M. Keynes, A tract on monetary reform (1924), Robert Z. Aliber, ‘The Interest 
Rate Parity Theorem: A Reinterpretation’, 81 Journal of Political Economy 1451 (1973), at 1451-1459, Pierre-Alexis 
Cosandier et al, ‘Interest Rate Parity Tests; Switzerland and some Major Western Countries’, 5 Journal of Banking 
and Finance 187 (1981), at 187-200, as well as Alex Luiz Ferreira et al, ‘Does the real interest rate parity hypothesis 
hold? Evidence for developed and emerging markets’, 26 Journal of International Monetary and Finance 364 (2007), 
at 364-382. To the extent that interest rate parity theory holds, the dollar ($) return on dollar ($) deposits equals the 
euro (€) return on (€) deposits multiplied with the following fraction:                               ⁄ . (1 + i$) = (1 + i€) 
* (   ). 
1932
 1,000 * 1,02 = 1,020.00. 1,020 * 1.30 = 1,326.00.            ⁄  = 1.0608. 1,250 * 1.0608 = 1,326.00. 
     
    ⁄  = 
1,020.00.          ⁄  = 1,000.00. It is noted that in a real-world environment today’s forward rates and future spot 
rates are not identical. That would imply that future spot rates could be forecasted. And that, of course, is impossible 
as future developments in the capital markets cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, these rates are put on par for the 
purpose of the analysis for the following reason. A differential between today’s forward rate and the future spot rate – 
seen from a hindsight perspective – is the consequence of a market development rather than taxation. For the matter 
being analytically separate from taxation, it allows me to analytically exclude the implications of future market 
developments from the analysis. The point made is that movements in currency and exchange rates would not be 
affected under the advocated tax system. To the extent that future rates would diverge from today’s forward rate, 
such a differential would be appreciated accordingly by the tax implications under the advocated system. A 
differential in the forward rate and future spot rate involved would imply a corresponding differential in the tax effect 
involved. And so would a putting of the rates on par, allowing the analytical simplification for the current assessment. 
As the differential is not caused by taxation in a no-tax environment, it is not necessary to include it in the analysis if 
taxation is put into the equation. It would merely complex matters rather than alter things substantially. 
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At a certain moment in time (T0), Johnson undertakes an equity investment in a dinghy sales 
venture. Let us assume that Johnson’s inputs account for €1,000. Accordingly: 
 Johnson’s inputs for tax purposes from the perspective of Country A account for
€1,000.
 Johnson’s inputs for tax purposes from the perspective of Country B account for
$1,250 (given spot rate 1:1.25).
 Notably, the investment location is irrelevant for tax purposes, since the advocated
system divides tax base by reference to sales at destination. Further, if Johnson were
to invest in diverging currencies, matters would not analytically alter either.
1933
At a certain later moment in time (T1), Johnson sells its product in Countries A and B to 
customers Y and Z (investment return). Let us assume that Johnson’s outputs are as follows: 
 Johnson’s outputs on T1 in Country A equal €1,080 (sales to customer Y);
 Johnson’s outputs on T1 in Country B equal $1,350 (sales to customer Z).
Further, the given tax rate in Country A equals 25%, the Country B tax rate is 30% (rate 
disparity), respectively 25% (rate parity).  
The effects of currency exchange rate and interest rate mutations in the system may be 
illustrated best by reference to four scenarios, the first two of which refer to the Base Case 
environment (no mutations), the latter two to the Test Case environment (mutations). 
 The first scenario (no mutations) and third scenario (mutations) set forth the effects of
the tax system if no ACE applies, i.e., the effects under the application of a system
that makes use of a common return to equity-based corporate income tax base
definition.
 The second scenario (no mutations) and fourth scenario (mutations) set forth the
effects of the tax system where an ACE applies for tax base calculation purposes,
i.e., the effects under the application of the advocated tax system, taxing firm rents at
destination. Accordingly, the second and fourth scenario system addresses the 
effects under the advocated system in the absence and presence of mutations in 
currency exchange rates and interest rates. 
This accordingly produces the following four outcomes: 
1) Base Case, no mutations, no ACE (conventional corporate income tax basis) – fig.
85;
2) Base Case, no mutations, ACE (rents as tax base, i.e., the benchmark) – fig. 86;
3) Test Case, mutations, no ACE (conventional corporate income tax basis) – fig. 87;
4) Test Case, mutations, ACE (rents as tax base, i.e., the advocated system; testing
hypothesis) – fig. 88.
Fig. 85. Scenario 1) Base Case: no mutations in interest rate and currency exchange rate; no ACE 
No ACE  
No mutations – assumption a) 
Country A (€) 
(Tax rate: 25%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate: 30%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate 25%) 
Worldwide Inputs (I) 1,000.00 1,250.00 1,250.00 
Worldwide Outputs (O) 2,160.00
1934
2,700.00
1935
2,700.00
1936
Worldwide Profits (P) 1,160.00
1937
1,450.00
1938
1,450.00
1939
1933
 Would Johnson’s inputs, for instance, amount to €400 and $750, the inputs for tax purposes from the perspective 
of Country A would equal €1,000. That is, since $750 converts into €600, at the given €/$ currency exchange rate of 
1: 1.25 on T0, producing the Country A inputs of €400 + €600 = €1,000.00. The inputs for tax purposes from the 
perspective of Country B would equal $1,250. That is, since €400 converts into $500, at the given €/$ currency 
exchange rate of 1: 1.25 on T0, producing the Country B inputs of $750 + $500 = $1,250.00. 
1934
 1,080 +          ⁄  = 2,160.00. 
1935
 1,350 + 1,080 * 1.25 = 2,700.00. 
1936
 1,350 + 1,080 * 1.25 = 2,700.00. 
1937
 2,160.00 -/- 1,000.00 = 1,160.00. 
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(P = O -/- I) 
Tax (T) 
(Tax on worldwide profits; T = P*T) 
290.00
1940
435.00
1941
362.50
1942
Double tax relief Country A (DTR
A
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
145.00
1943
n/a n/a 
Double tax relief Country B (DTR
B
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
n/a 217.50
1944
181.25
1945
Tax Payable 
(TP = T -/- double tax relief) 
€145.00
1946
$217.50
1947
$181.25 
(€145.00)
1948
The calculations in this table reveal that in the Base Case environment (no mutations) the 
system (corporate income tax basis) produces a 50-50 allocation of Johnson’s worldwide 
profit at destination. The system implicitly allocates Johnson’s costs on a 50-50 basis also, 
i.e., as the cost allocation effectively follows the sales allocation. The system allocates profit
at destination. 
Johnson’s sales in Country A worth €1,080.00 correspond with 50% of Johnson’s worldwide 
sales worth €2,160.00, i.e., from the perspective of Country A. The tax payable in Country A 
equals €145.00. This produces an effective average tax rate of 25% on 50% of Johnson’s 
profit attributed to Country A territories by reference to Johnson’s profits that are destined for 
Country A. 
Johnson’s sales in Country B worth $1,350.00 correspond with 50% of Johnson’s worldwide 
sales worth $2,700.00, i.e., from the perspective of Country B. The tax payable in Country B 
respectively equals $217.50 (30% tax rate) and $181.25 (25% tax rate). This produces an 
effective average tax rate of, respectively 30% and 25% on 50% of Johnson’s profit attributed 
to Country B territories by reference to Johnson’s profits that are destined for Country B. 
Fig. 86. Scenario 2) Base Case: no mutations in interest rate and currency exchange rate; ACE 
ACE 
No mutations – assumption a) 
Country A (€) 
(Tax rate: 25%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate: 30%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate 25%) 
Worldwide Inputs (I) 1,040.00
1949
1,300.00
1950
1,300.00
1951
Worldwide Outputs (O) 2,160.00
1952
2,700.00
1953
2,700.00
1954
Worldwide Rents (R) 
(R = O -/- I) 
1,120.00
1955
1,400.00
1956
1,400.00
1957
Tax (T) 
(Tax on worldwide rents; T = R*T) 
280.00
1958
420.00
1959
350.00
1960
1938
 2,700.00 -/- 1,250.00 = 1,450.00. 
1939
 2,700.00 -/- 1,250.00 = 1,450.00. 
1940
 0.25 * 1,160.00 = 290.00. 
1941
 0.30 * 1,450.00 = 435.00. 
1942
 0.25 * 1,450.00 = 362.50. 
1943      
    ⁄      ⁄  * 290 = 145.00.
 
1944            
     ⁄  * 435 = 217.50.
 
1945            
     ⁄  * 362.50 = 181.25. 
1946
 290 -/- 145 = 145.00. 
1947
 435 -/- 217.50 = 217.50. 
1948
 362.50 -/- 181.25 = 181.25. Notably, $181.25, i.e., the tax payable in country B converts into €145, i.e., the double 
tax relief amount by country A:            ⁄  = 145.00. 
1949
 1,000 * 1,04 = 1,040.00. 
1950
 1,250 * 1,04 = 1,300.00.
 
1951
 1,250 * 1,04 = 1,300.00.
 
1952
 1,080 +          ⁄  = 2,160.00. 
1953
 1,350 + 1,080 * 1.25 = 2,700.00. 
1954
 1,350 + 1,080 * 1.25 = 2,700.00. 
1955
 2,160 -/- 1,040 = 1,120.00. 
1956
 2,700 -/- 1,300 = 1,400.00 
1957
 2,700 -/- 1,300 = 1,400.00 
1958
 0.25 * 1,120 = 280.00. 
1959
 0.30 * 1,400 = 420.00. 
1960
 0.25 * 1,400 = 350.00. 
422
Double tax relief Country A (DTR
A
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
140.00
1961
n/a n/a 
Double tax relief Country B (DTR
B
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
n/a 210.00
1962
175.00
1963
Tax Payable 
(TP = T -/- double tax relief) 
€140.00
1964
$210.00
1965
$175.00 
(€140.00)
1966
The calculations in this table tell us that in the Base Case environment (no mutations) the 
system (ACE-basis) produces a 50-50 allocation of Johnson’s worldwide rents at destination. 
The introduction of the ACE does not affect the allocation key. Again, the system also 
implicitly allocates Johnson’s costs on a 50-50 basis, i.e., as the cost allocation effectively 
follows the sales allocation. The same holds for the allocation of the ACE. The system 
allocates profit at destination. 
Johnson’s sales in Country A, worth €1,080.00 correspond with 50% of Johnson’s worldwide 
sales worth €2,160.00, i.e., from the perspective of Country A .The tax payable in Country A 
equals €140.00. This produces an effective average tax rate of 25% on 50% of Johnson’s 
rents attributed to Country A territories by reference to Johnson’s rents that are destined for 
Country A. The revenue decreases with €5.00 relative to the revenue in scenario 1).
1967
 This
effect has been caused by the introduction of the ACE into the system. The relative increase 
of the inputs for tax purposes of €40.00 brought about by the ACE produces the €5.00 
revenue decrease.
1968
Johnson’s sales in Country B worth $1,350.00 correspond with 50% of Johnson’s worldwide 
sales worth $2,700.00, i.e., from the perspective of Country B. The tax payable in Country B 
respectively equals $210.00 (30% tax rate) and $175.00 (25% tax rate). This produces an 
effective average tax rate of respectively 30% and 25% on 50% of Johnson’s rents attributed 
to Country B territories by reference to Johnson’s profits that are destined for Country B. The 
revenue decreases respectively by $7.50 and $6.25 relative to the revenue in scenario 1).
1969
This effect has been caused by the introduction of the ACE into the system. The relative 
increase of the inputs for tax purposes of $50.00 brought about by the ACE produces the 
respective $7.50 and $6.25 revenue decreases.
1970
Fig. 87. Scenario 3) Test Case: no ACE; mutations in interest rate and currency exchange rate. 
No ACE 
Mutations – assumption b) 
Country A (€) 
(Tax rate: 25%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate: 30%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate 25%) 
Worldwide Inputs (I) 1,000.00 1,300.00
1971
1,300.00
1972
Worldwide Outputs (O) 2,118.46
1973
2,754.00
1974
2,754.00
1975
Worldwide Profits (P) 1,118.46
1976
1,454.00
1977
1,454.00
1978
1961      
    ⁄      ⁄  * 280 = 140.00.
 
1962            
     ⁄  * 420 = 210.00.
 
1963            
     ⁄  * 350 = 175.00.
 
1964
 280 -/- 140 = 140.00. 
1965
 420 -/- 210 = 210.00. 
1966
 350 -/- 175 = 175.00. Notably, $175.00, i.e., the tax payable in country B converts into €140, i.e., the double tax 
relief amount by country A:            ⁄  = 140.00. 
1967
 145 -/- 140 = 5.00 
1968
 (1,040 -/- 1,000) * 0.50 * 0.25 = 5.00 
1969
 Country B (30% tax rate); 217.50 -/- 210.00 = 7.50. Country B (25% tax rate ); 181.25 -/- 175.00 = 6.25. 
1970
 Country B (30% tax rate); (1,300 -/- 1,250) * 0.50 * 0.30 = 7.50. Country B (25% tax rate); (1,300 -/- 1,250) * 0.50 
* 0.30 = 6.25. 
1971
 1,000 * 1,30 = 1,300.00, i.e., inputs amount of €1,000 multiplied with €/$ forward rate of 1/1.30 on January 1, 
FY01. 
1972
 1,000 * 1,30 = 1,300.00, i.e., inputs amount of €1,000 multiplied with €/$ forward rate of 1/1.30 on January 1, 
FY01. 
1973
 1,080 +          ⁄  = 2,118.46. 
1974
 1,350 + 1,080 * 1.30 = 2,754.00. 
1975
 1,350 + 1,080 * 1.30 = 2,754.00. 
1976
 2,118.46 -/- 1,000 = 1,118.46. 
1977
 2,754 -/- 1,300 = 1,454.00. 
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(P = O -/- I) 
Tax (T) 
(Tax on worldwide profits; T = P*T) 
279.62
1979
436.20
1980
363.50
1981
Double tax relief Country A (DTR
A
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
137.07
1982
n/a n/a 
Double tax relief Country B (DTR
B
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
n/a 222.38
1983
185.31
1984
Tax Payable 
(TP = T -/- double tax relief) 
€142.55
1985
$213.82
1986
$178.19 
(€137.07)
1987
The calculations in this table reveal that in the Test Case environment (mutations) the system 
(corporate income tax-basis) produces an allocation key which favors the taxing jurisdiction 
where the currency rate strengthens (here, Country A). In the current example, the system 
produces a B-A tax base allocation of 49.50-50.50, favoring Country A over Country B. This 
effect has also been recognized in the literature, and is considered problematic. “The fact that 
the income attributed to those operations would rise when the exchange rate strengthens 
runs counter to the normal presumption that a stronger exchange rate makes it more difficult 
to export (and to compete with imports), creating downward pressure on profits.”
1988
 The cost
allocation still implicitly and effectively follows the sales allocation. 
Johnson’s sales in Country A worth €1,080.00 correspond with 50.50% of Johnson’s 
worldwide sales worth €2,118.46, i.e., from the perspective of Country A .The tax payable in 
Country A equals €142.55. The revenue decreases with €2.45 relative to the revenue in 
scenario 1).
1989
 This effect has been caused by the value decrease of the $ relative to the €.
The $ sales have become less profitable to the firm. This effect is not compensated by the 
shift in the profit allocation in favor of Country A. 
Johnson’s sales in Country B worth $1,350.00 correspond with 49.50% of Johnson’s 
worldwide sales worth $2,727.00, i.e., from the perspective of Country B. The tax payable in 
Country B respectively equals $213.82 (30% tax rate) and $178.19 (25% tax rate). The 
revenue decreases respectively by $3.68 and $3.06 relative to the revenue in scenario 1.
1990
This effect has been caused by the value decrease of the $ relative to the €. The € inputs 
have increased rendering the operations less profitable to the firm. This effect is not 
compensated by the shift in the implicit costs allocation in favor of Country B. 
Notably, in the tax rate parity scenario where both Country A and Country B apply a 25% tax 
rate, the calculations show that “fluctuations in exchange rates would affect only the division 
of the tax base.”
1991
 Viz., the calculations show that the tax payable in Country B of $178.19
1978
 2,754 -/- 1,300 = 1,454.00. 
1979
 0.25 * 1,118.46 = 279.62. 
1980
 0.30 * 1,454.00 = 436.20. 
1981
 0.25 * 1,454.00 = 363.50. 
1982      
    ⁄         ⁄  * 279.62 = 137.07. 
1983            
     ⁄  * 436.20 = 222.38. 
1984            
     ⁄  * 363.50 = 185.31. 
1985
 279.62-/- 137.07 = 142.55. 
1986
 436.20 -/- 222.38 = 213.82. 
1987
 363.50 -/- 185.31= 178.19. Notably, $178.19, i.e., the tax payable in country B converts into €137.07, i.e., the 
double tax relief granted by country A:           ⁄  = 137.07. Notably, 
       
    ⁄  = 142.55. 
1988
 See Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of 
Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 243, at 261-262, and J.T. van Egdom RA, Verrekenprijzen; de verdeling van de winst van een 
multinational (2011), at 22 (footnote 45). 
1989
 145.00 -/- 142.55 = 2.45. Notably, revenue would have increased if the $ would have increased in value – as that 
would have produced more valuable $ outputs. 
1990
 Country B (30% tax rate); 217.50 -/- 213.82= 3.68. Country B (25% tax rate); 181.25 -/- 178.19 = 3.06. Notably, 
revenue would have increased if the $ would have increased in value (as that would have produced cheaper 
€ inputs). 
1991
 See Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of 
Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 243, at 261-262. 
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converts into €137.07, i.e., the double tax relief amount granted by Country A (the opposite 
also holds true). The table also shows that to the extent that “tax rates differ, aggregate tax 
liability would also be affected.”
1992
The tax effects in this scenario as caused by the movement in the currency exchange rate 
provides a tax-induced incentive at the micro-level. It incentivizes the firm to speculate at the 
inputs side and increase its production in Country B and reduces its production in Country A. 
The system also provides an incentive for firms to speculate at the output-side and to 
increase its selling in Country A and reduce its selling in Country B. Alternatively, the system 
forces multinationals to engage in tax-induced hedging transactions to insure themselves 
against the risks of upward and downward movements in the tax burdens they face. At the 
macro-level, it provides a tax-induced monetary policy incentive for countries to reduce their 
currency rate to attract business and promote exports. The scenario 3) system accordingly is 
not neutral as regards the geographic location of firm inputs. 
Fig. 88. Scenario 4) Test Case: ACE; mutations in interest rate and currency exchange rate. 
ACE 
Mutations – assumption b) 
Country A (€) 
(Tax rate: 25%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate: 30%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate 25%) 
Worldwide Inputs (I) 1,020
1993
1,326.00
1994
1,326.00
1995
Worldwide Outputs (O) 2,118.46
1996
2,754.00
1997
2,754.00
1998
Worldwide Rents (R) 
(R = O -/- I) 
1,098.46
1999
1,428.00
2000
1,428.00
2001
Tax (T) 
(Tax on worldwide rents; T = R*T) 
274.62
2002
428.40
2003
357.00
2004
Double tax relief Country A (DTR
A
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
134.62
2005
n/a n/a 
Double tax relief Country B (DTR
B
)
(      (
      
        
)    ) 
n/a 218.40
2006
182.00
2007
Tax Payable 
(TP = T -/- double tax relief) 
€140.00
2008
$210.00
2009
$175.00 
(€134.62)
2010
The calculations in this table, i.e., the effects under the advocated system, show that in the 
Test Case environment (mutations), the system (ACE basis) produces an allocation key 
which, indeed, favors the taxing jurisdiction where the currency rate strengthens (here, 
Country A). In the current example, the system produces an A-B tax base allocation 
percentage of 50.50-49.50, favoring Country A over Country B. This effect is identical to the 
allocation key in scenario 3). However, contrary to the outcomes in scenario 3) in terms of tax 
payable and revenue allocation, here the outcomes do not differentiate from those in scenario 
2). The amounts of tax payable in scenario 2) ‘Base Case: no mutations; ACE’, and scenario 
4) ‘Test Case: mutations; ACE’ are identical. The issues in scenario 3) accordingly do not
1992
 Ibidem. 
1993
 1,000 * 1,02 = 1,020.00. 
1994
 1,250 * 1,0608 = 1,326.00. 
1995
 1,250 * 1,0608 = 1,326.00. 
1996
 1,080 +          ⁄  = 2,118.46. 
1997
 1,350 + 1,080*1.30 = 2,754.00. 
1998
 1,350 + 1,080*1.30 = 2,754.00. 
1999
 2,118.46 -/- 1,020 = 1,098.46. 
2000
 1,326 -/- 2,754 = 1,428.00. 
2001
 1,326 -/- 2,754 = 1,428.00. 
2002
 0.25 * 1,098.46 = 274.62 
2003
 0.30 * 1,428 = 428.40. 
2004
 0.25 * 1,428 = 357.00. 
2005      
    ⁄         ⁄  * 274.62 = 134.62. 
2006            
     ⁄  * 428.40 = 218.40. 
2007            
     ⁄  * 357.00 = 182.00. 
2008
 274.62 -/- 134.62 = 140.00. 
2009
 428.40 -/- 218.40 = 210.00. 
2010
 357.00 -/- 182.00 = 175.00. Notably, $175.00, i.e., the tax payable in country B converts into €140.00, i.e., the 
double tax relief granted by country A:            ⁄  = 134.62. Notably, 
       
    ⁄  = 140.00. 
425
arise in scenario 4). The cost allocation still implicitly and effectively follows the sales 
allocation. 
Why are the outcomes identical to those in scenario 2)? Johnson’s sales in Country A worth 
€1,080.00 correspond with 50.50% of Johnson’s worldwide sales worth €2,118.46, i.e., from 
the perspective of Country A .The tax payable in Country A equals €140.00. The amount of 
tax is accordingly identical to that in scenario 2). This effect is caused by the advocated 
system’s property that it taxes rents rather than profits. The value decrease of the $ relative to 
the € has been compensated by a converse decrease of the $ interest rate relative to the € 
interest rate. The currency exchange rate mutation and the converse interest rate mutation 
have cancelled each other out, thereby, in this respect, producing a neutral system. The 
neutrality has been upheld due to the combination of worldwide taxation and a fractional 
approach towards providing double tax relief. 
Johnson’s sales in Country B worth $1,350.00 correspond with 49.50% of Johnson’s 
worldwide sales worth $2,727.00, i.e., from the perspective of Country B. The tax payable in 
Country B, respectively, equals $210.00 (30% tax rate) and $175.00 (25% tax rate). The 
revenue accordingly is identical to those in scenario 2). This effect again is caused by the 
advocated system’s property of taxing rents rather than nominal returns to equity. The value 
decrease of the $relative to the € has been compensated by a converse decrease of the $ 
interest rate relative to the € interest rate. The currency exchange rate mutation and the 
converse interest rate mutation have cancelled each other out, thereby, in this respect, 
producing a neutral system. The neutrality, as said, has been upheld due to the combination 
of worldwide taxation and a fractional approach towards the provision of double tax relief. 
An assessment of the advocated system reveals that it would operate neutrally as regards the 
allocation of firm inputs. The system would not tax-distort investment location decisions, even 
in the presence of mutations in currency exchange rates and interest rates. The problematic 
effects of currency exchange rate mutations in formulary apportionment recognized in the 
literature,
2011
 are not a consequence of the profit division mechanism used. It is the
consequence of the use of a conventional return to equity tax base definition rather than an 
economic rents-oriented tax base definition. In addition, interest rate parity is not affected by 
the advocated tax system, as the model taxes worldwide rents and provides double tax relief 
for foreign income by reference to a sales basis fractional approach. The system promotes 
production factor neutrality accordingly. 
6.4.5.4 Simplifying matters: multiplying firm’s worldwide rents with domestic sales 
over worldwide sales ratio 
The advocated system can be further simplified mathematically without losing these essential 
efficiency enhancing properties.
2012
 The simplification may be achieved by calculating the tax
payable by reference to the tax on worldwide rents as multiplied with a domestic sales over 
worldwide sales ratio: 
Tax Payable = Tax Rate * Firm’s Worldwide Rents *                               ⁄   
In a schedule (fig. 89): 
Fig. 89. Scenario 4
A
) Test Case: ACE; mutations in interest rate and currency exchange rate / simplified
ACE 
Mutations – assumption b) 
Country A (€) 
(Tax rate: 25%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate: 30%) 
Country B ($) 
(Tax rate 25%) 
2011
 See Charles E. McLure Jr. et al, ‘Deciding Whether the European Union Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of 
Company Income’, in Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union; Issues and Options for 
Reform (2000) 243, at 261-262. 
2012
 I would like to thank professor A.J.A. (Ton) Stevens for the insight. 
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Worldwide Inputs (I) 1,020
2013
1,326.00
2014
1,326.00
2015
Worldwide Outputs (O) 2,118.46
2016
2,754.00
2017
2,754.00
2018
Worldwide Rents (R) 
(R = O -/- I) 
1,098.46
2019
1,428.00
2020
1,428.00
2021
Tax (T) 
(Tax on worldwide rents; T = R*T) 
274.62
2022
428.40
2023
357.00
2024
Tax Payable Country A 
(TPA = TA * 
      
        
) 
€140.00
2025
n/a n/a 
Tax Payable Country B 
TPB = TB * 
      
        
n/a $210.00
2026
$175.00
2027
The simplification relative to the ‘worldwide taxation minus double tax relief approach’ as 
consistently utilized until this point of the analysis, has become available, since the 
complications addressed in Chapter 3 involving cross-border loss offset (sections 3.4.2 and 
3.5.3.2) and intra-firm transfers (sections 3.4.3 and 3.5.3.3) have been resolved throughout 
the course of this study via other means. Cross-border loss offset issues cease to arise under 
the advocated system in consequence of the advocated worldwide tax-consolidation 
(addressed in Chapter 4). Issues involving intra-firm transfers cease to arise under the 
advocated system as a consequence of the replacement of SA/ALS by a ‘sales only 
apportionment’ for geographic tax base attribution purposes (addressed in the current 
chapter).  
It accordingly suffices to calculate the tax payable by multiplying the tax on the firm’s 
worldwide rents against its domestic sales over worldwide sales ratio. The system notably still 
is a worldwide system using a fractional approach to establish the tax payable in the 
respective taxing states involved. The reason for this is that the system needs to properly 
address the cross-border differentials in currency exchange rates and interest rates. A 
‘territorial’ destination-based corporate tax would fail to serve that purpose. 
In consequence the advocated system adheres to a two-step approach to calculate the tax 
payable whereby (1) the firm’s worldwide rents are viewed and (2) multiplied with a domestic 
sales over worldwide sales ratio. That is, to arrive at an equitable and efficient slicing of the 
global tax pie.  
6.4.6 Rate coordination, revenue sharing? Perhaps not 
Section 6.4.5.1 ends with the remark that economic efficiencies would remain to hold up 
under a destination-based division of profit to a certain extent, if tax rate differentials remain 
present. Ceteris paribus, firms will be incentivized to sell their products in the comparatively 
lower taxing jurisdiction first. Customers will be incentivized to buy products in the 
comparatively lower tax jurisdiction. Similar effects can be seen in European Union value 
2013
 1,000 * 1,02 = 1,020.00. 
2014
 1,250 * 1,0608 = 1,326.00. 
2015
 1,250 * 1,0608 = 1,326.00. 
2016
 1,080 +          ⁄  = 2,118.46. 
2017
 1,350 + 1,080*1.30 = 2,754.00. 
2018
 1,350 + 1,080*1.30 = 2,754.00. 
2019
 2,118.46 -/- 1,020 = 1,098.46. 
2020
 1,326 -/- 2,754 = 1,428.00. 
2021
 1,326 -/- 2,754 = 1,428.00. 
2022
 0.25 * 1,098.46 = 274.62 
2023
 0.30 * 1,428 = 428.40. 
2024
 0.25 * 1,428 = 357.00. 
2025
 274.62 *                 ⁄  = 140.00. 
2026
 428.40 *          ⁄         ⁄  = 210.00. 
2027
 357.00 *          ⁄         ⁄  = 175.00. 
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added taxation, particularly near international (tax) borders. In value added taxation, the 
matter is sometimes referred to as ‘cross-border shopping’.
2028
Only a fully harmonized worldwide tax system applying identical tax rates would overcome 
these effects.
2029
 “[A]s long as each company faces the same effective corporate tax rate on
all its investments, then location decisions will not be distorted.”
2030
 Indeed, profit shifting
incentives would fully disappear under a system where even the tax rate disparity is resolved. 
In the presence of identical effective tax rates across tax borders, it would not make sense to 
seek to shift corporate profit for tax reasons. By inference, location distortions would be 
mitigated if and to the extent that rate bandwidths or minimum rates would be introduced, 
e.g., on a global level, or alternatively, on regional levels (EU, NAFTA).
2031
 Worth noting is
that European Parliament envisages a future possibility of tax rate coordination within the 
European Union under the CCCTB.
2032
Under such circumstances, one may also proceed to share the tax revenue rather than 
geographically assign the taxable base. That would basically bring about the adoption of a 
revenue sharing mechanism.
2033
 Revenue sharing would conceptually side-step the tax base
allocation issue altogether. Namely, the imposition of identical effective tax rates would render 
moot the necessity to geographically attribute tax base. From a micro-perspective, the cross-
border distribution of tax among firms under a tax revenue sharing mechanism would not 
differ from the cross-border distribution of tax under a tax base allocation mechanism if the 
effective tax rates across borders are identical. As the tax burdens imposed in both domestic 
and cross-border scenarios would be identical, inter-taxpayer neutrality issues and inter-
taxpayer equity issues would be absent. In the presence of identical effective average tax 
burdens across borders, the allocation of tax would solely constitute an inter-nation issue. In 
such a scenario, the distributional issue would arise solely at the macro-level to be dealt with 
at the governmental level accordingly. The jurisdictions involved may decide to assign the tax 
revenue, for instance, on the basis of macro-factors such as territorial GDPs, population, et 
cetera.
2034
It should be noted that the allocation of tax base by means of macro-factors would produce 
totally unfair outcomes if the tax rate is not also harmonized. The tax base division in such a 
2028
 See e.g. Lucas W. Davis, ‘The Effects Of Preferential VAT Rates Near International Borders: Evidence From 
Mexico’, 64 National Tax Journal 85, (2011), at 85-104. 
2029
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 700, 707 and 716. The similar argument has 
been used to advocate using uniform formulae in US state taxation, see Bharat Anand et al, ‘The weighting game: 
formula apportionment as an instrument of public policy’, 53 National Tax Journal 183 (2000), at 183-199, as well as 
Austan Goolsbee et al, ‘Coveting thy neighbor’s manufacturing: The dilemma of state income apportionment’, 75 
Journal of Public Economics 125 (2000), at 125-143. See for a comparison Joann M. Weiner, ‘Using the Experience 
in the U.S. States to Evaluate Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International Level’, 13 Tax 
Notes International 2113 (23 December 1996) who refers to the investment location distortions that arise under the 
present non-harmonization of state formulae in the US. 
2030
 See Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct investment: economic principles and tax policy 
considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 706. 
2031
 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘Tax competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-directive a solution?’, 7 
Erasmus Law Review 24 (2014), at 24-38. For an analysis on regional tax coordination in the South East Asian 
region, see Adrianto Dwi Nugroho, ‘Tickets to Ride: The Race for Preferable CIT Regimes Towards ASEAN 
Economic Community’, 40 Intertax 531 (2012, No. 10), at 531-539. 
2032
 European Parliament proposed to introduce the possibility for future rate harmonization; See European 
Parliament legislative resolution of 19 April 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)), Amendment 10; changes 
proposed to recital 5a (new). If the CCCTB would apply mandatorily as well, that would effectively introduce a fully 
centralized
 
‘European Union Company Income Tax’ (‘EUCIT’). 
2033
 On revenue sharing, see Thomas Horst, ‘A Note on The Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income’, 94 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 793 (1980), at 793-798, Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of outbound direct 
investment: economic principles and tax policy considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 698 (2008), at 
706, Malcolm Gammie, ‘Corporate Taxation in Europe – Paths to a Solution’, 4 British Tax Review 233 (2001), at 
233-249, and Jack M. Mintz, ‘The Role of Allocation in a Globalized Corporate Income Tax’, International Monetary 
Fund Working Paper, WP/98/134, 1998, at Section III. Revenue sharing has also been suggested in the area of EU-
VAT, see, e.g., Kenneth Vyncke et al, ‘Towards a Simpler, More Robust and Efficient VAT System by Levying VAT at 
EU Level’, 22 International VAT Monitor 242 (2011, No. 4), at 242-248. 
2034
 On the assigning of tax revenue on the basis of macro factors, Walter Hellerstein et al, ‘Lost in Translation: 
Contextual Considerations in Evaluating the Relevance of US Experience for the European Commission's Company 
Taxation Proposals’, 58 Bulletin for international taxation 86 (2004), at 86-98. 
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scenario would render completely out of sync with the economic activities that the individual 
taxable firms perform within the respective taxing jurisdictions. This has also been 
acknowledged by commentators within the context of the European Union’s CCCTB project: 
“macro-based apportionment presents the fundamental drawback of disconnecting the real 
economic activity performed by a company in a country with its tax liability in that country, 
which conflicts with the very idea of a 'fair' distribution of the tax base. (…) Therefore, a 
sharing mechanism based on macro factors would require a complementary action at EU 
level on tax rates (harmonizing tax rates or fixing a bracket of admissible tax rates). Thus, an 
expert concluded that macro apportionment does not seem a realistic solution for the CCCTB 
project; it would only have sense in a context of more harmonization of corporate taxation at 
the EU level, for example a scenario with an EU corporate income tax, which is far beyond 
the current policy.”
2035
 In the presence of tax rate differentials macro-based allocation,
therefore, should not be considered a route to be followed.
2036
The market neutrality that a multilateral coordination of effective tax rates would give rise to, 
however, comes with a price. A harmonization of tax rates encroaches upon the respective 
nation state’s competence in the area of corporate taxation to individually set its tax policies 
and to decide on the size of government and the revenue requirements to finance public 
expenditure. Accordingly, tax rate coordination would basically erode the state’s power of the 
purse in corporate tax. Rate coordination belittles the essence of fiscal sovereignty of the 
nation state, since, without the power of the purse, a nation state cannot properly function, 
and perhaps could even be considered not to exist at all. 
Tax rate coordination would involve an essential transfer of fiscal autonomy from the nation 
state to some kind of supranational taxing agency. Worth noting is that, despite the European 
Parliament’s suggestion to the opposite, the Commission has expressed that it cannot accept 
rate coordination.
2037
 It considers that the CCCTB proposal is meant to not touch upon tax
rates, for these are a matter inherent in state tax sovereignty, and should be dealt with 
through domestic legislation accordingly.
2038
 It may therefore perhaps not come as a surprise
that even the suggestion of rate harmonization encounters serious political resistance in the 
European Union Member States, due to the substantial transfers of fiscal autonomy to the 
union it would involve. Rate harmonization seems to give rise to insurmountable sovereignty 
issues. 
It seems that tax rate differentiation needs to be accepted as a given.
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 But perhaps that
should not be considered to pose that big of a conceptual issue at all. As the tax base in the 
advocated system would be allocated to the market jurisdiction, a relatively immobile tax 
connection factor, the location distortions may be mitigated significantly – i.e., in comparison 
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to the location distortions present in the current international tax regime. This has already 
been extensively elaborated upon. Further, the maintenance of tax rate disparities would 
allow nation states to autonomously set their tax policies and uphold their fiscal sovereignties 
as a consequence of that. Commentators have argued that the allocation of corporate income 
at destination may ultimately even help governments to pursue the policy objectives their 
voters desire more independently than they are able to do today, as such a tax base 
allocation system would take away the “pressures of tax competition for an increasingly 
mobile capital” present in the current system.
2040
Further, it may be argued that the remaining fiscal competition may very well merely revolve 
around matters referred to as the ‘Tiboutian paradigm’ or ‘administrative net outputs’.
2041
Tibout’s paradigm of tax competition basically suggests that persons choose jurisdictions 
based on their preferred levels of government services and bear the cost of reduced services 
if they choose a lower-tax jurisdiction, assuming the perfect mobility of persons and a positive 
correlation between the level of the corporate tax impost and the level benefits of public 
goods provided – the benefits principle. The concept of states competing through their 
administrative net outputs has been suggested by Vogel.
 2042
 Like Tibout, Vogel also mentions
the benefits principle to connect the correlation between tax revenue and government 
expenditure with the efficiency of the administrative machinery of government. He basically 
suggests that states would compete over their ‘administrative net outputs’ as the relative 
levels of tax revenues and public goods provided would, in the end, be indifferent as to where 
to locate. Both approaches suggest that regardless of the level of government, the costs of 
services rendered are borne either way, as a fee paid to the provider of the good or service or 
as a tax paid to government.
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Under these approaches, the decision (where) to (re)locate would not relate to the tax burden 
imposed but to the favored and most efficiently organized level of government one would 
want to be subject to. It is uncertain whether the Tiboutian paradigm of tax competition or the 
idea of competing over administrative net outputs holds up (best). The correlation between 
taxes paid and government services rendered cannot be measured. The same goes for the 
fair value of government. We simply do not know. 
Assessing the matter of tax rate coordination – appreciating the fiscal sovereignty of the 
nation state, the Tiboutian paradigm and Vogel’s thoughts on administrative net outputs – I 
intuitively favor the upholding of tax rate disparities, perhaps within an internationally agreed 
broad bandwidth, or under the setting of some international minimum tax rate standard. I 
intuitively feel that fiscal sovereignty should remain within the realms of the nation state and 
the nation state’s politics. The thought of a ‘global taxing agency’, or even a ‘world 
government’ perhaps, even if organized democratically in a constitutionally sound fashion, is 
a bit too far-fetched for me – too much science-fiction – at least in the world’s current state. 
6.5 Final remarks 
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This chapter is devoted to seeking an answer to the question of how to geographically divide 
the corporate tax base among taxing jurisdictions. Where should we tax? How should the 
global firm’s taxable base be allocated geographically?  
The analysis has been inspired by the theory of the firm and the notion that the firm’s 
business proceeds should be taxed once and as close as possible to its source. It has been 
argued that income lacks geographic attributes. Income production as the result of the 
interplay of firm inputs and firm outputs are as global as the multinational itself. The chapter 
has proceeded to assess the spectrum of possible perspectives ranging from the firms’ input 
locations at origin to the firms’ output locations at destination.  
The argument made is that one should agree on the allocation key and to aim at taking away 
arbitrage opportunities. That would lead to an attribution of tax base by reference to elements 
that seem rational to use but lie outside the firm’s control. In such a case, the tax allocation 
would operate invariantly to the location of resources. It has been argued that it would be 
sensible to attribute tax base by adhering to the demand side of income production. That 
would produce a destination-based tax base attribution approach where the tax base would 
be assigned to the market jurisdiction. 
It has further been argued that such a destination-based tax base attribution approach would 
enhance fairness. It would promote a globally efficient and non-discriminatory allocation of 
firm inputs. The system – Tax Payable = Tax Rate * Firm’s Worldwide Rents * (Domestic 
Sales / Worldwide Sales) – would cease to tax-distort investment location decisions, even in 
the presence of mutations in currency exchange rates and interest rates. That is, since the 
advocated system combines worldwide taxation with a fractional approach for the purpose of 
distributing the global tax pie to sovereign countries. This property, to the best of my 
knowledge, is an original contribution to the literature. The allocation of firm rents to the 
market jurisdiction would significantly mitigate the incentives to shift taxable profit by shifting 
corporate investment across tax borders, which exists under the current origin-oriented 
international tax regime. 
As discussed, the ideal would be to adopt a destination-based tax base attribution approach 
on a worldwide coordinated basis. But also, if it would be impossible to attain international 
consensus, still a strong incentive would exist for individual nation states to move towards 
assigning the tax base to the market jurisdiction. Such a move could very likely boost 
domestic competitiveness, driving economic growth as a consequence. If one country were to 
decide to move to implementing a destination-based corporate tax system, chances are that 
others would follow suit. The adoption of a destination-based rents attribution by a single 
country may initiate a knock-on effect, producing a worldwide adoption by nation states of 
destination-based corporation tax systems in the equilibrium. 
A transformation from the current origin-based system to a destination-based fractional 
system would perhaps entail a redistribution of tax revenues across countries. The 
distributional effects however seem impossible to predict. Matters would depend on various 
future behavioral effects that seem impossible to assess today. The answer to the question of 
which countries would gain and which would lose seems to lie in their domestic corporate 
sales to corporate income ratios. 
With the approach advocated towards profit division, the final inadequacy in the international 
tax regime seems resolved. In addition to the first (Chapter 4) and second (Chapter 5) pieces 
of the international tax jigsaw puzzle, the final third piece seems to have also fallen into place. 
This paves the way for forwarding an overview of the building blocks of the advocated system 
in the upcoming concluding Chapter 7. That is, the ‘corporate tax 2.0’. 
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Part V – Sharing the pie; the building blocks of a ‘corporate tax 2.0’ 
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– Chapter 7 –
Conclusions; the building blocks of a fair international tax regime 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions; the building blocks of a fair international tax regime 
7.1 The issue 
The international corporate tax regime that is currently in place to tax firms on their business 
proceeds operates arbitrarily. The aggregates of the nation states international corporate tax 
systems seem to distort a globally efficient allocation of resources. 
The current model of corporate taxation finds its origins in the 1920s. The model referred to 
as the 1920s Compromise in this study well-suits the economic realities of the early days of 
international trade and commerce, the times when international business primarily revolved 
around bulk trade and bricks-and-mortar industries. But those days have long since passed. 
Globalization, European integration, the rise of multinational enterprises, e-commerce and 
intangible assets have changed the world considerably. 
These developments have caused the model to operate inconsistently with economic reality 
today. Corporate taxation and economic reality do not align anymore; the model ill-suits 
current market realities. This initiates tax-induced distortions in multinational business 
decisions. The arbitrage may work to the benefit or detriment of nationally and internationally 
active firms. It also seems to pressurize nation state corporate tax revenue levels. This may 
lead to spill-over effects and welfare losses at the end of the day. Matters seem to worsen in 
today’s increasingly globalizing economy. This is considered unfair, i.e., inequitable and 
inefficient. 
The distortions in the current international tax regime may be categorized into ‘obstacles’, 
‘disparities’ and ‘inadequacies’: 
 Obstacles; unilaterally imposed distortive tax treatment of cross-border economic
activities relative to non-cross-border economic activities;
 Disparities; distortive tax treatment of cross-border economic activities relative to non-
cross-border economic activities caused by mutual divergences between the
international tax systems of states;
 Inadequacies; distortive allocation of tax due to the inadequate old-fashioned building
blocks making up the international tax regime.
7.2 The central research question and the key sub questions 
7.2.1 Central research question: how should the business proceeds of 
multinationals be taxed? 
The question arises as to whether a proper alternative for taxing multinationals can be 
modeled. 
How should the business proceeds of multinationals be taxed? 
How should we tax multinationals in a global market? How should we share the tax pie? Is it 
possible to think of something better than the current model? What would such an alternative 
model look like? How would such a corporation tax 2.0 operate? 
This study seeks to set forth a corporate taxation framework alternative to the one currently 
found in international taxation. It therefore departs from the starting point of not necessarily 
accepting the authority of currently applicable tax law. Current tax law serves illustrative 
rather than argumentative purposes. 
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7.2.2 Key sub-questions: in three steps towards fairness in corporate taxation 
The study has identified three analytical steps to be taken to model an alternative framework 
for taxing multinational business proceeds in a global market. These steps would appear in 
the answers to the following three sub questions. 
1. How should the notion of fairness in corporate taxation be understood?
2. How should the obstacles be resolved?
3. How should the disparities and inadequacies be resolved?
The answer to the first sub-question would provide the normative framework to assess both 
the properties of the current international tax regime and those of the suggested alternative 
approach. The answers to the second and third questions would provide the building blocks of 
the alternative system resolving the identified key problematic issues in the current 
international tax regime. These are the pieces of the international tax jigsaw puzzle. 
7.3 Sharing the pie: building blocks of a fair international tax regime 
7.3.1 Some thoughts on fairness in corporate taxation; a normative framework built 
on the equality principle 
The first constituent part of the analysis (Part II, Chapter 2) addresses the first sub-question: 
How to understand the notion of fairness in international corporate taxation? As the authority 
of currently applicable law is not followed as a normative point of departure, the first step 
taken is to seek to develop a normative framework. What constitutes the benchmark to 
assess the (un)fairness of the international tax regime? What are the principles underlying a 
sound tax system? 
For this purpose, a concept of fairness in corporate taxation is developed. It is argued that this 
concept is founded on the equality principle, conforming to the notion of equal treatment 
before the law. Economically equal circumstances should be tax-treated equally for tax 
purposes. Unequal economic circumstances should be tax-treated unequally to the extent of 
the circumstances being unequal. Cancelling out tax instrumentalism, it is argued that the 
equality principle and neutrality principle are interchangeable in corporate taxation. Neutral 
tax treatment equals equal tax treatment. And vice versa. 
The argument has been made that the normative requirement of tax parity in equal economic 
circumstances should be kept analytically separate from the application of the respective tax 
laws in a particular case, as the tax effects in the respective case at hand are tested against 
the benchmark of the notion of tax parity in equal circumstances. Taxation is excluded as it is 
the subject of the analysis, much like the solution of a numerical calculation does not affect 
the underlying mathematical rules directing that solution. 
From the equality postulate, it has been deduced that everyone in an economic relationship 
with a taxing state has the obligation to contribute to the financing of public goods from which 
one benefits in accordance with one’s means – ‘equity’. And the distribution of production 
factors should take place on the basis of market mechanisms without, or at least with as little 
as possible, public interference – ‘economic efficiency’. Taxation should not affect business 
decisions, neither in a positive nor in a negative manner – tax neutrality, including the concept 
of neutrality of the legal form. From there on, a framework is built in which the 1920s 
Compromise is placed as well as the model that has been developed in this study.  
It has further been set forth that: 
 in a global market environment, it should be irrelevant for corporate tax purposes
where the economic operator has its tax place of residence. It should also be
irrelevant whether or not the economic operator involved performs its business
activities in a cross-border context;
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 the taxable entity for corporate tax purposes should correspond with the economic
operator deriving the business income. If it concerns the taxation of a multinational
firm, it would accordingly be the firm that is to be treated as the taxable entity for
corporate tax purposes;
 the tax base should be designed by reference to a foundation income concept that
focuses on true business income. It should resort to taxing business cash flows or
economic rents, as these constitute the remuneration for the production factor of
enterprise;
 the tax should be levied once at the location that corresponds with the income’s
geographical source as closely as possible.
Moreover, the argument has been made that fairness in corporate taxation may ultimately 
only be achieved through a worldwide approximation of country tax systems. Various scholars 
have suggested possible approaches to achieve this means. The suggestions range from 
global profit splits to destination-based cash flow taxes. The European Commission 
envisages a European Union-wide cross-border consolidated corporate tax base to be shared 
among the Member States by reference to a formulary mechanism; the CCCTB. 
Indeed, it perhaps cannot be expected that any of these suggestions will leave the drawing 
board any time soon. Nation states seem politically unwilling at the end of the day to truly give 
up their sovereign entitlements in the field of direct taxation; and this is a necessary 
prerequisite to attain some form of tax approximation. Perhaps, the tax sovereignty of states 
needs to be respected as a given. That is, at least to some extent, for instance, regarding the 
establishment of the tax rate. 
This does not mean that political realities provide a sufficient argument to stop thinking of an 
optimal international tax regime. As long as the suggestions forwarded remain to exist on the 
drawing board only, fairness in corporate taxation will not be achieved in reality. The status 
quo upholds as long as nation states remain unwilling to resolve the problems that they have 
created. The problems in the international tax regime will not be resolved by adhering to 
political realities. “Political opposition should be recognized for what it is.”
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7.3.2 Towards a fair international tax regime – eliminating obstacles: ‘Worldwide 
taxation in the event of a domestic nexus; double tax relief in the form of a 
credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign income regarding a foreign 
nexus 
The second part of the analysis (Part III, Chapter 3) addresses the second sub-question: How 
will the obstacles in the current international tax systems of states be resolved? The analysis 
builds on the prerequisite of the fiscal sovereignty in corporate taxation to lie at nation state 
level – i.e., as is the case in reality today. 
The argument is made that a nation state’s international tax system should be internally fair – 
a notion of ‘tax fairness within the international tax system of a state’. Equal circumstances 
should be treated equally under the operation of the international tax system of the nation 
state involved. This produces a notion that has been referred to as ‘internal equity’ and 
‘internal production factor neutrality’. This concept promotes neutrality in taxation regarding 
both inbound and outbound movements of the production factors of capital, labor and 
enterprise. To the best of my knowledge, this element in the analysis is original. 
The analysis demonstrates that the international adherence to the widely-known tax policy 
notions of capital and labor import neutrality and capital and labor export neutrality actually do 
not induce neutral tax treatment. Import neutrality promoting tax systems distort production 
factor exports. Export neutrality promoting tax systems distort production factor imports. It 
follows that the same holds true for the double tax relief systems common in international 
taxation, i.e., the base exemption method and the credit method.  
2044
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for 
Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax Journal 3 (2010), at 15. 
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The point made is that ‘internal equity’ and ‘internal production factor neutrality’ call for the 
imposition of worldwide taxation on the business proceeds of firms that have nexus in a taxing 
state. This approach renders it irrelevant where the taxpayer involved has its place of 
residence or its place of incorporation. It operates fully in a non-discriminatory fashion 
accordingly. 
To acknowledge the single tax principle, the unlimited tax liability should be combined with an 
equitable and neutral double tax relief mechanism. For that purpose, reference is made to a 
double tax relief mechanism referred to as the ‘credit for domestic tax attributable to foreign 
income’. This produces a system where all countries involved tax their fraction of the 
worldwide income to which they are entitled – ‘taxing the fraction’. This approach renders it 
irrelevant in terms of tax burdens imposed whether the taxpayer involved operates its 
business activities in a cross-border or purely domestic environment, also regarding the 
investment direction. It accordingly operates in a non-distortive fashion. 
The equitable and non-distortive operation of the advocated fractional approach has been 
illustrated by means of numerical examples, respectively dealing with tax rate progressivity, 
cross-border losses, intra-firm modes of transfers and currency exchange rate mutations. To 
illustrate matters, the assessment undertaken engages in a thought experiment, applying 
identical tax systems at both sides of the tax border – i.e., to analytically cancel out the effects 
of the disparities in the international tax regime. The approach taken at this point analytically 
corresponds with the application of the ‘internal consistency test’ under US constitutional law. 
It has further been argued that a consistent interpretation of the fundamental freedoms in 
European Union law in the field of direct taxation would necessarily need to arrive at the same 
system. That is as the advocated system is comprehensively non-discriminatory and non-
restrictive from a European Union law perspective. Unfortunately, in its case law regarding the 
freedoms, the Court of Justice of the European Union adopts analytically inconsistent 
reasoning when interpreting the fundamental freedoms. The court arrives at analytically 
inconsistent approaches, thereby creating inequities, inefficiencies and legal uncertainty in the 
process. 
The approach advocated in Part III of the analysis is unable to resolve the distortions that may 
arise as a result of the disparities and inadequacies in the international tax regime. These, 
however, do not render the analysis invalid. The approach advocated in Part III merely 
constitutes a first building block towards a fair international tax regime. 
7.3.3 Towards a fair international tax regime; eliminating disparities adequately 
7.3.3.1 Who to tax, what to tax and where to tax? 
The third part of the analysis (Part IV, Chapters 4, 5 and 6) addresses the third sub-question. 
How will the disparities in the international tax regime be adequately resolved? This part 
builds on the observation that the disparities and inadequacies in the international tax regime 
can be taken away by means of tax coordination, i.e., approximating the tax unit definition, the 
tax base definition and the tax base allocation methodology. That is, to arrive at an 
adequately coordinated international tax regime. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively address the following three questions: 
1. Who should be taxed?
2. What should be taxed?
3. Where should be taxed?
7.3.3.2 Who to tax? The group as a taxable entity 
The fourth chapter seeks to answer the question of whom to tax in an alternative international 
corporate tax regime. What constitutes the appropriate taxable entity in a corporate tax 2.0? 
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The argument is made that an answer lies in cross-border tax consolidation; treat the 
multinational firm as a single taxable entity for corporate tax purposes. The treatment of the 
group as a single taxable entity for corporate tax purposes is favored over the separate entity 
approach that is currently in place, basically because it is principally founded on economic 
reality, i.e., the theory of the firm. 
To define the group for corporate tax purposes, the argument is made that two criteria should 
be adopted. Tax consolidation should apply regarding: 
a) corporate interests that provide the ultimate parent company with a decisive influence
over the underlying business affairs of its subsidiaries, provided that;
b) the parent company holds its corporate interest as a capital asset.
Moreover, tax consolidation should be allowed in both domestic and cross-border scenarios. 
The ultimate parent could be assigned as the (principal) taxpayer for corporation tax 
assessment purposes. 
Following the observations in Part III, the taxable entity accordingly defined – i.e., the group – 
should be subject to an unlimited corporate tax liability in each taxing jurisdiction in which it 
exceeds a minimum threshold of economic activity (‘nexus’). In cross-border scenarios, 
double tax relief should subsequently be available by means of the credit for domestic tax that 
is attributable to foreign income. 
The adoption of such an approach would remove all distortions that are currently caused by 
the commonly adopted approach to deal with each group company as a single taxable entity, 
resident or non-resident taxpayer for corporate tax purposes. Parity in corporate taxation 
would be achieved regarding both domestic and cross-border investment scenarios. It would 
cancel out all unilaterally imposed distortions in the corporate taxation of multinationals. 
Corporate tax burden and tax revenue levels would not be influenced by the multinationals’ 
legal structuring or the question of whether business is conducted in a domestic or cross-
border context. The system would accordingly be comprehensively ‘obstacle-free’. 
Moreover, the system would operate indifferently with regards to the legal organization of the 
firm. As intra-group legal realities would be disregarded, the system would not be vulnerable 
to paper profit shifting through intra-firm legal structuring. The system would accordingly 
neutralize the arbitrage in the current international tax regime involving intra-firm: 
 financing arrangements;
 hybrid income and hybrid entity mismatches;
 branch (i.e., permanent establishment) versus subsidiary differentials;
 jurisdictional mismatches regarding the financing of business operations through
controlled non-tax consolidated foreign subsidiary companies.
The advocated system would render superfluous the need for the ad hoc correction 
mechanisms that are common in today’s corporation tax systems. To the extent that it 
concerns intra-group legal realities, there would be no need for correction measures, such as 
economic double tax relief mechanisms, (interest) deduction limitations, intra-firm profit 
pooling regimes, asset transfer regimes and intra-firm mergers and acquisitions regimes. Thin 
capitalization issues would be rendered moot. 
The approach as advocated requires the acceptance that the problems caused by taking the 
separate entity assumption as a starting point in corporate taxation cannot be resolved within 
the tax framework that created them. The bottleneck for a proper functioning of such an 
approach would lie in the required political willingness of states to tax-coordinate and assist 
each other administratively. 
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7.3.3.3 What to tax? Economic rents as taxable base 
The fifth chapter seeks to answer the question as to what to tax in an alternative international 
corporate tax regime. What constitutes the appropriate taxable base in a corporate tax 2.0? 
The argument is made that an answer lies in rents taxation. That is, to appropriately resolve 
the financing discrimination issues that arise under a typical nominal return to equity-based 
tax system, i.e., the bias towards debt financing relative to equity financing under a common 
corporate income tax, tax should be imposed by reference to the firm’s economic rents 
instead of the profits derived. Further, the tax coordination at this point would adequately 
address the hybrid income mismatches in the current international tax regime. 
Rents taxation is favored over the current nominal return to equity standard, basically 
because it is principally founded on economic reality. Economic rents constitute the 
remuneration in return for the provision of the production factor of enterprise. Various 
commentators have resorted to advocating the approach of taxing rents instead of profits. 
The approach taken is to arrive at a taxing system where, basically, only the above normal 
returns are taken into account for corporate tax base calculation purposes. This may be 
achieved technically by making use of a tax base foundation concept containing an allowance 
for corporate equity (‘ACE’). An ACE-based foundation concept to tax business income 
produces c.q. promotes: 
 equal to statutory average effective tax rates, as it effectively taxes business cash
flows;
 nil effective marginal tax rates, accordingly leaving marginal financing decisions
unaffected;
 tax neutrality in the presence of timing differentials between depreciation for tax
bookkeeping purposes and economic depreciation. This is because the present
values of depreciation and ACE allowances are independent of the rate against which
assets are written-off in tax bookkeeping.
The effects of the system are demonstrated by means of numerical and formulaic examples. 
Notably, the ACE is favored over the comprehensive business income tax (‘CBIT’) and the 
cash flow taxes in their varieties. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the tax cascading effects regarding equity investments in 
minority shareholdings may be resolved by means of a relief mechanism referred to as the 
‘indirect tax exemption’. This economic double tax relief mechanism would operate similarly to 
an indirect tax credit. That is, however, with the exception that the credit available regarding 
the grossed-up equity proceeds is calculated at an amount equal to the domestic tax that can 
be attributed to the excess earnings of the respective entity in which the equity investment is 
held. To efficiently arrive at a single taxation of the business cash flows involved, the 
economic double tax relief mechanism would be combined with a ‘loss recapture mechanism’ 
and a ‘profit carry forward mechanism’. The neutral operation of such a double tax relief 
system is demonstrated by means of numerical and formulaic examples. To the best of my 
knowledge, the relief mechanism developed at this point in the analysis is original. 
7.3.3.4 Where to tax? Destination-based sales-only apportionment 
Locate the tax base… 
Chapter 6 seeks to answer the question of where to tax in an alternative international 
corporate tax regime. What constitutes the appropriate tax base division key in a corporate 
tax 2.0? 
… by reference to a destination based attribution key…
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The argument is made that an answer lies in a destination-based tax base attribution 
approach. The tax base should be assigned geographically to the location of the firm’s 
customers. Such an approach may appropriately resolve the arbitrage and the investment 
location distortions that arise in international taxation today. That is, under the current origin-
based profit attribution methodology that assigns corporate tax base to the input locations by 
making use of the concepts of separate accounting and the arm’s length standard (SA/ALS). 
The observation has been made that corporate income essentially lacks geographic 
attributes. Income has no geographic location. The income production as the result of the 
interplay of firm inputs at the supply side and firm outputs at the demand side are as global as 
the multinational itself. This may render it somewhat pointless to search for the true source of 
income.  
However, this does not mean that there is nothing to be said on the matter. The analysis has 
therefore proceeded to assess the spectrum of possible approaches ranging from the firms’ 
input locations at origin to the firms’ output locations at destination. 
The argument has been made that the tax base division key should aim at taking away 
arbitrage opportunities. That would lead to an attribution of tax base by reference to elements 
that seem rational to use but lie outside the firm’s control. The tax allocation would operate 
invariantly to the location of resources in such a case. It would be sensible to attribute tax 
base by adhering to the demand side of income production. That is, as firm outputs 
significantly lie outside the control of the firm involved – notably, the opposite holds true 
regarding the firm inputs at the supply side. That would produce a destination-based tax base 
attribution approach where the tax base is assigned to the market jurisdiction. 
It has further been argued that a destination-based tax base attribution key would enhance 
fairness. It would promote a global efficient and non-discriminatory allocation of firm inputs. 
The approach taken – Tax Payable = Tax Rate * Firm’s Worldwide Rents * (Domestic Sales / 
Worldwide Sales) – would cease to tax-distort investment location decisions, even in the 
presence of mutations in currency exchange rates and interest rates. That is, since the 
advocated system combines worldwide taxation with a fractional approach for the purpose of 
distributing the global tax pie to sovereign countries. This property, to the best of my 
knowledge, is an original contribution to the literature. The allocation of firm rents to the 
market jurisdiction would significantly mitigate the incentives to shift taxable profit by shifting 
corporate investment across tax borders, which exist under the current origin-oriented 
international tax regime. 
… establishing nexus by reference to a quantitative turnover threshold…
As a connecting factor to establishing tax jurisdiction – identifying nexus that is – it has been 
advocated to replace the current permanent establishment, place of incorporation and place 
of effective management tests for a quantitative turnover threshold test at destination. Such a 
tax jurisdiction test would operate similarly to the distance sales rules in European Union 
value added tax and the sales factor presence tests in US state income taxation. Profit 
allocation by reference to separate accounting and arm’s length pricing would then be 
abolished. 
... and allocating the tax base by reference to a sales factor standard. 
The advocated tax base allocation standard would assign the tax base exclusively to the 
customer location. It would operate conceptually equivalent to a destination-based sales 
factor key common in formulary apportionment systems. The place of supply rules in 
European value added taxation would be helpful in optimizing the design of the tax base 
allocation standards. Notably, a destination-based rents tax does not transform the corporate 
tax involved into a value added tax. 
The ideal would be to adopt a destination-based tax base attribution approach on a worldwide 
coordinated basis. The coordination at this point would adequately put an end to the double 
443
(non-)taxation issues that arise from income allocation mismatches under the current 
international tax regime. 
There is an incentive for countries to implement this approach 
But also, if it would be impossible to attain international consensus, still a strong incentive 
would exist for individual nation states to move towards assigning the tax base to the market 
jurisdiction. Such a move would very likely boost domestic competitiveness, driving economic 
growth as a consequence. 
If one country were to decide to move to implementing a destination-based corporate tax 
system, chances are that others would follow suit. The adoption of a destination-based rents 
attribution by a single country may initiate a knock-on effect producing a worldwide adoption 
by nation states of destination-based corporation tax systems in the equilibrium. Experiences 
in US state income taxation provide some verification supporting this thesis by way of 
analogy. 
A transformation from the current origin-based to a destination-based system may entail a 
redistribution of tax revenues across countries. The distributional effects, however, seem 
impossible to predict. Matters would depend on various future behavioral effects that seem 
impossible to assess today. The answer to the question of which countries would gain and 
which would lose seems to lie in their domestic corporate sales to corporate income ratios, 
veteris paribus. Today’s major consumer markets are rarely tax havens. It may be likely that 
the current tax-haven countries would experience revenue reductions, while the current high-
tax countries would experience revenue increases. 
Maintaining fiscal sovereignty at nation state level… 
The sole disparity remaining would be a tax rate disparity, i.e., to the extent that tax rates are 
not coordinated. By maintaining the tax rate decision at the nation state level, the countries 
involved would be able to maintain their sovereign entitlements in deciding on the tax burdens 
imposed and the chosen size of government. The consequence would be that market 
neutrality would not be fully realized. The differentials in effective average tax rates may, to 
some extent, distort the selling location. These effects may particularly arise close to 
international borders – ‘cross-border shopping’. 
… for a relatively small price
The location distortions at the demand side, however, seem less significant relative to the 
distortions at the supply side. Sales at destination are widely considered the least mobile tax 
connecting factor, i.e., relative to tax connecting factors addressing firm inputs like assets and 
payroll. Customer markets are immobile. The same would accordingly hold true for the 
mobility – or the elasticity – of the corporate tax base. Further, under a destination-based tax 
base attribution, key firms would still have an incentive to sell as much product as possible, 
even in jurisdictions putting a relatively higher weight on the sales factor. Such an incentive to 
sell regardless of the presence of a factor taxing it is absent at the supply side of income 
production. 
7.3.5 Sharing the pie; building blocks of a ‘corporate tax 2.0’ 
The building blocks of a corporate tax 2.0 have emerged; the pieces of the international tax 
jigsaw puzzle may seem discovered: 
 Fairness in corporate taxation calls for tax parity in equal economic circumstances;
 Taxing the fraction; corporate taxpayers would be subject to worldwide taxation in
each jurisdiction in which it has nexus – double tax relief would be granted by
reference to the domestic tax that can be attributed to the taxpayer’s nexus abroad;
 The firm involved would constitute the taxable entity;
 The firm’s rents would constitute the taxable base;
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 The firm’s rents would be geographically assigned by reference to the firm’s sales at
destination.
Adopting all building blocks, the ‘Corporate Tax 2.0’ would boil down to the following formula: 
Tax Payable by ‘Firm A’ in Country X  
=  
Tax Rate * ‘Firm A’s’ Worldwide Rents * (Domestic Sales / Worldwide Sales) 
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‘Sharing the Pie’; Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market 
The current international corporate tax regime for taxing the business proceeds of firms operates 
arbitrarily. The aggregates of the nation states’ international corporate tax systems seem to distort a 
global efficient allocation of resources. 
The current model of corporate taxation finds its origins in the 1920s. It well suited the economic 
realities of the early days of international trade and commerce; the times when international business 
primarily revolved around bulk trade and bricks-and-mortar industries. But those days are long gone. 
Globalization, European integration, the rise of multinational enterprises, e-commerce, and intangible 
assets have changed the world considerably. 
These developments have caused the model to operate inconsistently with the economic reality of 
today. Corporate taxation and economic reality are no longer aligned. The model is ill-suited to current 
market realities. As a result multinational business decisions are distorted by tax considerations. The 
arbitrage may work to the benefit or detriment of nationally and internationally active firms. It also 
seems to put pressure on nation state corporate tax revenue levels. This may lead to spill-over effects 
and welfare losses at the end of the day. Matters seem to worsen in today’s increasingly globalizing 
economy. 
The question arises as to whether a proper alternative for taxing multinationals can be modeled. How 
should business proceeds of multinationals be taxed? Can we create something that suits the nature of 
a global marketplace somewhat better? What would such an alternative tax system look like? How 
would it operate? 
This study seeks to set forth an alternative to the corporate taxation framework currently found in 
international taxation. The aim is to develop some building blocks for an optimal approach towards 
taxing the business proceeds of multinationals, i.e., a ‘corporate tax 2.0’. As a starting point the 
authority of currently applicable national, international, and European tax law are not necessarily 
accepted. Accordingly, applicable tax law serves illustrative rather than argumentative purposes in this 
research. 
The study discovers the following components for a ‘Corporate Tax 2.0’: 
Tax Payable by ‘Firm A’ in Country X  
=  
Tax Rate * ‘Firm A’s’ Worldwide Rents * (Domestic Sales / Worldwide Sales) 
Maarten de Wilde (1979) obtained his LL.M degrees at the Utrecht University in 2005 (Dutch Civil Law 
and Tax Law; both cum laude). He works as a university researcher/lecturer at the Erasmus University 
and as a university lecturer at the University of Amsterdam. In combination with his academic work 
Maarten works as a professional support lawyer at Loyens & Loeff N.V., a law firm based in Rotterdam, 
the Netherlands. Maarten can be reached for comments at dewilde@law.eur.nl. 
472
